Lev Tolstoy, A Founder of Democratic Education.

In this philosophical-theoretical study of Lev Tolstoy's pedagogical legacy of his Yasnaya Polyana school in the Russian Empire (1859-1862), I raised three major questions: (1) was Lev Tolstoy a democratic educator, and if so, why can one claim that, (2) if so, what kind of a democratic educator was he, and (3) what kind of limitations to his democratic education have I observe and what were the sources of these limitations? My answer to the first question was unequivocally positive. I argue that Tolstoy was the conceptual founder of democratic non-coercive education and the first known practitioner of democratic education for children. In my view, his democratic education was based on educational offerings provided by the teachers. His democratic educational philosophy was based on non-coercion, naturalism, anarchism, liveliness, pragmatism, pedagogical experimentation, student responses, pedagogical self-reflection, and dialogism. At the same time, his democratic education was limited to his uncritical acceptance of conventionalism. Tolstoy's attraction to Progressive Education was facilitated by ignoring his enormous powers, both explicit and implicit, that he manifested exercised in the school and enacted through his "pervasive informality." In my judgment, Tolstoy overemphasized pedagogy over self-education and did not distinguish learning from education. Still, Tolstoy's pioneering work in democratic education, both in theory and practice, remains mostly unacknowledged and unanalyzed while continuing to be highly relevant and potentially influential.

The normativist-naturalist puzzle: Functions and assumptions of health assessment tools.

While there is no shortage in discussions of health assessment tools, little is known about health professionals' experience of their practical uses. However, these tools rely on assumptions that have significant impacts on the practice of health assessment. In this study, we explore health professionals' experiences with health assessment tools, that is, how they define, use, and understand these tools, and whether they take them to measure health and wellbeing. We combine a qualitative, interview-based study of the uses and understandings of health assessment tools among Danish health professionals with a philosophical analysis of these applications and perceptions. Our study shows that contrary assumptions are involved in the use of the tools, to the extent that one can speak of a normativist-naturalist puzzle: health professionals generally apply a normativist conception of health, find health assessment useful and valuable for their clinical practice, but believe that what the tools measure is basically not health proper but some proximal entity of a more naturalist kind. This result demonstrates the complexity of health assessment tools and suggests that they are used with care to ensure both that particular tools are used for the kinds of tasks they are most apt for, and that they are put to use in awareness of their limitations.

Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications.

Work at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry has an extensive and influential history, and has received increased attention recently, with the emergence of professional associations and a growing literature. In this paper, we review key advances in work on philosophy and psychiatry, and their related clinical implications. First, in understanding and categorizing mental disorder, both naturalist and normativist considerations are now viewed as important - psychiatric constructs necessitate a consideration of both facts and values. At a conceptual level, this integrative view encourages moving away from strict scientism to soft naturalism, while in clinical practice this facilitates both evidence-based and values-based mental health care. Second, in considering the nature of psychiatric science, there is now increasing emphasis on a pluralist approach, including ontological, explanatory and value pluralism. Conceptually, a pluralist approach acknowledges the multi-level causal interactions that give rise to psychopathology, while clinically it emphasizes the importance of a broad range of "difference-makers", as well as a consideration of "lived experience" in both research and practice. Third, in considering a range of questions about the brain-mind, and how both somatic and psychic factors contribute to the development and maintenance of mental disorders, conceptual and empirical work on embodied cognition provides an increasingly valuable approach. Viewing the brain-mind as embodied, embedded and enactive offers a conceptual approach to the mind-body problem that facilitates the clinical integration of advances in both cognitive-affective neuroscience and phenomenological psychopathology.

Definición, descripción y conceptualización en la psicoterapia. Una visión desde las ciencias comportamentales y evidencias

In this document, psychotherapeutic practice is described from a perspective of science and evidence, using as an instrument the definitions, descriptions, and conceptualizations subsequently supported by a naturalistic and non-mediational position. Starting from the conception with psychotherapy free of union biases or any particular approach. First, a description of what it is and its phases is addressed. Then, conceptualizations in psychotherapy of personal and social problems and procedures were established. Finally, this document concludes based on the criteria proposed by the (American Psychological Association (APA), 2006) and the Plan for Comprehensive Action on Mental Health (World Health Organization, 2013) for a practice based on evidence.

En el presente documento, se describe la práctica psicoterapéutica desde una perspectiva de la ciencias y evidencias, usando como instrumento definiciones, descripciones y conceptualizaciones apoyado posteriormente por una postura naturalista y no mediacional. Partiendo desde una concepción de la psicoterapia libre de sesgos gremiales o desde alguna aproximación particular. Primero, se aborda una descripción sobre qué es y sus fases. Luego, se establecen las conceptualizaciones en psicoterapia, de problema personal y social y de procedimientos. Finalmente se concluye con el presente documento a partir de los criterios propuestos por la (American Psychological Association (APA), 2006) y el Plan para la acción integral sobre salud mental  (Organización Mundial para la Salud, 2013) para una práctica basada en la evidencia.

The Dynamics of Disease: Toward a Processual Theory of Health.

The following article presents preliminary reflections on a processual theory of health and disease. It does this by steering the discussion more toward an ontology of organisms rather than conceptual analysis of the semantic content of the terms "health" and "disease." In the first section, four meta-theoretical assumptions of the traditional debate are identified and alternative approaches to the problems are presented. Afterwards, the view that health and disease are constituted by a dynamic relation between demands imposed on an organism and individual presuppositions for adequate response is developed. In the last section, the paper takes stock of three possible objections to and clarifies some implications of this approach to the notions of health and disease.

Naturalism and the hard problem of mysticism in psychedelic science.

Psychedelic substances are known to facilitate mystical-type experiences which can include metaphysical beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality. Such insights have been criticized as being incompatible with naturalism and therefore false. This leads to two problems. The easy problem is to elaborate on what is meant by the "fundamental nature of reality," and whether mystical-type conceptions of it are compatible with naturalism. The hard problem is to show how mystical-type insights, which from the naturalistic perspective are brain processes, could afford insight into the nature of reality beyond the brain. I argue that naturalism is less restrictive than commonly assumed, allowing that reality can be more than what science can convey. I propose that what the mystic refers to as the ultimate nature of reality can be considered as its representation- and observation-independent nature, and that mystical-type conceptions of it can be compatible with science. However, showing why the claims of the mystic would be true requires answering the hard problem. I argue that we can in fact directly know the fundamental nature of one specific part of reality, namely our own consciousness. Psychedelics may amplify our awareness of what consciousness is in itself, beyond our conceptual models about it. Moreover, psychedelics may aid us to become aware of the limits of our models of reality. However, it is far from clear how mystical-type experience could afford access to the fundamental nature of reality at large, beyond one's individual consciousness. I conclude that mystical-type conceptions about reality may be compatible with naturalism, but not verifiable.

What are Mental Disorders? Exploring the Role of Culture in the Harmful Dysfunction Approach.

A shared problem in psychology, psychiatry, and philosophy is how to define mental disorders. Various theories have been proposed, ranging from naturalism to social constructionism. In this article, I first briefly introduce the current landscape of such theories, before concentrating on one of the most influential approaches today: The harmful dysfunction theory developed by Jerome Wakefield. It claims that mental disorders are hybrid phenomena since they have a natural basis in dysfunctional mental mechanisms, but also a cultural component in the harm experienced by human beings. Although the theory is well thought through, I will raise a critical question: Is it possible to isolate mental mechanisms as naturally evolved from cultural factors? I will argue that it is not, but that the theory could still be helpful in an understanding of mental disorders, albeit on a new footing that does not operate with a natural and a cultural component as two separate factors. I argue that we need to develop a "naturecultural" approach to psychopathology that avoids mentalism, based on the fact that human beings are irreducibly persons.

Specialists with spirit: Re-enchanting the vocation of science.

This article is both a comment on the collection of papers, "Specialists with Spirit: Re-Enchanting the Vocation of Science," offered as a tribute to Klaas van Berkel, and an attempt to add historical depth to present-day sensibilities about the academic discipline called the history of science: Is it a special sort of inquiry? Is science as its subject matter a special sort of culture? Max Weber's 1917 Science as a Vocation lecture, and its continuing appropriations, is a focal point for addressing these questions.

Epistemological Alienation in Scientific Psychology.

This article presents the concept of epistemological alienation in order to examine psychology's epistemological quantitative Paradigm and its connection to political reality. Politzer's work of how mainstream psychology turns the first-person language of the individual into a mechanistic third-person pseudoscience is thoroughly discussed. Consequently, through some marginalized voices within psychology, it is examined how psychologists disregard the subject's own voice, intentionality, meaning and judgment-forming mechanisms promoting instead a naturalistic and mechanistic language, based heavily on psychometric methodology and a false and altered account of psychology's history. Psychology's mechanistic language is compared to Marx's concept of alienation, various aspects of which are discussed. The case is made that epistemological alienation is an internal process in psychological research that stems from and reinforces, essentializes and "epistemologizes" the alienation and the individualization of the modern subject.

Beyond Conceptual Analysis: Social Objectivity and Conceptual Engineering to Define Disease.

In this article, I side with those who argue that the debate about the definition of "disease" should be reoriented from the question "what is disease" to the question of what it should be. However, I ground my argument on the rejection of the naturalist approach to define disease and the adoption of a normativist approach, according to which the concept of disease is normative and value-laden. Based on this normativist approach, I defend two main theses: (1) that conceptual analysis is not the right method to define disease and that conceptual engineering should be the preferred method and (2) that the method of conceptual engineering should be implemented following the principles of Alexandrova's account of social objectivity in the context of the definition of disease.

Re: Viewing Observation. The Philosophy of Medical Imaging.

Visualisation and observation are distinct, though interrelated activities. Observation involves the sensing of data. Visualisation renders data tractable to the specific sense of vision. There is no visualisation without observation, and some observation requires visualisation for it to happen at all. Visualisation and observation have long been understood as critical underpinnings of theory formation, as well as practice.Over time, a series of debates have prised apart the supposed strict division between looking and theorising, as well as the assumed passivity of looking. These challenges replaced the assertion of independence with claims of causal influence running in both directions.Earlier discussion has focussed on the role of human observers, with the understanding that instrumentation played a mere enabling role, enhancing observation through technology for visualisation and visual enhancement. But new approaches in the philosophy of technology have also questioned this assumption.Postphenomenology, the set of practices leading to contemporary philosophy of technology, encompasses a set of approaches for re-evaluating the role of technology in observation, and with it reassessing the impact of observation on theory formation and clinical practice. With reference to ideas from postphenomenology, we consider the contours of a biophilosophical theory of visual observation.

Reflections on "Health" from the Perspective of Immunology / 中国医学伦理学

The philosophical debate on "health" was examined based on three situations in immunology: the role of the immune system in cancer, maternal infant inheritance, and xenotransplantation. The concepts of "health" depicted by naturalism, dispositionalism inherited from naturalism, and constructivism are difficult to be well applied in the above three situations. Examining whether there is something "go wrong" in the organism on physiological and natural levels, and whether the occurrence of "wrong-goings" can bring "good" results, and then giving value judgments based on them, is a better approach to characterize "health". Conducting value judgments means arousing the imagination and expectation: there is a tension between the expectation that "health can be restored" through medical intervention and the inevitable uncertainty of actual medical knowledge. If expectation failed, patients’ well-being would be undermined. Therefore, in the clinical application and research of cutting-edge methods such as immunotherapy, it is still required to be cautious about statements such as "restoring health" that may bring excessive expectations to patients.

Protocol statements, physicalism, and metadata: Otto Neurath on scientific evidence.

Otto Neurath's role in the so-called protocol sentence debates is typically framed as primarily an epistemologically radical rejection of empiricist foundationalism. However, less well recognized is that from this debate, Neurath emerges with a conception of protocol statements that functions as a radical reconceptualization of evidence. Whilst recognizably still empiricist, Neurath's conception of evidence breaks with many of the key assumptions that predominate within the empiricist tradition. In rejecting the assumption of an epistemologically privileged relationship between an observer and their own observation reports, Neurath shifts the emphasis onto the importance of contextualizing information that guarantees the stability of observation reports. In so doing, he not only provides a conception of evidence better suited to the actual role of evidence in science, but also anticipates contemporary discussion of the importance of evidential metadata.

Internal constraints for phenomenal externalists: a structure matching theory.

We motivate five constraints on theorizing about sensory experience. We then propose a novel form of naturalistic intentionalism that succeeds where other theories fail by satisfying all of these constraints. On the proposed theory, which we call structure matching tracking intentionalism, brains states track determinables. Internal structural features of those states select determinates of those determinables for presentation in experience. We argue that this theory is distinctively well-positioned to both explain internal-phenomenal structural correlations and accord external features a role in fixing phenomenology. In addition, we use the theory to shed light on how one comes to experience "missing shades".

A tale of two cities: emotion and reason in the formation of moral judgement and possible metaethical implications.

The project of naturalizing ethics has multiple contributions, from cognitive and moral psychology to primatology, neuroscience or evolutionary theory. One of the strategies for naturalizing ethics has been to argue that moral norms and values can be explained away if we focus on their causal history, if it is possible to offer both an ultimate and proximate causal explanation for them. In this article, I will focus on the contribution of cognitive and moral psychology as a way of offering a proximate causal explanation for moral judgments. I am mostly interested in understanding to what extent these cognitive and psychological questions have some bearing in the fields of ethics and meta-ethics. Does this research programme put at stake the contention that ethics is a manifestation of human rationality? Is it true that finding the cognitive underpinnings of some of our moral judgments vindicates some meta-ethical position, namely some kind of reductionist naturalism? In the end, I will argue that even if scientific disciplines such as cognitive psychology give us a naturalized picture of the moral agent, there seem to be no reasons to think that from a naturalized perspective of the agent capable of perceiving value it must follow the naturalization of value itself.

Does Machine Understanding Require Consciousness?

This article addresses the question of whether machine understanding requires consciousness. Some researchers in the field of machine understanding have argued that it is not necessary for computers to be conscious as long as they can match or exceed human performance in certain tasks. But despite the remarkable recent success of machine learning systems in areas such as natural language processing and image classification, important questions remain about their limited performance and about whether their cognitive abilities entail genuine understanding or are the product of spurious correlations. Here I draw a distinction between natural, artificial, and machine understanding. I analyse some concrete examples of natural understanding and show that although it shares properties with the artificial understanding implemented in current machine learning systems it also has some essential differences, the main one being that natural understanding in humans entails consciousness. Moreover, evidence from psychology and neurobiology suggests that it is this capacity for consciousness that, in part at least, explains for the superior performance of humans in some cognitive tasks and may also account for the authenticity of semantic processing that seems to be the hallmark of natural understanding. I propose a hypothesis that might help to explain why consciousness is important to understanding. In closing, I suggest that progress toward implementing human-like understanding in machines-machine understanding-may benefit from a naturalistic approach in which natural processes are modelled as closely as possible in mechanical substrates.

Sustainable impact of COVID-19 on education projects: aspects of naturalism.

History records show that pandemics and threats have always given new directions to the thinking, working, and learning styles. This article attempts to thoroughly document the positive core of coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) and its impact on global social psychology, ecological stability, and development. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is used to test the hypotheses and comprehend the objectives of the study. The findings of the study reveals that the path coefficients for the variables health consciousness, naturalism, financial impact and self-development, sustainability, compassion, gregariousness, sympathy, and cooperation demonstrate that the factors have a positive and significant effect on COVID-19 prevention. Moreover, the content analysis was conducted on recently published reports, blog content, newspapers, and social media. The pieces of evidence from history have been cited to justify the perspective. Furthermore, to appraise the opinions of professionals of different walks of life, an online survey was conducted, and results were discussed with expert medical professionals. Outcomes establish that the pandemics give birth to creativity, instigate innovations, prompt inventions, establish human ties, and foster altruistic elements of compassion and emotionalism.

Consciousness and complexity: Neurobiological naturalism and integrated information theory.

In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt's Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi's and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.

Teleology and the organism: Kant's controversial legacy for contemporary biology.

This paper distinguishes two ways in which Kant's ideas concerning the relation between teleology and biological organization have been taken up in contemporary philosophy of biology and theoretical biology. The first sees his account as the first instance of the modern understanding of teleology as a heuristic tool aimed at producing mechanistic explanations of organismal form and function. The second sees in Kant's concept of intrinsic purposiveness the seed of a radically new way of thinking about biological systems that should be developed by turning teleology into a legitimate concept of natural science. We name the two approaches heuristic and naturalistic, respectively. Our aim is to critically evaluate these approaches and suggest that the naturalistic option, which remains a minority position, deserves to be taken more seriously than it currently is in contemporary biological theory. While evolution by natural selection closes the case on intelligent design, it does not close the case on teleology in general. In fact, the current return of the organism and the recent calls for an agential perspective in evolutionary biology point out that we still have some thinking to do concerning this side of Kant's legacy.

Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism.

In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one 'normativist' label ceases to be appropriate for the whole range of positions. If values and norms are not explicit components of the concept of disease, but only intervene in other explanatory roles, then the concept of disease is no more value-laden than many other scientific concepts, or even any other scientific concept. We call the newly identified position "value-conscious naturalism" about disease, and point to some of its theoretical and practical advantages.