Can premium differentiation counteract adverse selection in the Dutch supplementary health insurance? A simulation study.

Most health insurers in the Netherlands apply community-rating and open enrolment for supplementary health insurance, although it is offered at a free market. Theoretically, this should result in adverse selection. There are four indications that adverse selection indeed has started to occur on the Dutch supplementary insurance market. The goal of this paper is to analyze whether premium differentiation would be able to counteract adverse selection. We do this by simulating the uptake and premium development of supplementary insurance over 25 years using data on healthcare expenses and background characteristics from 110,261 insured. For the simulation of adverse selection, it is assumed that only insured for whom supplementary insurance is expected not to be beneficial will consider opting out of the insurance. Therefore, we calculate for each insured the financial profitability (by making assumptions about the consumer's expected claims and the premium set by the insurer), the individual's risk attitude and the probability to opt out or opt in. The simulation results show that adverse selection might result in a substantial decline in insurance uptake. Additionally, the simulations show that if insurers were to differentiate their premium to 28 age and gender groups, adverse selection could be modestly counteracted. Finally, this paper shows that if insurers would apply highly refined risk-rating, adverse selection for this type of supplementary insurance could be counteracted completely.

A voluntary deductible in health insurance: the more years you opt for it, the lower your premium?

Adverse selection regarding a voluntary deductible (VD) in health insurance implies that insured only opt for a VD if they expect no (or few) healthcare expenses. This paper investigates two potential strategies to reduce adverse selection: (1) differentiating the premium to the duration of the contract for which the VD holds (ex-ante approach) and (2) differentiating the premium to the number of years for which insured have opted for a VD (ex-post approach). It can be hypothesized that premiums will decrease with the duration of the contract or the number of years for which insured have opted for a VD, providing an incentive to insured to opt for a deductible also in (incidental) years they expect relatively high expenses. To test this hypothesis, we examine which premium patterns would occur under these strategies using data on healthcare expenses and risk characteristics of over 750,000 insured from 6 years. Our results show that, under the assumptions made, only without risk equalization the premiums could decrease with the duration of the contract or the number of years for which insured have opted for a VD. With (sophisticated) risk equalization, decreasing premiums seem unfeasible, both under the ex-ante and ex-post approach. Given these findings, we are sceptical about the feasibility of these strategies to counteract adverse selection.

Potential determinants of deductible uptake in health insurance: How to increase uptake in The Netherlands?

In health insurance, voluntary deductibles are offered to the insured in return for a premium rebate. Previous research has shown that 11 % of the Dutch insured opted for a voluntary deductible (VD) in health insurance in 2014, while the highest VD level was financially profitable for almost 50 % of the population in retrospect. To explain this discrepancy, this paper identifies and discusses six potential determinants of the decision to opt for a VD from the behavioral economic literature: loss aversion, risk attitude, ambiguity aversion, debt aversion, omission bias, and liquidity constraints. Based on these determinants, five potential strategies are proposed to increase the number of insured opting for a VD. Presenting the VD as the default option and providing transparent information regarding the VD are the two most promising strategies. If, as a result of these strategies, more insured would opt for a VD, moral hazard would be reduced.

How profitable is a voluntary deductible in health insurance for the consumer?

To counteract moral hazard in health insurance, insured can be offered a voluntary deductible (VD) in return for a premium rebate. In the Dutch mandatory basic health insurance however, only 11 per cent of the insured opted for a VD in 2014. Several determinants could affect the decision to opt for a VD. This paper examines one of these determinants: the financial profitability. A VD is profitable for the consumer if the out-of-pocket expenses do not exceed the offered premium rebate. The empirical analyses, based upon individual-level data on costs and characteristics of over 800,000 Dutch insured, show that a VD of €500 on top of the mandatory deductible of €360 would have been financially profitable for 48 per cent of the Dutch insured given the average premium rebate of € 240 in 2014. If the whole population had a VD, most insured would obtain either the maximum loss (44 per cent) or the maximum gain (41 per cent). A VD is profitable for males, young insured, healthy insured and insured with few healthcare expenses in the past. To further reduce moral hazard, the following strategies can be used to increase the number of insured opting for a VD: provide insured with information regarding the VD and introduce a shifted deductible.