Culture shapes spontaneous brain dynamics - Shared versus idiosyncratic neural features among Chinese versus Canadian subjects.

Environmental factors, such as culture, are known to shape individual variation in brain activity including spontaneous activity, but less is known about their population-level effects. Eastern and Western cultures differ strongly in their cultural norms about relationships between individuals. For example, the collectivism, interdependence and tightness of Eastern cultures relative to the individualism, independence and looseness of Western cultures, promote interpersonal connectedness and coordination. Do such cultural contexts therefore influence the group-level variability of their cultural members' spontaneous brain activity? Using novel methods adapted from studies of inter-subject neural synchrony, we compare the group-level variability of resting state EEG dynamics in Chinese and Canadian samples. We observe that Chinese subjects show significantly higher inter-subject correlation and lower inter-subject distance in their EEG power spectra than Canadian subjects, as well as lower variability in theta power and alpha peak frequency. We demonstrate, for the first time, different relationships among subjects' resting state brain dynamics in Chinese and Canadian samples. These results point to more idiosyncratic neural dynamics among Canadian participants, compared with more shared neural features in Chinese participants.

Antisocial and impulsive personality traits are linked to individual differences in somatosensory maps of emotion.

Somatosensory experience is an important component of emotion, playing a prominent role in many traditional emotion theories. Nonetheless, and despite the extensive literature on the influence of individual differences in emotional processing, the relation between personality traits and emotion-related somatosensation has received little attention. Here, we addressed this question in a large sample of healthy individuals through the "bodily maps of emotion" behavioural paradigm, in which participants indicated the location and extent of their body sensations for the 6 basic and 4 additional social emotions (contempt, envy, pride, shame). We found that emotional somatosensation in specific body areas, including the heart, the stomach, and the head, was related to specific personality factors, particularly antisocial attitudes and impulsivity. Moreover, the similarity of individual participants' maps to the group-average was likewise negatively correlated with antisocial tendencies. Overall, our results suggest that differences in individuals' sensitivity to somatosensation from different body areas, as well as the typicality of their topographical patterns, may partly underlie variation in higher-order social and affective traits.

Intrinsic neural timescales mediate the cognitive bias of self - temporal integration as key mechanism.

Our perceptions and decisions are not always objectively correct as they are featured by a bias related to our self. What are the behavioral, neural, and computational mechanisms of such cognitive bias? Addressing this yet unresolved question, we here investigate whether the cognitive bias is related to temporal integration and segregation as mediated by the brain's Intrinsic neural timescales (INT). Using Signal Detection Theory (SDT), we operationalize the cognitive bias by the Criterion C as distinguished from the sensitivity index d'. This was probed in a self-task based on morphed self- and other faces. Behavioral data demonstrate clear cognitive bias, i.e., Criterion C. That was related to the EEG-based INT as measured by the autocorrelation window (ACW) in especially the transmodal regions dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and default-mode network (DMN) as distinct from unimodal visual cortex. Finally, simulation of the same paradigm in a large-scale network model shows high degrees of temporal integration of temporally distinct inputs in CMS/DMN and dlPFC while temporal segregation predominates in visual cortex. Together, we demonstrate a key role of INT-based temporal integration in CMS/DMN and dlPFC including its relation to the brain's uni-transmodal topographical organization in mediating the cognitive bias of our self.

Variability and task-responsiveness of electrophysiological dynamics: Scale-free stability and oscillatory flexibility.

Cortical oscillations and scale-free neural activity are thought to influence a variety of cognitive functions, but their differential relationships to neural stability and flexibility has never been investigated. Based on the existing literature, we hypothesize that scale-free and oscillatory processes in the brain exhibit different trade-offs between stability and flexibility; specifically, cortical oscillations may reflect variable, task-responsive aspects of brain activity, while scale-free activity is proposed to reflect a more stable and task-unresponsive aspect. We test this hypothesis using data from two large-scale MEG studies (HCP: n = 89; CamCAN: n = 195), operationalizing stability and flexibility by task-responsiveness and spontaneous intra-subject variability in resting state. We demonstrate that the power-law exponent of scale-free activity is a highly stable parameter, which responds little to external cognitive demands and shows minimal spontaneous fluctuations over time. In contrast, oscillatory power, particularly in the alpha range (8-13 Hz), responds strongly to tasks and exhibits comparatively large spontaneous fluctuations over time. In sum, our data support differential roles for oscillatory and scale-free activity in the brain with respect to neural stability and flexibility. This result carries implications for criticality-based theories of scale-free activity, state-trait models of variability, and homeostatic views of the brain with regulated variables vs. effectors.

Relating self-disorders to neurocognitive and psychopathological measures in first-episode schizophrenia.

AIM: The notion of a disturbed self as the core feature of schizophrenia dates back to the founding texts on the illness. Since the development of the psychometric tool for examination of anomalous self-experience (EASE), self-disorders have become accessible to empirical research. Empirical studies have shown that EASE measured self-disorders predict schizophrenia spectrum in prospective studies and consistently show a selective hyper aggregation of self-disorder in schizophrenia and schizotypal disorders. The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between self-disorders cognitive deficits and symptoms in schizophrenia. METHODS: Thirty-five non-acute first-episode patients with schizophrenia and 35 matched healthy controls were evaluated with EASE, cognitive deficits, and symptoms (PANSS positive, negative and general). [Correction added on 28 January 2022, after first online publication: the words, 'evaluated with' were missing and have now been added to the preceding sentence.] RESULTS: The results show that self-disorders and symptoms are correlated among patients with schizophrenia, but not with cognitive deficits. Moreover, with the exception of attentional deficits, neurocognitive impairment was not significantly higher among patients with schizophrenia compared to healthy controls. CONCLUSIONS: We argue that this adds support to a view of schizophrenia as being characterized by specific traits of pre-reflective self-disturbance, which are related to the severity of symptoms, whereas neurocognitive impairment reflects a separate or distinct aspect of schizophrenia.

Dynamic relationships between spontaneous and evoked electrophysiological activity.

Spontaneous neural activity fluctuations have been shown to influence trial-by-trial variation in perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes. However, the complex electrophysiological mechanisms by which these fluctuations shape stimulus-evoked neural activity remain largely to be explored. Employing a large-scale magnetoencephalographic dataset and an electroencephalographic replication dataset, we investigate the relationship between spontaneous and evoked neural activity across a range of electrophysiological variables. We observe that for high-frequency activity, high pre-stimulus amplitudes lead to greater evoked desynchronization, while for low frequencies, high pre-stimulus amplitudes induce larger degrees of event-related synchronization. We further decompose electrophysiological power into oscillatory and scale-free components, demonstrating different patterns of spontaneous-evoked correlation for each component. Finally, we find correlations between spontaneous and evoked time-domain electrophysiological signals. Overall, we demonstrate that the dynamics of multiple electrophysiological variables exhibit distinct relationships between their spontaneous and evoked activity, a result which carries implications for experimental design and analysis in non-invasive electrophysiology.

Spatiotemporal neuroscience - what is it and why we need it.

The excellent commentaries to our target paper hint upon three main issues, (i) spatiotemporal neuroscience; (ii) neuro-mental relationship; and (iii) mind, brain, and world relationship. (i) We therefore discuss briefly the history of Spatiotemporal Neuroscience. Distinguishing it from Cognitive Neuroscience and related branches (like Affective, Social, etc. Neuroscience), Spatiotemporal Neuroscience can be characterized by focus on brain activity (rather than brain function), spatiotemporal relationship (rather than input-cognition-output relationship), and structure (rather than stimuli/contents). (ii) Taken in this sense, Spatiotemporal Neuroscience allows one to conceive the neuro-mental relationship in dynamic spatiotemporal terms that complement and extend (rather than contradict) their cognitive characterization. (iii) Finally, more philosophical issues like the need to dissolve the mind-body problem (and replace it by the world-brain relation) and the question for different levels of time including their nestedness are discussed.

Temporal integration as "common currency" of brain and self-scale-free activity in resting-state EEG correlates with temporal delay effects on self-relatedness.

The self is a multifaceted phenomenon that integrates information and experience across multiple time scales. How temporal integration on the psychological level of the self is related to temporal integration on the neuronal level remains unclear. To investigate temporal integration on the psychological level, we modified a well-established self-matching paradigm by inserting temporal delays. On the neuronal level, we indexed temporal integration in resting-state EEG by two related measures of scale-free dynamics, the power law exponent and autocorrelation window. We hypothesized that the previously established self-prioritization effect, measured as decreased response times or increased accuracy for self-related stimuli, would change with the insertion of different temporal delays between the paired stimuli, and that these changes would be related to temporal integration on the neuronal level. We found a significant self-prioritization effect on accuracy in all conditions with delays, indicating stronger temporal integration of self-related stimuli. Further, we observed a relationship between temporal integration on psychological and neuronal levels: higher degrees of neuronal integration, that is, higher power-law exponent and longer autocorrelation window, during resting-state EEG were related to a stronger increase in the self-prioritization effect across longer temporal delays. We conclude that temporal integration on the neuronal level serves as a template for temporal integration of the self on the psychological level. Temporal integration can thus be conceived as the "common currency" of neuronal and psychological levels of self.

Is temporo-spatial dynamics the "common currency" of brain and mind? In Quest of "Spatiotemporal Neuroscience".

Neuroscience has made considerable progress in unraveling the neural correlates of mental phenomena like self, consciousness, and perception. However, the "common currency" shared between neuronal and mental activity, brain and mind, remains yet unclear. In this article, we propose that the dynamics of time and space provides a "common currency" that connects neuronal and mental features. Time and space are here understood in a dynamic context (as in contemporary physics): that is, in terms of the way the brain's spontaneous activity constructs its spatial and temporal relationships, for instance in terms of functional connectivity and different frequencies of fluctuations. Recruiting recent empirical evidence, we show that the different ways in which the spontaneous activity constructs its "inner time and space" are manifested in distinct mental features. Specifically, we demonstrate how spatiotemporal mechanisms like spatiotemporal repertoire, integration, and speed yield mental features like consciousness, self, and time speed perception. The focus on the brain's spatiotemporal mechanisms entails what we describe as "Spatiotemporal Neuroscience". Spatiotemporal Neuroscience conceives neuronal activity in terms of its temporo-spatial dynamics rather than its various functions (e.g., cognitive, affective, social, etc.) as in other branches of neuroscience (as distinguished from Cognitive, Affective, Cultural, Social, etc. Neuroscience). That allows Spatiotemporal Neuroscience to take into view the so-called 'spatio-temporality' of mental features including their non-causal, intrinsic and transformative relationship with neuronal features. In conclusion, Spatiotemporal Neuroscience opens the door to investigate and ultimately reveal the brain's own temporo-spatial dynamics as the hitherto missing "common currency" of neuronal and mental features.