Assuntos
Antibacterianos , Farmacorresistência Bacteriana , Clima , Mudança Climática , Aquecimento Global , HumanosAssuntos
Infecções por Coronavirus , Saúde Global , Pandemias , Pneumonia Viral , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Humanos , Saúde Pública , SARS-CoV-2RESUMO
This paper argues that the existing definition of pandemics is not nuanced enough, because it is predicated solely on the criterion of spread, rather than on the criteria of spread and severity. This definitional challenge is what I call 'the conflation problem': there is a conflation of two different realities of global health, namely global health emergencies (i.e., severe communicable diseases that spread across borders) and nonemergencies (i.e., communicable or noncommunicable diseases that spread across borders and that may be severe). To put this argument forth, this paper begins by discussing the existing and internationally accepted definition of pandemics, its requirements, as well as its strengths (section 1). Section 2 then considers the problem with the standard definition of pandemics (i.e., the conflation problem) and some examples of it. Finally, section 3 evaluates some practical implications of the conflation problem to then explore conceptual clarity as the adequate solution.
Assuntos
Saúde Global/legislação & jurisprudência , Princípios Morais , Pandemias/legislação & jurisprudência , Surtos de Doenças , Política de Saúde , Humanos , Internacionalidade , Organização Mundial da SaúdeAssuntos
Infecções por Coronavirus/prevenção & controle , Regulamento Sanitário Internacional , Direito Internacional , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Pneumonia Viral/prevenção & controle , Viagem/legislação & jurisprudência , COVID-19 , Infecções por Coronavirus/epidemiologia , Saúde Global/legislação & jurisprudência , Humanos , Pneumonia Viral/epidemiologia , Organização Mundial da SaúdeRESUMO
Human rights advocates often use inflated and thus underspecified terminologies when addressing the content of their claims. One example of such loose terminology is the term 'well-being', as currently employed in connection with a definition for the right to health. What I call the 'well-being conception of health' conflates the distinct ideas of basic and non-basic health needs, as well as those of individual autonomy and freedom. I call this the conflation problem. This paper argues for the need of an understanding of the right to health, nuanced enough to capture not only these distinct ideas, but also their moral relevance for the common good.