RESUMO
Central environmental inspection (CEI) is an environmental governance tool launched by the Chinese central government in recent years. The aim of CEI is to enhance the implementation of environmental regulations by going beyond supervising enterprises to supervise local governments. Previous studies have shown that CEI is beneficial for improving corporate environmental performance, but the relationship between CEI and the environmental behavior of companies achieving a high level of environmental performance is not clear. Drawing on principal-agent theory, this study explains how CEI influences corporate green innovation by changing the incentive structures of local governments and firms for adopting different environmental strategies. Moreover, two boundary conditions between CEI and corporate green innovation are identified: political connections and industry competition. The boundary conditions affect the individual and collective bargaining intentions of companies to comply with environmental regulations. We test our hypotheses by using a sample of 1152 publicly traded industrial firms in China from 2014 to 2018. Our findings show that CEI is conducive to corporate green innovation. This positive effect is strengthened in politically connected firms or firms in highly monopolized industries with lower bargaining intentions. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the effect of CEI on micro (firm-level) environmental behaviors and the antecedents of corporate green innovation.
