Inferential reasoning abilities in wild-caught bumblebees.

The ability to make a decision by excluding alternatives (i.e. inferential reasoning) is a type of logical reasoning that allows organisms to solve problems with incomplete information. Several species of vertebrates have been shown to find hidden food using inferential reasoning abilities. Yet little is known about invertebrates' logical reasoning capabilities. In three experiments, I examined wild-caught bumblebees' abilities to locate a 'rewarded' stimulus using direct information or incomplete information-the latter requiring bees to use inferential reasoning. To do so, I adapted three paradigms previously used with primates-the two-cup, three-cup and double two-cup tasks. Bumblebees saw either two paper strips (experiment 1), three paper strips (experiment 2) or two pairs of paper strips (experiment 3) and experienced one of them being rewarded or unrewarded. At the test, they could choose between two (experiment 1), three (experiment 2) or four paper strips (experiment 3). Bumblebees succeeded in the three tasks and their performance was consistent with inferential reasoning. These findings highlight the importance of comparative studies with invertebrates to comprehensively track the evolution of reasoning abilities, in particular, and cognition, in general.

Learning strategy differentially impacts memory connections in children and adults.

Even once children can accurately remember their experiences, they nevertheless struggle to use those memories in flexible new ways-as in when drawing inferences. However, it remains an open question as to whether the developmental differences observed during both memory formation and inference itself represent a fundamental limitation on children's learning mechanisms, or rather their deployment of suboptimal strategy. Here, 7-9-year-old children (N = 154) and young adults (N = 130) first formed strong memories for initial (AB) associations and then engaged in one of three learning strategies as they viewed overlapping (BC) pairs. We found that being told to integrate-combine ABC during learning-both significantly improved children's ability to explicitly relate the indirectly associated A and C items during inference and protected the underlying pair memories from forgetting. However, this finding contrasted with implicit evidence for memory-to-memory connections: Adults and children both formed A-C links prior to any knowledge of an inference test-yet for children, such links were most apparent when they were told to simply encode BC, not integrate. Moreover, the accessibility of such implicit links differed between children and adults, with adults using them to make explicit inferences but children only doing so for well-established direct AB pairs. These results suggest that while a lack of integration strategy may explain a large share of the developmental differences in explicit inference, children and adults nevertheless differ in both the circumstances under which they connect interrelated memories and their ability to later leverage those links to inform flexible behaviours. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Children and adults view AB and BC pairs related through a shared item, B. This provides an opportunity for learners to connect A-C in memory. Being encouraged to integrate ABC during learning boosted performance on an explicit test of A-C connections (children and adults) and protected from forgetting (children). Children and adults differed in when implicit A-C connections were formed-occurring primarily when told to separately encode BC (children) versus integrate (adults), respectively. Adults used implicit A-C connections to facilitate explicit judgments, while children did not. Our results suggest developmental differences in the learning conditions promoting memory-to-memory connections.

Support for learning under naturalistic conditions.

Educational opportunities occur through naturalistic everyday life experiences (e.g., reading a newspaper, listening to a podcast, or visiting a museum). Research primarily examines learning under controlled conditions, such as in a classroom or laboratory. There is relatively little known about the extent to which adults extract semantic content, beyond factual recall, from naturalistic educational experiences. In the present work, we focused on virtual museum exhibits. The materials were sourced directly from an art history museum. The naturalistic nature of this work stems from the type of content used though an important component of naturalistic learning-motivational processes-was not measured. In each of three experiments, we assessed adult learners' performance on tests of factual recall, inferential reasoning, and self-derivation through memory integration from naturalistic virtual museum exhibits. In anticipation of the potential challenge associated with learning outcomes under naturalistic conditions, we administered a yoked protocol under which participants had opportunities to engage in retrieval practice (Experiment 2a) or restudy (Experiment 2b) as explicit mechanisms of support for the three tests of learning. In all experiments, participants performed successfully on all three tests of learning; factual recall was the most accessible of the three learning outcomes. There was no difference in performance at the group level across experiments, but there was at the individual level, such that idea units generated during retrieval practice predicted learning outcomes, whereas restudy of those exact idea units did not. The current work provides novel insight into mechanisms underlying adult learning from naturalistic educational opportunities.

Wild skuas can use acoustic cues to locate hidden food.

Among animals, the visual acuity of several predatory bird species is probably the most outstanding. This, and the ease with which visually based tasks are administered, has led researchers to predominantly use the visual modality when studying avian cognition. Some wild skua populations routinely use acoustic cues emitted by their prey during foraging. In this study, we thus assessed whether this species was able to locate hidden food using acoustic cues alone (training phase). During the subsequent test phase, we investigated the capacity of successful individuals to choose the correct baited container in four conditions: (i) baited (shaking the baited container), (ii) full information (shaking both containers), (iii) exclusion (shaking the empty container), and (iv) control (shaking neither container). Four out of ten subjects succeeded in locating the baited container in the training phase. During the test phase, most subjects chose the baited container significantly more than the empty container in the baited and full information condition, while their performance was at chance level in the control condition. When no sound emanated from the empty container in the exclusion condition, one out of four skuas chose the baited container with more accuracy than predicted by chance. As this bird chose correctly on the first trial and during the first five trials, its performance is unlikely due to learning processes (learning to exclude the empty container). Although further tests are necessary to draw firm conclusions, our results open the way for assessing further this species' reasoning abilities in the wild.

Dimensions and mechanisms of memory organization.

Memory formation is dynamic in nature, and acquisition of new information is often influenced by previous experiences. Memories sharing certain attributes are known to interact so that retrieval of one increases the likelihood of retrieving the other, raising the possibility that related memories are organized into associative mnemonic structures of interconnected representations. Although the formation and retrieval of single memories have been studied extensively, very little is known about the brain mechanisms that organize and link related memories. Here we review studies that suggest the existence of mnemonic structures in humans and animal models. These studies suggest three main dimensions of experience that can serve to organize related memories: time, space, and perceptual/conceptual similarities. We propose potential molecular, cellular, and systems mechanisms that might support organization of memories according to these dimensions.

Sensitivity of implicit evaluations to accurate and erroneous propositional inferences.

Explicit (directly measured) evaluations are widely assumed to be sensitive to logical structure. However, whether implicit (indirectly measured) evaluations are uniquely sensitive to co-occurrence information or can also reflect logical structure has been a matter of theoretical debate. To test these competing ideas, participants (N = 3928) completed a learning phase consisting of a series of two-step trials. In step 1, one or more conditional statements (A â†’ B) containing novel targets co-occurring with valenced adjectives (e.g., "if you see a blue square, Ibbonif is sincere") were presented. In step 2, a disambiguating stimulus, e.g., blue square (A) or gray blob (¬A) was revealed. Co-occurrence information, disambiguating stimuli, or both were varied between conditions to enable investigating the unique and joint effects of each. Across studies, the combination of conditional statements and disambiguating stimuli licensed different normatively accurate inferences. In Study 1, participants were prompted to use modus ponens (inferring B from A â†’ B and A). In Studies 2-4, the information did not license accurate inferences, but some participants made inferential errors: affirming the consequent (inferring A from A â†’ B and B; Study 2) or denying the antecedent (inferring ¬B from A â†’ B and ¬A; Studies 3A, 3B, and 4). Bayesian modeling using ordinal constraints on condition means yielded consistent evidence for the sensitivity of both explicit (self-report) and implicit (IAT and AMP) evaluations to the (correctly or erroneously) inferred truth value of propositions. Together, these data suggest that implicit evaluations, similar to their explicit counterparts, can reflect logical structure.

Exclusion in the field: wild brown skuas find hidden food in the absence of visual information.

Inferential reasoning by exclusion allows responding adaptively to various environmental stimuli when confronted with inconsistent or partial information. In the experimental context, this mechanism involves selecting correctly between an empty option and a potentially rewarded one. Recently, the increasing reports of this capacity in phylogenetically distant species have led to the assumption that reasoning by exclusion is the result of convergent evolution. Within one largely unstudied avian order, i.e. the Charadriiformes, brown skuas (Catharacta antarctica ssp lonnbergi) are highly flexible and opportunistic predators. Behavioural flexibility, along with specific aspects of skuas' feeding ecology, may act as influencing factors in their ability to show exclusion performance. Our study aims to test whether skuas are able to choose by exclusion in a visual two-way object-choice task. Twenty-six wild birds were presented with two opaque cups, one covering a food reward. Three conditions were used: 'full information' (showing the content of both cups), 'exclusion' (showing the content of the empty cup), and 'control' (not showing any content). Skuas preferentially selected the rewarded cup in the full information and exclusion condition. The use of olfactory cues was excluded by results in the control condition. Our study opens new field investigations for testing further the cognition of this predatory seabird.

Dorsal Premotor Cortex Neurons Signal the Level of Choice Difficulty during Logical Decisions.

Studies on the neuronal correlates of decision making have demonstrated that the continuous flow of sensorial information is integrated by sensorimotor brain areas in order to select one among simultaneously represented targets and potential actions. In contrast, little is known about how these areas integrate memory information to lead to similar decisions. Using serial order learning, we explore how fragments of information, learned and stored independently (e.g., A > B and B > C), are linked in an abstract representation according to their reciprocal relations (such as A > B > C) and how this representation can be accessed and manipulated to make decisions. We show that manipulating information after learning occurs with increased difficulty as logical relationships get closer in the mental map and that the activity of neurons in the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) encodes the difficulty level during target selection for motor decision making at the single-neuron and population levels.

Inference by exclusion in the red-tailed black cockatoo (Calyptorhynchus banksii).

Inference by exclusion is the ability to select a given option by excluding the others. When designed appropriately, tests of this ability can reveal choices that cannot be explained by associative processes. Over the past decade, exclusion reasoning has been explored in several non-human taxonomic groups, including birds, mainly in Corvids and Parrots. To increase our understanding of the taxonomic distribution of exclusion reasoning and, therefore, its evolution, we investigated exclusion performances in red-tailed black cockatoos (Calyptorhynchus banksii), an Australian relative of the Goffin cockatoo (Cacatua goffini), using a food-finding task. Cockatoos were required to find a food item hidden in 1 of the 2 experimenter's hands. Following training sessions in which they reliably selected the closed baited hand they had just been shown open, each individual was tested on 4 different conditions. Critical to demonstrating exclusion reasoning was the condition in which they were shown the empty hand and then offered a choice of both closed hands. The performance of all birds was above chance on all experimental conditions but not on an olfactory and/or cuing control condition. The results suggest that the birds might be able to infer by exclusion, although an explanation based on rule learning cannot be excluded. This first experiment in red-tailed black cockatoo highlights the potential of this species as a model to study avian cognition and paves the pathway for future investigations.

Ontological Constraints in Children's Inductive Inferences: Evidence From a Comparison of Inferences Within Animals and Vehicles.

There is a lively debate concerning the role of conceptual and perceptual information in young children's inductive inferences. While most studies focus on the role of basic level categories in induction the present research contributes to the debate by asking whether children's inductions are guided by ontological constraints. Two studies use a novel inductive paradigm to test whether young children have an expectation that all animals share internal commonalities that do not extend to perceptually similar inanimates. The results show that children make category-consistent responses when asked to project an internal feature from an animal to either a dissimilar animal or a similar toy replica. However, the children do not have a universal preference for category-consistent responses in an analogous task involving vehicles and vehicle toy replicas. The results also show the role of context and individual factors in inferences. Children's early reliance on ontological commitments in induction cannot be explained by perceptual similarity or by children's sensitivity to the authenticity of objects.

Razonamiento inferencial y atribución de inferencias en niños pequeños / Inferential reasoning and Inference attribution in young children

Este estudio tuvo tres propósitos. Primero, identificó las inferencias que noventa niños y niñas entre tres y cinco años utilizaron para resolver dos tareas cognitivas diseñadas para el estudio, cada una exigiendo un tipo de inferencia: perceptual/directa y relacional. En segundo lugar, exploró si los niños atribuían inferencias a los personajes que aparecían en las dos tareas. Por último, identificó la relación entre el nivel de dificultad de la tarea y el tipo de inferencia usada por los niños. En general, la atribución inferencial se incrementó entre los tres y cinco años ante las dos tareas. Como se esperaba, los resultados mostraron que el nivel de dificultad de la tarea estuvo relacionado con la atribución que los niños hacían en ambas tareas, aunque el patrón fue más claro ante la tarea más compleja. Los resultados sugieren que los niños pequeños no solo usan, sino que atribuyen inferencias en la primera infancia; y también que la explicación del razonamiento inferencial no está estrictamente limitada a la edad. El tipo de inferencia que demanda una tarea y el nivel de dificultad de la misma interactúan con la edad y deben ser considerados en la explicación del desarrollo del razonamiento inferencial en los primeros años.

The purpose of this study was threefold: First, it identified inferences used by ninety children between three to fiveyears-old when solving two cognitive tasks designed to conduct the study, each one demanding a specific type of inference: direct/perceptual inference, and relational inference. In the second place, it explored whether children attributed inferences to characters involved in the tasks. Finally, it identified the relationship between tasks' levels of difficulty and children´s inferential reasoning. In general, inferential attribution increased between three to five-yearsold at both tasks. As expected, the results showed that the level of difficulty and type of inference had a significant effect on inferential attribution at both tasks, although the pattern was more evident in the most difficult task. The results suggested that young children not only use but also attribute inference as a source of knowledge during early childhood; and that explanations regarding inferential reasoning are not strictly limited by age. The type of inference demanded by a task and its level of difficulty interacting with age should be considered when explaining reasoning development during the early years

Socioeconomic environment effect on inferential reasoning of Latin American students / Efecto ambiental socioeconómico sobre el raciocinio inferencial de estudiantes latinoamericanos

Abstract Introduction Inferential reasoning (IR) is a major component of intelligence, which comprises many different cognitive processes such as perception, memory, and logic. Many studies have proposed that socioeconomic status (SES) has a negligible association with IR, but more recent findings suggest that they may have a higher association when evaluating group instead of individual SES. Objective The aim of this study is to test the effects of both individual (students) and group (schools) socioeconomic status on IR, comparing different countries of Latin America. Method The sample was composed of 2 358 students aged 14 and 15 years from 52 different schools (44% public) of five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru). Participants took part in an inferential reasoning test and answered a socioeconomic questionnaire. Results SES student showed a small positive correlation with IR (r = .10, p < .001), while SES school had a more pronounced effect on IR (F [2, 1944] = 74.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .07), with higher IR at schools with higher SES. A significant difference of IR between countries (F [4, 1976] = 20.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .04), was also found with Peru showing the highest mean. Peru was the country with the higher percentage of private schools in the present study. A multilevel model was fitted using individual and group SES as predictors. Discussion and conclusion Our findings showed that group SES have a higher predictive value of IR when compared to individual SES. This result suggests that individuals with low SES can benefit from studying on higher SES schools. Future research and the importance of public policies are discussed.

Resumen Introducción El razonamiento inferencial (IR) es un componente importante de la inteligencia que comprende diversos procesos cognitivos, como la percepción, la memoria y la lógica. Muchos estudios han propuesto que el nivel socioeconómico (NSE) tiene una baja asociación con IR, pero hallazgos más recientes sugieren que el NSE del grupo puede tener mayor asociación que el NSE individual con el IR. Objetivo El objetivo de este estudio es investigar los efectos del nivel socioeconómico individual (estudiantes) y de grupo (escuelas) sobre el IR, haciéndose comparaciones entre diferentes países de América Latina. Método La muestra estuvo compuesta por 2 358 estudiantes con edades comprendidas entre los 14 y los 15 años, de 52 escuelas diferentes (44% públicas), de cinco países de América Latina (Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia y Perú). Los participantes fueron evaluados con una prueba de razonamiento inferencial y un cuestionario socioeconómico. Resultados El NSE individual mostró una pequeña correlación positiva con IR (r = .10 p < .001), mientras que el NSE de grupo tuvo un efecto más pronunciado sobre IR (F [2, 1944] = 74.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .07) con mayor IR en las escuelas con mayor NSE. También se encontró una diferencia significativa de IR entre los países (F [4, 1976] = 20.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .04), con un promedio más alto para Perú, el país con mayor número de escuelas particulares en el presente estudio. Se ajustó un modelo multinivel utilizando las variables principales. Discusión y conclusión Nuestros resultados demostraron que el NSE de grupo tiene un mayor valor predictivo de IR en comparación con el SES individual. Este resultado sugiere que los individuos con un nivel socioeconómico bajo pueden beneficiarse de estudiar en escuelas con SES superiores. Se discuten las futuras investigaciones y la importancia de las políticas públicas.

Experience matters: Dogs (Canis familiaris) infer physical properties of objects from movement clues.

Reasoning about physical properties of objects such as heaviness by observing others' actions toward them is important and useful for adapting to the environment. In this study, we asked whether domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) can use a human's action to infer a physical property of target objects. In Experiment 1, dogs watched an experimenter opening two differently loaded swinging doors with different corresponding degrees of effort, and then were allowed to open one of the doors. Dogs chose randomly between the two doors. In Experiment 2, we gave new dogs the same test as in Experiment 1, but only after giving them experience of opening the doors by themselves, so that they already knew that the doors could be either light or heavy. In this test the dogs reliably chose the light door. These results indicate that dogs are able to infer physical characteristics of objects from the latters' movement caused by human action, but that this inferential reasoning requires direct own experience of the objects.

Effects of outcome and trial frequency on the inverse base-rate effect.

The inverse base-rate effect is a bias in contingency learning in which participants tend to predict a rare outcome for a conflicting set of perfectly predictive cues. Although the effect is often explained by attention biases during learning, inferential strategies at test may also contribute substantially to the effect. In three experiments, we manipulated the frequencies of outcomes and trial types to determine the critical conditions for the effect, thereby providing novel tests of the reasoning processes that could contribute to it. The rare bias was substantially reduced when the outcomes were experienced at equal rates in the presence of predictive-cue frequency differences (Exp. 2), and when the predictive cues were experienced at equal rates in the presence of outcome frequency differences (Exp. 3). We also found a consistent common-outcome bias for novel cue compounds. The results indicate the importance of both cue and outcome frequencies to the inverse base-rate effect, and reveal a combination of necessary conditions that are not well captured by appealing to inferential strategies at test. Although both attention-based and inferential theories explain some aspects of these data, no existing theory fully accounts for these effects of relative novelty.

Playing by the rules: self-interest information influences children's trust and trustworthiness in the absence of feedback.

This study documented how children's decisions to trust and help partners in a game depend on the game's incentives. Adults, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds (N=128) guessed the location of hidden prizes, assisted by a partner who observed the hiding. After each hiding event the partner shared information with participants about the prize's location. Participants earned prizes every time they guessed correctly. The partner earned prizes either from participants' correct (cooperation incentive) or incorrect (competition incentive) guesses. Children and adults trusted their partner more often when the game incentivized cooperation versus competition. A complementary pattern was observed when participants assisted their partner find prizes they observed being hidden: Participants strategically shared truthful information more often when the game rewarded cooperation.