Freud, materialista mecanicista às últimas consequências / Freud, mechanistic-materialistic to the ultimate consequences / Freud, matérialiste mécaniste aux ultimes conséquences / Freud, materialista mecanicista hasta las últimas consecuencias

Este artigo traz uma reflexão sobre o estatuto epistemológico da psicanálise criada por Freud. Ela foi desenvolvida por meio de um confronto crítico ao enquadramento de sua metapsicologia no marco do que alguns autores chamaram vitalismo, que teria sido resultado de um desvio em relação à sua formação acadêmica ao retomar e atualizar o vitalismo do século XIX por meio da noção de Trieb. Em resposta, este artigo recoloca em discussão alguns temas como o ambiente de formação científica de Freud, o estatuto da noção de Trieb - que considera convencional e entrópica - e, por fim, recorrendo a Canguilhem, enquadra a metapsicologia de Freud no marco do materialismo mecanicista elevado às últimas consequências, o que teria sido de fato resultado de seu verdadeiro procedimento epistemológico além de sua mais ousada e refinada contribuição científica à época.

This paper proposes a reflection on the epistemological status of psychoanalysis created by Freud. It was developed through a critical confrontation of the insertion of his metapsychology within a framework some authors have called vitalism, which would have been the result of a deviation from his academic education when resuming and updating the 19th-century concept of vitalism with the notion of Trieb. In response, this article discusses some topics, such as Freud's scientific training environment, the status of the notion of Trieb - which is considered conventional and entropic - and finally, resorting to Canguilhem, inserts Freud's metapsychology in a framework of mechanistic materialism elevated to the ultimate consequences, which would have been the result of his true epistemological procedure, in addition to his most daring and refined scientific contribution at the time.

Cet article apporte une réflexion critique sur le statut épistémologique de la psychanalyse créée par Freud. La réflexion s'est développée à travers un refus de cadrer sa métapsychologie dans le cadre de ce que certains auteurs ont appelé le vitalisme, ce qui aurait été le résultat d'un écart par rapport à sa formation académique quand il a repris et actualisé le vitalisme du XIXe siècle à travers la notion de Trieb. En réponse, cet article met en discussion certains thèmes tels que l'environnement de formation scientifique de Freud, le statut de la notion de Trieb - qu'il considère conventionnel et entropique - et, enfin, en utilisant Canguilhem, adapte la métapsychologie de Freud dans le cadre du matérialisme mécaniste élevé aux dernières conséquences, qui auraient en fait été le résultat de sa véritable procédure épistémologique, sa contribution scientifique la plus audacieuse et raffinée à l'époque.

Este artículo reflexiona sobre el estado epistemológico del psicoanálisis creado por Freud. Fue desarrollado a través de una confrontación crítica con el fundamento de su metapsicología dentro del marco de lo que algunos autores llamaron vitalismo, que habría sido el resultado de una desviación de su formación académica al reanudar y actualizar el vitalismo del siglo 19 a través de la noción de Trieb. En respuesta, este artículo pone en discusión algunos temas, como el entorno de capacitación científica de Freud, el estado de la noción de Trieb - que es considerado convencional y entrópico - y, finalmente, recurriendo a Canguilhem, colocando a la metapsicología de Freud en el marco del materialismo mecanicista elevado a las últimas consecuencias, lo que habría sido el resultado de su verdadero proceder epistemológico, además de su contribución científica más atrevida y refinada de la época.

The Transhumanist conception of body: a critical analysis from a complex systems perspective

What is the conception of the human body underlying the Transhumanism project? This question guides the present analysis undertaken from a philosophical- interdisciplinary perspective. Inspired by Le Breton (2008) and Morin's (2014) hypotheses about the complexity of the human body, we criticize mechanistic conception of the living body underlying the Transhumanism project. Implications of the Transhumanism project for personal identity are proposed based on hypotheses of complex systems theory as a starting point for critical reflection on a possible gloomy future envisioned by the unnatural/artificial development of the transhuman body.

A Grammar of Praxis: an Exposé of "A New Logical Foundation for Psychology", a Few Additions, and Replies to Alaric Kohler and Alexander Poddiakov.

Taking departure in the author's recent book "A New Logical Foundation for Psychology" the paper proposes a solution to the long-standing so-called crisis in psychology. The causes to this crisis are above all found in a ruling reductionist and mathematically supported mechanistic understanding of nature with roots in European Renaissance, and following that, of man's embedment in nature. This leaves no place for non-mechanistic relations to unique and irreplaceable persons and objects defining the human psyche or soul, and fundamental phenomena as love and grief are consequently not understood. No humanistic superstructure of language or systems of signs and concepts can repair this loss of a vital dimension in basic human practical relations to the world. However, it is just in modern mathematics and mathematical logic, that the reductions of mechanicism are surmounted, at the same time leaving a place for mechanicism within a broader conceptual frame and defining a rich practical basis for understanding the role of language and human concepts. The wider perspectives comprise a new union of natural and human sciences. Finally the paper presents replies to two important commentaries to the author's abovementioned book.

Activity Theories and the Ontology of Psychology: Learning from Danish and Russian Experiences.

Psychology has permanent problems of theoretical coherence and practical, analytic and critical efficiency. It is claimed that Activity Theory (AT) with roots in a long European philosophical tradition and continued in Russian AT is a first step to remedy this. A Danish version of AT may have a key to exceed some, mostly implicit, ontological restrictions in traditional AT and free it from an embracement of functionalism and mechanicism, rooted in Renaissance Physics. The analysis goes back to Aristotle's understanding of the freely moving animal in its ecology and introduces some dualities in the encounter between subject and object which replace the dualistic dichotomies traditionally splitting Psychology in Naturwissenschaft vs. Geisteswissenshaft. This also implies a "Copernican turn" of Cartesian dualism. The perspectives are to give place for a phenomenology of meaning without cutting human psyche out of Nature and to open Psychology to its domain.

Do mecanicismo ao selecionismo: uma breve contextualização da transição do behaviorismo radical / From mechanicism to selectionism: a brief contextualization of the radical behaviorism transition

O behaviorismo radical, como filosofia da ciência do comportamento formulada por B. F. Skinner, tem sido desde sua criação alvo de inúmeras críticas e tentativas de rotulação. Dentre as principais críticas está a noção amplamente divulgada de que o behaviorismo radical e sua ciência, análise experimental do comportamento, adotam uma postura eminentemente mecanicista. Para tentar demonstrar o equívoco deste tipo de afirmação, este ensaio busca uma possível interpretação e contextualização do desenvolvimento do behaviorismo radical, no qual se destaca, principalmente, a necessidade de observar que apesar de Skinner ter iniciado seus estudos de psicologia dentro de uma tradição mecanicista, ele cedo adota uma posição que tem como função criticar e afastar-se deste tipo de pensamento.

The radical behaviorism, as a philosophy of the behavior science formulated by B. F. Skinner, has been a target for endless criticisms and attempts of labeling, since its creation. Among the main criticisms is the widely spread idea that the radical behaviorism and its science, the behavior experimental analysis, adopted an eminently mechanicist posture. Trying to show the misconception of this statement, this essay presents a possible interpretation and contextualization of the radical behaviorism development, where it is mainly highlighted, the need to observe that, although Skinner has started his psychology studies within a mechanicist tradition,he soon adopts a position of criticizing this type of thought, besides presenting as in his science as in his philosophy, a distance each time greater of the mechanicism, and an every time more coherent approach of a selectionist point of view.