Schizophrenia, the very idea: On self-disorder, hyperreflexivity, and the diagnostic concept.

The purpose of the present article is to consider schizophrenia-the very idea-from the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology, with special attention to the problematic nature of the diagnostic concept as well as to the prospect and challenges inherent in focusing on subjective experience. First, we address historical and philosophical topics relevant to the legitimacy of diagnostic categorization-in general and regarding "schizophrenia" in particular. William James's pragmatist approach to categorization is discussed. Then we offer a version of the well-known basic-self or ipseity-disturbance model (IDM) of schizophrenia, but in a significantly revised form (IDMrevised). The revised model better acknowledges the diverse and even seemingly contradictory nature of schizophrenic symptoms while, at the same time, interpreting these in a more unitary fashion via the key concept of hyperreflexivity-a form of exaggerated self-awareness that tends to undermine normal world-directedness and the stability of self-experience. Particular attention is paid to forms of exaggerated "self-presence" that are sometimes neglected yet imbue classically schizophrenic experiences involving subjectivism or quasi-solipsism and/or all-inclusive or ontological forms of paranoia. We focus on the distinctively paradoxical nature of schizophrenic symptomatology. In concluding we consider precursors in the work of Klaus Conrad, Kimura Bin and Henri Grivois. Finally we defend the concept of schizophrenia by considering its distinctive way of altering certain core aspects of the human condition itself.

What Is It Like to Be in Alcohol Addiction Recovery? A Dialectical Phenomenological Analysis.

INTRODUCTION: Currently, there is no scientific consensus on the concept of alcohol addiction recovery beyond substance use control. This conceptual issue challenges the implementation of therapeutic strategies and mental health policies that are unrestricted to symptomatic remission. Aiming to contribute to its definition, this study aimed to examine the recovery experience of individuals with alcohol addiction using dialectical phenomenological psychopathology (DPP) as a theoretical and methodological framework. METHODS: A dialectical phenomenological analysis was conducted through an examination of online interviews with eight Brazilian, São Paulo state citizens who were self-declared to be undergoing alcohol addiction recovery (or who declared that they had completely recovered). RESULTS: Participants' reports generated eight categories that were subdivided into two groups. The first group indicated experiential elements of recovery, such as changes in self-relation, changes in interpersonal relations, and changes in time relations, giving new meanings to suffering and alcohol use, and recovery as a continuous process. The second group referred to how the participants interpreted recovery according to their worldviews: as a spiritual experience, moral reformation, and mentality change. CONCLUSION: These categories can be understood through the lens of DPP as a process of change in the subjects' being in the world, characterized by the continued management of their existential imbalances in the dimensions of spatiality, temporality, selfhood, and intersubjectivity. The results are preliminary when it comes to conceptualizing recovery but may help future studies to develop recovery-oriented therapeutic strategies.

A phenomenologically grounded specification of varieties of adolescent depression.

Researchers are increasingly acknowledging that psychopathological conditions usually grouped together under the generic label "depression" are highly diverse. However, no differential therapeutic approach currently exists that is sensitive to the varieties of depression afflicting young people. In fact, the discussion is missing something much more fundamental: a specification of the types of adolescent depression. Recent research that has aimed to classify different kinds of depression has mainly studied adult populations and predominantly used technically complicated measurements of biological markers. The neglect of the potential particularities of dysphoric disorders affecting youths is unfortunate, and the exclusive focus on biological parameters unnecessarily restrictive. Moreover, this one-sidedness obfuscates more directly available sources of clinically relevant data that could orient conceptualization efforts in child and adolescent psychiatry. Particularly, clues for discriminating different types of adolescent depression may be obtained by analyzing personally articulated accounts of how affected young people experience changes in their relation to the world and to themselves. Thus, here we present and discuss the findings of a study that explored the possibility of specifying types of adolescent depression in a phenomenological way. The study investigated the association between these types and the vicissitudes of personality development. In accounts given by youths diagnosed with depression during semi-structured interviews, we identified themes and examined their phenomenological centrality. Specifically, our qualitative analyses aimed to determine the relative importance of certain themes with respect to the overall intelligibility of the described changes to the relational space. Based on the findings of these analyses, we differentiate three specifiers of adolescent depression and suggest an association between particular types of experiences and the trajectory of affected adolescents' personality development. To our knowledge, this is the first phenomenologically grounded specification of types of adolescent depression with potential therapeutic significance. Thus, based on this contribution, we propose that modes of scientific exploration that are close to phenomenological philosophy-which have been ignored in the context of developmental psychopathology-could offer a foundation to theories developed in the field of child and adolescent psychiatry.

The Autism Rating Scale for Schizophrenia - Revised English Version: An Instrument to Characterize Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders Phenotype.

Dis-sociality (DS) reflects the impairment of social experience in people with schizophrenia; it encompasses both negative features (disorder of attunement, inability to grasp the meaning of social contexts, the vanishing of social shared knowledge) and positive features (a peculiar set of values, ruminations not oriented to reality), reflecting the existential arrangement of people with schizophrenia. DS is grounded on the notion of schizophrenic autism as depicted by continental psychopathology. A rating scale has been developed, providing an experiential phenotype. Here we present the Autism Rating Scale for Schizophrenia - Revised English version (ARSS-Rev), developed on the Italian version of the scale. The scale is provided by a structured interview to facilitate the assessment of the phenomena investigated here. ARSS-Rev is composed of 16 distinctive items grouped into 6 categories: hypo-attunement, invasiveness, emotional flooding, algorithmic conception of sociality, antithetical attitude toward sociality, and idionomia. For each item and category, an accurate description is provided. Different intensities of phenomena are assessed through a Likert scale by rating each item according to its quantitative features (frequency, intensity, impairment, and need for coping). The ARSS-Rev has been able to discriminate patients with remitted schizophrenia from euthymic patients with psychotic bipolar disorder. This instrument may be useful in clinical/research settings to demarcate the boundaries of schizophrenia spectrum disorders from affective psychoses.

Relações entre tempo vivido, depressão e pandemia na perspectiva da psicopatologia fenomenológica / Interrelation between lived time, depression, and pandemic from the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology / Relations entre le temps vécu, la dépression et la pandémie dans la perspective de la psychopathologie phénoménologique / Relaciones entre tiempo vivido, depresión y pandemia desde la perspectiva de la psicopatología fenomenológica

O tempo foi amplamente investigado por Eugène Minkowski, retomando os conceitos de Henri Bergson de tempo cronológico e duração vivida. Apesar de algumas divergências, a influência bergsoniana contribuiu para os estudos de Minkowski, que buscou alcançar as características e as alterações do tempo vivido nos pacientes. A alteração na vivência do tempo — possivelmente intensificada na pandemia de Covid-19 — está no cerne da depressão de acordo com a psicopatologia fenomenológica. Assim, o objetivo deste artigo é ampliar a compreensão sobre o tempo vivido e a depressão durante esse período, o que é relevante considerando o acometimento de mais de 300 milhões de pessoas no mundo pela depressão e o aumento em 25% na sua prevalência global após o primeiro ano de contágio do vírus.

Resumos Time has been extensively investigated by Eugène Minkowski, taking up Henri Bergson's concepts of objective time and lived time. Despite some divergences, Bergsonian's influence contributed to the studies of Minkowski, who sought to reach the characteristics and alterations of lived time in patients. The alteration in the experience of time — possibly intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic — is placed at the core of depression according to phenomenological psychopathology. Thus, this study aims to expand the understanding of lived time and depression during the pandemic, which is relevant considering that more than 300 million people worldwide are affected by depression and that its global prevalence increased by 25% after the first year of the virus infection.

Le temps a fait l'objet de recherches par Eugène Minkowski, reprenant les concepts de temps chronologique et de durée vécue d'Henri Bergson. Malgré certaines divergences, l'influence bergsonienne a contribué aux études de Minkowski, qui cherchait à comprendre les caractéristiques et les changements du temps vécu chez les patients. Le changement dans l'experience du temps — peut-être intensifié pendant la pandémie de COVID-19 — est au cœur de la depression selon la psychopathologie phénoménologique. Cet article cherche donc à élargir la compréhension du temps vécu et de la dépression pendant cette période, ce qui est pertinent compte tenu du fait que plus de 300 millions de personnes dans le monde sont touchées par la dépression et l'augmentation de 25% de sa prévalence mondiale après la première année d'infection par le virus.

El tiempo fue ampliamente investigado por Eugène Minkowski, retomando los conceptos de Henri Bergson de tiempo cronológico y duración vivida. A pesar de algunas divergencias, la influencia bergsoniana contribuyó a los estudios de Minkowski, que pretendía llegar a las características y cambios del tiempo vivido en los pacientes. La alteración en la vivencia del tiempo — posiblemente intensificada en la pandemia del COVID-19 — está en el centro de la depresión según la psico-patología fenomenológica. El objetivo de este artículo es ampliar la comprensión del tiempo vivido y de la depresión durante este período, lo que es relevante considerando que la depresión afecta a más de 300 millones de personas en el mundo y que hubo un aumento del 25% en su prevalencia global después del primer ano de contagio del virus.

Incels, autism, and hopelessness: affective incorporation of online interaction as a challenge for phenomenological psychopathology.

Recent research has drawn attention to the prevalence of self-reported autism within online communities of involuntary celibates (incels). These studies suggest that some individuals with autism may be particularly vulnerable to the impact of incel forums and the hopelessness they generate. However, a more precise description of the experiential connection between inceldom, self-reported autism, and hopelessness has remained unarticulated. Therefore, this article combines empirical studies on the incel community with phenomenological and embodiment approaches to autism, hopelessness, and online affectivity. We analyze three interrelated aspects of online interactions in incel communities - worldview, bodily self-relation, and mutual dismissals - and examine how these elements contribute to the consolidation of the loss of significant life possibilities. By investigating the potential negative influence of specific online environments on affective dispositions, our approach contributes to the debate on current challenges to "situate" phenomenological psychopathology.

The phenomenological model of depression: from methodological challenges to clinical advancements.

In this article our overall aim is to illustrate how phenomenological psychopathology can advance the clinical work on depression. To do so, we start by unfolding the current phenomenological model of depression. We argue that this model faces a methodological challenge, which we define as 'the challenge of patho-description'. Mental disorders, such as depression, influence how people are able to access and describe their own experiences. This becomes a challenge for phenomenological psychopathology since its methodology is based on people's ability to describe their own experiences. To deal with this challenge, in the case of depression, we turn to the framework of phenomenological interview. We interview 12 participants (7 women, 5 men, age-range from 29 to 57 years) with moderate and severe depression. From the interview results, we show how phenomenological interview deals with the challenge of patho-description and how patho-description in depression conceals experiential nuances. We unfold these nuances and describe how people with depression pre-reflectively experience a variety of feelings, a type of agency, overly positive self-image, and relations in a hyper-social way. These descriptive nuances not only strengthen the phenomenological model of depression, but they also help advance the clinical work on depression. We firstly illustrate how the descriptive nuances can be added to current manuals and rating scales to advance diagnostic work. Secondly, we illustrate how phenomenological, 'bottom-up', and embodied approaches function at the pre-reflective level of experience, and that further effort at this level can help advance therapy for depression.

Phenomenology yesterday, today, and tomorrow: a proposed phenomenological response to the double challenges of contemporary recovery-oriented person-centered mental health care.

This paper argues that a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology's traditional twin roles in psychiatry (one science-centered, the other individual-centered) is needed to support the recovery-oriented practice that is at the heart of contemporary person-centered mental health care. The paper is in two main sections. Section I illustrates the different ways in which phenomenology's two roles have played out over three significant periods of the history of phenomenology in 20th century psychiatry: with the introduction of phenomenology in Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology in 1913; with the development a few years later of structural phenomenological psychopathology; and in the period of post-War humanism. Section II is concerned with the role of phenomenology in contemporary mental health. There has been a turn to phenomenology in the current period, we argue, in response to what amounts to an uncoupling of academic psychiatry from front-line clinical care. Corresponding with the two roles of phenomenology, this uncoupling has both scientific aspects and clinical aspects. The latter, we suggest, is most fully expressed in a new model of "recovery," defined, not by the values of professionals as experts-by-training, but by the values of patients and carers as experts-by-experience, specifically, by what is important to the quality of life of the individual concerned in the situation in question. We illustrate the importance of recovery, so defined, and the challenges raised by it for both the evidence-base and the values-base of clinical decision-making, with brief clinical vignettes. It is to these challenges we argue, that phenomenology through a synthesis of its twin roles is uniquely equipped to respond. Noting, however, the many barriers to such a synthesis, we argue that in the current state of development of the field, it is by way of a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology's roles that we should proceed. From such a dialectic, a genuine synthesis of roles may ultimately emerge. We conclude with a note on the wider significance of these developments, arguing that contrary to 20th century stereotypes, they show psychiatry to be leading the way for healthcare as a whole, in developing the resources for 21st century person-centered clinical care.

Obsessive-compulsive existential type: a dialectical-phenomenological approach.

The clinical presentation of obsessive-compulsive patients is characterized by unwanted, intrusive, nonsensical, self-related, and recurrent ideas, thoughts, images, or impulses associated with active compulsive compensations. Under the operational diagnostic criteria adopted by the biological- and cognitive-oriented neopositivist medical paradigm, it is known as "obsessive-compulsive disorder." However, this paradigm has been criticized for its controversial assumptions, limited methodologies, theoretic biases, and inconsistency in producing practical outcomes. To bypass some of these issues, we propose a complementary approach that draws on and further develops existing psychopathological studies of the obsessive-compulsive anthropological condition based on dialectical phenomenological psychopathology. As such, we refer to the global clinical configuration as the "obsessive-compulsive existential type." Our theoretical inspiration comes from the classical phenomenological work on obsessions undertaken by Straus and Gebsattel, which identified the negative transformation of the obsessive-compulsive life-world or the endogenous emergence of the anti-eidos (diluting existential force). We then propose to broaden the concept of anti-eidos, especially in its dialectical correlation with eidos (unifying existential force), representing the existential dialectic between transformation and permanence. Next, we detail the dynamics of anthropological disproportions in obsessive-compulsive existential type, essentially the supremacy of the anti-eidos over the eidos. This primary imbalance modifies the obsessive-compulsive existential structure, consisting of polymorphic temporality; weakened intentionality; maladjusted calibration of distance with the world and others; an integral, isolated, besieged self with dwindling self-agency, and tense and over-protecting embodiment. We also analyze compensatory hyperreflexivity and compulsive rituals as expressions of structural counterbalancing designed to contain the primary structural disproportions and derangements. The heterogeneous obsessive-compulsive clinical manifestations are the complex result of the primary structural alteration and subsequent phenomenological compensations. They tend to be variable in temporal span and rarely assume a fixed form, hindering diagnosis. We correlate structural frameworks with multiple clinical examples. Finally, we raise some insights on how our study may contribute to scientific research and therapeutic proposals.

Recontextualizing the subject of phenomenological psychopathology: Establishing a new paradigm case.

Recently, there have been calls to develop a more contextual approach to phenomenological psychopathology-an approach that attends to the socio-cultural as well as personal and biographical factors that shape experiences of mental illness. In this Perspective article, we argue that to develop this contextual approach, phenomenological psychopathology should adopt a new paradigm case. For decades, schizophrenia has served as the paradigmatic example of a condition that can be better understood through phenomenological investigation. And recent calls for a contextual approach continue to use schizophrenia as their primary example. We argue, in contrast, that substance misuse provides a better paradigm case around which to develop a contextually sensitive phenomenological psychopathology. After providing a brief vignette and analysis of a case of substance misuse, we explain why this kind of condition requires considerable sensitivity and attention to context, better motivating the incorporation and development of new contextually sensitive approaches.

Se-duction is not sex-duction: Desexualizing and de-feminizing hysteria.

The psychopathological analysis of hysteria is a victim of narrow conceptualizations. Among these is the inscription of hysteria in the feminine sphere, about body and sexuality, which incentivized conceptual reductionism. Hysteria has been mainly considered a gendered pathology, almost exclusively female, and it has been associated with cultural and/or religious features over time rather than treated as a psychopathological world. Further, hysteria has been dominated by conceptual inaccuracies and indecision, not only in terms of clinical features but also in terms of its definition. For this reason, it seems necessary to "undress" hysteria from this feminization, sexualization, and corporealization with which it has been abundantly clothed over the years. "Undressing" hysteria will make possible a reconfiguring and deconstructing of the explanatory-causal model of Charcot and Freud. However, if we take out this cultural heritage, the stigma accompanying this diagnosis, and the weight of the enormous historical tradition that hysteria carries, the world of hysteria continues to constitute a domain full of complexity and nosographic challenges. Hysteria has been considered a sum of psychological behaviors and states illustrated by drama, mystery, or falsity. The difficulty in understanding the multiple somatic manifestations which characterize this clinical condition created several controversies and much confusion. In the current nosography, the personological component of hysteria has been separated from its symptomatic manifestation, in the Histrionic Personality Disorder and Conversion Disorder categories, respectively. This segmentation by descriptive nosography does contribute to a unitary understanding of the phenomenon and, consequently, of daily clinical practice. Clinical complexity can be grasped and deciphered only if the symptom is inscribed in the patient's lifeworld and his/her subjective life history. Clinical practice is thus thought of in terms of a structural aggregation of a homogeneous set of phenomena, together constituting a specific way of being in the world. The starting point of this article is the evident modalities characterizing this life-world, taking care not to confuse the point of origin with the point of expression.

"An illness of isolation, a disease of disconnection": Depression and the erosion of we-experiences.

Depression is an affective disorder involving a significant change in an individual's emotional and affective experiences. While the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM) mentions that social impairment may occur in depression, first-person reports of depression consistently name isolation from others as a key feature of depression. I present a phenomenological analysis of how certain interpersonal relations are experienced in depression. In particular, I consider whether depressed individuals are able to enter into "we-experiences" with other people. We-experiences are experiences had with two or more people as a we (rather than having an experience as an I), experiences that allow one to enter into robustly shared experiences with others. I claim that the ability to enter into we-experiences (both actual and habitual) is eroded in depression due to an overwhelming feeling of being different to and misunderstood by others. As such, I suggest that depression should be conceived of as fixing an individual in their first-person singular perspective, thus inhibiting their ability to experience in the first-person plural and to feel a sense of connectedness or togetherness with others as part of a we. By attending to on-going impacts of a diminished ability to enter into we-experiences, we can provide a situated and more nuanced account of the changes of interpersonal relations in depression that captures the progressive (rather than static) nature of the disorder. In turn, this analysis furthers our understanding of the emergence, frustration, and erosion of actual and habitual we-experiences.

Paving the way for systemic phenomenological psychiatry - the forgotten heritage of Wolfgang Blankenburg.

Phenomenological psychopathology focuses on the first-person experience of mental disorders. Although it is in principle descriptive, it also entails an explanatory dimension: single psychological symptoms are conceived as genetically arising from a holistic structure of personal experience, i.e., the patient's being-in-the-world - and of its dynamic unfolding over time. Yet both classical and current phenomenological approaches tend to identify the essential disorder or "trouble générateur" (Minkowski) of mental illness within the individual, thereby neglecting the relevance of the social context not only for the emergence of symptoms but also for their treatment. The work of Wolfgang Blankenburg on schizophrenia represents a noteworthy approach to overcome this individualistic tendency. He introduced the concept of "loss of common sense" as the structural core of schizophrenic experience and being-in-the-world and he considered the social and most importantly familial context for the emergence of schizophrenic experience. By accounting not only for personal experience but also for interactional structures of families and social milieus in which experience is embedded, Blankenburg thereby offered ways to combine phenomenological and systemic explanations of mental disorders. Beside his most renowned work on "the loss of common sense," in this paper we also present his family studies of young persons with schizophrenia, which have so far received little if no attention. We thus discuss the different ways in which Blankenburg expanded the phenomenological approach into a more systemic and social direction. We then link Blankenburg's work with current systemic explanatory models of schizophrenia and explore the clinical and scientific implications of this link. Finally, we call for further research on the synergy effects between the two.

A psicopatologia fenomenológica da atenção: entre a descrição e a hermenêutica / Phenomenological psychopathology of attention: between description and hermeneutics / Psychopathologie phénoménologique de l'attention: entre description et heméneutique / La psicopatología fenemonológica de la atención: entre la descripción y la hermenéutica

Neste trabalho, propõe-se uma análise sobre as contribuições da psicopatologia fenomenológica para a consideração crítica dos fenômenos de atenção e desatenção no contexto social e histórico contemporâneo. Para tanto, analisa a matriz naturalista de concepção da atenção e de sua disfunção e situa a psicopatologia fenomenológica; apresenta diretrizes críticas quanto à concepção naturalista das funções executivas e sua correlação com os processos atencionais; interroga descrições da experiência vivida do sujeito desatento e analisa a normatividade social da experiência atentiva e de seus critérios intersubjetivos e contextuais. Ao fim, propõe-se uma hermenêutica dos regimes atencionais contemporâneos, que destaca o acoplamento entre a experiência de fracasso atentivo e as demandas de um mundo cada vez mais recheado de estímulos e mais veloz.

Resumos This paper analyses the contributions of phenomenological psychopathology for the critical consideration of the phenomena of attention and inattention in the contemporary social and historical context. To achieve that goal, we analyzed the naturalist matrix of conception of attention and its dysfunction and situated phenomenological psychopathology. We present critical guidelines regarding the naturalistic conception of executive functions and their correlation with attentional processes and question descriptions of the inattentive subject's experience. We further analyzed the social normativity of the attentive experience and its intersubjective and contextual criteria. Finally, we propose a hermeneutical approach regarding contemporary attention regime, which highlights the link between the experience of attentive failure and the demands of a world that has become increasingly faster and filled with stimuli.

Dans cet essai, nous proposons une analyse des apports de la psychopathologie phénoménologique à la prise en compte critique des phénomènes d'attention et d'inattention dans le contexte social et historique contemporain. Pour cela, nous analysons la matrice naturaliste de conception de l'attention et ses dysfonctionnements et situons la psychopathologie phénoménologique, nous présentons des lignes directrices critiques concernant la conception naturaliste des fonctions exécutives et leur corrélation avec les processus attentionnels, nous interrogeons les descriptions de l'expérience du sujet inattentif et nous analysons la normativité sociale de l'expérience attentive et ses critères intersubjectifs et contextuels. Finalement, nous proposons une approche herméneutique du régime d'attention contemporain qui met en évidence le couplage entre l'expérience de l'échec attentif et les exigences d'un monde de plus en plus rapide et rempli de stimuli.

En este trabajo proponemos un análisis sobre los aportes de la psicopatología fenomenológica a la consideración crítica de los fenómenos de atención y desatención en el ámbito social e histórico contemporáneo. Para ello, se analiza la matriz naturalista de concepción de la atención y su disfunción y se sitúa a la psicopatología fenomenológica; se presentan pautas críticas sobre la concepción naturalista de las funciones ejecutivas y su correlación con los procesos atencionales; se interrogan las descripciones de la experiencia del sujeto desatento; y se analiza la normatividad social de la experiencia de atención y de sus criterios intersubjetivos y contextuales. Por último, se propone un enfoque hermenéutico de los regímenes atencionales contemporáneos, que destaca el acople entre la experiencia del fracaso atencional y las exigencias de un mundo cada vez más rápido y lleno de estímulos.

The Dialectics of Altered Experience: How to Validly Construct a Phenomenologically Based Diagnosis in Psychiatry.

In this paper, we present how a dialectical perspective on phenomenological psychopathology, called Dialectical Phenomenology (DPh), can contribute to current needs of psychiatric diagnosis. We propose a three-stage diagnostic methodology: first- and second-person stages, and synthetic hermeneutics stage. The first two stages are divided into a pre-dialectical and a dialectical phase. The diagnostic process progresses in a trajectory of increasing complexity, in which knowledge obtained at one level is dialectically absorbed and intertwined into the next levels. Throughout the article, we offer some examples of each step. In overall, the method starts off from the patient's own narrative, proceeds to two stages of phenomenological reduction designed to guarantee the scientific validity of the object, and concludes with a hermeneutical narrative synthesis that is dialectically composed of the patient's and psychopathologist's shared narratives. At the end of this process, the initial first-person narrative is transformed into a specific scientific object, a full dialectical phenomenological psychiatric diagnosis. This form of diagnosis constitutes a comprehensive alternative for an integral assessment of the complexities of human psychological alteration, bringing together both the interpretation of the suffering person and the scientific categories of psychiatry.

Contribuições da Noção de Crise do Senso Comum na Esquizofrenia em Stanghellini / Contributions of Stanghellini's notion of the Crisis of Common Sense in Schizophrenia

Resumo A noção de crise do senso comum na esquizofrenia é introduza por Wolfgang Blankenburg através do conceito de perda da evidência natural. Na contemporaneidade, Giovanni Stanghellini revista e amplia essa noção, propondo uma perspectiva panorâmica dessa crise. Este artigo apresenta as contribuições trazidas pela perspectiva de Stanghellini, introduzindo seu entendimento sobre o conceito de senso comum e a relevância deste para a compreensão da esquizofrenia. Para o autor, o senso comum é compreendido de três modos: como saber socialmente compartilhado, sintonização intuitiva e cenestesia. Através das noções de intercorporeidade e koinè aisthesis, Stanghellini entende a esquizofrenia como experiência de rompimento da relação habitual com o mundo. Sua proposta contribui para a prática clínica ao sugerir direções à psicoterapia com esquizofrênicos.

Abstract The notion of crisis of common sense on schizophrenia is introduced by Wolfgang Blankenburg through his concept of loss of natural evidence. In contemporaneity, Giovanni Stanghellini revisits and amplifies this notion by proposing a panoramic perspective on this crisis. This paper presents the contributions brought by Stanghellini's perspective, introducing his understanding of common sense and its relevance for the comprehension of schizophrenia. For the author, common sense is understood in three ways: as a knowledge socially shared, intuitive attunement, and cenesthesia. Through the notions of intercorporeality and koinè aisthesis, Stanghellini conceives schizophrenia as an experience of disruption of the habitual relation with the world. His proposal contributes to clinical practice by suggesting directions for the psychotherapy with schizophrenics.

When the World Breaks Down: A 3-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism in Schizophrenia.

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective's (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual's existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.

"Common Currency" Between Experience and Brain: Spatiotemporal Psychopathology of the Resting State in Depression.

The aim of this contribution is to introduce Spatiotemporal Psychopathology and the way it may complement and extent Phenomenological Psychopathology by bridging the methodological gap between the brain and experience. In the first part, I will provide examples for spatiotemporal correspondence between neuronal and psychopathological features. Specifically, I will discuss how spatial changes in the brain's spontaneous activity translate into abnormal experience of the self in major depressive disorder (MDD). Finally, I will briefly discuss the method of such Spatiotemporal Psychopathology and distinguish it from the methods relied on in other forms of Psychopathology with a special focus on showing the continuity between Spatiotemporal and Phenomenological Psychopathology.