Model-free metacognition.

Extensive work has been done on the metacognitive capacities of humans, as well as to investigate metacognitive processes in nonhuman animals. What we propose here, however, is that there are two very different forms that metacognition can take: either model-based (implicating at least a simplified model of the thinker's own mind), or model-free (representing some mental state or process in oneself in the absence of any such model). The focus of all work on human metacognitive judgments has been on the model-based variety, as have been most attempts to discover metacognition in animals. We first review recent studies suggesting that there are no resources shared between human metacognitive judgments and the sorts of behavioral tests employed with animals, implying that the latter fail to provide evidence of even simplified forms of model-based metacognition. Thereafter the question of model-free metacognition in animals is pursued. Negative verdicts are rendered on a pair of possible claims of this sort. But two positive answers are defended. One is that epistemic emotions like curiosity and interest, as well as the signals involved in failed memory searches, implicate representations whose content is, unknown. The other is that decisions to deploy attentional / mental effort (which many animals besides humans can do) depend on appraisals of an analog-magnitude signal representing the extent to which executive resources are engaged.

Aportes al estudio de las relaciones entre memoria episódica y teoría de la mente / Contributions to the Study of the Relations Between Episodic Memory and Theory of Mind

Resumen La teoría de la mente emerge en el desarrollo con anterioridad a la memoria episódica, posibilitando a través de la capacidad de metarrepresentación el desdoblamiento y viaje mental que ella misma implica. Para la evaluación de los procesos se administraron las Historias Extrañas de Happé, el Test de las miradas, el Test de Aprendizaje Verbal España-Complutense y una tarea experimental a 20 mujeres con diagnóstico de Síndrome de Turner y sus respectivos controles. Los resultados indican dificultades en ambos procesos cognitivos y correlaciones entre la teoría de la mente e indicadores de memoria episódica de contenido y de la fuente. Se hipotetiza que la anatomía cerebral atípica, propia de esta población, traería problemas en el desarrollo de la teoría de la mente y esto, a su vez, podría asociarse con dificultades en los mecanismos de metarrepresentación y reexperimentación subjetiva de vivencias que la memoria episódica implica. Los resultados obtenidos permiten una mayor comprensión del perfil neuropsicológico de las mujeres con diagnóstico de Síndrome de Turner y podrían servir de insumo teórico para el diseño de estrategias clínicas y psicoeducativas que tiendan a fomentar, en esta población, las habilidades de teoría de la mente y memoria episódica.

Abstract The present study explores the relations between the cognitive and affective processes of theory of mind and verbal episodic memory in women diagnosed with Turner Syndrome, a chromosomal disorder caused by a missing or incomplete X chromosome in females. Women with this diagnostic present an atypical cerebral morphology affecting frontal and temporoparietal zones. These areas match the neuroanatomic substratum shared by both theory of mind and episodic memory. The concept of theory of mind refers to the ability to anticipate others' social behavior through the attribution and understanding of mental entities such as desires, beliefs, emotions and intentions. It is a complex skill that involves not only the mental representation of something that cannot be observed directly, but also the decentration of one's own perspective and the use of these skills to predict behaviors. This ability is composed by two different processes: a cognitive theory of mind that refers to the ability to make inferences about desires, beliefs and intentions of other people; and an affective theory of mind, related to the ability to infer others' emotions, understanding the affective mental states and adopting the point of view of the other person, without experiencing these emotions. In the particular case of women diagnosed with Turner Syndrome, there is evidence supporting the hypothesis that this population presents general difficulties in this ability, showing a greater deficit in cognitive theory of mind. On the other hand, episodic memory consists of the memory that one has of past experiences. This memory system is a psychological process of paramount importance for human beings, since it enables the remembrance of something that has happened a long time ago. It allows the person to re-experience events that occurred earlier in his or her life, involving the ability to generate meta-representational comments on how knowledge was obtained. This way, people revive, through self-awareness, previous experiences and also project similar experiences to the future. Episodic memory can be divided into the memory about the occurrence of an event (item memory) and the memory of the phenomenological context of the event, which involves the handling of spatial, temporal, emotional and perceptual information (source memory). It is considered that theory of mind has an earlier development than episodic memory, enabling through the capacity of meta-representation the unfolding and mental journey that episodic memory implies. In order to evaluate these processes, a battery of four tests was administered to 20 women diagnosed with Turner Syndrome and their respective controls: Happé Strange Stories, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, the Spain-Complutense Verbal Learning Test and an experimental task. Results indicate difficulties in both cognitive processes, as well as correlations between theory of mind and indicators of item and source memory. A possible hypothesis could argue that the atypical cerebral anatomy of women diagnosed with Turner Syndrome would result in theory of mind deficits, and these in turn could be associated with difficulties in the capacities of meta-representation and subjective re-experimentation of past events needed by episodic memory. These results enable a better comprehension of the neuropsychological profile of women diagnosed with Turner Syndrome and could serve as a theoretical input for the design of clinical and psychoeducational strategies that tend to promote theory of mind and episodic memory in this population.

False belief and relative clauses in Autism Spectrum Disorders.

Previous studies have suggested sentential complementation is the crucial ingredient of language that relates to false-belief (FB) reasoning, while the role of relative clauses (RCs) is less clear. Nevertheless, under the hypothesis that clausal embedding has a meta-representational effect, arguably implied in FB, one expects a link between FB and not only complementation but also relativization. Seventeen children with ASD (6 to 16 years, mean age 9;2) were assessed for RCs and FB. Comprehension of RCs significantly predicted FB performance, while none of the controlled factors played a predictive role (comprehension of simple sentences, vocabulary, morpho-syntax and working memory). Findings suggest that clausal embedding, common to both sentential complements and RCs, serves as a bootstrap for FB reasoning.