The Reciprocal Relationship Between Sexual Arousal and Disgust as Evidenced in Automatic Approach-Avoidance Behavior.

Sexual encounters imply exposure to stimuli that in other contexts typically elicit disgust-induced avoidance. To explain why people nevertheless tend to show sexual approach, it has been proposed that heightened sexual arousal may temporarily inhibit disgust. In line with this, studies have found that sexually aroused individuals showed heightened willingness to approach disgusting stimuli. Because automatic processes are critically involved in sexual behaviors, we examined whether the impact of sexual arousal extends to automatic responses to disgust-elicitors. To test the proposed reciprocal relationship between sex and disgust, we also investigated whether disgust reduces automatic sexual approach. In Study 1, 116 female participants (M = age 19.53) were assigned to a sexual arousal or control condition and performed a speeded approach-avoidance task to assess automatic responses to disgusting stimuli. In Study 2, 174 female participants (M = age 22.14) were assigned to a disgust, sexual arousal, or control condition and performed an approach-avoidance task involving both sex and disgust-relevant stimuli. Sexual arousal did not affect automatic responses to disgusting stimuli, and disgust did not influence automatic responses towards sexual stimuli. The reciprocal relationship between sexual arousal and disgust that was previously found for controllable responses did not extend to automatic responses.

Influence of sad mood induction on implicit self-esteem and its relationship with symptoms of depression and anxiety.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Implicit self-esteem (ISE) refers to the valence of triggered associations when the self is activated. Despite theories, previous studies often fail to observe low ISE in depression and anxiety. It is feasible that sad mood is required to activate dysfunctional self-associations. The present study tested the following hypotheses: i) ISE is lower following a sad mood induction (SMI); ii) the relationship between ISE and level of depression/anxiety symptoms is relatively strong when ISE is measured during sad mood; iii) individuals with higher levels of depression/anxiety symptoms will show a relatively large decrease in ISE following a SMI. METHODS: In this mixed-designed study, university students completed the self-esteem implicit association test (IAT) either at baseline (control condition; n = 46) or following a SMI (experimental condition; n = 49). To test the third hypothesis, a SMI and IAT were also given in the control condition. Both conditions completed self-report measures of explicit self-esteem (ESE), and symptoms of depression and anxiety. RESULTS: There was no support for the first two hypotheses, but some support that symptoms of anxiety correlated with larger decreases in ISE following a SMI which partly supported the third hypothesis. This disappeared when controlling for multiple testing. LIMITATIONS: Results are limited to non-clinical participants. CONCLUSIONS: While ISE was robust against increases in sad mood, there was some tentative support that symptoms of anxiety were related to larger decreases in ISE following a SMI.

Modification of cognitive biases related to posttraumatic stress: A systematic review and research agenda.

Cognitive models of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) postulate that cognitive biases in attention, interpretation, and memory represent key factors involved in the onset and maintenance of PTSD. Developments in experimental research demonstrate that it may be possible to manipulate such biases by means of Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM). In the present paper, we summarize studies assessing cognitive biases in posttraumatic stress to serve as a theoretical and methodological background. However, our main aim was to provide an overview of the scientific literature on CBM in (analogue) posttraumatic stress. Results of our systematic literature review showed that most CBM studies targeted attentional and interpretation biases (attention: five studies; interpretation: three studies), and one study modified memory biases. Overall, results showed that CBM can indeed modify cognitive biases and affect (analog) trauma symptoms in a training congruent manner. Interpretation bias procedures seemed effective in analog samples, and memory bias training proved preliminary success in a clinical PTSD sample. Studies of attention bias modification provided more mixed results. This heterogeneous picture may be explained by differences in the type of population or variations in the CBM procedure. Therefore, we sketched a detailed research agenda targeting the challenges for CBM in posttraumatic stress.

Collaboration enhances later individual memory for emotional material.

Research on collaborative remembering suggests that collaboration hampers group memory (i.e., collaborative inhibition), yet enhances later individual memory. Studies examining collaborative effects on memory for emotional stimuli are scarce, especially concerning later individual memory. In the present study, female undergraduates watched an emotional movie and recalled it either collaboratively (n = 60) or individually (n = 60), followed by an individual free recall test and a recognition test. We replicated the standard collaborative inhibition effect. Further, in line with the literature, the collaborative condition displayed better post-collaborative individual memory. More importantly, in post-collaborative free recall, the centrality of the information to the movie plot did not play an important role. Recognition rendered slightly different results. Although collaboration rendered more correct recognition for more central details, it did not enhance recognition of background details. Secondly, the collaborative and individual conditions did not differ with respect to overlap of unique correct items in free recall. Yet, during recognition former collaborators more unanimously endorsed correct answers, as well as errors. Finally, extraversion, neuroticism, social anxiety, and depressive symptoms did not moderate the influence of collaboration on memory. Implications for the fields of forensic and clinical psychology are discussed.

Disgust- and anxiety-based emotional reasoning in non-clinical fear of vomiting.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Emotional reasoning has been described as a dysfunctional tendency to use subjective responses to make erroneous inferences about threatening outcomes in objectively safe situations (e.g., "If I feel anxious/disgusted, there must be danger/risk of becoming ill"). Prior studies found evidence for anxiety-based emotional reasoning (ER) in several anxiety disorders as well as disgust-based ER in healthy individuals scoring above the clinical cut-off on a measure of contamination fear. The current study tested whether disgust- and anxiety-based ER might be involved in fear of vomiting, a phobic disorder in which both fear/anxiety and disgust are assumed to play an important role. METHODS: Non-clinical participants scoring high (>75%; n = 35) and low (<25%; n = 38) on a measure of fear of vomiting were presented with a series of scripts describing objectively safe everyday situations that systematically varied in the absence/presence of the actor's disgust/anxiety response. Following each script, participants rated their perceived danger and threat of contamination/illness. RESULTS: In line with hypotheses, specifically high vomit-fearful individuals used experienced disgust and anxiety to overestimate risk of becoming ill. Follow up analyses taking into account shared variance between both emotions revealed that more pronounced ER in the high vomit fearful group was mainly driven by the emotion of disgust. LIMITATIONS: Current study asked participants to imagine experienced emotions in scenarios instead of experimentally inducing real-life emotions. CONCLUSIONS: These findings are consistent with the view that disgust-based ER is involved in fear of vomiting.

"If I feel disgusted, I must be getting ill": emotional reasoning in the context of contamination fear.

Patients suffering from anxiety disorders have been shown to infer danger on the basis of their anxiety responses "if I feel anxious, there must be danger." This tendency logically hampers the identification of false alarms and may thus act in a way to confirm the a priori threat value of the feared stimuli/situations. Since disgust is assumed to play a critical role in the persistence of contamination fears in OCD, the question rises whether individuals suffering from fear of contamination perhaps similarly infer danger on the basis of their disgust response: "If I feel disgusted, it must be contagious." Therefore, this study tested whether indeed disgust-based reasoning might be involved in fear of contamination. On the basis of the contamination fear subscale of the Padua Inventory (PI), we selected a group of participants scoring higher than the established clinical range (n=31, PI>13) and a group of participants low (n=27, PI<5) in contamination fear. Each participant was presented with a series of 2 times 4 types of scripts that systematically varied in the absence/presence of objective threat of contamination and the absence/presence of the actor's disgust response. Following each script, participants rated their perceived threat of contamination/illness. In line with the hypothesis that disgust-based reasoning might be involved in fear of contamination, specifically high contamination fearful individuals inferred risk of becoming ill on the basis of experienced disgust (in addition to objective threat), as was evidenced by a significant Group (high vs. low)×Threat (yes vs. no)×Disgust response (yes vs. no) interaction. This finding might not only help to explain the persistence of contamination fears, but also provides some fresh clues to improve currently available treatment options.

Fewer intrusions after an attentional bias modification training for perceptual reminders of analogue trauma.

The present experimental analogue study used computerised attention training to investigate the role of attention bias in the prediction of intrusive memories. After exposure to a trauma film, participants in a training group (n=22) were presented with a variant of the exogenic cueing task (ECT) in which visual film reminders (i.e., stills from the trauma film) were always presented during invalid and neutral control stimuli always during valid trials. The purpose of this cue-location contingency was reinforcing the direction of attention away from film reminders. Control participants (n=23) performed a similar training without such a contingency. Post-training processing bias was assessed with a single target Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) task, in which trauma-film reminders served as task-irrelevant distracters appearing shortly before a neutral target. The frequency of film-related intrusions was recorded in a take-home diary and at a follow-up session three days after film viewing. Participants who underwent attention training reported fewer film-related intrusions and showed less interference by visual film distracters than controls. Implications for research on attention bias after real-life trauma are discussed.

Pre-Stressor Interference Control and Intrusive Memories.

Although intrusive imagery is a common response in the aftermath of a stressful or traumatic event, only a minority of trauma victims show persistent re-experiencing and related psychopathology. Individual differences in pre-trauma executive control possibly play a critical role. Therefore, this study investigated whether a relatively poor pre-stressor ability to resist proactive interference in working memory might increase risk for experiencing undesirable intrusive memories after being exposed to a stressful event. Non-clinical participants (N = 85) completed a modified version of a widely used test of interference control in working memory (CVLT; Kramer and Delis 1991) and subsequently watched an emotional film fragment. Following presentation of the fragment, intrusive memories were recorded in a 1-week diary and at a follow up session 7 days later. A relatively poor ability to resist proactive interference was related to a relatively high frequency of film-related intrusive memories. This relationship was independent of neuroticism and gender. These findings are consistent with the idea that a pre-morbid deficit in the ability to resist proactive interference reflects a vulnerability factor for experiencing intrusive memories after trauma exposure.

Cognitive control and suppression of memories of an emotional film.

Relatively weak cognitive control existing prior to a stressful event may be associated with intrusive memories of that stressor afterwards. To test this possibility, we tested participants under circumstances that putatively decrease cognitive control and explored how this affected the relation between indices of cognitive control and intrusive memories. Evening type participants (N = 80) were tested at either an optimal or a non-optimal time of day. Tests of working memory capacity and inhibitory control were administered. Subsequently, participants saw an emotional film fragment and engaged in thought suppression afterwards. Results show different correlational patterns in time-of-testing groups. At non-optimal times there were negative, but relatively weak correlations between working memory capacity and intrusions. Better inhibitory control was associated with fewer intrusions during the initial minute of the thought suppression period and with fewer self-reported intrusions. At optimal times however, these correlations were absent. Working memory capacity even showed robust correlations in the opposite direction. These findings cast doubts on the suitability of indices of working memory capacity for testing the idea that relatively weak cognitive control is linked to intrusive memory phenomena. Specific measures of inhibitory control may prove to be more appropriate for testing this idea.

Individual differences in experiencing intrusive memories: the role of the ability to resist proactive interference.

This study explored whether a relatively poor ability to resist or inhibit interference from irrelevant information in working memory is associated with experiencing undesirable intrusive memories. Non-selected participants (N=91) completed a self-report measure of intrusive memories, and carried out experimental tasks intended to measure two different types of inhibition: resistance to proactive interference and response inhibition (i.e., the ability to prevent automatically triggered responses). The results showed a significant relationship between inhibition at the cognitive level (i.e., resistance to proactive interference) and the frequency of intrusive memories (especially in the group of female participants) whereas no such relationship with measures of response inhibition emerged. These findings are consistent with the idea that deficient inhibitory control reflects a vulnerability factor for experiencing intrusive memories. Implications for research investigating risk factors for the development of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are discussed.

Pre-stressor cognitive control is related to intrusive cognition of a stressful film.

It has been suggested that relatively weak cognitive control existing prior to a stressful event may be associated with intrusive memories of that stressor afterwards. We explored this in two analog studies employing unselected participants who saw an emotional film fragment and completed behavioral (i.e., color-naming interference [CNI]) and self-report indices of intrusions. Prior to film presentation, several cognitive control tests were administered. Study 1 showed that better updating/monitoring was linked to less CNI from negative film-related words. However, better updating/monitoring was associated with more diary reports of intrusive memories. Study 2 showed that a better resistance to pro-active interference (PI) predicted less self-reported film-related intrusive cognition after 24h. However, after this delay, both self-reported intrusions and CNI were not related to updating/monitoring. Taken together, the results suggest that a specific pre-existing cognitive control function (i.e., resistance to PI) may be involved in the regulation of post-stressor intrusive memory phenomena.