Mouse tracking performance: A new approach to analyzing continuous mouse tracking data.

Mouse tracking is an important source of data in cognitive science. Most contemporary mouse tracking studies use binary-choice tasks and analyze the curvature or velocity of an individual mouse movement during an experimental trial as participants select from one of the two options. However, there are many types of mouse tracking data available beyond what is produced in a binary-choice task, including naturalistic data from web users. In order to utilize these data, cognitive scientists need tools that are robust to the lack of trial-by-trial structure in most normal computer tasks. We use singular value decomposition (SVD) and detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA) to analyze whole time series of unstructured mouse movement data. We also introduce a new technique for describing two-dimensional mouse traces as complex-valued time series, which allows SVD and DFA to be applied in a straightforward way without losing important spatial information. We find that there is useful information at the level of whole time series, and we use this information to predict performance in an online task. We also discuss how the implications of these results can advance the use of mouse tracking research in cognitive science.

Metaphor and the Philosophical Implications of Embodied Mathematics.

Embodied approaches to cognition see abstract thought and language as grounded in interactions between mind, body, and world. A particularly important challenge for embodied approaches to cognition is mathematics, perhaps the most abstract domain of human knowledge. Conceptual metaphor theory, a branch of cognitive linguistics, describes how abstract mathematical concepts are grounded in concrete physical representations. In this paper, we consider the implications of this research for the metaphysics and epistemology of mathematics. In the case of metaphysics, we argue that embodied mathematics is neutral in the sense of being compatible with all existing accounts of what mathematical entities really are. However, embodied mathematics may be able to revive an older position known as psychologism and overcome the difficulties it faces. In the case of epistemology, we argue that the evidence collected in the embodied mathematics literature is inconclusive: It does not show that abstract mathematical thinking is constituted by metaphor; it may simply show that abstract thinking is facilitated by metaphor. Our arguments suggest that closer interaction between the philosophy and cognitive science of mathematics could yield a more precise, empirically informed account of what mathematics is and how we come to have knowledge of it.

Extending Gurwitsch's field theory of consciousness.

Aron Gurwitsch's theory of the structure and dynamics of consciousness has much to offer contemporary theorizing about consciousness and its basis in the embodied brain. On Gurwitsch's account, as we develop it, the field of consciousness has a variable sized focus or "theme" of attention surrounded by a structured periphery of inattentional contents. As the field evolves, its contents change their status, sometimes smoothly, sometimes abruptly. Inner thoughts, a sense of one's body, and the physical environment are dominant field contents. These ideas can be linked with (and help unify) contemporary theories about the neural correlates of consciousness, inattention, the small world structure of the brain, meta-stable dynamics, embodied cognition, and predictive coding in the brain.

Joint perceptual decision-making: a case study in explanatory pluralism.

Traditionally different approaches to the study of cognition have been viewed as competing explanatory frameworks. An alternative view, explanatory pluralism, regards different approaches to the study of cognition as complementary ways of studying the same phenomenon, at specific temporal and spatial scales, using appropriate methodological tools. Explanatory pluralism has been often described abstractly, but has rarely been applied to concrete cases. We present a case study of explanatory pluralism. We discuss three separate ways of studying the same phenomenon: a perceptual decision-making task (Bahrami et al., 2010), where pairs of subjects share information to jointly individuate an oddball stimulus among a set of distractors. Each approach analyzed the same corpus but targeted different units of analysis at different levels of description: decision-making at the behavioral level, confidence sharing at the linguistic level, and acoustic energy at the physical level. We discuss the utility of explanatory pluralism for describing this complex, multiscale phenomenon, show ways in which this case study sheds new light on the concept of pluralism, and highlight good practices to critically assess and complement approaches.

Phenomenology and connectionism.

I show how the dynamics of consciousness can be formally derived from the "open dynamics" of neural activity, and develop a mathematical framework for neuro-phenomenological investigation. I describe the space of possible brain states, the space of possible conscious states, and a "supervenience function" linking them. I show how this framework can be used to associate phenomenological structures with neuro-computational structures, and vice-versa. I pay special attention to the relationship between (1) the relatively fast dynamics of consciousness and neural activity, and (2) the slower dynamics of knowledge update and brain development.