Incentivizing adherence to pre-exposure prophylaxis for HIV prevention: a randomized pilot trial among male sex workers in Mexico.

Low adherence to preventative medications against life-long health conditions is a major contributor to global morbidity and mortality. We implemented a pilot randomized controlled trial in Mexico to measure the extent to which conditional economic incentives help male sex workers increase their adherence to pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) for HIV prevention. We followed n = 110 male sex workers over 6 months. At each quarterly visit (at months 0, 3, and 6), all workers received a $10 transport reimbursement, a free 3-month PrEP supply, and completed socio-behavioral surveys. The primary outcome was an objective biomarker of medication adherence based on tenofovir (TFV) drug concentration levels in hair collected at each visit. Individuals randomized to the intervention received incentives based on a grading system as a function of PrEP adherence: those with high (> 0.043 ng/mg TFV concentration), medium (0.011 to 0.042 ng/mg), or low (< 0.011 ng/mg) adherence received $20, $10, or $0, respectively. Six-month pooled effects of incentives on PrEP adherence were analyzed using population-averaged gamma generalized estimating equation models. We estimated heterogeneous treatment effects by sex worker characteristics. The incentive intervention led to a 28.7% increase in hair antiretroviral concentration levels over 6 months consistent with increased PrEP adherence (p = 0.05). The effect of incentives on PrEP adherence was greater for male sex workers who were street-based (vs. internet) workers (p < 0.10). These pilot findings suggest that modest conditional economic incentives could be effective, at scale, for improving PrEP adherence among male sex workers, and should be tested in larger implementation trials. ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT03674983.

Punto Seguro: A Randomized Controlled Pilot Using Conditional Economic Incentives to Reduce Sexually Transmitted Infection Risks in Mexico.

Randomized controlled pilot evaluated effect of conditional economic incentives (CEIs) on number of sex partners, condom use, and incident sexually transmitted infections (STIs) among male sex workers in Mexico City. Incentives were contingent on testing free of new curable STIs and/or clinic attendance. We assessed outcomes for n = 227 participants at 6 and 12 months (during active phase with incentives), and then at 18 months (with incentives removed). We used intention-to-treat and inverse probability weighting for the analysis. During active phase, CEIs increased clinic visits (10-13 percentage points) and increased condom use (10-15 percentage points) for CEI groups relative to controls. The effect on condom use was not sustained once CEIs were removed. CEIs did not have an effect on number of partners or incident STIs. Conditional incentives for male sex workers can increase linkage to care and retention and reduce some HIV/STI risks such as condomless sex, while incentives are in place.

The disproportionate burden of HIV and STIs among male sex workers in Mexico City and the rationale for economic incentives to reduce risks.

INTRODUCTION: The objective of this article is to present the rationale and baseline results for a randomized controlled pilot trial using economic incentives to reduce HIV and sexually transmitted infection (STI) risk among male sex workers (MSWs) in Mexico City. METHODS: Participants (n=267) were tested and treated for STIs (chlamydia, gonorrhoea, syphilis and HIV) and viral hepatitis (hepatitis B and C), received HIV and STI prevention education and were randomized into four groups: (1) control, (2) medium conditional incentive ($50/six months), (3) high conditional incentive ($75/six months) and (4) unconditional incentive ($50/six months). In the conditional arms, incentives were contingent upon testing free of new curable STIs (chlamydia, gonorrhoea and syphilis) at follow-up assessments. RESULTS: Participants' mean age was 25 years; 8% were homeless or lived in a shelter, 16% were unemployed and 21% lived in Mexico City less than 5 years. At baseline, 38% were living with HIV, and 32% tested positive for viral hepatitis or at least one STI (other than HIV). Participants had a mean of five male clients in the previous week; 18% reported condomless sex with their last client. For 37%, sex work was their main occupation and was conducted mainly on the streets (51%) or in bars/discotheques (24%) and hotels (24%). The average price for a sex transaction was $25 with a 35% higher payment for condomless sex. CONCLUSIONS: The findings suggest that economic incentives are a relevant approach for HIV prevention among MSWs, given the market-based inducements for unprotected sex. This type of targeted intervention seems to be justified and should continue to be explored in the context of combination prevention efforts.

Impacto de la selección de los mecanismos de pago en la producción de atención de salud: ¿están en línea con los objetivos sanitarios? / Impact of payment mechanisms on health services production in Chile: are the mechanisms in tune with the health policy objectives?

Este trabajo intenta caracterizar de los problemas que contienen los incentivos, principalmente aquellos contenidos en los mecanismos de transferencia usados en Chile, que no se encuentran a la altura de los desafíos de la actual reforma, por lo que se requiere entrar en una fase de modificación importante. A la vez, se describe evidencia empírica que muestra efectos indeseados sobre la producción de prestaciones a nivel global, desde hace algunos años y desde 2005, con la implementación de la reforma y la introducción de las GES, asociados a los mecanismos de pago. Esto es, disminución general de la actividad del SNSS, aumento de las urgencias y de la compra externa tanto vía MLE como GES. La disminución de la actividad general del SNSS no implica una caída en la productividad ya que se produce un cambio en el case-mix de producción del sistema, incentivado por las GES y sus compromisos asociados. Esto último, puede estar reflejando problemas de acceso en lo no GES. Por último, se reseña de modo general, la propuesta que está siendo trabajada en el sector para modificar los sistemas de transferencia.

The current mechanisms of financial transfer in the Chilean Health Care System imply incentives that are not up to the challenges of the Health Reform initiated in 2002. According to the authors, important modifications are required. We present empirical evidence of the undesired effects of those mechanisms on the overall generation of health services in the last few years. Starting in 2005, the Health Reform introduced Explicit Guarantees (GES) for the Provision of certain services, and these are linked to the mechanisms of payment to the providers. There has been a general decrease in the activities of the National Health Services System, an increase of emergency care and in the purchase of external services via the Explicit Guarantees and also via the Free Choice option included in the public system. The reduction of the general activity of the public system is not matched by a fall in productivity: what we observe is a change in the case mix, which is induced mainly by the Explicit Guarantees scheme and its associated commitments. A reduction of access to non GES care may be under way. We describe the general outline of a proposed change in the financial transfer mechanisms, which is being discussed in the health sector.