RESUMO
Improved African pharmaceutical manufacturing has been on global and local agendas since the 1970s, yet the industry has been locked-in into low technologies for decades. What caused the technological and industrial stagnation for such a critical sector for local and global health security? What are the political economy roots of such long-running industrial underdevelopment lock-in? What do colonial extractive economic and political institutions and their setup and mixes have to do with the sector? This study considers how extractive economic and political institutions' architectures and infrastructures shaped the African pharmaceutical industry's underdevelopment. We argue that extractive economic and political institutions shaped contemporary institutions in former colonial countries, and these institutions persist for a long time. The pivotal argument of innovation systems is that technological change-driven innovation is important for building superior economic performance and competitiveness, and institutions are a vital component of the system. However, institutions are not value-neutral; they carry the political and economic objectives and aspirations of the agents who design them. Innovation systems theory needs to incorporate the analysis of extractive economic and political institutions and the role they played in locking-in the African pharmaceutical industries into underdevelopment.
RESUMO
Abstract What are the effects of extractive informal institutions on the horizontal accountability process in a developing democracy? This paper presents evidence about the harmful effects of extractive informal institutions on horizontal accountability within subnational governments in Brazil. After three decades of free and competitive elections, the institutional design of oversight institutions for state governments has hardly changed. We explore the hypothesis that more extractive informal institutions, measured by the level of income inequality, is associated with decreasing transparency levels. Given its extensive social, political, and economic diversity embedded in an overall centralized formal institutional framework, Brazil provides an appropriate setting to test the hypothesis that extractive informal institutions responsible for increased income inequality can undermine horizontal accountability in new democracies.
Resumen ¿Cuáles son los efectos de las instituciones informales extractivas sobre el proceso de accountability horizontal en una democracia en desarrollo? Este artículo presenta evidencia sobre los efectos dañinos de las instituciones informales extractivas sobre la accountability horizontal dentro de los gobiernos subnacionales en Brasil. Después de tres décadas de elecciones libres y competitivas, el diseño institucional de las instituciones de supervisión de los gobiernos estatales apenas ha cambiado. Exploramos la hipótesis de que las instituciones informales más extractivas, medidas por el nivel de desigualdad de ingresos, están asociadas con niveles decrecientes de transparencia. Dada su amplia diversidad social, política y económica integrada en un marco institucional formal, general y centralizado, Brasil proporciona un entorno apropiado para probar la hipótesis de que las instituciones informales extractivas, responsables de una mayor desigualdad de ingresos, pueden socavar la accountability horizontal en las nuevas democracias.
Resumo Quais são os efeitos das instituições informais extrativas no processo de accountability horizontal numa democracia em desenvolvimento? Este artigo apresenta evidências sobre os efeitos nocivos das instituições informais extrativistas na accountability horizontal dos governos subnacionais no Brasil. Após três décadas de eleições livres e competitivas, o desenho institucional das instituições de fiscalização dos governos estaduais praticamente não mudou. Exploramos a hipótese de que instituições informais mais extrativas, medidas pelo nível de desigualdade de renda, estão associadas a níveis decrescentes de transparência. Dada a sua extensa diversidade social, política e econômica, inserida num quadro institucional formal centralizado, o Brasil oferece um cenário apropriado para testar a hipótese de que as instituições informais extrativas responsáveis pelo aumento da desigualdade de rendimentos podem minar a accountability horizontal nas novas democracias.
Assuntos
BrasilRESUMO
Even though the European Union (EU) is considered one of the best performers in the world in fighting corruption, the situation changes when the analysis is shifted to the national dimension of its member states, with significant differences concerning the effects of corruption on population health. Using the theory of New Institutional Economics as a complementary tool that provides additional representativeness to this phenomenon, the aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the impact of corruption on population health, considering also other demographic and socio-economic determinants. Using data collected at the EU level registered between 2000-2019, we employ panel date models to validate the ongoing effect of perceived corruption on population health. Our empirical findings fully validate the institutionalist perspective, according to which countries with inclusive institutions better control the anomaly of corruption while benefitting from higher life expectancy and reducing child mortality rates. Conversely, the EU countries with rather extractive institutions suffer in terms of both longevity of population and infant mortality. Our study emphasizes that in tackling corruption pressure on population health, the most effective way is to improve the quality of governance in countries with fragile institutions.
