Information for Persons Who Are Immunocompromised Regarding Prevention and Treatment of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in the Context of Currently Circulating Omicron Sublineages - United States, January 2023.

As of January 20, 2023, >90% of circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants in the United States, specifically Omicron BQ.1, BQ.1.1, XBB, and XBB.1.5 sublineages, are unlikely to be susceptible to the combined monoclonal antibodies, tixagevimab and cilgavimab (Evusheld) used for preexposure prophylaxis against SARS-CoV-2 infection (1). The Food and Drug Administration announced on January 26, 2023, that Evusheld is not currently authorized for preexposure prophylaxis against SARS-CoV-2 infection in the United States (2). It is important that persons who are moderately to severely immunocompromised,* those who might have an inadequate immune response to COVID-19 vaccination, and those with contraindications to receipt of COVID-19 vaccines, exercise caution and recognize the need for additional preventive measures (Box). In addition, persons should have a care plan that includes prompt testing at the onset of COVID-19 symptoms and rapid access to antivirals if SARS-CoV-2 infection is detected.

COVID-19 Response Roles among CDC International Public Health Emergency Management Fellowship Graduates.

Since 2013, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has offered the Public Health Emergency Management Fellowship to health professionals from around the world. The goal of this program is to build an international workforce to establish public health emergency management programs and operations centers in participating countries. In March 2021, all 141 graduates of the fellowship program were invited to complete a web survey designed to examine their job roles and functions, assess their contributions to their country's COVID-19 response, and identify needs for technical assistance to strengthen national preparedness and response systems. Of 141 fellows, 89 successfully completed the survey. Findings showed that fellowship graduates served key roles in COVID-19 response in many countries, used skills they gained from the fellowship, and desired continuing engagement between the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and fellowship alumni to strengthen the community of practice for international public health emergency management.

Conceptual Framework for Understanding Incident Management Systems During Public Health Emergencies.

OBJECTIVE: Effective incident management is essential for coordinating efforts of multiple disciplines and stakeholders when responding to emergencies, including public health disasters such as the ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. METHODS: Existing research frameworks tend to focus on formal structures and doctrine (eg, ICS-NIMS); however, organizational processes that underlie incident management have not been systematically assessed and synthesized into a coherent conceptual framework. RESULTS: The lack of a framework has hindered the development of measures of performance that could be used to further develop the evidence base and facilitate process improvement. To address this gap, we present a conceptual framework of incident management drawn from expert feedback and a review of literature on incident management and related fields. The framework features 23 measurement constructs grouped into 5 domains: (1) situational awareness and information sharing, (2) incident action and implementation planning, (3) resource management and mobilization, (4) coordination and collaboration, and (5) feedback and continuous quality improvement. CONCLUSIONS: As such, the article provides a first step toward the development of robust measures for assessing the performance and effectiveness of incident management systems.

Public Health Emergency Response Leadership Training: A Qualitative Assessment of Existing Educational Opportunities and Perceived Facilitators, Barriers, and Priorities in Professional Development.

OBJECTIVE: We aimed to understand the current training environment for developing public health emergency response leaders and highlight facilitators and barriers in accessing targeted training. DESIGN: We designed 4 focus groups to gather organizational perspectives on public health emergency response leadership development. Discussions were recorded, transcribed, coded, and analyzed to synthesize key themes. SETTING: Focus groups were convened at the 2019 Preparedness Summit (March 27-28) in St Louis, Missouri. PARTICIPANTS: Twenty-three public health professionals from 9 Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement award recipient jurisdictions and 12 local health departments participated. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: We examined the current availability, relevance, specificity, and utility of educational content and delivery modalities. Facilitators and barriers were identified as opportunities to improve training access. RESULTS: Generic emergency management training is considered important and widely available but with limited application in public health practice. Existing leadership training opportunities in public health emergency response are limited and not widely known. While organizational support and accessible training facilitate participation, resource constraints (ie, funding, time, and staff) exist as key barriers. In addition, frequent staff turnover and attrition that result in loss of institutional knowledge likely hinder effective public health emergency responses. CONCLUSION: Effective public health emergency response depends on capable leaders not only well versed in specialized technical disciplines and practices but also familiar with-or preferably fluent in-emergency management principles and functions. This study demonstrated that well-aimed training strategies and organizational planning are essential in developing public health emergency response leaders. Specifically, leadership development may accrue considerable benefit from a standardized training curriculum. In addition, scalable training programs developed through public, private, and academic partnerships may lessen resource demands on individual organizations to facilitate training access. Finally, training practicums (eg, mentoring, shadowing) may provide opportunities to facilitate active learning and preserve institutional knowledge through leadership transitions.

State of public health emergency response leadership training: A multitiered organizational perspective.

OBJECTIVE: To capture organizational level information on the current state of public health emergency response leadership training. DESIGN: A web-based questionnaire. PARTICIPANTS: This multitiered assessment of health departments included two distinct respondent groups: (1) Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement recipients (n = 34) and (2) local health departments (LHDs) (n = 169) representative of different agency sizes and populations served. RESULTS: Overall, PHEP and LHD respondents expressed a clear preference for participatory learning with practical drills/exercises and participatory workshops as the preferred training delivery modes. Compared with technical and role-specific training, leadership training was less available. For both PHEP and LHD respondents, staff availability for training is most notably limited due to lack of time. For PHEP respondents, a common factor limiting agency ability to offer training is lack of mentors/instructors, whereas for LHD respondents, it is limited funding. CONCLUSIONS: Efforts should focus on increasing accessibility and the continued development of rigorous and effective training based on practical experience in all aspects of multitiered public health emergency response leadership.

Public Health Emergency Risk Communication and Social Media Reactions to an Errant Warning of a Ballistic Missile Threat - Hawaii, January 2018.

On January 13, 2018, at 8:07 a.m. Hawaii Standard Time, an errant emergency alert was sent to persons in Hawaii. An employee at the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (EMA) sent the errant alert via the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system and the Emergency Alert System (EAS) during a ballistic missile preparedness drill, advising persons to seek shelter from an incoming ballistic missile. WEA delivers location-based warnings to wireless carrier systems, and EAS sends alerts via television and radio (1). After 38 minutes, at 8:45 a.m., Hawaii EMA retracted the alert via WEA and EAS (2). To understand the impact of the alert, social media responses to the errant message were analyzed. Data were extracted from Twitter* using a Boolean search for tweets (Twitter postings) posted on January 13 regarding the false alert. Tweets were analyzed during two 38-minute periods: 1) early (8:07-8:45 a.m.), the elapsed time the errant alert circulated until the correction was issued and 2) late (8:46-9:24 a.m.), the same amount of elapsed time after issuance of the correction. A total of 5,880 tweets during the early period and 8,650 tweets during the late period met the search criteria. Four themes emerged during the early period: information processing, information sharing, authentication, and emotional reaction. During the late period, information sharing and emotional reaction themes persisted; denunciation, insufficient knowledge to act, and mistrust of authority also emerged as themes. Understanding public interpretation, sharing, and reaction to social media messages related to emergencies can inform development and dissemination of accurate public health messages to save lives during a crisis.

Influenza-Related Communication and Community Mitigation Strategies: Results From the 2015 Pandemic Influenza Readiness Assessment.

Emergence of a novel infectious disease, such as pandemic influenza, is the one global crisis most likely to affect the greatest number of people worldwide. Because of the potentially severe and contagious nature of influenza, a rapid multifaceted pandemic response, which includes nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and effective strategies for communication with the public are essential for a timely response and mitigating the spread of disease. A web-based questionnaire was administered via email in July 2015 to 62 Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) directors across jurisdictions that receive funding through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention PHEP cooperative agreement. This report focuses on two modules: Public Information and Communication and Community Mitigation. Consistent and targeted communication are critical for the acceptability and success of NPIs. All 62 jurisdictions have developed or are in the process of developing a communications plan. Community-level NPIs such as home isolation, school closures, and respiratory etiquette play a critical role in mitigating the spread of disease. Effective, ongoing communication with the public is essential to ensuring wide spread compliance of NPI's, especially among non-English-speaking populations. Planning should also include reaching vulnerable populations and identifying the correct legal authorities for closing schools and canceling mass gatherings.

Assessment of State, Local, and Territorial Zika Planning and Preparedness Activities - United States, June 2016-July 2017.

The emergency response to Zika virus disease required coordinated efforts and heightened collaboration among federal, state, local, and territorial public health jurisdictions. CDC activated its Emergency Operations Center on January 21, 2016, with seven task forces to support the national response. The State Coordination Task Force, which functions as a liaison between jurisdictions and federal operations during a response, coordinated the development of CDC Guidelines for Development of State and Local Risk-based Zika Action Plans, which included a Zika Preparedness Checklist (1). The checklist summarized recommendations covering topics from the seven task forces. In July 2016, CDC's Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response (OPHPR) awarded $25 million in supplemental funding to 53 jurisdictions (41 states, eight territories, and four metropolitan areas) to support Zika preparedness and response activities. In December 2016, CDC awarded an additional $25 million to 21 of the 53 jurisdictions at the greatest risk for seeing Zika in their communities based on the presence of the mosquito responsible for spreading Zika, history of local transmission, or a high volume of travelers from Zika-affected areas. The additional $25 million was part of the $350 million in Zika supplemental funding provided to CDC by Congress in 2016* (2,3). Funded jurisdictions reported progress through the checklist at five quarterly points throughout the response. Data were analyzed to assess planning and response activities. Among the 53 jurisdictions, the percentage that reported having a Zika virus readiness, response, and recovery plan increased from 26% in June 2016 to 64% in July 2017. Overall, Zika planning and response activities increased among jurisdictions from June 2016 to July 2017. The recent Zika virus outbreak underscores the importance of strengthening state, local, and territorial health department capacity for rapid response to emerging threats.

Progress in Public Health Emergency Preparedness-United States, 2001-2016.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program's progress toward meeting public health preparedness capability standards in state, local, and territorial health departments. METHODS: All 62 PHEP awardees completed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's self-administered PHEP Impact Assessment as part of program review measuring public health preparedness capability before September 11, 2001 (9/11), and in 2014. We collected additional self-reported capability self-assessments from 2016. We analyzed trends in congressional funding for public health preparedness from 2001 to 2016. RESULTS: Before 9/11, most PHEP awardees reported limited preparedness capabilities, but considerable progress was reported by 2016. The number of jurisdictions reporting established capability functions within the countermeasures and mitigation domain had the largest increase, almost 200%, by 2014. However, more than 20% of jurisdictions still reported underdeveloped coordination between the health system and public health agencies in 2016. Challenges and barriers to building PHEP capabilities included lack of trained personnel, plans, and sustained resources. CONCLUSIONS: Considerable progress in public health preparedness capability was observed from before 9/11 to 2016. Support, sustainment, and advancement of public health preparedness capability is critical to ensure a strong public health infrastructure.

Improvements in State and Local Planning for Mass Dispensing of Medical Countermeasures: The Technical Assistance Review Program, United States, 2007-2014.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate and describe outcomes of state and local medical countermeasure preparedness planning, which is critical to ensure rapid distribution and dispensing of a broad spectrum of life-saving medical assets during a public health emergency. METHODS: We used 2007 to 2014 state and local data collected from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Technical Assistance Review. We calculated descriptive statistics from 50 states and 72 local Cities Readiness Initiative jurisdictions that participated in the Technical Assistance Review annually. RESULTS: From 2007 to 2014, the average overall Technical Assistance Review score increased by 13% for states and 41% for Cities Readiness Initiative jurisdictions. In 2014, nearly half of states achieved the maximum possible overall score (100), and 94% of local Cities Readiness Initiative jurisdictions achieved a score of 90 or more. CONCLUSIONS: Despite challenges, effective and timely medical countermeasure distribution and dispensing is possible with appropriate planning, staff, and resources. However, vigilance in training, exercising, and improving plans from lessons learned in a sustained, coordinated way is critical to ensure continued public health preparedness success.

2015 Pandemic Influenza Readiness Assessment Among US Public Health Emergency Preparedness Awardees.

OBJECTIVES: To assess how US Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) awardees plan to respond to an influenza pandemic with vaccination. METHODS: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention developed the Pandemic Influenza Readiness Assessment, an online survey sent to PHEP directors, to analyze, in part, the readiness of PHEP awardees to vaccinate 80% of the populations of their jurisdictions with 2 doses of pandemic influenza vaccine, separated by 21 days, within 16 weeks of vaccine availability. RESULTS: Thirty-eight of 60 (63.3%) awardees reported being able to vaccinate their populations within 16 weeks; 38 (63.3%) planned to allocate more than 20% of their pandemic vaccine supply to points of dispensing (PODs). Thirty-four of 58 (58.6%) reported staffing as a challenge to vaccinating 80% of their populations; 28 of 60 (46.7%) reported preparedness workforce decreases, and 22 (36.7%) reported immunization workforce decreases between January 2012 and July 2015. CONCLUSIONS: Awardees relied on PODs to vaccinate segments of their jurisdictions despite workforce decreases. Planners must ensure readiness for POD sites to vaccinate, but should also leverage complementary sites and providers to augment public health response.

Readiness to Vaccinate Critical Personnel During an Influenza Pandemic, United States, 2015.

OBJECTIVES: To assess the readiness to vaccinate critical infrastructure personnel (CIP) involved in managing public works, emergency services, transportation, or any other system or asset that would have an immediate debilitating impact on the community if not maintained. METHODS: We analyzed self-reported planning to vaccinate CIP during an influenza pandemic with data from 2 surveys: (1) the Program Annual Progress Assessment of immunization programs and (2) the Pandemic Influenza Readiness Assessment of public health emergency preparedness programs. Both surveys were conducted in 2015. RESULTS: Twenty-six (43.3%) of 60 responding public health emergency preparedness programs reported having an operational plan to identify and vaccinate CIP, and 16 (26.2%) of 61 responding immunization programs reported knowing the number of CIP in their program's jurisdictions. CONCLUSIONS: Many programs may not be ready to identify and vaccinate CIP during an influenza pandemic. Additional efforts are needed to ensure operational readiness to vaccinate CIP during the next influenza pandemic.

Integrating pharmacies into public health program planning for pandemic influenza vaccine response.

BACKGROUND: During an influenza pandemic, to achieve early and rapid vaccination coverage and maximize the benefit of an immunization campaign, partnerships between public health agencies and vaccine providers are essential. Immunizing pharmacists represent an important group for expanding access to pandemic vaccination. However, little is known about nationwide coordination between public health programs and pharmacies for pandemic vaccine response planning. METHODS: To assess relationships and planning activities between public health programs and pharmacies, we analyzed data from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention assessments of jurisdictions that received immunization and emergency preparedness funding from 2012 to 2015. RESULTS: Forty-seven (88.7%) of 53 jurisdictions reported including pharmacies in pandemic vaccine distribution plans, 24 (45.3%) had processes to recruit pharmacists to vaccinate, and 16 (30.8%) of 52 established formal relationships with pharmacies. Most jurisdictions plan to allocate less than 10% of pandemic vaccine supply to pharmacies. DISCUSSION: While most jurisdictions plan to include pharmacies as pandemic vaccine providers, work is needed to establish formalized agreements between public health departments and pharmacies to improve pandemic preparedness coordination and ensure that vaccinating pharmacists are fully utilized during a pandemic.

SURVEILLANCE OF A CHRONIC LIVER DISEASE OF UNIDENTIFIED CAUSE IN A RURAL SETTING OF ETHIOPIA: A CASE STUDY.

BACKGROUND: An outbreak of a chronic liver disease of unidentified cause, known as "Unidentified Liver Disease (ULD)" by local communities was first observed in a rural village in Tigray, northern-Ethiopia in 2001. Little was known about the geographical extent, trend, and epidemiology of the disease. METHODS: The Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI) by then Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, World Health Organization, and Tigray Regional Health Bureaue established the ULD surveillance system in 2009 to characterize and monitor trends for this emerging disease and to identify cases for treatment and follow up. A large-scale official training was provided to the surveillance staff on case identification, management and reporting. In absence of a confirmatory test, the system used simple case definitions that could be applied by frontline staff with varying clinical training. To maximize resources, health extension workers already conducting household visits in affected communities identified cases and increased community awareness about the disease. A team was placed in Shire, in close proximity to the outbreak region, to provide support and collect reports from health facilities and district health offices. RESULTS: As of September 2011, a total of 1,033 cases, including 314 deaths were identified. Contamination of locally produced grains with several pyrrolizidine alkaloid producing plants was identified cause of the disease. Staff interviews identified that shortage and turnover of trained staff were major challenges. LESSONS LEARNED: Long term dedication by frontline staff, using simple case definitions to identify cases, and active collection of missing reports were critical for surveillance of this chronic non-infectious disease of unknown cause in a rural, resource-limited setting.

Preparedness Perceptions, Sociodemographic Characteristics, and Level of Household Preparedness for Public Health Emergencies: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2006-2010.

Our objective was to inform state and community interventions focused on increasing household preparedness by examining the association between self-reported possession of household disaster preparedness items (ie, a 3-day supply of food and water, a written evacuation plan, and a working radio and flashlight) and perceptions of household preparedness on a 3-point scale from "well prepared" to "not at all prepared." Data were analyzed from 14 states participating in a large state-based telephone survey: the 2006-2010 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) (n = 104,654). Only 25.3% of the population felt they were well prepared, and only 12.3% had all 5 of the recommended items. Fewer than half the households surveyed had 4 or more of the recommended preparedness items (34.1%). Respondents were more likely to report their households were well prepared as the number of preparedness items possessed by their household increased. Risk factors for having no preparedness items were: younger age, being female, lower levels of education, and requesting the survey to be conducted in Spanish. To increase household disaster preparedness, more community-based preparedness education campaigns targeting vulnerable populations, such as those with limited English abilities and lower reading levels, are needed.

Monitoring of Persons with Risk for Exposure to Ebola Virus Disease - United States, November 3, 2014-March 8, 2015.

On October 27, 2014, CDC released guidance for monitoring and movement of persons with potential Ebola virus disease (Ebola) exposure in the United States. For persons with possible exposure to Ebola, this guidance recommended risk categorization, daily monitoring during the 21-day incubation period, and, for persons in selected risk categories, movement restrictions. The purpose of the guidance was to delineate methods for early identification of symptoms among persons at potential risk for Ebola so that they could be isolated, tested, and if necessary, treated to improve their chance of survival and reduce transmission. Within 7 days, all 50 states and two local jurisdictions (New York City [NYC] and the District of Columbia [DC]) had implemented the guidelines. During November 3, 2014-March 8, 2015, a total of 10,344 persons were monitored for up to 21 days with >99% complete monitoring. This public health response demonstrated the ability of state, territorial, and local health agencies to rapidly implement systems to effectively monitor thousands of persons over a sustained period.

Exploring the potential association between brominated diphenyl ethers, polychlorinated biphenyls, organochlorine pesticides, perfluorinated compounds, phthalates, and bisphenol A in polycystic ovary syndrome: a case-control study.

BACKGROUND: Polycystic Ovary Syndrome (PCOS) is an endocrine-metabolic disorder that affects approximately 6-10% of women of child-bearing age. Although preliminary studies suggest that certain pollutants may act as endocrine disruptors in animals, little is known about their potential association with PCOS. The objective of this case-control pilot study is to determine whether women with PCOS have higher concentrations of specific environmental contaminants compared to women who have not developed PCOS. METHODS: Fifty-two PCOS case-patients (diagnosed using the National Institutes of Health 1990 definition) and 50 controls were recruited in 2007-2008, from an urban academic medical center in Los Angeles, CA. Brominated diphenyl ethers, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), organochlorine pesticides, and perfluorinated compounds (PFCs) were measured in serum, and phthalates metabolites and bisphenol A (BPA) in urine. RESULTS: PCOS case-patients had significantly higher geometric mean (GM) serum concentrations of two PFCs: perfluorooctanoate (PFOA) (GMcases = 4.1 µg/L, GMcontrols = 2.3 µg/L; p = 0.001) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) (GMcases = 8.2 µg/L, GMcontrols = 4.9 µg/L; p = 0.01), and lower urinary concentrations of monobenzyl phthalate (mBzP) (GMcases = 7.5 µg/g creatinine, GMcontrols = 11.7 µg/g creatinine; p = 0.02). Logistic regression, controlling for body mass index, age and race, identified an increased likelihood of PCOS in subjects with higher serum concentrations of PFOA and PFOS (adjusted-ORs = 5.8-6.9, p < 0.05), and with lower urine concentrations of mBzP and mono-n-butyl phthalate (mBP) (aORs = 0.14-0.25, p < 0.05). CONCLUSIONS: Our data suggest that PCOS case-patients may differ from controls in their environmental contaminant profile. PCOS subjects had higher serum concentrations of two PFCs, PFOA and PFOS, and lower urine concentrations of mBP and mBzP. Future studies are needed to confirm these preliminary findings and determine if these chemicals or their precursors may have a role in the pathogenesis of PCOS.

Use of the community assessment for public health emergency response to conduct community health assessments for public health accreditation.

A community health assessment (CHA) is a collaborative process of collecting and analyzing data to learn about the health status of a community. Community health assessments are also a requirement of public health accreditation for state and local health departments and of the Affordable Care Act for nonprofit hospitals. One element of a CHA is primary data collection. This article describes the use of the Community Assessment for Public Health Emergency Response (CASPER) method for primary data collection to meet public health accreditation requirements in 2 case study communities--Nashua, New Hampshire, and Davidson County, North Carolina; CASPER is a flexible and efficient method for the collection of population-based primary data in an urban or rural setting.