Dynamic coopetition game between private label and national brand under carbon trading policy.

The increasing environmental concerns have changed the coopetition behavior between private-label (PL) retailers and national-brand (NB) manufacturers, which needs firms to reconsider their competitive and cooperative strategies to cope with this change. To address this need, we incorporate carbon trading policy into dynamic coopetition game models between a PL retailer and an NB manufacturer. We examine their dynamic evolution trajectories of state variables, decision variables, and profit value functions by using numerical simulation. The sensitivity analysis shows that: (i) some key parameters affect the steady-state values of variables and profit value functions; (ii) the relative strengths of the NB manufacturer and the PL retailer affect decision variables and profit value functions. The results indicate that the carbon trading policy significantly affects dynamic coopetition between the PL retailer and the NB manufacturer.

Optimal Strategies of Product Price, Quality, and Corporate Environmental Responsibility.

With the awakening of environmental consciousness, more and more firms desire to go "green" by shifting their focus of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from charitable contributions to environmental actions called corporate environmental responsibility (CER). We develop a monopoly differential game to depict optimal corporate strategies of product price, quality, and CER. Using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, we analyze optimal feedback equilibrium strategies for pricing and investing in both quality and CER with/without government subsidies. Numerical simulations show that government subsidy can improve CER and profit.

Optimal Coordination Strategy for International Production Planning and Pollution Abating under Cap-and-Trade Regulations.

Because both pollution emissions and production policies often are international in scope, it is necessary to find optimal coordination strategies for international production planning and pollution abating. Differential game models are developed for multiple neighboring countries to reach optimal decisions on their production planning and pollution abating under cap-and-trade regulations. Non-cooperative and cooperative differential games are presented to depict the optimal tradeoffs between production planning and pollution abating. Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations are then employed to analyze the asymmetric and symmetric feedback solutions. Numerical simulations are used to illustrate the results. Five different dividends are also discussed. With the proposed strategies, more improvement will be directed toward production supplies and environmental issues than ever before.

Effects of Smart City Policies on Green Total Factor Productivity: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment in China.

When cities develop rapidly, there are negative effects such as population expansion, traffic congestion, resource shortages, and pollution. It has become essential to explore new types of urban development patterns, and thus, the concept of the "smart city" has emerged. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the links between smart city policies and urban green total factor productivity (GTFP) in the context of China. Based on panel data of 200 cities in China from 2007-2016 and treating smart city policy as a quasi-natural experiment, the paper uses a difference-in-differences propensity score matching (PSM-DID) approach to prevent selection bias. The results show: (a) Smart city policies can significantly increase urban GTFP by 16% to 18%; (b) the larger the city, the stronger and more significant this promotion.