RESUMO
Tanto a ideia de uma psicologia experimental quanto a realização de experimentos psicológicos já estão presentes no século 18. Contudo, é no século 19, primeiramente nas universidades alemãs, que a psicologia experimental adquire um novo estatuto, marcando fortemente a identidade da nova psicologia. O objetivo do presente artigo é apresentar uma reflexão de caráter histórico-filosófico sobre a natureza da psicologia experimental, com base nas contribuições de Fechner, Wundt e James. Depois de apresentar sua dimensão histórica, discutimos sua relação com a psicologia experimental contemporânea, no sentido de esclarecer se elas podem iluminar de alguma forma seu caminho futuro. Concluímos que um diálogo efetivo depende da modificação de certas condições estruturais do modelo atual de formação do psicólogo.
Both the idea of experimental psychology and the realization of psychological experiments were already present in the 18th century. However, it was in the 19th century, firstly in German universities, that experimental psychology acquired a new status, thereby marking the identity of the new psychology. The aim of this paper is to present a historical-philosophical reflection on the nature of experimental psychology, based on the contributions of Fechner, Wundt and James. After presenting their historical dimension, we discuss their relation with contemporary experimental psychology, in order to clarify whether they can somehow illuminate its future path. We conclude that an effective dialogue depends on the modification of certain structural conditions in the current training model for psychologists.
Tanto la idea de la psicología experimental como la realización de experimentos psicológicos ya se encontraban presentes en el siglo XVIII. Sin embargo, fue en el siglo XIX, y primero en las universidades alemanas, que la psicología experimental adquirió un nuevo estatus, marcando así la identidad de la nueva psicología. El objetivo de este artículo es presentar una reflexión histórico-filosófica sobre la naturaleza de la psicología experimental, basada en las contribuciones de Fechner, Wundt y James. Después de presentar su dimensión histórica, discutimos su relación con la psicología experimental contemporánea, para aclarar si de alguna manera pueden iluminar su futuro camino. Concluimos que un diálogo efectivo depende de la modificación de ciertas condiciones estructurales en el modelo actual de entrenamiento de los psicólogos.
RESUMO
American psychologist and philosopher William James devoted the entirety of his career to exploring the nature of volition, as expressed by such phenomena as will, attention, and belief. As part of that endeavor, James's unorthodox scientific pursuits, from his experiments with nitrous oxide and hallucinogenic drugs to his investigation of spiritualist mediums, represent his attempt to address the "hard problems" of consciousness for which his training in brain physiology and experimental psychology could not entirely account. As a student, James's reading in chemistry and physics had sparked his interest in the concepts of energy and force, terms that he later deployed in his writing about consciousness and in his arguments against philosophical monism and scientific materialism, as he developed his "radically empiricist" ideas privileging discontinuity and plurality. Despite James's long campaign against scientific materialism, he was, however, convinced of the existence of a naturalistic explanation for the more "wayward and fitful" aspects of mind, including transcendent experiences associated with hysteria, genius, and religious ecstasy. In this paper, I examine aspects of James's thought that are still important for contemporary debates in psychology and neuroscience: his "transmission theory" of consciousness, his ideas on the "knowing of things together," and, finally, the related concept of "the compounding of consciousness," which postulates the theoretical possibility for individual entities within a conscious system of thought to "know" the thoughts of others within the system. Taken together, these ideas suggest that James, in spite of, or perhaps because of, his forays into metaphysics, was working toward a naturalistic understanding of consciousness, what I will term a "distributive model," based on his understanding of consciousness as an "awareness" that interacts dynamically within, and in relation to, its environment.
