RESUMO
Cooperators benefit others with paying costs. Evolution of cooperation crucially depends on the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, denoted as c. In this work, we investigate the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma for various values of c with four of the representative memory-one strategies, i.e., unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, tit-for-tat, and win-stay-lose-shift. We consider replicator dynamics which deterministically describes how the fraction of each strategy evolves over time in an infinite-sized well-mixed population in the presence of implementation error and mutation among the four strategies. Our finding is that this three-dimensional continuous-time dynamics exhibits chaos through a bifurcation sequence similar to that of a logistic map as c varies. If mutation occurs with rate µâª1, the position of the bifurcation sequence on the c axis is numerically found to scale as µ^{0.1}, and such sensitivity to µ suggests that mutation may have nonperturbative effects on evolutionary paths. It demonstrates how the microscopic randomness of the mutation process can be amplified to macroscopic unpredictability by evolutionary dynamics.
