Factors of children's allocation behavior: peer relationship and resource quantity as the main determinants.

This study investigated the resource allocation of Chinese sixth-graders and the role of peer relationship in different resource conditions (N = 132, Mage = 11. 35 years, SD = 0.60). We designed the resource quantity as a between-group variable, with one group participating in a resource-limited experiment and another group in a resource-abundant experiment. Both groups of children allocated token resources to three types of peers relationships: good friends, disliked individuals, and strangers. Based on our experimental hypotheses, we presupposed three experimental outcomes: selfish allocation, equal allocation, and altruistic allocation. To analyze the data, we employed multivariate unordered regression analysis and performed two rounds of regression analyses using both selfish and altruistic allocations as reference categories to enhance the statistical power of regression model. Our results reveal that the resource quantity had a significant hindering effect on children's allocation behaviors, as the amount of available resources for allocation increased, so did their willingness to allocate selfishly. It was also found that an increase in resources led to a decrease in the proportion of children allocating equally. Nonetheless, the results still revealed generalized peer relationship preferences: children tended to allocate more resources to friends than to individuals they disliked. But when faced with disliked individuals, they were relatively more likely to allocate equally. Finally, we observed the proportion of equal allocation and discussed the similar impact of inequality aversion, different allocation contexts, and children's theory of mind on equitable allocation among sixth-graders.

Multidimensional assessment of social cognition using non-immersive virtual reality in dementia with Lewy bodies and Alzheimer's disease: an exploratory study.

INTRODUCTION: Few studies have focused on social cognition in dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB), even though some brain structures being well known as underlying social cognitive processes are directly impacted in this disease. Furthermore, social cognition processes have been mostly studied independently using evaluations with poor ecological validity. We aimed at studying the ability of a new naturalistic and multidimensional social cognition task to reveal impairments in DLB patients. We chose to compare the profile of these patients with that of Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients, for which social cognition is better preserved. METHOD: Fifteen patients (DLB: n = 7; AD: n = 8) and 28 healthy controls underwent the REALSoCog task. They encountered several social situations (e.g. control versus transgressions) in a non-immersive virtual city environment allowing the assessment of moral cognition, cognitive and affective theory of mind (ToM), emotional empathy and behavioral intentions. RESULTS: The main results showed (i) a lower ability to detect transgressions in DLB patients, particularly conventional ones, whereas moral cognition seemed better preserved in AD patients; (ii) a cognitive ToM impairment in both DLB and AD patients, while affective ToM is impaired only in DLB patients; (iii) a decreased emotional empathy specifically observed in DLB patients; (iv) more inappropriate behavioral intentions, mainly in DLB patients, but also in some AD patients. CONCLUSIONS: This study suggests the feasibility and potential interest of the REALSoCog task in revealing social cognition deficits, particularly for DLB patients by showing different social patterns as compared to AD patients. These results offer interesting clinical perspectives to develop more naturalistic tasks in such populations and for clinical differential diagnosis. Limitations and future perspectives are discussed.

Children's consideration of motivation in evaluations of socially (un)mindful actions.

Previous research shows that both adults and children by 5 or 6 years of age appreciate socially mindful actions where one leaves a choice for others. However, less is known as to whether children consider motivations in their evaluations of socially (un)mindful actions. Here we investigated whether children and adults can spontaneously evaluate socially (un)mindful behaviors depending on contextual cues, specifically whether the actions happen in public or in private. We also investigated how children evaluate these actions when provided with explicit information on motivations. We presented 99 children (aged 6-11 years) and 99 adults in China with two characters performing the same socially mindful or unmindful behaviors. One character acted publicly, whereas the other acted privately. Participants were asked to compare the two characters first spontaneously and then again after explicit information on the characters' motivations was provided. We found that whereas adults spontaneously favor private socially mindful acts, children favor public socially mindful acts. Only after motivations were provided did children favor private socially mindful acts like adults. In addition, we found asymmetry in that motivation seems to matter more in evaluations of socially mindful actions than in evaluations of socially unmindful ones. These findings are the first to reveal children's consideration of motivations in their evaluations of socially mindful behaviors.

Blame framing and prior knowledge influence moral judgments for people involved in the Tulsa Race Massacre among a combined Oklahoma and UK sample.

Introduction: How an event is framed impacts how people judge the morality of those involved, but prior knowledge can influence information processing about an event, which also can impact moral judgments. The current study explored how blame framing and self-reported prior knowledge of a historical act of racial violence, labeled as Riot, Massacre, or Event, impacted individual's cumulative moral judgments regarding the groups involved in the Tulsa Race Massacre (Black Tulsans, the Tulsa Police, and White Tulsans). Methods and results: This study was collected in two cohorts including undergraduates attending the University of Oklahoma and individuals living in the United Kingdom. Participants were randomly assigned to a blame framing condition, read a factual summary of what happened in Tulsa in 1921, and then responded to various moral judgment items about each group. Individuals without prior knowledge had higher average Likert ratings (more blame) toward Black Tulsans and lower average Likert ratings (less blame) toward White Tulsans and the Tulsa Police compared to participants with prior knowledge. This finding was largest when what participants read was framed as a Massacre rather than a Riot or Event. We also found participants with prior knowledge significantly differed in how they made moral judgments across target groups; those with prior knowledge had lower average Likert ratings (less blame) for Black Tulsans and higher average Likert ratings (more blame) for White Tulsans on items pertaining to causal responsibility, intentionality, and punishment compared to participants without prior knowledge. Discussion: Findings suggest that the effect of blame framing on moral judgments is dependent on prior knowledge. Implications for how people interpret both historical and new events involving harmful consequences are discussed.

Uncertain Facts or Uncertain Values? Testing the Distinction Between Empirical and Normative Uncertainty in Moral Judgments.

People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor-analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral uncertainty and to rate different aspects of their uncertainty about this case. Across this wide range of moral scenarios, our items loaded onto three reliable factors: lack of information, unclear consequences, and normative uncertainty. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure using predefined stimulus material. N = 402 participants each rated eight scenarios that systematically varied in their degree of uncertainty regarding the consequences of the described actions and in the value conflict that was inherent to them. The empirical uncertainty factors were mainly affected by the introduction of uncertainty regarding consequences, and the normative uncertainty factor was mainly affected by the introduction of value conflict. Our studies provide evidence that the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty accurately describes a psychological reality. We discuss the relevance of our findings for research on moral judgments and decision-making, and folk metaethics.

No Peace for the Wicked? Immorality Is Thought to Disrupt Intrapersonal Harmony, Impeding Positive Psychological States and Happiness.

Why do people think that someone living a morally bad life is less happy than someone living a good life? One possibility is that judging whether someone is happy involves not only attributing positive psychological states (i.e., lots of pleasant emotions, few unpleasant emotions, and satisfaction with life) but also forming an evaluative judgment. Another possibility is that moral considerations affect happiness attributions because they tacitly influence attributions of positive psychological states. In two studies, we found strong support for the second hypothesis. Moral considerations only appear to affect happiness attributions when they also affect attributions of positive psychological states. Additionally, both studies supported a hypothesis about why moral judgments have these effects. Specifically, we found that when people judge that someone is living a bad life, they infer that the person is not at peace with themselves. However, when this inference is blocked, moral considerations do not affect attributions of happiness or positive psychological states. In sum, although "happiness" appears to be a purely psychological concept, happiness judgments are sensitive to moral considerations because people often assume that immorality disrupts intrapersonal harmony.

The "(a)moral brain": When things go wrong.

In the past decades, a growing interest of neuroscience on moral judgment and decision-making has shed new light on the neurobiological correlates of human morality. It is now understood that moral cognition relies on a complex integration of cognitive and affective information processes that implicate a widely distributed brain network. Moral cognition relies on the coordination of several domain-general processes, subserved by domain-general neural networks, rather than a specific moral cognition system subserved by a specific neural network. In this chapter, we will first briefly review what is currently known about the "moral brain," i.e., the network of brain regions consistently implicated in studies of moral cognition, which include decision-making, affective processing, mentalizing, and perspective-taking processing regions. We will then review the evidence of the impairments found in this network in individuals with psychopathy, a condition whose characteristics indicate profound disturbances in appropriate moral processing. We will present data from neuroimaging studies with forensic/clinical, general population, as well as child and adolescent samples, which seem to converge to support the notion that the moral dysfunction observed in individuals with psychopathy may stem from a disruption of affective components of moral processing rather than from an inability to compute moral judgments per se.

The Puzzle of Evaluating Moral Cognition in Artificial Agents.

In developing artificial intelligence (AI), researchers often benchmark against human performance as a measure of progress. Is this kind of comparison possible for moral cognition? Given that human moral judgment often hinges on intangible properties like "intention" which may have no natural analog in artificial agents, it may prove difficult to design a "like-for-like" comparison between the moral behavior of artificial and human agents. What would a measure of moral behavior for both humans and AI look like? We unravel the complexity of this question by discussing examples within reinforcement learning and generative AI, and we examine how the puzzle of evaluating artificial agents' moral cognition remains open for further investigation within cognitive science.

Contrasting two models of utilitarian reasoning.

One influential framework for examining human moral cognition has been a dual process model, in which utilitarian judgment (e.g., infliction of harm for the greater good) is associated with cognitive control processes, while non-utilitarian judgment (e.g., avoiding such harms) is associated with emotional, automatic processes. Another framework of moral cognition, the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, posits that utilitarian choices may reflect either instrumental harm, i.e., inflicting harm on an individual for the greater good; or impartial beneficence, i.e., impartially and altruistically acting for the benefit of the overall welfare. We evaluated preregistered hypotheses (https://osf.io/m425d) derived from these models of moral cognition in a sample of 275 neurologically healthy older adults. Our results suggest that both the dual process and two-dimensional models provided insights regarding utilitarian reasoning, including three cardinal domains of conflict between utilitarianism and common-sense morality: agent-centered permissions, special obligations, and personal rights. One prediction of the dual process-based model was supported by our findings, with higher emotionality associated with decreased endorsement of utilitarian judgments (b = - 0.12, p < .001). We also found partial support for the two-dimensional model, as utilitarian judgments about dilemmas involving agent-centered permissions and personal rights were dissociated; however, both sets of judgments were associated with utilitarian judgments involving special obligations (p < .001 and p = .008, respectively). We propose that our findings, with support for some elements of the dual process and two-dimensional models, can be integrated into a revised two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment as including impartial beneficence and acceptance of attributable harms.

Why do evaluative judgments affect emotion attributions? The roles of judgments about fittingness and the true self.

Past research has found that the value of a person's activities can affect observers' judgments about whether that person is experiencing certain emotions (e.g., people consider morally good agents happier than morally bad agents). One proposed explanation for this effect is that emotion attributions are influenced by judgments about fittingness (whether the emotion is merited). Another hypothesis is that emotion attributions are influenced by judgments about the agent's true self (whether the emotion reflects how the agent feels "deep down"). We tested these hypotheses in six studies. After finding that people think a wide range of emotions can be fitting and reflect a person's true self (Study 1), we tested the predictions of these two hypotheses for attributions of happiness, love, sadness, and hatred. We manipulated the emotions' fittingness (Studies 2a-b and 4) and whether the emotions reflected an agent's true self (Studies 3 and 5), measuring emotion attributions as well as fittingness judgments and true self judgments. The fittingness manipulation only impacted emotion attributions in the cases where it also impacted true self judgments, whereas the true self manipulation impacted emotion attribution in all cases, including those where it did not impact fittingness judgments. These results cast serious doubt on the fittingness hypothesis and offer some support for the true self hypothesis, which could be developed further in future work.

Can prosocial values improve brain health?

Prosocial values play a critical role in promoting care and concern for the well-being of others and prioritizing the common good of society. Evidence from population-based reports, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical studies suggests that these values depend on social cognition processes, such as empathy, deontological moral cognition, moral emotions, and social cooperation. Additionally, indirect evidence suggests that various forms of prosocial behaviors are associated with positive health outcomes at the behavioral, cardiovascular, immune, stress-related, and inflammatory pathways. However, it is unclear whether prosociality can positively influence brain health outcomes. In this perspective, we propose that prosocial values are not only influenced by brain conditions but could also potentially play a role in protecting brain health. We review studies from various fields that support this claim, including recent reports of prosociality-based interventions impacting brain health. We then explore potential multilevel mechanisms, based on the reduction of allostatic overload at behavioral, cardiovascular, immune, stress-related, and inflammatory levels. Finally, we propose potential prosociality-based interventions for improving brain health in at-risk populations, such as psychiatric and neurological patients, and individuals exposed to poverty or violence. Our perspective suggests that prosocial values may play a role in promoting and maintaining healthy brains.

Could it? Should it? Cognitive reflection facilitates children's reasoning about possibility and permissibility.

Children can be unduly skeptical of events that violate their expectations, claiming that these events neither could happen nor should happen even if the events violate no physical or social laws. Here, we explored whether children's reasoning about possibility and permissibility-modal cognition-is aided by cognitive reflection, or the disposition to privilege analysis over intuition. A total of 99 children aged 4 to 11 years judged the possibility and permissibility of several hypothetical events, and their judgments were compared with their scores on a developmental version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-D). Children's CRT-D scores predicted their ability to differentiate possible events from impossible ones and their ability to differentiate impermissible events from permissible ones as well as their ability to differentiate possibility from permissibility in general. Such differentiations were predicted by children's CRT-D scores independent of age and executive function. These findings suggest that mature modal cognition may require the ability to reflect on, and override, the intuition that unexpected events cannot happen.

Seeking evidence and explanation signals religious and scientific commitments.

Who is more committed to science: the person who learns about a scientific consensus and doesn't ask questions, or the person who learns about a scientific consensus and decides to pursue further inquiry? Who exhibits greater commitment to religious teachings: the person who accepts doctrine without question, or the person who seeks further evidence and explanations? Across three experiments (N = 801) we investigate the inferences drawn about an individual on the basis of their epistemic behavior - in particular, their decision to pursue or forgo further inquiry (evidence or explanation) about scientific or religious claims. We find that the decision to pursue further inquiry (about science or religion) is taken to signal greater commitment to science and to truth, as well as trustworthiness and good moral character (Studies 1-3). This is true even in the case of claims regarding controversial science topics, such as anthropogenic climate change (Study 3). In contrast, the decision to forgo further inquiry is taken to signal greater commitment to religion, but only when the claim under consideration contains religious content (Study 1-3). These findings shed light on perceived scientific and religious norms in our predominantly American and Christian sample, as well as the rich social inferences drawn on the basis of epistemic behavior.

Why Do God and Humans Punish? Perceived Retributivist Punishment Motives Hinge on Views of the True Self.

Laypeople often believe that God punishes transgressions; however, their inferences about God's punishment motives remain unclear. We addressed this topic by asking laypeople to indicate why God punishes. We also examined participants' inferences about why humans punish to contribute to scholarly conversations regarding the extent to which people may anthropomorphize God's mind. In Studies 1A to 1C, participants viewed God as less retributive than humans. In Study 2, participants expected God (vs. humans) to view humans' true selves more positively; this difference mediated participants' views of God as less retributive than humans. Study 3 manipulated agents' views of humans' true selves and examined how such information influenced each agent's perceived motives. Participants viewed a given agent as less retributive when that agent regarded the true self as good (versus bad). These findings extend scholarship on lay theories of punishment motives and highlight links between religious and moral cognition.

Do infants understand educational television content based on scientific findings?

Although attempts to create evidence-based television content for infants from birth to 2 years of age are notable, it has not been empirically verified to what extent infants understand such content. Our study evaluated whether Japanese 11- to 20-month-olds (N = 97; 52 boys and 45 girls) understand evidence-based television content using a looking-time method. When presented with content based on number themes, infants demonstrated an understanding of addition. When presented with content related to moral cognition, infants preferentially looked at a helper more than at a non-helper. Results reveal that infants understand educational television content based on scientific findings, demonstrating robustness and ecological validity. We discuss the possibility that broadcasting such content promotes infants' sensitivity to numbers and morals and provides learning opportunities through television.

How Imagination and Memory Shape the Moral Mind.

Interdisciplinary research has proposed a multifaceted view of human cognition and morality, establishing that inputs from multiple cognitive and affective processes guide moral decisions. However, extant work on moral cognition has largely overlooked the contributions of episodic representation. The ability to remember or imagine a specific moment in time plays a broadly influential role in cognition and behavior. Yet, existing research has only begun exploring the influence of episodic representation on moral cognition. Here, we evaluate the theoretical connections between episodic representation and moral cognition, review emerging empirical work revealing how episodic representation affects moral decision-making, and conclude by highlighting gaps in the literature and open questions. We argue that a comprehensive model of moral cognition will require including the episodic memory system, further delineating its direct influence on moral thought, and better understanding its interactions with other mental processes to fundamentally shape our sense of right and wrong.

Nursing Ethics from the Perspective of Moral Injury / 中国医学伦理学

Due to the specialty of the profession, nursing staff often face more traumatic events in which their self-moral cognition is contrary to the reality, and gradually turn to moral injury on this basis. The level of nursing ethical literacy of nursing staff greatly affects their differences in moral cognition and the strength of moral resilience, thus determining the development and recovery of moral injury. The latest ethical code for nurses, the Expert Consensus on Nursing Ethics for the Prevention and Control of Major Infectious Diseases, has improved the rights and interests of nursing staff. The active practice of this code can help nursing staff effectively respond to the endogenous and exogenous injury sources brought about by the epidemic, eliminate negative moral cognition, improve the moral resilience of nursing staff, as well as has positive effects on the prevention of moral injury for nursing staff.

A functional neuroimaging investigation of Moral Foundations Theory.

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that the human mind contains modules (or "foundations") that are functionally specialized to moralize unique dimensions of the social world: Authority, Loyalty, Purity, Harm, Fairness, and Liberty. Despite this strong claim about cognitive architecture, it is unclear whether neural activity during moral reasoning exhibits this modular structure. Here, we use spatiotemporal partial least squares correlation (PLSC) analyses of fMRI data collected during judgments of foundation-specific violations to investigate whether MFT's cognitive modularity claim extends to the neural level. A mean-centered PLSC analysis returned two latent variables that differentiated between social norm and moral foundation violations, functionally segregated Purity, Loyalty, Physical Harm, and Fairness from the other foundations, and suggested that Authority has a different neural basis than other binding foundations. Non-rotated PLSC analyses confirmed that neural activity distinguished social norm from moral foundation violations, and distinguished individualizing and binding moral foundations if Authority is dropped from the binding foundations. Purity violations were persistently associated with amygdala activity, whereas moral foundation violations more broadly tended to engage the default network. Our results constitute partial evidence for neural modularity and motivate further research on the novel groupings identified by the PLSC analyses.

Perceiving and pursuing legitimate power.

How do people perceive and pursue legitimate power? For the social sciences, this question is venerable. Yet, for cognitive science, it offers fresh and generative opportunities to explore how adults evaluate legitimacy, how children learn to do so, and what difference legitimate power makes for people's thoughts, feelings, and actions.