Coping Ability and Promotion Countermeasures of Medical and Health Institutions Reputation Crisis: A Case Study in Hubei Province.

At present, the doctor-patient relationships in Chinese medical and health institutions (MHI) are increasingly tense, and the reputation crisis challenges are being faced by MHI more frequently. However, the reputation crisis management level of the MHI is directly related to the future development and construction of the MHI and is an important management link that cannot be ignored. Therefore, how to quantify the impact of the relevant crisis on hospitals has become a major problem. First of all, this paper uses the situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) to combine the characteristics of hospital reputation crisis with the theory and classification of MHI reputation crisis from three perspectives: victim crisis, accidental crisis, and preventable crisis. Second, a more comprehensive analysis of MHI reputation crisis management model is conducted in the research cases, based on the relevant data of Union Hospital, Tongji Medical College Huazhong University of Science and Technology (UH), Tongji Hospital, Tongji Medical College Huazhong University of Science and Technology (TJ), Zhongnan Hospital of Wuhan University (ZN), Renmin Hospital of Wuhan University (RM), and Maternal and Child Hospital of Hubei Province (MC). Third, we divide MHI reputation positioning into four types, namely robust, growth, fragile, and sensitive, and innovate SCCT to build a new MHI crisis classification type. Finally, this paper provides appropriate crisis management strategies for sample MHI based on the above examples and theories. Furthermore, we realize the lifecycle management of MHI reputation by identifying, evaluating and responding to reputation issues. This study provides a theoretical reference for the MHI reputation crisis management level and the adjustment of future management strategies.

Evolutionary game dynamics of the Wright-Fisher process with different selection intensities.

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations can be described by a frequency-dependent, stochastic Wright-Fisher process. The fitness of individuals in a population is not only linked to environmental conditions but also tightly coupled to the types and frequencies of competitors, leading to different types of individuals with different selection intensities. We studied a 2 × 2 symmetric game in a finite population and established a dynamic model of the Wright-Fisher process by introducing different selection intensities for different strategies. Thus, we provided another effective way to study the evolutionary dynamics of a finite population and obtained the analytical expressions of fixation probabilities under weak selection. The fixation probability of a strategy is not only related to a game matrix but also to different selection intensities. The conditions required for natural selection to favor one strategy and for that strategy to be an evolutionary stable strategy (ESSN) are specified in our model. We compared our results with those of a Moran dynamic process with different selection intensities to explore these two processes better. In the two processes, the conditions conducive to the strategy's taking fixation are the same. By simulation analysis, the dynamic relationships between the fixation probabilities and selection intensities were intuitively observed in the prisoner's dilemma, coordination, and coexistence games. The fixation probability of the cooperative strategy in the prisoner's dilemma decreases with the increase of its own selection intensity. In the coexistence and coordination games, the fixation probability of the cooperative strategy increases with its own selection intensity. For the three types of games, the fixation probability of the cooperative strategy decreases with the increase of the selection intensity of the defection strategy.