Is Martin Luther King or Malcolm X the more acceptable face of protest? High-status groups' reactions to low-status groups' collective action.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology on Jul 8 2019 (see record 2019-40588-001). In the article, Malcolm X was misspelled in the article title, in the second epigraph below the abstract, and in the second paragraph of the first paragraph and the first sentence of the fifth paragraph of the Implications for the Effectiveness of Low-Status Collective Action section. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Work on collective action focuses mainly on the perspective of disadvantaged groups. However, the dynamics of social change cannot be fully understood without taking into account the reactions of the members of advantaged groups to collective action by low-status groups. In 10 experiments conducted in 4 different intergroup contexts (N = 1349), we examine advantaged groups support for normative versus non-normative collective action by disadvantaged groups. Experiments 1a to 1e show that normative collective action is perceived as more likely to improve the disadvantaged group's position and that non-normative collective action is perceived as more damaging to the advantaged group's social image. Also, these differences are due to differences in perceptions of actions violating norms of protest and perceptions of protesters as blaming the advantaged group for the inequality. Experiments 2a to 3 show that high compared with low identified members of advantaged groups distinguish more between types of collective action, showing a greater preference for the normative type. Both a mediational design and an experimental-causal-chain design (Experiments 3 and 4) show that support among high identifiers depends more on whether collective action damages the high-status group's social image than on whether it actually reduces inequality. Findings suggest that high-status groups' support for collective action is not only shaped by the perceived likelihood of change but also by its potential damage to the image of the high-status ingroup. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Inherence heuristic versus essentialism: Issues of antecedence and cognitive mechanism.

We argue (1) that the empirical evidence offered by the authors is insufficient to sustain their claim; (2) that, beyond methodological problems, the proposed underlying cognitive mechanism is largely speculative and that a reverse, more motivational, path is equally plausible; and (3) that the distinction and antecedence of inherence intuitions with respect to essentialist beliefs remain to be demonstrated.

When are emotions related to group-based appraisals? A comparison between group-based emotions and general group emotions.

In the literature on emotions in intergroup relations, it is not always clear how exactly emotions are group-related. Here, we distinguish between emotions that involve appraisals of immediate group concerns (i.e., group-based emotions) and emotions that do not. Recently, general group emotions, measured by asking people how they feel "as a group member" but without specifying an object for these emotions, have been conceptualized as reflecting appraisals of group concerns. In contrast, we propose that general group emotions are best seen as emotions about belonging to a group. In two studies, general group emotions were closely related to emotions that are explicitly measured as belonging emotions. Two further studies showed that general group emotions were not related to appraisals of immediate group concerns, whereas group-based emotions were. We argue for more specificity regarding the group-level aspects of emotion that are tapped by emotion measures.

Retrieving autobiographical memories influences judgments about others: the role of metacognitive experiences.

This research investigates whether metacognitive experiences accompanying the retrieval of autobiographical memories influence judgments about others. Based on social projection research, we tested the hypothesis that ease-of-retrieval, affecting how the self is perceived, affects first impressions. In line with this prediction, Experiment 1 showed that participants asked to recall a few personal instances of assertive behavior (easy retrieval) judged an unknown person to be more assertive than participants recalling many instances (difficult retrieval). Experiment 2, targeting creativity, provided evidence for the retrieval-ease mechanism: The effect disappeared when ease-of-retrieval was discredited as informational source in a misattribution paradigm. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 replicated this pattern for the same personality traits and demonstrated two boundary conditions: Participants' ease of autobiographical recalls affected judgments of in- but not outgroup members (Experiment 3), and judgments of unknown others were affected after autobiographical recall but not after recalling behaviors of someone else (Experiment 4).

Social identity salience shapes group-based emotions through group-based appraisals.

Group-based emotions have been conceptualised as being rooted in perceivers' social identity. Consistent with this idea, previous research has shown that social identity salience affects group-based emotions, but no research to date has directly examined the role of group-based appraisals in comparison with individual appraisals. In the present studies, we measured group-based appraisals through a thought-listing procedure. In Experiment 1, we explicitly reminded people of their group identity, which led to the predicted change in group-based anger. This effect was mediated by group-based appraisals. In Experiment 2, participants either discussed a group-relevant scenario in small groups or a related topic irrelevant to the group. The group-relevant condition not only led to stronger indignation but the perceived presence of group-based appraisals was also related to participants' reports of indignation. These results provide further evidence for the importance of group-based appraisals as components of group-based emotions.

Integrating The Stereotype Content Model (Warmth And Competence) And The Osgood Semantic Differential (Evaluation, Potency, And Activity).

We integrate two prominent models of social perception dimensionality. In three studies, we demonstrate how the well-established semantic differential dimensions of evaluation and potency relate to the stereotype content model dimensions of warmth and competence. Specifially, using a correlational design (Study 1) and experimental designs (Studies 2 and 3), we found that semantic differential dimensions run diagonally across stereotype content model quadrants. Implications of integrating classic and modern approaches of social perception are discussed.

You want to give a good impression? Be honest! Moral traits dominate group impression formation.

Research has shown that warmth and competence are core dimensions on which perceivers judge others and that warmth has a primary role at various phases of impression formation. Three studies explored whether the two components of warmth (i.e., sociability and morality) have distinct roles in predicting the global impression of social groups. In Study 1 (N= 105) and Study 2 (N= 112), participants read an immigration scenario depicting an unfamiliar social group in terms of high (vs. low) morality, sociability, and competence. In both studies, participants were asked to report their global impression of the group. Results showed that global evaluations were better predicted by morality than by sociability or competence-trait ascriptions. Study 3 (N= 86) further showed that the effect of moral traits on group global evaluations was mediated by the perception of threat. The importance of these findings for the impression-formation process is discussed.

On reducing an empathy gap: the impact of self-construal and order of judgment.

Empathy gaps, in which individuals exaggerate self-other similarities or differences, generate errors in social judgments. We investigated whether changing individuals' self-construal may reduce one specific empathy gap: the illusion of courage. Participants primed with independent or interdependent self-construal made judgments about their own and other people's willingness to dance in public. Participants in the interdependence condition showed a reduction of the empathy gap, but only when judging the other first. This finding highlights that simple contextual manipulations have the potential to reduce egocentric biases in social judgments.

Similarity on the rebound: inhibition of similarity assessment leads to an ironic postsuppressional rebound.

A widely held but rarely tested assumption among cognitive scientists is that different cognitive tasks may rely upon a single basic cognitive process. Using an established methodology to examine the suppression and subsequent rebound of mental operations, the present research indicates that suppressing use of similarity in one domain results in the subsequent rebound of similarity assessment in a different domain, suggesting that both domains rely on the same underlying cognitive process. In two studies, we demonstrate that leading people to suppress natural similarity assessment in one task produces increased reliance on similarity in subsequent, different, and apparently unrelated tasks. In Experiment 1, participants led to suppress similarity in a concentration task subsequently made more errors in a false-memory paradigm than did control participants. In Experiment 2, participants suppressing similarity in a categorization task made more false-memory errors and perceived more similarity between word pairs than participants who did not suppress. The findings suggest that the cognitive process of similarity assessment may be a domain-general process, such that it is widespread across a number of different mental tasks.

What do you mean by "European"? Evidence of spontaneous ingroup projection.

The ingroup projection model posits that group members project ingroup features onto a superordinate category. The present research aimed at isolating the cognitive underpinnings of this process. If ingroup projection is a spontaneous cognitive process, a superordinate category prime should facilitate the processing of the ingroup prototype rather than the outgroup prototype. Three studies support this hypothesis by comparing subliminal semantic priming in two different populations, an intra- versus intergroup situation, and with an ingroup prototype manipulated by changing the intergroup context. Results indicated that the superordinate category prime facilitated the processing of ingroup rather than outgroup traits (Experiment 1) and that these traits depended on the particular content of the ingroup prototype made salient by different contexts (Experiments 2 and 3). The findings indicate that the cognitive representation of the superordinate category is based on ingroup traits and that this representation is context dependent.

A question of compensation: the social life of the fundamental dimensions of social perception.

This research examines the impact of the compensation effect between the fundamental dimensions of warmth and competence on behavioral confirmation. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with 2 groups that varied on 1 of the 2 dimensions and asked to select the questions that they wanted to pose to learn more about the groups. Participants preferred to ask negative (positive) questions about the unmanipulated dimension to the high (low) group. In Experiment 2, participants rated the 2 groups on the basis of naïve people answers to those questions. As predicted, compensation emerged. Experiment 3 involved interactions among 3 participants, 1 interviewing the other 2 using the questions selected in Experiment 1. Ratings of targets' reactions again showed compensation.

Compensation versus halo: the unique relations between the fundamental dimensions of social judgment.

Recent work on the relations between the two dimensions of social judgment, that is, warmth and competence, evidenced compensation such that a group seen more positively than another group on one dimension is seen less positively on the second. The authors examine the status of this compensatory relation by introducing a third dimension in the judgment context. Experiment 1 extends earlier work in a different population, comparing compensation as a function of whether warmth or competence is manipulated and competence or warmth is the unmanipulated dimension. Experiments 2 and 3 use healthiness as the unmanipulated dimension and reveal the presence of halo rather than compensation between warmth or competence on one hand and healthiness on the other. These findings suggest that compensation may not only stem from a concern for distributive justice but may also derive from the unique structural and functional relations between the two fundamental dimensions of social judgment.

Cultural differences in the correction of social inferences: Does the dispositional rebound occur in an interdependent culture?

Although social observers have been found to rely heavily on dispositions in their causal analysis, it has been proposed that culture strongly affects this tendency. Recent research has shown that suppressing dispositional inferences during social judgment can lead to a dispositional rebound, that is relying more on dispositional information in subsequent judgments. In the present research, we investigated whether culture also affects this rebound tendency. First, Thai and Belgian participants took part in a typical attitude attribution paradigm. Next, dispositional rebound was assessed by having participants describe a series of pictures. The dispositional rebound occurred for both Belgian and Thai participants when confronted with a forced target, but disappeared for Thai participants when the situational constraints of the target were made salient. The findings are discussed in light of the current cultural models of attribution theory.

When moderation is mediated and mediation is moderated.

Procedures for examining whether treatment effects on an outcome are mediated and/or moderated have been well developed and are routinely applied. The mediation question focuses on the intervening mechanism that produces the treatment effect. The moderation question focuses on factors that affect the magnitude of the treatment effect. It is important to note that these two processes may be combined in informative ways, such that moderation is mediated or mediation is moderated. Although some prior literature has discussed these possibilities, their exact definitions and analytic procedures have not been completely articulated. The purpose of this article is to define precisely both mediated moderation and moderated mediation and provide analytic strategies for assessing each.

Protecting the ingroup stereotype: ingroup identification and the management of deviant ingroup members.

In two experiments, we investigated the impact of the presentation of a deviant ingroup member on the perception of the ingroup among participants who differed in their degree of identification with the ingroup. In Study 1, we measured psychology students' level of identification with the group of psychologists (i.e. the ingroup) and presented them with an anti-norm versus a pro-norm psychologist. Results showed that in the anti-norm condition (but not in the pre-norm condition), identification predicted the ratings of psychologists as a group and the perception of typicality of the deviant psychologist. Also, in this condition, the impact of the level of identification on the ratings of psychologists proved to be mediated by the perceived typicality of the deviant. In Study 2, group measures were taken both before and after presentation of a deviant among members of an environmentalist group who differed in their level of identification with the ingroup. The level of identification had an impact on the modification of the ratings of environmentalists as a group, and this effect was mediated by the perceived typicality of the deviant environmentalist. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for the black sheep effect and the stereotype change literature.