Musical interaction with children and young people with severe or profound intellectual and multiple disabilities: a scoping review.

This scoping review addresses peer-reviewed research on musical interaction with children and young people with severe/profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (S/PIMD). Twenty-five articles published between the years 2000 and 2020 met the inclusion criteria. A narrative synthesis was used to summarise and evaluate different features, including participant characteristics, study design and methods, type of musical interaction, the abilities and behaviours in focus, reported benefits, promising components of musical interaction, and quality appraisal of the studies. The results revealed a variation in participant characteristics and study designs, where small-sample descriptive case studies were most common. In terms of the type of musical interaction, active music therapy was the most commonly used approach, followed by technology-mediated and multisensory musical activities. In terms of abilities and behaviours, a large majority of the studies focused on social interaction and communication, followed by engagement, attention and affect. Six categories were identified as promising components of musical interaction: the responsivity of the interaction partner, singing songs, structure and predictability in the activities, long-term interventions, technology-mediated and multisensory musical activities, and a therapeutic alliance between interaction partners. Based on this review, we discuss future research and practical implications for musical interaction and music therapy for children and young people with S/PIMD.

Profound Intellectual Disability and the Bestowment View of Moral Status.

This article engages with debates concerning the moral worth of human beings with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (PIMDs). Some argue that those with such disabilities are morally less valuable than so-called normal human beings, whereas others argue that all human beings have equal moral value and that, therefore, each group of humans ought to be treated with equal concern. We will argue in favor of a view that takes points from opposing camps in the debates about the moral worth of humans with such disabilities. Our position, roughly, is this: most humans with PIMDs are persons in the morally significant sense and, therefore, deserve moral consideration equal to that granted to so-called "normal" human beings. Some humans with PIMD may not be persons, but nevertheless deserve moral consideration equal to that of persons because they stand in a special relation to persons.

The Moorean argument for the full moral status of those with profound intellectual disability: a rejoinder to Roberts.

In a recent paper we argued that a Moorean strategy can be employed to justify our continuing to believe the following proposition, even in the presence of philosophical views that entail it is false, without any philosophical argument against those views, and without any positive philosophical argument in its favour: H>A: Humans have an equal moral status that is higher than the moral status of non-human animals. The basic idea is that our confidence in the truth of this proposition is greater than our confidence in the propositions that make up those philosophical views that entail that it is false, and that this is sufficient to justify rejecting those views and to continue to believe H>A. Roberts has recently responded to our argument by claiming that (i) although the Moorean strategy is valid, it is not powerful and (ii) a resort to the Moorean strategy reflects too great a pessimism about the accounts available that purport to justify H>A. In this short rejoinder we explain why Roberts fails to establish his two claims.

Self-pathologizing, self-condemning, self-liberating: Youths' accounts of their ADHD-related behavior.

This study analyzes the discursive construction of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and self in relation to a socioculturally shared understanding of moral norms. Thirteen Finnish youth aged 11 to 16 diagnosed with ADHD were interviewed during this discourse analysis study. The youth accounted for their culturally undesirable behavior, performance and traits through three different types of accounts: (1) externalizing personal responsibility due to a compelling medical condition, (2) internalizing personal responsibility through moral self-condemnation, and (3) distancing oneself from the socially imposed stereotypes and stigmas related to ADHD. This study challenges dominant understanding of young people with a diagnosis of ADHD and contributes to our understanding of how ADHD is constructed in their lives.

A Moorean argument for the full moral status of those with profound intellectual disability.

This paper is about the moral status of those human beings who have profound intellectual disabilities (PIDs). We hold the common sense view that they have equal status to 'normal' human beings, and a higher status than any non-human animal. On the standard account of moral status, this view cannot be sustained. In this paper, we ask whether, in order to be justified in continuing to hold our view, we are obliged to offer an alternative account that does sustain it? Our answer is that we are not.

Ethical analysis of the concept of disability.

The concept of disability from an ethical viewpoint was examined. Whether disability results from the way society is built and the way ideas and judgments considering disability are established in a communal interaction was discussed (i.e., is disability socially created and constructed?). Although views on disability emphasizing its social nature are basically sound, they are also insufficient because they fail to consider the normative dimension attached to the concept of disability. The core of the concept of disability is ethical, which is why a moral philosophical examination of the concept is needed. Three possible ethical theories of disability (universal, objective, subjectivist, and communitarian) are briefly presented and discussed and a preliminary outline of a basis for a sound ethical model of disability presented.

Is it wrong to deliberately conceive or give birth to a child with mental retardation?

This paper discusses the issues of deciding to have a child with mental retardation, and of terminating a pregnancy when the future child is known to have the same disability. I discuss these problems by criticizing a utilitarian argument, namely, that one should act in a way that results in less suffering and less limited opportunity in the world. My argument is that future parents ought to assume a strong responsibility towards the well-being of their prospective children when they decide to reproduce. The moral point in cases in which our acts affect the well-being of future children should be expressed strictly in terms of parents' culpability. Future children thus do not have current moral standing but presently living persons have current obligations to consider the presumable effects of their actions on future people. I will also argue that there are morally significant differences between 'selective contraception' and selective abortion.

Parental responsibility and the morality of selective abortion.

It is now a common opinion in Western countries that a child's impairment would probably place an unexpected burden on her parents, a burden that the parents have not committed themselves to dealing with. Therefore, selective abortion is in general a morally justified option for the parents. I argue that this view is based on biased information about the quality of life of individuals with impairments and their families. Also, a conscious decision to procreate should bring about conscious assent to assuming obligations as a parent. This implies a duty of caring for any kind of child. Consequently, if the child's condition is not such that it would make its life not worth living, and if the parents live in an environment where they are not able to provide their child and themselves an adequate well-being, they do not have a morally sufficient reason to terminate the pregnancy on the grounds of fetal abnormality.