The contribution of semantic distance knowledge to size constancy in perception and grasping when visual cues are limited.

To achieve a stable perception of object size in spite of variations in viewing distance, our visual system needs to combine retinal image information and distance cues. Previous research has shown that, not only retinal cues, but also extraretinal sensory signals can provide reliable information about depth and that different neural networks (perception versus action) can exhibit preferences in the use of these different sources of information during size-distance computations. Semantic knowledge of distance, a purely cognitive signal, can also provide distance information. Do the perception and action systems show differences in their ability to use this information in calculating object size and distance? To address this question, we presented 'glow-in-the-dark' objects of different physical sizes at different real distances in a completely dark room. Participants viewed the objects monocularly through a 1-mm pinhole. They either estimated the size and distance of the objects or attempted to grasp them. Semantic knowledge was manipulated by providing an auditory cue about the actual distance of the object: "20 cm", "30 cm", and "40 cm". We found that semantic knowledge of distance contributed to some extent to size constancy operations during perceptual estimation and grasping, but size constancy was never fully restored. Importantly, the contribution of knowledge about distance to size constancy was equivalent between perception and action. Overall, our study reveals similarities and differences between the perception and action systems in the use of semantic distance knowledge and suggests that this cognitive signal is useful but not a reliable depth cue for size constancy under restricted viewing conditions.

Internal representations of the canonical real-world distance of objects.

In the real world, every object has its canonical distance from observers. For example, airplanes are usually far away from us, whereas eyeglasses are close to us. Do we have an internal representation of the canonical real-world distance of objects in our cognitive system? If we do, does the canonical distance influence the perceived size of an object? Here, we conducted two experiments to address these questions. In Experiment 1, we first asked participants to rate the canonical distance of objects. Participants gave consistent ratings to each object. Then, pairs of object images were presented one by one in a trial, and participants were asked to rate the distance of the second object (i.e., a priming paradigm). We found that the rating of the perceived distance of the target object was modulated by the canonical real-world distance of the prime. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to judge the perceived size of canonically near or far objects that were presented at the converging end (i.e., far location) or the opening end (i.e., near location) of a background image with converging lines. We found that regardless of the presentation location, participants perceived the canonically near object as smaller than the canonically far object even though their retinal and real-world sizes were matched. In all, our results suggest that we have an internal representation of the canonical real-world distance of objects, which affects the perceived distance of subsequent objects and the perceived size of the objects themselves.