What makes Voldemort tick? Children's and adults' reasoning about the nature of villains.

How do children make sense of antisocial acts committed by evil-doers? We addressed this question in three studies with 434 children (4-12 years) and 277 adults, focused on participants' judgments of both familiar and novel fictional villains and heroes. Study 1 established that children viewed villains' actions and emotions as overwhelmingly negative, suggesting that children's well-documented positivity bias does not prevent their appreciation of extreme forms of villainy. Studies 2 and 3 assessed children's and adults' beliefs regarding heroes' and villains' moral character and true selves, using an array of converging evidence, including: how a character felt inside, whether a character's actions reflected their true self, whether a character's true self could change over time, and how an omniscient machine would judge a character's true self. Across these measures, both children and adults consistently evaluated villains' true selves to be more negative than heroes'. Importantly, at the same time, we also detected an asymmetry in the judgments, wherein villains were more likely than heroes to have a true self that differed from their outward behavior. More specifically, across the ages studied participants more often reported that villains were inwardly good, than that heroes were inwardly bad. Implications, limitations, and directions for future research are discussed in light of our expanding understanding of the development of true self beliefs.

Altruism, hypocrisy and theory of mind in autistic and nonautistic children.

Children make choices between generosity and greed every day. Often they must also choose between confession or denial of antisocial acts like greed, thereby displaying either honesty or hypocrisy. Such choices pose cognitive challenges that, in theory, might reflect children's developing social-cognitions and affect their daily social lives and developmental opportunities. Individual differences in altruism and hypocrisy were examined in relation to theory of mind (ToM) in 102 school-age children (44 autistic; 58 typically developing) using ecologically valid altruism and hypocrisy tests where generosity had lasting real-life costs and hypocrisy was self-serving. Selfless altruism was abundant for autistic and nonautistic children alike and was significantly predicted by ToM over and above other predictors like age, gender, and language. More nonautistic (74%) than autistic children (41%) displayed hypocrisy, although individual ToM differences among ASD children were not significantly correlated with it. Findings extend to new instances (altruism and hypocrisy) evidence of ToM's importance for everyday social behaviors that impact upon peer relations while also extending past evidence that: (a) unexpected sociomoral strengths can coexist with ToM delays, (b) attention to individual differences is crucial, and (c) autistic children's capacity to develop sociomoral reasoning should not be underestimated. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Measurement of Cognition for the National Children's Study.

The National Children's Study Cognitive Health Domain Team developed detailed plans for assessing cognition longitudinally from infancy to early adulthood. These plans identify high-priority aspects of cognition that can be measured efficiently and effectively, and we believe they can serve as a model for future large-scale longitudinal research. For infancy and toddlerhood, we proposed several paradigms that collectively allowed us to assess six broad cognitive constructs: (1) executive function skills, (2) episodic memory, (3) language, (4) processing speed, (5) spatial and numerical processing, and (6) social cognition. In some cases, different trial sequences within a paradigm allow for the simultaneous assessment of multiple cognitive skills (e.g., executive function skills and processing speed). We define each construct, summarize its significance for understanding developmental outcomes, discuss the feasibility of its assessment throughout development, and present our plan for measuring specific skills at different ages. Given the need for well-validated, direct behavioral measures of cognition that can be used in large-scale longitudinal studies, especially from birth to age 3 years, we also initiated three projects focused on the development of new measures.

Theory-of-Mind Development in Young Deaf Children With Early Hearing Provisions.

Deaf and hard-of-hearing (DHH) children born to hearing parents have profound theory-of-mind (ToM) delays, yet little is known about how providing hearing assistance early in life, through cochlear implants and hearing aids, influences their ToM development. We thus addressed (a) whether young DHH children with early hearing provision developed ToM differently than older children did in previous research and (b) what ToM understandings characterize this understudied population. Findings from 84 three- to six-year-old DHH children primarily acquiring spoken language demonstrated that accumulated hearing experience influenced their ToM, as measured by a five-step ToM scale. Moreover, language abilities mediated this developmental relationship: Children with more advanced language abilities, because of more time using cochlear implants and hearing aids, had better ToM growth. These findings demonstrate the crucial relationships among hearing, language, and ToM for DHH children acquiring spoken language, thereby addressing theoretical and practical questions about ToM development.

How Bilingualism Informs Theory of Mind Development.

The possibility and nature of bilingual advantage for theory of mind (ToM), that is, young bilingual children outperforming their monolingual peers, have been discussed increasingly since the first research on the topic was published in 2003. Because accumulating evidence demonstrates a ToM advantage for bilingual individuals, in this article, we focus on how this advantage arises. We consider how current theoretical positions, including executive function, metalinguistic awareness, and sociolinguistic awareness accounts, explain such an advantage in young bilingual children. These theoretical accounts receive some, but only partial, support, so further research and theory are needed to understand comprehensively the relationship between bilingualism and ToM.

Caregiving relationships as evolutionary and developmental bases of obligation.

Obligation as defined by Tomasello requires mutually capable parties, but one-sided caregiver relationships reveal its developmental and evolutionary precursors. Specifically, "coercive" emotions may prompt protective action by caregivers toward infant primates, and infants show distress toward caregivers when they appear to violate expectations in their relationships. We argue that these early social-relational expectations and emotions may form the base of obligation.

Robot teachers for children? Young children trust robots depending on their perceived accuracy and agency.

Children acquire extensive knowledge from others. Today, children receive information from not only people but also technological devices, like social robots. Two studies assessed whether young children appropriately trust technological informants. One hundred and four 3-year-olds learned the names of novel objects from either a pair of social robots or inanimate machines, where 1 informant was previously shown to be accurate and the other inaccurate. Children trusted information from an accurate social robot over an inaccurate one, as they have been shown to do for human informants, and even more so when they perceived the robots as having psychological agency. However, children did not learn selectively from inanimate, but accurate, machines. Children can learn from technological devices (e.g., social robots) but trust their information more when the device appears to have mindful agency. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Creepiness Creeps In: Uncanny Valley Feelings Are Acquired in Childhood.

The uncanny valley posits that very human-like robots are unsettling, a phenomenon amply demonstrated in adults but unexplored in children. Two hundred forty 3- to 18-year-olds viewed one of two robots (machine-like or very human-like) and rated their feelings toward (e.g., "Does the robot make you feel weird or happy?") and perceptions of the robot's capacities (e.g., "Does the robot think for itself?"). Like adults, children older than 9 judged the human-like robot as creepier than the machine-like robot-but younger children did not. Children's perceptions of robots' mental capacities predicted uncanny feelings: children judge robots to be creepy depending on whether they have human-like minds. The uncanny valley is therefore acquired over development and relates to changing conceptions about robot minds.

Children's Early Awareness of Comprehension as Evident in Their Spontaneous Corrections of Speech Errors.

A crucial human cognitive goal is to understand and to be understood. But understanding often takes active management. Two studies investigated early developmental processes of understanding management by focusing on young children's comprehension monitoring. We ask: When and how do young children actively monitor their comprehension of social-communicative interchanges and so seek to clarify and correct their own potential miscomprehension? Study 1 examined the parent-child conversations of 13 children studied longitudinally in everyday situations from the time the children were approximately 2 years through 3 years. Study 2 used a seminaturalistic situation in the laboratory to address these questions with more precision and control with 36 children aged 2-3 years.

Longitudinal Theory of Mind (ToM) Development From Preschool to Adolescence With and Without ToM Delay.

Longitudinal tracking of 107 three- to-thirteen-year-olds in a cross-sequential design showed a 6-step theory of mind (ToM) sequence identified by a few past cross-sectional studies validly depicted longitudinal ToM development from early to middle childhood for typically developing (TD) children and those with ToM delays owing to deafness or autism. Substantively, all groups showed ToM progress throughout middle childhood. Atypical development was more extended and began and ended at lower levels than for TD children. Yet most children in all groups progressed over the study's mean 1.5 years. Findings help resolve theoretical debates about ToM development for children with and without delay and gain strength and weight via their applicability to three disparate groups varying in ToM timing and sequencing.

Explaining the Unpredictable: The Development of Causal Theories of Mind in Deaf and Hearing Children.

Two studies of 100 children aged 3-12 years examined theory of mind (ToM) understanding via explanations and predictions in hearing preschoolers and ToM-delayed deaf children. Study 1's 75 children (31 deaf; 44 hearing) displayed an "explanation advantage," devising valid epistemic ToM explanations despite failing simpler forced-choice false-belief (FB) prediction tests. This novel discovery for deaf children extended to unexpectedly frequent cognitive ("think" or "know") explanations. Study 2 (with 25 additional deaf children; Mage  = 9) showed that microgenetic FB explanation practice resulted in significant gains on FB prediction posttests that were absent in a non-ToM control group. Implications for (a) explanation's interconnection with conceptual development, (b) designing ToM interventions, and (c) teaching deaf and hearing children are discussed.

Nimble negotiators: How theory of mind (ToM) interconnects with persuasion skills in children with and without ToM delay.

Persuasion is an essential social skill. Yet its development and underpinnings are poorly understood. In 2 studies, a total of 167 children aged 3 to 12 years took theory of mind (ToM) tests and participated in unscripted, seminaturalistic persuasive conversations. Children were typically developing (TD) or had deafness or autism spectrum disorder (ASD). High-level, informationally rich persuasive arguments increased with age in all groups in both studies, as did ToM. In both studies, ToM scores predicted persuasion skill over and above age, language ability, and deafness/ASD status. In Study 1, TD 8-year-olds outperformed age-matched deaf and autistic children in ToM but only equaled them in persuasive skill. Study 2 employed more challenging persuasion tasks and revealed superior persuasion performance by school-aged TD children compared with same-aged children with deafness or ASD. Deaf and ASD groups did better on Study 1's straightforward persuasion tasks than on Study 2's more challenging ones, whereas TD children rose to the added challenge without their persuasion performance suffering. (PsycINFO Database Record

Aggression, Sibling Antagonism, and Theory of Mind During the First Year of Siblinghood: A Developmental Cascade Model.

A developmental cascade model was tested to examine longitudinal associations among firstborn children's aggression, theory of mind (ToM), and antagonism toward their younger sibling during the 1st year of siblinghood. Aggression and ToM were assessed before the birth of a sibling and 4 and 12 months after the birth, and antagonism was examined at 4 and 12 months in a sample of 208 firstborn children (initial Mage  = 30 months, 56% girls) from primarily European American, middle-class families. Firstborns' aggression consistently predicted high sibling antagonism both directly and through poorer ToM. Results highlight the importance of examining longitudinal influences across behavioral, social-cognitive, and relational factors that are closely intertwined even from the early years of life.

Deaf and hearing children's development of theory of mind, peer popularity, and leadership during middle childhood.

This study had two primary aims. First, we compared deaf and hearing children during middle and late childhood on (a) cognitive understanding of basic and advanced theory of mind (ToM) and (b) social dimensions of peer group relations, including popularity, isolation, leadership, and the disposition to interact positively with peers. Second, using correlational analyses, we examined ToM's connections with these social variables to see whether and how ToM impacts children's social lives. A total of 57 children (36 deaf children of hearing parents and 21 hearing children) 6 to 14years of age completed a 6-step developmental ToM Scale, and their teachers reported on the social variables. Hearing children outperformed deaf children on ToM and all teacher-rated variables. For deaf children, popularity correlated positively, and social isolation correlated negatively, with ToM even after controlling for age, gender, and language ability. For hearing children, the only ToM link was a weak correlation with leadership. Possible reasons for the differences between deaf and hearing groups are discussed, together with the likelihood of bidirectional causal links and implications for deaf children's social development in school.

Peer social skills and theory of mind in children with autism, deafness, or typical development.

Consequences of theory of mind (ToM) development for daily social lives of children are uncertain. Five to 13-year-olds (N = 195) with typical development, autism, or deafness (both native and late signers) took ToM tests and their teachers reported on their social skills for peer interaction (e.g., leadership, group entry). Groups differed in both ToM understanding (with late-signing deaf children especially delayed even relative to autistic children) and peer social skills (with autistic children especially delayed even relative to deaf late signers). Crucially, for the typically developing hearing children and deaf children alike, ToM understanding independently predicted peer social skills over and above age, gender, language ability, and, for deaf children, status as native- or late-signer. These novel findings offer some of the best evidence to date of the relevance of ToM cognitions to real-world social behavior for both these groups. However, for those with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) the pattern was different. The apparent link of ToM to peer competence was not a direct one but instead was significantly mediated by language ability. Several possible explanations for this intriguing autism-specific result were also discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

Developing concepts of ordinary and extraordinary communication.

We examine how understandings of ordinary and extraordinary communication develop. Three- to 10-year-old children and adults (N = 183) were given scenarios in which a protagonist wanted help from a human (their parent) or from God. Scenarios varied in whether protagonists expressed their desires aloud (by asking) or silently (by hoping), whether (for human scenarios) parents were nearby or far away, and whether (for God scenarios) protagonists expressed desires through ordinary means (asking or hoping) or more extraordinary means (praying). Following each scenario, participants were asked whether the recipient (either the parent or God) was aware of the protagonist's desire. Children as young as 3 to 4 years old understood that both loudness and distance limit the effectiveness of human communication, reporting that humans would most likely be aware of desires when they were expressed both aloud and nearby. As well, by this age children reported that God would more often be aware of desires than would humans, but children of all ages often reported that God (like humans) would be more aware of desires expressed aloud (rather than silently). These concepts of ordinary and extraordinary communication continued to be refined through middle childhood. Children's performance on standard theory-of-mind tasks and participants' religious background predicted whether they attributed awareness to God. (PsycINFO Database Record

Young Children Prefer and Remember Satisfying Explanations.

Research with preschool children shows that explanations are important to them in that they actively seek explanations in their conversations with adults. But, what sorts of explanations do they prefer, and what, if anything, do young children learn from the explanations they receive? Following a preliminary study with adults (N=67) to establish materials for use with children, we addressed this question using a semi-naturalistic methodology. 4- and 5-year-olds (N=69) were dissatisfied when receiving non-explanations to their explanatory questions, but satisfied when receiving explanations, and their satisfaction varied appropriately across several levels of explanatory information. Moreover, using recall as a measure of learning, whereas children typically failed to recall non-explanations, their recall of explanatory information was consistently high and also varied appropriately across differing levels of information provided. These results confirm that children not only actively seek informative explanations in their everyday conversational interactions with adults, they selectively retain the answers they receive.

Theory-of-Mind Training Causes Honest Young Children to Lie.

Theory of mind (ToM) has long been recognized to play a major role in children's social functioning. However, no direct evidence confirms the causal linkage between the two. In the current study, we addressed this significant gap by examining whether ToM causes the emergence of lying, an important social skill. We showed that after participating in ToM training to learn about mental-state concepts, 3-year-olds who originally had been unable to lie began to deceive consistently. This training effect lasted for more than a month. In contrast, 3-year-olds who participated in control training to learn about physical concepts were significantly less inclined to lie than the ToM-trained children. These findings provide the first experimental evidence supporting the causal role of ToM in the development of social competence in early childhood.