Stimulus-elicited involuntary autobiographical memories.

The reflexive imagery task (RIT) has been used to investigate stimulus-elicited involuntary mental processes. The task has been successful in eliciting involuntary perceptual experiences, urges, and even higher-order cognitions, but it has never been used to elicit autobiographical memories, even though in everyday life these memories are often activated involuntarily by external stimuli. These memories are different in interesting ways from the kinds of mental representations that have been activated involuntarily in the RIT. The memories have properties which might make them insusceptible to such a form of external influence. Perhaps substantive effects will not arise because the mental representations associated with autobiographical memories are complex, poly-sensory, and rich in terms of content. To investigate this matter, we developed a variant of the RIT in which participants were presented with external stimuli (line drawings of everyday objects) and instructed not to recall any autobiographical memories. We investigated whether the nature of the involuntary memories was influenced by the nature of the stimulus. In two experiments, the involuntary memories were associated to the stimulus on a majority of the trials (∼80%). We discuss theoretical implications of this finding and of identifying the conditions in which such involuntary effects will not arise. The boundary conditions of the RIT effect illuminate the limits of unconscious processing and also the role of conscious processing in nervous function.

The habituation of higher-order conscious processes: Evidence from mental arithmetic.

A recurring idea in psychology is that one is conscious only of the "outputs" of mental operations, but not of the operations themselves. Often, such "entry into consciousness" occurs involuntarily. To investigate involuntary entry, some experimentalists have used the reflexive imagery task (RIT). The RIT has revealed that, under certain conditions, external stimuli (e.g., line drawings) can elicit involuntary entry of high-level cognitions. In the basic version of the task, participants are presented with visual objects and instructed not to subvocalize (i.e., say in one's head) the names of these objects. Participants cannot suppress these subvocalizations on a majority of the trials. It has been proposed that, if RIT effects resemble a reflex, then perhaps they will habituate as reflexes do. In the "habituation" variant of the RIT, the same stimulus object (e.g., CAT) is presented on ten consecutive trials (ten "instantiations"), in order to induce habituation (i.e., a weakened RIT effect). It remains unknown whether such habituation effects arise for stimulus-elicited processes that depend, not on subvocalization, but on more complex processes, such as mental arithmetic. To illuminate this issue, we conducted a conceptual replication of the "habituation" RIT that involves, on each trial, the participant trying not to add two numbers (e.g., 14 and 2). We assessed whether the habituation effects were stimulus-specific or set-specific. Understanding the boundary conditions of the RIT effect and its habituation illuminates the limits of unconscious processes and the role of conscious processing.