What Does It Mean to Be Human Today?

With the progress of artificial intelligence, the digitalization of the lifeworld, and the reduction of the mind to neuronal processes, the human being appears more and more as a product of data and algorithms. Thus, we conceive ourselves "in the image of our machines," and conversely, we elevate our machines and our brains to new subjects. At the same time, demands for an enhancement of human nature culminate in transhumanist visions of taking human evolution to a new stage. Against this self-reification of the human being, the present book defends a humanism of embodiment: our corporeality, vitality, and embodied freedom are the foundations of a self-determined existence, which uses the new technologies only as means instead of submitting to them. The book offers an array of interventions directed against a reductionist naturalism in various areas of science and society. As an alternative, it offers an embodied and enactive account of the human person: we are neither pure minds nor brains, but primarily embodied, living beings in relation with others. This general concept is applied to issues such as artificial intelligence (AI), transhumanism and enhancement, virtual reality, neuroscience, embodied freedom, psychiatry, and finally to the accelerating dynamics of current society which lead to an increasing disembodiment of our everyday life. The book thus applies cutting-edge concepts of embodiment and enactivism to current scientific, technological, and cultural tendencies that will crucially influence our society's development in the twenty-first century.

What is Phenomenological Bioethics? A Critical Appraisal of Its Ends and Means.

In recent years the phenomenological approach to bioethics has been rejuvenated and reformulated by, among others, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus. Building on the now-relatively mainstream phenomenological approach to health and illness, Svenaeus has sought to bring phenomenological insights to bear on the bioethical enterprise, with a view to critiquing and refining the "philosophical anthropology" presupposed by the latter. This article offers a critical but sympathetic analysis of Svenaeus' efforts, focusing on both his conception of the ends of phenomenological bioethics and the predominantly Heideggerian means he employs. Doing so reveals certain problems with both. I argue that the main aim of phenomenological bioethics as set out by Svenaeus needs to be reformulated, and that there are important oversights in his approach to reaching this end. I conclude by arguing that to overcome the latter problem we should draw instead on the works of Max Scheler and Hans Jonas.

Analysis and/or Interpretation in Neurophysiology? A Transatlantic Discussion Between F. J. J. Buytendijk and K. S. Lashley, 1929-1932.

In the interwar period, biologists employed a diverse set of holistic approaches that were connected to different research methodologies. Against this background, this article explores attempts in the 1920s and 1930s to negotiate quantitative and qualitative methods in the field of neurophysiology. It focuses on the work of two scientists on different sides of the Atlantic: the Dutch animal psychologist and physiologist Frederik J.J. Buytendijk and the American neuropsychologist Karl S. Lashley, specifically analyzing their critical correspondence, 1929-1932, on the problems surrounding the term intelligence. It discusses the inexplicable anomalies in neurophysiology as well as the reliability of quantitative and qualitative methods. While in his laboratory work Lashley adhered to a strictly analytic approach, Buytendijk tried to combine quantitative methods with phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches. The starting point of their discussion is Lashley's monograph on Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence (1929) and the rat experiments discussed therein. Buytendijk questioned the viability of the maze-learning method and the use of statistics to test intelligence in animals; he reproduced Lashley's experiments and then confronted Lashley with his critical findings. In addition to elucidating this exchange, this paper will, more generally, shed light on the nature of the disagreements and shared assumptions prevalent among interwar neurophysiologists. In turn, it contributes to historiographical debates on localization and functionalism and the discrepancy between analytic (quantitative) and interpretative (qualitative) approaches.

What makes us human? Exploring the significance of ricoeur's ethical configuration of personhood between naturalism and phenomenology in health care.

The aim of this article is to elaborate on how a distinct concept of the person can be implemented within person-centred care as an ethical configuration of personhood in the tension between the two predominant cultures of knowledge within health care: naturalism and phenomenology. Starting from Paul Ricoeur's 'personalism of the first, second, and third person' and his 'broken' ontology, open-ended, incomplete, and imperfect mediations, placed at the precise juncture where reality is divided up into two separate cultures of knowledge, is identified as crucial for what makes us human. Within this context, Ricoeur's distinct ethical configuration of personhood is based on the homology between the linguistic, practical, narrative, and moral determinations of selfhood-articulated as a hermeneutics of the self, without any methodological break. Person-centred care is thus recognized as an profound ethical approach to health care based on mediations of 'horizontal' (teleological) and 'vertical' (deontological) readings of an ethical configuration of personhood by the use of practical wisdom.

Health and Illness as Enacted Phenomena.

In this paper I explore health and illness through the lens of enactivism, which is understood and developed as a bodily-based worldly-engaged phenomenology. Various health theories - biomedical, ability-based, biopsychosocial - are introduced and scrutinized from the point of view of enactivism and phenomenology. Health is ultimately argued to consist in a central world-disclosing aspect of what is called existential feelings, experienced by way of transparency and ease in carrying out important life projects. Health, in such a phenomenologically enacted understanding, is an important and in many cases necessary part of leading a good life. Illness, on the other hand, by such a phenomenological view, consist in finding oneself at mercy of unhomelike existential feelings, such as bodily pains, nausea, extreme unmotivated tiredness, depression, chronic anxiety and delusion, which make it harder and, in some cases, impossible to flourish. In illness suffering the lived body hurts, resists, or, in other ways, alienates the activities of the ill person.

Divergent patterns of confrontation with death using the Anticipated Farewell to Existence Questionnaire (AFEQT): a cross-sectional comparative study of four samples with increasing proximity to death.

BACKGROUND: Based on the concept of "Daseinsverabschiedung", an anthropological theory of "Anticipated Farewell to Existence" (AFE) was suggested on the basis of six grounding dimensions: selfhood, interpersonality, temporality, corporeality, worldliness, and transcendence, which are activated in a genuine manner facing death. The purpose of the study is to quantitatively compare the extent of confrontation with death between dying people in palliative care and those in other stages of life by means of the Anticipated Farewell to Existence Questionnaire" (AFEQT), based on these dimensions. METHODS: The sample (N = 485) consists of dying individuals in palliative wards and hospices (n = 121); old people living in nursing homes not suffering from a mortal disease (n = 62); young adults (n = 152), and middle-aged adults (n = 150). The design is cross-sectional and analytical. The relevance of anticipated farewell to existence was measured by means of the AFEQT. The internal consistency of the AFEQT was assessed using Cronbach's alpha and convergent validity by means of dimensions of the Life Attitude Profile-Revised (LAP-R). Differences between groups and associations with control variables were estimated by means of multiple regression models, including propensity scores. RESULTS: Cronbach's alpha for AFEQT was > 0.80 for the whole test and all subsamples, but < 0.70 for most dimensions in dying people. Correlations between each dimension and corresponding two factors was almost overall r > 0.80, p < 0.001. Good convergent validity between dimensions of AFEQT and of Life Attitude Profile-Revised in young and middle-aged participants showed correlations for superordinate indices between -0.23 and 0.72, and an overall p < 0.001. Dying people scored significantly higher for all dimensions, especially "altruistic preoccupation" and "reconciliation with existence" than people in other life stages (p < 0.01- < 0.001). Personality traits of "openness" and "agreeableness" are positively associated with higher scoring of AFEQT dimensions. About 77% of dying participants reported a personal benefit through the interview questions. CONCLUSIONS: With proximity to death, the anthropological dimensions proposed scored significant higher than in other stages of life, reflecting a stronger awareness, confrontation and reconciliation with the end of their own life. These dimensions, especially preoccupation for related persons and coexistence of acceptance and struggle with death have to be taken into account in a sensitive way by supporting dialogues with dying people and their relatives. TRIAL REGISTRATION: Observational cross-sectional study.

Neanderthals as familiar strangers and the human spark: How the 'golden years' of Neanderthal research reopen the question of human uniqueness.

During the past decades, our image of Homo neanderthalensis has changed dramatically. Initially, Neanderthals were seen as primitive brutes. Increasingly, however, Neanderthals are regarded as basically human. New discoveries and technologies have led to an avalanche of data, and as a result of that it becomes increasingly difficult to pinpoint what the difference between modern humans and Neanderthals really is. And yet, the persistent quest for a minimal difference which separates them from us is still noticeable in Neanderthal research. Neanderthal discourse is a vantage point from which the logic of 'us' versus 'other' is critically reconsidered. Studying contemporary academic literature and science autobiographies from an oblique perspective, focusing not on Neanderthals as objects, but on the dynamics of interaction between Neanderthal researchers and their finds, basic convictions at work in this type of research are retrieved. What is at issue is not the actual distinction between modern humans and Neanderthals (which is continuously being redefined), but rather the dualistic construction of human and nonhuman. Neanderthal understanding is affected by the desire to safeguard human uniqueness. The overall trend is to identify the human mark or spark, which defines us as favoured 'winners'. The paradoxes emerging in contemporary Neanderthal discourse are symptomatic of the fact that a dualistic style of thinking is no longer tenable.

O humano em Søren Kierkegaard e em Viktor Frankl / The human in Søren Kierkegaard and Viktor Frankl

Este trabalho é um estudo teórico que objetiva abordar aspectos centrais da Antropologia Filosófica presentes em dois autores existencialistas: Søren Kierkegaard e Viktor Frankl. A partir do estudo do que é o homem, apresentamos algumas importantes questões existenciais que, embora desenvolvidas pelos autores supracitados nos séculos XIX e XX, respectivamente, permanecem atuais: o desespero e a busca pelo sentido, liberdade, responsabilidade, possibilidade e necessidade, angústia e vazio existencial.Partimos da pesquisa qualitativa, por meio de uma revisão de literatura, buscando atender ao objetivo proposto. Compreendemos que a dimensão do espírito diferencia o homem dos outros seres. Ambos os autores destacam a esfera espiritual e compreendem o humano em sua integralidade. Conclui-se que Kierkegaard e Frankl, em seus pressupostos, oferecem possibilidade de conhecimento do homem e de questões existenciais relevantes para nossa sociedade permeada pelo desespero e pelo vazio existencial. Assim, as proposições dos autores contribuem especialmente para as ciências humanas.

This paper is a theoretical study that aims to approach central aspects of Philosophical Anthropology present in two existentialist authors: Søren Kierkegaard and Viktor Frankl. From the study of what man is, we present some important existential questions that, although developed by these authors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively, remain current: despair and the search for meaning, freedom, responsibility, possibility and necessity, anguish and existential void. We started from the qualitative research, through a literature review seeking to meet the proposed objective. We understand that the dimension of the spirit differentiates man from other beings. Both authors highlight the spiritual realm and understand the human in its entirety. We conclude that Kierkegaard and Frankl, in their assumptions, offer the possibility of knowledge of man, and of existential questions relevant to our society, which is permeated by despair and existential emptiness. Thus, the authors' propositions contribute especially to the humanities.

O humano em Søren Kierkegaard e em Viktor Frankl / The human in Søren Kierkegaard and Viktor Frankl

Este trabalho é um estudo teórico que objetiva abordar aspectos centrais da Antropologia Filosófica presentes em dois autores existencialistas: SørenKierkegaard e Viktor Frankl. A partir do estudo do que é o homem, apresentamos algumas importantes questões existenciais que, embora desenvolvidas pelos autores supracitados nos séculos XIX e XX, respectivamente, permanecem atuais: o desespero e a busca pelo sentido, liberdade, responsabilidade, possibilidade e necessidade, angústia e vazio existencial. Partimos da pesquisa qualitativa, por meio de uma revisão de literatura, buscando atender ao objetivo proposto. Compreendemos que a dimensão do espírito diferencia o homem dos outros seres. Ambos os autores destacam a esfera espiritual e compreendem o humano em sua integralidade. Conclui-se que Kierkegaard eFrankl, em seus pressupostos, oferecem possibilidade de conhecimento do homem e de questões existenciais relevantes para nossa sociedade permeada pelo desespero e pelo vazio existencial. Assim, as proposições dos autores contribuem especialmente para as ciências humanas

This paper is a theoretical study that aims to approach central aspects of Philosophical Anthropology present in two existentialist authors: Søren Kierkegaard and Viktor Frankl. From the study of what man is, we present some important existential questions that, although developed by these authors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively, remain current: despair and the search for meaning, freedom, responsibility, possibility and necessity, anguish and existential void. We started from the qualitative research, through a literature review seeking to meet the proposed objective. We understand that the dimension of the spirit differentiates man from other beings. Both authors highlight the spiritual realm and understand the human in its entirety. We conclude that Kierkegaard and Frankl, in their assumptions, offer the possibility of knowledge of man, and of existential questions relevant to our society, which is permeated by despair and existential emptiness. Thus, the authors' propositions contribute especially to the humanities

["being born with and in its environment" : Frederik Buytendijk's Experimental Conceptualization of an Animal-Environment Unit]. / "mit und in seiner Umwelt geboren" : Frederik Buytendijks experimentelle Konzeptualisierung einer Tier-Umwelt-Einheit.

The Dutch animal psychologist Frederik J. J. Buytendijk (1887-1974) developed an anti-reductionist approach in his ethological research of the 1920s and 1930s distinct from behaviorism, explicitly including in his experimental practices the freedom of animals, variable observations, and the subjective experience of the investigator. Buytendijk thereby developed a scientific theory that methodologically relied on phenomenology, hermeneutics, and concepts of unity based on gestalt theory, but did not abandon quantitative data collection. On the contrary, in his Groningen institute Buytendijk based his work on the biological theories of Jakob von Uexküll and specifically investigated the thesis of an "animal-environment unit". Using this institutional framework and two experiments (1924 & 1931), this article determines to what extent Buytendijk was able to verify his statement that the animal was "born with and in its environment", which at the same time supported his scientific-philosophical concept. Accordingly, Buytendijk understood the environment as an organ of the animal, not only as a metaphor, but also as reality.

O homem e o método: reflexões sobre os parâmetros filosóficos da transdisciplinaridade / The man and the method: reflections on the philosophical dimensions of transdisciplinarity / El hombre y el método: reflexiones acerca de las dimensiones filosóficas de la transdisciplinariedad

O artigo visa a estabelecer algumas referências filosóficas para demarcar a diferença entre inter e transdisciplinaridade. Não se trata de propor um modelo previamente estabelecido de investigação transdisciplinar, uma vez que esta se constitui com base em problemas concretos que exigem esse tipo de abordagem. No entanto pretendemos propor alguns elementos reflexivos que possam contribuir para sua demarcação e diferenciação. Entre eles, destacamos, em primeiro lugar, que a transdisciplinaridade responde a uma necessidade histórica que se desdobra numa necessidade lógica. Em seguida, que ela expressa uma exigência ética incontornável e, finalmente, que ela tem uma dimensão antropológica. Esses três elementos convergem na disposição de abertura crítica que deve caracterizar as práticas transdisciplinares.

This article aims to establish some philosophical references to determine the difference between inter and transdisciplinarity. It is not a question of proposing a previously established model of transdisciplinary research since this is based on the concrete problems that require this type of approach. However, we intend to propose some reflective elements that may contribute to its establishment and differentiation. Among others, we shall highlight, firstly, that transdisciplinary responds to a historical necessity that unfolds into a logical necessity. Secondly, that it expresses an unavoidable ethical requirement and, finally, that it has an anthropological dimension. These three elements converge in the provision of critical openness that should characterize transdisciplinary practices.

El artículo tiene como objetivo establecer algunas referencias filosóficas para demarcar la diferencia entre inter y transdisciplinario. Esto no es proponer un modelo previamente fijado de la investigación transdisciplinaria ya que esta se constituye a partir de los problemas concretos que exigen este tipo de enfoque. Sin embargo, pretendemos proponer algunos elementos reflexivos que puedan contribuir a su demarcación y diferenciación. Entre ellas destacamos, en primer lugar que transdisciplinario responde a una necesidad histórica que se desarrolla en una necesidad lógica. En seguida que expresa una exigencia ética ineludible y en última instancia tiene una dimensión antropológica. Estos tres elementos convergen en la provisión de apertura crítica que debe caracterizar las prácticas transdisciplinarias.

Are older people a vulnerable group? Philosophical and bioethical perspectives on ageing and vulnerability.

The elderly are often considered a vulnerable group in public and academic bioethical debates and regulations. In this paper, we examine and challenge this assumption and its ethical implications. We begin by systematically delineating the different concepts of vulnerability commonly used in bioethics, before then examining whether these concepts can be applied to old age. We argue that old age should not, in and of itself, be used as a marker of vulnerability, since ageing is a process that can develop in a variety of different ways and is not always associated with particular experiences of vulnerability. We, therefore, turn to more fundamental phenomenological considerations in order to reconstruct from a first person perspective the intricate interconnections between the experiences of ageing and vulnerability. According to this account, ageing and old age are phenomena in which the basic anthropological vulnerability of human beings can manifest itself in an increased likelihood of harm and exploitation. Thus, we plead for a combined model of vulnerability that helps to avoid problems related to the current concepts of vulnerability. We conclude first that old age as such is not a sufficient criterion for being categorized as vulnerable in applied ethics, and second that reflections on ageing can help to develop a better understanding of the central role of vulnerability in human existence and in applied ethics.

[On Michel Foucault's unpublished lectures on Ludwig Binswanger's existential analysis (Lille 1953-54)]. / À propos d'un cours inédit de Michel Foucault sur l'analyse existentielle de Ludwig Binswanger (Lille 1953-54) Über Michel Foucaults Unveröffentlichte Vorlesungen Zur Daseinsanalyse Ludwig Binswangers (Lille 1953-54).

This paper aims to analyze Michel Foucault's position toward phenomenological psychology and psychopathology during the 1950s, in light of the new documentary sources available today. Our investigation is especially focused on one of the courses given by Foucault at the University of Lille between 1952 and 1954, namely, the course on "Binswanger and phenomenology" (1953-54). The analysis of this course, which was conceived by Foucault within the context of a philosophical reflection on the anthropological problem of psychopathology, will finally allow us to re-ascribe Foucault the place he deserves in the field of "philosophy of psychiatry".

Em busca de uma inesperada antropologia filosófica Heideggeriana / Looking for an unexpected Heidegger's philosophical anthropology

Existe a possibilidade de apreensão de uma inesperada Antropologia Filosófica decorrente da Analítica Existencial do Dasein empreendida por Martin Heidegger em Ser e Tempo - ainda que não tenha sido esta sua intenção filosófica. Os posicionamentos explicitados nas conferências de Zöllikon, em diálogo com sua ontologia fundamental, inequivocamente constitui imprescindível reflexão para fundamento e desenvolvimento das ciências humanas em geral, e da Psicologia e Psicopatologia fenomenológica em particular. Essa tarefa a ser constituída através de pesquisas científicas e filosóficas, em paralelo, representa missão imprescindível ao balizamento da práxis das ciências humanas que aí reivindicam fundamentos epistemológicos, de modo a proporcionar-lhes o advento de novas produções científicas, e elementos para uma práxis inspirada nos preceitos fenomenológico-existenciais, segundo suas concepções de intersubjetividades e alteridades expressas cooriginariamente, em histórias, tempos e espaços vividos. O diálogo entre ciências e filosofia, em grande medida, impõe a necessidade de distinção precisa entre o que se coloca como objeto dessa duas diferentes fontes de produção de saberes, permanecida na instância de uma instigação mútua, como condição de possibilidade para desenvolvimento e fundamentação de ambas.

There is a possibility of seizing an unexpected Philosophical Anthropology resulting from Existential Analytic of Dasein undertaken by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time - although this was not his philosophical intention. His positions assumed in Zöllikon conference through dialogue with his fundamental ontology, is unequivocally an essential foundation for reflection and development of the human sciences in general and psychology and psychopathology phenomenological in particular. This task must to be performed through scientific and philosophical researches, in parallel, as a essential mission needed to base the practice of human sciences that claim for epistemological foundations in order to provide them to the advent of new scientific productions, and needed elements for inspired thoughts founded in existential-phenomenological precepts, according to their conceptions of intersubjectivities and otherness cooriginatedly expressed in lived stories, times and spaces. The dialogue between science and philosophy, largely imposes the need for a precise distinction between what is assumed as object for those two different sources of production of knowledge, remain in the instance of a mutual incitement, as a condition of possibility for the development and justification of both.

Impacto social de la muerte perinatal: aspectos antropológicos / Social impact of perinatal death: anthropological implications

La muerte perinatal se puede abordar desde el aspecto médico, legal, ético y sociocultural, por lo que es un evento transdisciplinario que exige un ejercicio de investigación que permita dilucidar los problemas a los que se pueden enfrentar los sujetos que se encuentran o se han visto inmersos en dicho evento. Por tal motivo, el presente trabajo aborda, desde la Antropología Filosófica y la Antropología de la Muerte, el impacto en los grupos y sujetos que se encuentran inmersos en el evento de la muerte perinatal.

Perinatal death can be approached from medical, legal, ethical and socio-cultural aspects, so it is a transdisciplinary event which requires an exercise of research that allows to elucidate those problems that could be faced by the subjects who are or have been involved in this event. For this reason, this work addresses, from philosophical anthropology and the anthropology of death, the impact on groups and individuals who are immersed in the event of perinatal death.

Una propuesta attropológica para la comprensiónde la resiliencia en niños: lass virtudes humanas / An anthropologiaal proposal to understand children's resilience: human virtues / Uma proposta antropológica para a compreensão da resiliência nas crianças: as virtudes humanas

El abordaje de la resiliencia ha tenido algunas modificaciones a lo largo de los años. En un principio, se enfocaba en los aspectos negativos que las personas generaban en medio de la adversidad. Posteriormente, se ha centrado en las características positivas que pueden desarrollarse como producto de estas situaciones. El objetivo de este trabajo consistió en generar una reflexión sobre la manera de comprender y conceptualizar la resiliencia desde diferentes perspectivas teóricas y así generar una nueva manera de entenderla de acuerdo con las virtudes humanas desde la antropología filosófica. Para cumplir con este propósito, se llevó a cabo una revisión de la literatura empírico-analítica de los estudios que proponían una manera de evaluar y medir este concepto. Aunque existen algunas propuestas para medir la resiliencia desde diferentes disciplinas, ninguno de los estudios previos tuvo en cuenta las virtudes humanas como indicadores de resiliencia desde la antropología filosófica.

The approach to resilience has undergone several changes over the years. Initially, it concentrated on the negative aspects persons generate in the midst of adversity. Subsequently, the focus has been on the positive characteristics that may develop as a result of these situations. The aim of this study is to reflect on how resilience can be understood and conceptualized from different theoretical perspectives and, thus, to find new ways to understand it based on human virtues from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. To do so, the authors reviewed empirical-analytic literature on studies that propose ways to assess and measure this concept. Although there are some proposals to measure resilience through different disciplines, none of the previous studies took into account human virtues as indicators of resilience from the standpoint of philosophical anthropology.

A abordagem da resiliência vem tendo algumas modificações ao longo dos anos. Em um princípio, enfocava-se nos aspectos negativos que as pessoas geravam em meio da adversidade. Posteriormente, centrou-se nas características positivas que podem se desenvolver como produto dessas situações. O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em gerar uma reflexão sobre a maneira de compreender e conceitualizar a resiliência sob diferentes perspectivas teóricas e, assim, gerar uma nova maneira de entendê-la de acordo com as virtudes humanas a partir da antropologia filosófica. Para atingir este propósito, realizou-se uma revisão da literatura empírico-analítica dos estudos que propunham uma maneira de avaliar e medir este conceito. Embora existam algumas propostas para medir a resiliência desde diferentes disciplinas, nenhum dos estudos prévios considerou as virtudes humanas como indicadores de resiliência a partir da antropologia filosófica.

O cognitivismo é um humanismo / Cognitivism is a humanism

O Cognitivismo defende uma imagem de ser humano plenamente compatível com a defendida pela tradição humanista ocidental e o movimento da Psicologia Humanista norte-americana. O humanismo postula um ser humano com qualidades únicas no universo conhecido, que portanto possui necessariamente algo natural e universal que o caracteriza, ou seja, uma natureza humana. No caso da Psicologia Humanista, acrescenta-se a este princípio básico o da crença num ser humano livre e auto-orientado. Implícita ou explicitamente, o Cognitivismo defende que o ser humano é: consciente, ativo, movido por causas e razões, orientado a metas, um processador de informação, tem seus processos cognitivos governados por regras, possui um inconsciente cognitivo, constrói as regras que coordenam sua cognição, possui tendências inatas, reage a significados atribuídos, tem emoções que atuam através da cognição, é epistemicamente motivado e constituído de mente e corpo que interagem e se influenciam mutuamente. Com a revolução cognitiva e o surgimento de uma abordagem que defende tal modelo de objeto para a Psicologia e testa suas hipóteses sobre ele através do método experimental, o ainda nascente movimento humanista foi progressivamente perdendo força e razão de ser. O espírito reducionista, determinista e desumanizante que segundo os humanistas era disseminado na Psicologia pelo Behaviorismo e pela Psicanálise encontrava então um opositor muito mais poderoso, o Cognitivismo, que se ocupou de grande parte dos temas de investigação reivindicados pela Psicologia Humanista

Cognitivism defends a human being image fully compatible with the one of the humanist western traditionand of the movement of the North American Humanistic Psychology. The Humanism postulates a humanbeing with unique qualities in the known universe, therefore necessarily possessing something natural anduniversal that characterizes it, in other words, a human nature. In the case of the Humanistic Psychology, itis increased to this basic principle of the faith on a free and self-oriented human being. Implicitly or explicitly,Cognitivism defends that the human being is: conscious,active,moved by causes and reasons,oriented togoals,a information processor,rule-governedin their cognitive processes, a owner of a cognitive unconscious,constructorof rules that coordinate its cognition, a owner of innate tendencies,a attributed meaningsreactor,has emotions that act through cognition,epistemically motivatedand constituted of mind and body thatinteractand are mutually influenced. With the cognitive revolution and the appearance of an approach thatdefends such object model for Psychology and tests their hypotheses on him through the experimentalmethod, the still recent-born humanist movement went progressively losing his meaning and strength. Thereductionist, determinist and dehumanizing spirit that, according to the humanists, was disseminated byBehaviorism and Psychoanalysis in Psychology, had found a much more powerful opponent, the Cognitivism,which was in charge of great part of the investigation themes demanded by Humanistic Psychology