How I Would have been Differently Treated. Discrimination Through the Lens of Counterfactual Fairness.

The widespread use of algorithms for prediction-based decisions urges us to consider the question of what it means for a given act or practice to be discriminatory. Building upon work by Kusner and colleagues in the field of machine learning, we propose a counterfactual condition as a necessary requirement on discrimination. To demonstrate the philosophical relevance of the proposed condition, we consider two prominent accounts of discrimination in the recent literature, by Lippert-Rasmussen and Hellman respectively, that do not logically imply our condition and show that they face important objections. Specifically, Lippert-Rasmussen's definition proves to be over-inclusive, as it classifies some acts or practices as discriminatory when they are not, whereas Hellman's account turns out to lack explanatory power precisely insofar as it does not countenance a counterfactual condition on discrimination. By defending the necessity of our counterfactual condition, we set the conceptual limits for justified claims about the occurrence of discriminatory acts or practices in society, with immediate applications to the ethics of algorithmic decision-making.

Investigating Employees' Concerns and Wishes Regarding Digital Stress Management Interventions With Value Sensitive Design: Mixed Methods Study.

BACKGROUND: Work stress places a heavy economic and disease burden on society. Recent technological advances include digital health interventions for helping employees prevent and manage their stress at work effectively. Although such digital solutions come with an array of ethical risks, especially if they involve biomedical big data, the incorporation of employees' values in their design and deployment has been widely overlooked. OBJECTIVE: To bridge this gap, we used the value sensitive design (VSD) framework to identify relevant values concerning a digital stress management intervention (dSMI) at the workplace, assess how users comprehend these values, and derive specific requirements for an ethics-informed design of dSMIs. VSD is a theoretically grounded framework that front-loads ethics by accounting for values throughout the design process of a technology. METHODS: We conducted a literature search to identify relevant values of dSMIs at the workplace. To understand how potential users comprehend these values and derive design requirements, we conducted a web-based study that contained closed and open questions with employees of a Swiss company, allowing both quantitative and qualitative analyses. RESULTS: The values health and well-being, privacy, autonomy, accountability, and identity were identified through our literature search. Statistical analysis of 170 responses from the web-based study revealed that the intention to use and perceived usefulness of a dSMI were moderate to high. Employees' moderate to high health and well-being concerns included worries that a dSMI would not be effective or would even amplify their stress levels. Privacy concerns were also rated on the higher end of the score range, whereas concerns regarding autonomy, accountability, and identity were rated lower. Moreover, a personalized dSMI with a monitoring system involving a machine learning-based analysis of data led to significantly higher privacy (P=.009) and accountability concerns (P=.04) than a dSMI without a monitoring system. In addition, integrability, user-friendliness, and digital independence emerged as novel values from the qualitative analysis of 85 text responses. CONCLUSIONS: Although most surveyed employees were willing to use a dSMI at the workplace, there were considerable health and well-being concerns with regard to effectiveness and problem perpetuation. For a minority of employees who value digital independence, a nondigital offer might be more suitable. In terms of the type of dSMI, privacy and accountability concerns must be particularly well addressed if a machine learning-based monitoring component is included. To help mitigate these concerns, we propose specific requirements to support the VSD of a dSMI at the workplace. The results of this work and our research protocol will inform future research on VSD-based interventions and further advance the integration of ethics in digital health.

Transparency as design publicity: explaining and justifying inscrutable algorithms.

In this paper we argue that transparency of machine learning algorithms, just as explanation, can be defined at different levels of abstraction. We criticize recent attempts to identify the explanation of black box algorithms with making their decisions (post-hoc) interpretable, focusing our discussion on counterfactual explanations. These approaches to explanation simplify the real nature of the black boxes and risk misleading the public about the normative features of a model. We propose a new form of algorithmic transparency, that consists in explaining algorithms as an intentional product, that serves a particular goal, or multiple goals (Daniel Dennet's design stance) in a given domain of applicability, and that provides a measure of the extent to which such a goal is achieved, and evidence about the way that measure has been reached. We call such idea of algorithmic transparency "design publicity." We argue that design publicity can be more easily linked with the justification of the use and of the design of the algorithm, and of each individual decision following from it. In comparison to post-hoc explanations of individual algorithmic decisions, design publicity meets a different demand (the demand for impersonal justification) of the explainee. Finally, we argue that when models that pursue justifiable goals (which may include fairness as avoidance of bias towards specific groups) to a justifiable degree are used consistently, the resulting decisions are all justified even if some of them are (unavoidably) based on incorrect predictions. For this argument, we rely on John Rawls's idea of procedural justice applied to algorithms conceived as institutions.

Trust does not need to be human: it is possible to trust medical AI.

In his recent article 'Limits of trust in medical AI,' Hatherley argues that, if we believe that the motivations that are usually recognised as relevant for interpersonal trust have to be applied to interactions between humans and medical artificial intelligence, then these systems do not appear to be the appropriate objects of trust. In this response, we argue that it is possible to discuss trust in medical artificial intelligence (AI), if one refrains from simply assuming that trust describes human-human interactions. To do so, we consider an account of trust that distinguishes trust from reliance in a way that is compatible with trusting non-human agents. In this account, to trust a medical AI is to rely on it with little monitoring and control of the elements that make it trustworthy. This attitude does not imply specific properties in the AI system that in fact only humans can have. This account of trust is applicable, in particular, to all cases where a physician relies on the medical AI predictions to support his or her decision making.