A shared linguistic space for transmitting our thoughts from brain to brain in natural conversations.

Effective communication hinges on a mutual understanding of word meaning in different contexts. The embedding space learned by large language models can serve as an explicit model of the shared, context-rich meaning space humans use to communicate their thoughts. We recorded brain activity using electrocorticography during spontaneous, face-to-face conversations in five pairs of epilepsy patients. We demonstrate that the linguistic embedding space can capture the linguistic content of word-by-word neural alignment between speaker and listener. Linguistic content emerged in the speaker's brain before word articulation, and the same linguistic content rapidly reemerged in the listener's brain after word articulation. These findings establish a computational framework to study how human brains transmit their thoughts to one another in real-world contexts.

Neural representations of naturalistic events are updated as our understanding of the past changes.

The brain actively reshapes our understanding of past events in light of new incoming information. In the current study, we ask how the brain supports this updating process during the encoding and recall of naturalistic stimuli. One group of participants watched a movie ('The Sixth Sense') with a cinematic 'twist' at the end that dramatically changed the interpretation of previous events. Next, participants were asked to verbally recall the movie events, taking into account the new 'twist' information. Most participants updated their recall to incorporate the twist. Two additional groups recalled the movie without having to update their memories during recall: one group never saw the twist; another group was exposed to the twist prior to the beginning of the movie, and thus the twist information was incorporated both during encoding and recall. We found that providing participants with information about the twist beforehand altered neural response patterns during movie-viewing in the default mode network (DMN). Moreover, presenting participants with the twist at the end of the movie changed the neural representation of the previously-encoded information during recall in a subset of DMN regions. Further evidence for this transformation was obtained by comparing the neural activation patterns during encoding and recall and correlating them with behavioral signatures of memory updating. Our results demonstrate that neural representations of past events encoded in the DMN are dynamically integrated with new information that reshapes our understanding in natural contexts.

The "Narratives" fMRI dataset for evaluating models of naturalistic language comprehension.

The "Narratives" collection aggregates a variety of functional MRI datasets collected while human subjects listened to naturalistic spoken stories. The current release includes 345 subjects, 891 functional scans, and 27 diverse stories of varying duration totaling ~4.6 hours of unique stimuli (~43,000 words). This data collection is well-suited for naturalistic neuroimaging analysis, and is intended to serve as a benchmark for models of language and narrative comprehension. We provide standardized MRI data accompanied by rich metadata, preprocessed versions of the data ready for immediate use, and the spoken story stimuli with time-stamped phoneme- and word-level transcripts. All code and data are publicly available with full provenance in keeping with current best practices in transparent and reproducible neuroimaging.

Discovering Event Structure in Continuous Narrative Perception and Memory.

During realistic, continuous perception, humans automatically segment experiences into discrete events. Using a novel model of cortical event dynamics, we investigate how cortical structures generate event representations during narrative perception and how these events are stored to and retrieved from memory. Our data-driven approach allows us to detect event boundaries as shifts between stable patterns of brain activity without relying on stimulus annotations and reveals a nested hierarchy from short events in sensory regions to long events in high-order areas (including angular gyrus and posterior medial cortex), which represent abstract, multimodal situation models. High-order event boundaries are coupled to increases in hippocampal activity, which predict pattern reinstatement during later free recall. These areas also show evidence of anticipatory reinstatement as subjects listen to a familiar narrative. Based on these results, we propose that brain activity is naturally structured into nested events, which form the basis of long-term memory representations.

Individual differences in the perception of biological motion and fragmented figures are not correlated.

WE LIVE IN A CLUTTERED, DYNAMIC VISUAL ENVIRONMENT THAT POSES A CHALLENGE FOR THE VISUAL SYSTEM: for objects, including those that move about, to be perceived, information specifying those objects must be integrated over space and over time. Does a single, omnibus mechanism perform this grouping operation, or does grouping depend on separate processes specialized for different feature aspects of the object? To address this question, we tested a large group of healthy young adults on their abilities to perceive static fragmented figures embedded in noise and to perceive dynamic point-light biological motion figures embedded in dynamic noise. There were indeed substantial individual differences in performance on both tasks, but none of the statistical tests we applied to this data set uncovered a significant correlation between those performance measures. These results suggest that the two tasks, despite their superficial similarity, require different segmentation and grouping processes that are largely unrelated to one another. Whether those processes are embodied in distinct neural mechanisms remains an open question.

Emotional Intelligence in a group of patients with first-episode psychosis in Iran.

This study was aimed to evaluate the Emotional Intelligence (EI) of a group of patients with first episode psychosis in Iran as compared with a healthy control group. A case-control design was used. EI was assessed using Persian version of Bar-On Emotional Quotient inventory (EQ-i) administered on 25 patients with history of a single psychotic episode in the last two years, as well as 64 healthy participants. The mean (±SD) of EI scores of patients' and healthy controls' group was 319.8 (±40.9) and 328.8 (±33.3), respectively. Two-independent sample t-test revealed no significant difference in the EI scores of two groups (P=0.29). In contrast with chronic schizophrenia, the patients with first-episode psychosis were not different from the healthy subjects in terms of emotional intelligence score. It might be implied that the low emotional intelligence of the patients with chronic psychotic disorders is an accumulative result of the underlying disease over time.

Stimulus fractionation by interocular suppression.

Can human observers distinguish physical removal of a visible stimulus from phenomenal suppression of that stimulus during binocular rivalry? As so often happens, simple questions produce complex answers, and that is the case in the study reported here. Using continuous flash suppression to produce binocular rivalry, we were able to identify stimulus conditions where most - but not all - people utterly fail to distinguish physical from phenomenal stimulus removal, although we can be certain that those two equivalent perceptual states are accompanied by distinct neural events. More interestingly, we find subtle variants of the task where distinguishing the two states is trivially easy, even for people who utterly fail under the original conditions. We found that stimulus features are differentially vulnerable to suppression. Observers are able to be aware of existence/removal of some stimulus attributes (flicker) but not others (orientation), implying that interocular suppression breaks down the unitary awareness of integrated features belonging to a visual object. These findings raise questions about the unitary nature of awareness and, also, place qualifications on the utility of binocular rivalry as a tool for studying the neural concomitants of conscious visual awareness.