Disposing of the self: the role of attachment in the disposition process.

It is well established that individuals have strong attachment to many possessions, but they cannot keep all these possessions forever. Disposition has received relatively limited attention in the literature though it is clear that disposition is significantly influenced by attachment. We review the burgeoning number of studies examining how possession attachment influences disposition. Attachment is influential at each stage of the disposition process, from the decision to stop using an object, the decision to dispose of an object, and the choice of disposal type. We end with a call for further research on disposal, particularly that which considers the role of object attachment at earlier stages of the disposition process.

When moral identity symbolization motivates prosocial behavior: the role of recognition and moral identity internalization.

This article examines the role of moral identity symbolization in motivating prosocial behaviors. We propose a 3-way interaction of moral identity symbolization, internalization, and recognition to predict prosocial behavior. When moral identity internalization is low, we hypothesize that high moral identity symbolization motivates recognized prosocial behavior due to the opportunity to present one's moral characteristics to others. In contrast, when moral identity internalization is high, prosocial behavior is motivated irrespective of the level of symbolization and recognition. Two studies provide support for this pattern examining volunteering of time. Our results provide a framework for predicting prosocial behavior by combining the 2 dimensions of moral identity with the situational factor of recognition.

Now that I'm sad, it's hard to be mad: the role of cognitive appraisals in emotional blunting.

People often encounter one emotion-triggering event after another. To examine how an emotion experience affects those that follow, the current article draws on the appraisal-tendency framework and cognitive appraisal theories of emotion. The emotional blunting hypothesis predicts that a specific emotion can carry over to blunt the experience of a subsequent emotion when defined by contrasting appraisal tendencies. Results support the hypothesis: Inducing sadness blunted subsequent anger (Studies 1 and 2), and inducing anger blunted subsequent sadness (Study 2). Situational (human) agency appraisals mediated the effect of anger (sadness) on subsequent sadness (anger) elicitation (Study 2). Priming agency appraisals (Study 3) also moderated results. Finally, the effect of emotional blunting carried over to cognitive outcomes in each of the three studies. Together, the results reveal the importance of examining the sequence of emotional experiences. Implications for emotion and judgment in applied settings (e.g., the courtroom) are discussed.