Individual differences in working memory capacity and temporal preparation: A secondary reanalysis.

The ability to prepare and maintain an optimal level of preparedness for action, across some unknown duration, is critical for human behavior. Temporal preparation has historically been analyzed in the context of reaction time (RT) experiments where the interval varies between the start of the trial, or foreperiod (FP), and the required response. Two main findings have come out of such paradigms: the variable FP effect (longer RTs to shorter vs. longer FPs) and the sequential FP effect (longer RTs when shorter FPs follow longer FPs). Several theoretical views of these FP effects have been proposed with some suggesting a dissociation while others argue for an implicit process driven by memory traces. One possible method to test these views of FP effects is to examine how individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) moderate such effects. To this end, I reanalyzed data from three studies in which participants completed measures of WMC and a simple RT task with a variable FP. Results suggest that individual differences in WMC were related to the magnitude of the variable FP and the sequential FP effect in two of three individual studies. A "mega-analysis" provided supportive evidence for a relationship between WMC and both forms of FP effects. The present combined experimental-individual differences study provides a novel approach to better understand how and why individuals vary in temporal preparation ability. Through leveraging several large-scale databases unseen in FP research, I provide a new way of understanding FP effects and response timing more generally.

The brief mind wandering three-factor scale (BMW-3).

In recent years, researchers from different fields have become increasingly interested in measuring individual differences in mind wandering as a psychological trait. Although there are several questionnaires that allow for an assessment of people's perceptions of their mind wandering experiences, they either define mind wandering in a very broad sense or do not sufficiently separate different aspects of mind wandering. Here, we introduce the Brief Mind Wandering Three-Factor Scale (BMW-3), a 12-item questionnaire available in German and English. The BMW-3 conceptualizes mind wandering as task-unrelated thought and measures three dimensions of mind wandering: unintentional mind wandering, intentional mind wandering, and meta-awareness of mind wandering. Based on results from 1038 participants (823 German speakers, 215 English speakers), we found support for the proposed three-factorial structure of mind wandering and for scalar measurement invariance of the German and English versions. All subscales showed good internal consistencies and moderate to high test-retest correlations and thus provide an effective assessment of individual differences in mind wandering. Moreover, the BMW-3 showed good convergent validity when compared to existing retrospective measures of mind wandering and mindfulness and was related to conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness as well as self-reported attentional control. Lastly, it predicted the propensity for mind wandering inside and outside the lab (as assessed by in-the-moment experience sampling), the frequency of experiencing depressive symptoms, and the use of functional and dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies. All in all, the BMW-3 provides a brief, reliable, and valid assessment of mind wandering for basic and clinical research.

Mind-wandering in daily life in depressed individuals: An experience sampling study.

BACKGROUND: A diagnostic criterion for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is difficulty concentrating and increased distractibility. One form of distraction that occurs in everyday life is mind-wandering. The current study aims to test how individuals with MDD and healthy controls differ in their mind-wandering in everyday life. METHODS: Adults diagnosed with MDD (n = 53) and healthy controls (n = 53) completed a week of experience sampling, with prompts administered up to eight times per day. At each prompt, participants reported the occurrence and characteristics of their mind-wandering. They also reported levels of momentary negative affect (NA), positive affect (PA), and rumination. RESULTS: MDD participants reported mind-wandering almost twice as often as healthy control participants. Compared to healthy participants, MDD participants rated their mind-wandering as more negative, but did not differ in terms of temporal orientation. Higher NA and lower PA predicted mind-wandering in the MDD group but not healthy controls, even after controlling for rumination. Time-lagged analyses revealed that current mind-wandering predicted future levels of PA in MDD participants but not in healthy controls; in contrast, current NA and PA did not predict future mind-wandering. LIMITATIONS: Limitations include our examination of specific forms of mind-wandering (i.e., we did not sample the full spectrum of this construct). CONCLUSIONS: Individuals with MDD frequently report engaging in mind-wandering in everyday life, and this appears to be coupled with affect. Mind-wandering may have maladaptive effects in MDD and could serve as a target for intervention.

Cross-sectional and longitudinal changes in mind-wandering in older adulthood.

Age-related declines in the frequency of mind-wandering are well established. Theories of mind-wandering have attempted to explain why this decline occurs, but no one theory firmly predicts such changes. One problem with these theoretical views, and the studies that have grown out of them, is their reliance on cross-sectional methods, which do not account for within-person changes over time in mind-wandering, and it is well-documented that cross-sectional and longitudinal changes in some cognitive domains do not align. We present a novel analysis of longitudinal change in subjective and objective indicators of mind-wandering during a sustained attention task. Cognitively normal adults (N = 277, age range 42-94) completed a sustained attention task with thought probes to measure mind-wandering repeatedly over several years. Linear mixed effect models revealed baseline differences in subjective mind-wandering reports among middle-aged and older adults. However, longitudinally, middle-aged participants showed a significant increase in subjective mind-wandering, whereas older participants showed no change. Changes in mind-wandering could not be explained by attentional control ability or contemporaneous estimates of interest and perceived difficulty, but they were explained by baseline levels of conscientiousness. Objective measures of mind-wandering did not show these same patterns and were largely only associated with participants perceived difficulty. Our results build on previous cross-sectional research and suggest that incorporating longitudinal analyses into theories of ageing and mind-wandering and mind-wandering more broadly is important for refining these theories. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Positively framing mind wandering does not increase mind wandering in older adults.

Age-related differences in mind wandering are robust, with older adults reporting less mind wandering compared to younger adults. While several theories have been put forth to explain this difference, one view has received less attention than others. Specifically, age-related differences in mind wandering might occur because older adults are reluctant to report on their mind wandering. The aim of the current study was to explicitly test this hypothesis. Older and younger adults completed a go/no-go task with intermittent thought probes to assess mind wandering. In one condition, participants were provided with standard instructions about how to respond to questions about their thoughts. In a second condition, participants were provided with a positive framing of mind wandering. Mind wandering was assessed both subjectively (i.e., via thought probes) and objectively (i.e., using different behavioral measures from the go/no-go task). The results of the study suggest that positively framing mind wandering did not impact rates of mind wandering or objective indicators of mind wandering for older or younger adults. Older adults reported less mind wandering, regardless of condition, compared to younger adults. Older adults also had generally better performance on the go/no-go task compared to younger adults. Bayesian analyses suggested that the main effect of framing condition, although not significant in Frequentist terms, did provide moderate evidence of an overall effect on mind wandering rates. We interpret the results as evidence against the reluctance hypothesis, consistent with previous work.

Further unpacking individual differences in mind wandering: The role of emotional valence and awareness.

Previous work has established a link between executive attention ability and mind wandering propensity, these studies typically collapse thought reports into a single category of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). We have shown that these TUTs can be differentiated by the emotional valence of their content. Awareness of TUTs might also be an important to consider, yet little work has been done on this front. The current study conceptually replicated and extended previous work by investigating the relationship between individual differences in executive attention, emotional valence and awareness of TUTs. Latent variable models indicated that Executive Attention was differentially correlated with emotional valence TUTs. However, only Attention Control was related to frequency of mind wandering with awareness. Intra-individual analyses indicated that negatively valenced TUTs and TUTs that occurred without awareness were associated with worse performance. Considering different dimensions of TUTs can provide a more complete picture of individual differences in mind wandering.

Effects of emotional valence of mind wandering on sustained attention performance.

The construct of mind wandering has notoriously been characterized as heterogenous which may mean that not all types of mind wandering produce the same pattern of results. One operationalization of mind wandering, task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs), can also itself vary in many dimensions, including the emotional valence of TUTs. The current study summarizes several years of work examining the impact that the emotional valence of TUTs has on different aspects of sustained attention. Participants in several studies reported whether their TUTs were negative, neutral, or positive in emotional valence during a sustained attention-to-response task (SART). The first major focus was a meta-analysis where we examined correlations between each TUT valence and SART performance measures. For the second major focus, we tested how different TUT valences changed over the course of the task. The results suggest that negative TUTs typically show stronger associations with SART performance measures, although all TUT valences have numerically similar correlations. Regarding time-on-task effects, across the studies, there was consistent evidence for a linear increase in negative TUTs across blocks. Evidence for this linear increase was not consistent for neutral and positive TUTs. The results of the current study suggest that the relationships between TUTs and performance, and their likelihood of occurring during a task, are not necessarily the same for every type of TUT. These results highlight the importance of continuing to investigate different types of TUTs and different forms of mind wandering, in general, to better understand how this phenomenon occurs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Antecedents of mind wandering states in healthy aging and mild cognitive impairment.

OBJECTIVE: Mind wandering refers to periods of internally directed attention and comprises up to 30% or more of our waking thoughts. Frequent mind wandering can be detrimental to ongoing task performance. We aim to determine whether rates of mind wandering change in healthy aging and mild cognitive impairment and how differences in mind wandering contribute to differences in attention and working memory. METHOD: We administered a standard behavioral task, the Sustained Attention to Response Test, to measure mind wandering in healthy younger adults (N = 66), healthy older adults (N = 51), and adults with cognitive impairment (N = 38), that was completed daily for 3 weeks. The N-back test was also administered at a reduced frequency as a measure of working memory performance. RESULTS: Generally speaking, averaged across 3 weeks of testing, relative to healthy older adults, mind wandering was higher in younger adults and in cognitive impairment, although the specific patterns varied across mind wandering states. Multiple states of mind wandering also predicted working memory performance; however, reaction time variability tended to be the best predictor based on model comparisons. Each state was also modestly associated with different dispositional factors including mood and Agreeableness. CONCLUSIONS: Patterns of mind wandering change across healthy aging and cognitive impairment and are related to individual differences in multiple dispositional factors and also working memory performance. These results suggest that different states of mind wandering should be measured and accounted for when modeling cognitive change in healthy and pathological aging. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Naturalistic assessment of reaction time variability in older adults at risk for Alzheimer's disease.

OBJECTIVE: Maintaining attention underlies many aspects of cognition and becomes compromised early in neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer's disease (AD). The consistency of maintaining attention can be measured with reaction time (RT) variability. Previous work has focused on measuring such fluctuations during in-clinic testing, but recent developments in remote, smartphone-based cognitive assessments can allow one to test if these fluctuations in attention are evident in naturalistic settings and if they are sensitive to traditional clinical and cognitive markers of AD. METHOD: Three hundred and seventy older adults (aged 75.8 +/- 5.8 years) completed a week of remote daily testing on the Ambulatory Research in Cognition (ARC) smartphone platform and also completed clinical, genetic, and conventional in-clinic cognitive assessments. RT variability was assessed in a brief (20-40 seconds) processing speed task using two different measures of variability, the Coefficient of Variation (CoV) and the Root Mean Squared Successive Difference (RMSSD) of RTs on correct trials. RESULTS: Symptomatic participants showed greater variability compared to cognitively normal participants. When restricted to cognitively normal participants, APOE ε4 carriers exhibited greater variability than noncarriers. Both CoV and RMSSD showed significant, and similar, correlations with several in-clinic cognitive composites. Finally, both RT variability measures significantly mediated the relationship between APOE ε4 status and several in-clinic cognition composites. CONCLUSIONS: Attentional fluctuations over 20-40 seconds assessed in daily life, are sensitive to clinical status and genetic risk for AD. RT variability appears to be an important predictor of cognitive deficits during the preclinical disease stage.

Age-Related Differences in Mind Wandering: The Role of Emotional Valence.

OBJECTIVES: Older adults consistently report fewer experiences of mind wandering compared to younger adults. Aging is also associated with a shift in the emotional focus of our thoughts, with older adults tending to experience an increase in attention toward positive information, or a "positivity bias," relative to younger adults. Here, we tested if the positivity bias associated with aging can also predict age-related changes in the content of older adults' mind wandering. METHOD: Older adults and younger adults completed a go/no-go task with periodic thought probes to assess rates of emotionally valenced mind wandering. RESULTS: Older adults reported significantly less negatively and neutrally valenced mind wandering compared to younger adults, but there was no age difference in reports of positively valenced mind wandering. Overall rates of mind wandering predicted poorer task performance for both age groups: Individuals who mind wandered more, performed worse, but this did not differ by the emotional valence. Both older adults and younger adults showed similar in-the-moment performance deficits, with mind wandering reports being associated with worse immediate no-go accuracy and faster reaction times, consistent with mindless responding. DISCUSSION: Focusing on different dimensions of thought content, such as emotional valence, can provide new insight into age-related differences in mind wandering. Older adults' mind wandering reports were less negative and neutral compared to younger adults' reports suggesting a positivity bias for older adults. However, this positivity bias does not seem to affect task performance. We discuss the implications of the findings for mind wandering theories and the positivity bias.

A Nomothetic Span Approach to the Construct Validation of Sustained Attention Consistency: Re-Analyzing Two Latent-Variable Studies of Performance Variability and Mind-Wandering Self-Reports.

The ability to sustain attention consistency is frequently assessed using either objective behavioral measures, such as reaction time (RT) variability, or subjective self-report measures, such as rates of task-unrelated thought (TUT). The current studies examined whether the individual-difference covariation in these measures provides a more construct valid assessment of attention consistency than does either alone. We argue that performance and self-report measures mutually validate each other; each measurement approach has its own sources of error, so their shared variance should best reflect the attention consistency construct. We reanalyzed two latent-variable studies where RT variability and TUTs were measured in multiple tasks (Kane et al. in J Exp Psychol Gen 145:1017-1048, 2016; Unsworth et al. in J Exp Psychol Gen 150:1303-1331, 2021), along with several nomological network constructs to test the convergent and discriminant validity of a general attention consistency factor. Confirmatory factor analyses assessing bifactor (preregistered) and hierarchical (non-preregistered) models suggested that attention consistency can be modeled as the shared variance among objective and subjective measures. This attention consistency factor was related to working memory capacity, attention (interference) control, processing speed, state motivation and alertness, and self-reported cognitive failures and positive schizotypy. Although bifactor models of general attention consistency provide the most compelling construct validity evidence for a specific ability to sustain attention, multiverse analyses of outlier decisions suggested they are less robust than hierarchical models. The results provide evidence for the general ability to sustain attention consistency and suggestions for improving its measurement.

A combined experimental-correlational approach to the construct validity of performance-based and self-report-based measures of sustained attention.

The ability to sustain attention is often measured with either objective performance indicators, like within-person RT variability, or subjective self-reports, like mind wandering propensity. A more construct valid approach, however, may be to assess the covariation in these performance and self-report measures, given that each of these is influenced by different sources of measurement error. If the correlation between performance-variability and self-report measures reflects the sustained attention construct, then task manipulations aimed at reducing the sustained attention demands of tasks should reduce the correlation between them (in addition to reducing mean levels of variability and mind wandering). The current study investigated this claim with a combined experimental-correlation approach. In two experiments (Ns ~ 1,500 each), participants completed tasks that either maximized or minimized the demand for sustained attention. Our demand manipulations successfully reduced the mean levels of sustained attention failures in both the objective and subjective measures, in both experiments. In neither experiment, however, did the covariation between these measures change as a function of the sustained attention demands of the tasks. We can therefore claim only minimal support for the construct validity of our measurement approach to sustained attention.

A "Goldilocks zone" for mind-wandering reports? A secondary data analysis of how few thought probes are enough for reliable and valid measurement.

Mind-wandering assessment relies heavily on the thought probe technique as a reliable and valid method to assess momentary task-unrelated thought (TUT), but there is little guidance available to help researchers decide how many probes to include within a task. Too few probes may lead to unreliable measurement, but too many probes might artificially disrupt normal thought flow and produce reactive effects. Is there a "Goldilocks zone" for how few thought probes can be used to reliably and validly assess individual differences in mind-wandering propensity? We address this question by reanalyzing two published datasets (Study 1, n = 541; Study 2, ns ≈ 260 per condition) in which thought probes were presented in multiple tasks. Our primary analyses randomly sampled probes in increments of two for each subject in each task. A series of confirmatory factor analyses for each probe "bin" size tested whether the latent correlations between TUT rate and theoretically relevant constructs like working memory capacity, attention-control ability, disorganized schizotypy, and retrospective self-reported mind wandering changed as more probes assessed the TUT rate. TUT rates were remarkably similar across increasing probe-bin sizes and zero-order correlations within and between tasks stabilized at 8-10 probes; moreover, TUT-rate correlations with other latent variables stabilized at about 8 thought probes. Our provisional recommendation (with caveats) is that researchers may use as few as 8 thought probes in prototypical cognitive tasks to gain reliable and valid information about individual differences in TUT rate.

Interpolated testing and content pretesting as interventions to reduce task-unrelated thoughts during a video lecture.

Considerable research has examined the prevalence and apparent consequences of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) in both laboratory and authentic educational settings. Few studies, however, have explored methods to reduce TUTs during learning; those few studies tested small samples or used unvalidated TUT assessments. The present experimental study attempted to conceptually replicate or extend previous findings of interpolated testing and pretesting effects on TUT and learning. In a study of 195 U.S. undergraduates, we investigated whether interpolated testing (compared to interpolated restudy) and pretesting on lecture-relevant materials (compared to pretesting on conceptually related but lecture-irrelevant materials) would reduce TUTs during a video lecture on introductory statistics. Subjects completed either a content-matched or content-mismatched pretest on statistics concepts and then watched a narrated lecture slideshow. During the lecture, half of the sample completed interpolated tests on the lecture material and half completed interpolated restudy of that material. All subjects responded to unpredictably presented thought probes during the video to assess their immediately preceding thoughts, including TUTs. Following the lecture, students reported on their situational interest elicited by the lecture and then completed a posttest. Interpolated testing significantly reduced TUT rates during the lecture compared to restudying, conceptually replicating previous findings-but with a small effect size and no supporting Bayes-factor evidence. We found statistical evidence for neither an interpolated testing effect on learning, nor an effect of matched-content pretesting on TUT rates or learning. Interpolated testing might have limited utility to support students' attention, but varying effect sizes across studies warrants further work.

Individual differences in dimensions of mind wandering: the mediating role of emotional valence and intentionality.

Individual differences in executive control ability reliably show that those with greater executive control report fewer instances of mind wandering during moderately demanding tasks. However, these findings have been limited in that they often treated mind wandering as a variable that collapsed across a variety of thought categories or dimensions. We suggest that two dimensions of mind wandering, intentionality and emotional valence, may be differential related to individual difference in executive control ability. The present study examined this using multiple measures of working memory capacity and attentional control while measuring emotional valence and intentionality of mind wandering during a single sustained attention task. Non-cognitive predictors of mind wandering were also measured. Overall, the results suggest that both working memory capacity and attention control are significant predictors of mind wandering propensity, replicating previous findings. However, the dimensions of emotional valence and intentionality suggested that this finding was not consistent across all types of thought reports. The current findings provide support for the view that it is critical to consider these two dimensions, among other important dimensions, of mind wandering to have a more complete understanding of individual differences in mind wandering.

Linking the dynamics of cognitive control to individual differences in working memory capacity: Evidence from reaching behavior.

We used a technique known as reach tracking to investigate how individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) relate to the functioning of two processes proposed to underlie cognitive control: a threshold adjustment process that temporarily inhibits motor output in response to signals of conflict and a controlled selection process that recruits top-down control to guide stimulus-response translation. Undergraduates (N = 135) performed two WMC tasks (updating counters and symmetry span) and a reach-tracking version of the Eriksen flanker task. Consistent with previous research using button-press flanker tasks, WMC significantly correlated with response time (RT) performance, with higher WMC scores corresponding to smaller congruency effects. Given that RTs reflect the combined functioning of multiple processes underlying cognitive control, we interpreted this effect to reflect a general link between WMC and both the threshold adjustment process and controlled selection process. We also found a significant association between WMC and participants' reach trajectories, with higher WMC scores corresponding to more direct reach movements on incongruent trials involving stimulus-response overlap with the preceding trial. We interpreted this effect to reflect a more specific link between WMC and the functioning of the controlled selection process. We discuss the observed links between WMC and cognitive control in relation to the unity and diversity of executive functions framework and in relation to the role of prefrontal and striatal dopamine in supporting adaptive cognitive control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Testing the construct validity of competing measurement approaches to probed mind-wandering reports.

Psychology faces a measurement crisis, and mind-wandering research is not immune. The present study explored the construct validity of probed mind-wandering reports (i.e., reports of task-unrelated thought [TUT]) with a combined experimental and individual-differences approach. We examined laboratory data from over 1000 undergraduates at two U.S. institutions, who responded to one of four different thought-probe types across two cognitive tasks. We asked a fundamental measurement question: Do different probe types yield different results, either in terms of average reports (average TUT rates, TUT-report confidence ratings), or in terms of TUT-report associations, such as TUT rate or confidence stability across tasks, or between TUT reports and other consciousness-related constructs (retrospective mind-wandering ratings, executive-control performance, and broad questionnaire trait assessments of distractibility-restlessness and positive-constructive daydreaming)? Our primary analyses compared probes that asked subjects to report on different dimensions of experience: TUT-content probes asked about what they'd been mind-wandering about, TUT-intentionality probes asked about why they were mind-wandering, and TUT-depth probes asked about the extent (on a rating scale) of their mind-wandering. Our secondary analyses compared thought-content probes that did versus didn't offer an option to report performance-evaluative thoughts. Our findings provide some "good news"-that some mind-wandering findings are robust across probing methods-and some "bad news"-that some findings are not robust across methods and that some commonly used probing methods may not tell us what we think they do. Our results lead us to provisionally recommend content-report probes rather than intentionality- or depth-report probes for most mind-wandering research.

The Worst Performance Rule, or the Not-Best Performance Rule? Latent-Variable Analyses of Working Memory Capacity, Mind-Wandering Propensity, and Reaction Time.

The worst performance rule (WPR) is a robust empirical finding reflecting that people's worst task performance shows numerically stronger correlations with cognitive ability than their average or best performance. However, recent meta-analytic work has proposed this be renamed the "not-best performance" rule because mean and worst performance seem to predict cognitive ability to similar degrees, with both predicting ability better than best performance. We re-analyzed data from a previously published latent-variable study to test for worst vs. not-best performance across a variety of reaction time tasks in relation to two cognitive ability constructs: working memory capacity (WMC) and propensity for task-unrelated thought (TUT). Using two methods of assessing worst performance-ranked-binning and ex-Gaussian-modeling approaches-we found evidence for both the worst and not-best performance rules. WMC followed the not-best performance rule (correlating equivalently with mean and longest response times (RTs)) but TUT propensity followed the worst performance rule (correlating more strongly with longest RTs). Additionally, we created a mini-multiverse following different outlier exclusion rules to test the robustness of our findings; our findings remained stable across the different multiverse iterations. We provisionally conclude that the worst performance rule may only arise in relation to cognitive abilities closely linked to (failures of) sustained attention.