Covert cortical processing: a diagnosis in search of a definition.

Historically, clinical evaluation of unresponsive patients following brain injury has relied principally on serial behavioral examination to search for emerging signs of consciousness and track recovery. Advances in neuroimaging and electrophysiologic techniques now enable clinicians to peer into residual brain functions even in the absence of overt behavioral signs. These advances have expanded clinicians' ability to sub-stratify behaviorally unresponsive and seemingly unaware patients following brain injury by querying and classifying covert brain activity made evident through active or passive neuroimaging or electrophysiologic techniques, including functional MRI, electroencephalography (EEG), transcranial magnetic stimulation-EEG, and positron emission tomography. Clinical research has thus reciprocally influenced clinical practice, giving rise to new diagnostic categories including cognitive-motor dissociation (i.e. 'covert consciousness') and covert cortical processing (CCP). While covert consciousness has received extensive attention and study, CCP is relatively less understood. We describe that CCP is an emerging and clinically relevant state of consciousness marked by the presence of intact association cortex responses to environmental stimuli in the absence of behavioral evidence of stimulus processing. CCP is not a monotonic state but rather encapsulates a spectrum of possible association cortex responses from rudimentary to complex and to a range of possible stimuli. In constructing a roadmap for this evolving field, we emphasize that efforts to inform clinicians, philosophers, and researchers of this condition are crucial. Along with strategies to sensitize diagnostic criteria and disorders of consciousness nosology to these vital discoveries, democratizing access to the resources necessary for clinical identification of CCP is an emerging clinical and ethical imperative.

The historical and philosophical roots of emergentism in the neurosciences.

Understanding and characterizing the relationship between mental phenomena and the brain is a huge challenge for modern neuroscience. No doubt, the conservative orthodox view of this relationship can be described as physicalist. Physicalism is the idea that, no matter how enigmatic mental phenomena may seem, they are nevertheless completely describable in physical and material terms. Still, despite centuries of effort, aspects of mind, such as the qualitative nature of subjective experience, have defied physical characterization. In the early 1920s, emergentism was advanced to explain the relationship between physical reality and higher-order phenomena, including life and mind. According to emergentism, such higher-order phenomena are derivative of and, at the same time, autonomous to underlying physical reality. This article describes the historical and philosophical development of emergentist theses, particularly as they have been treated in the neurosciences.

An evidence-based critical review of the mind-brain identity theory.

In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a 'loss-of-function lesion premise,' according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity pointing at the ineffable, undefinable, and seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective qualitative experiences and its related mental dimension. Here, several neuroscientific findings are reviewed that question the idea that posits phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity, and argue that the premise of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy. While these (mostly ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate equally well an ontology that posits mind and consciousness as a primal phenomenon.

Experiential knowledge: From philosophical debate to health care practice?

Despite experience-based expertise being increasingly common in health care, what experiential knowledge consists of remains a topic for debate. Here I propose a philosophical approach to clarify experiential knowledge, drawing on an analogous debate in philosophy of mind, which similarly targets the intuition that experience may generate unique knowledge. I outline the philosophical debate and explicate some relevant ideas for health care, so as to (a) evaluate whether and to what extent this analogous debate is helpful, and (b) supplement existing ideas on experiential knowledge with a philosophical analysis.

Imagination: A New Foundation for the Science of Mind.

After a long hiatus, psychology and philosophy are returning to formal study of imagination. While excellent work is being done in the current environment, this article argues for a stronger thesis than usually adopted. Imagination is not just a peripheral feature of cognition or a domain for aesthetic research. It is instead the core operating system or cognitive capacity for humans and has epistemic and therapeutic functions that ground all our sense-making activities. A sketch of imagination as embodied cognition is offered, followed by suggestions of how to organize imagination studies into a more rigorous science-humanities research area.

Astrocytes Imagined.

The cellular, molecular and physiological basis of cognition has proved elusive until emerging studies on astrocytes. The appearance of a deliberate aggregating element in cellular neurophysiology was difficult to satisfy computationally with excitatory and inhibitory neuron physiology alone. Similarly, the complex behavioral outputs of cognition are challenging to test experimentally. Astrocytic reception and control of synaptic communication has provided the possibility for study of the missing element. The advancement of genetic and neurophysiological techniques have now demonstrated astrocytes respond to neural input and subsequently provide the ability for neural synchronization and assembly at multiple and single synaptic levels. Considering the most recent evidence, it is becoming clear that astrocytes contribute to cognition. Is it possible then that our cognitive experience is essentially the domain of astrocyte physiology, ruminating on neural input, and controlling neural output? Although the molecular and cellular complexities of cognition in the human nervous system cannot be overstated, in order to gain a better understanding of the current evidence, an astrocyte centric basis of cognition will be considered from a philosophical, biological and computational perspective.

Where's My Consciousness-Ometer? How to Test for the Presence and Complexity of Consciousness.

Tools and tests for measuring the presence and complexity of consciousness are becoming available, but there is no established theoretical approach for what these tools are measuring. This article examines several categories of tests for making reasonable inferences about the presence and complexity of consciousness (defined as the capacity for phenomenal/subjective experience) and also suggests ways in which different theories of consciousness may be empirically distinguished. We label the various ways to measure consciousness the measurable correlates of consciousness (MCC) and include three subcategories in our taxonomy: (a) neural correlates of consciousness, (b) behavioral correlates of consciousness, and (c) creative correlates of consciousness. Finally, we reflect on how broader philosophical views about the nature of consciousness, such as materialism and panpsychism, may also be informed by the scientific process.

Varieties of transparency: exploring agency within AI systems.

AI systems play an increasingly important role in shaping and regulating the lives of millions of human beings across the world. Calls for greater transparency from such systems have been widespread. However, there is considerable ambiguity concerning what "transparency" actually means, and therefore, what greater transparency might entail. While, according to some debates, transparency requires seeing through the artefact or device, widespread calls for transparency imply seeing into different aspects of AI systems. These two notions are in apparent tension with each other, and they are present in two lively but largely disconnected debates. In this paper, we aim to further analyse what these calls for transparency entail, and in so doing, clarify the sorts of transparency that we should want from AI systems. We do so by offering a taxonomy that classifies different notions of transparency. After a careful exploration of the different varieties of transparency, we show how this taxonomy can help us to navigate various domains of human-technology interactions, and more usefully discuss the relationship between technological transparency and human agency. We conclude by arguing that all of these different notions of transparency should be taken into account when designing more ethically adequate AI systems.

Bridging the Gap between the Meaning of Natural Language and Mental Content.

Since Frege, mental content (conscious content) has been distinguished from the meaning of natural language and not regarded mental content as the meaning of language expression. This anti-psychological view cuts off the connection between the meaning of language and mental content, giving rise to the failures in solving the problems of mind. Instead of thinking about linguistic meaning and mental content separately, philosophers of mind put more emphasis on mental content and even equate the meaning of linguistic expressions with it. Therefore, the issues that what the relationship between linguistic meaning and mental content is and how they are connected are not well answered so far. The author argues in this paper that: 1) People attach meaning to symbols through communication activities when they have mental contents, thus forming the language, which is also a process of achieving psychological certainty in turn; 2) the relationship between linguistic meaning and mental content is similar to the interdependent relationship between monetary value and the use value of commodities. Without the latter, the former will lose its source, and the former also affects the latter. Philosophers of mind pay little attention to the interplay between language and mental content. Based on the above arguments and previous theories, this paper conceives a general model of the generation of linguistic meaning.

[Psychiatry without mind?] / Une psychiatrie sans esprit ?

Philosophy of Mind is currently one of the most prolific fields of research in philosophy and has witnessed a progressive hybridization with cognitive science. It focuses on fundamental questions to neuroscience and psychiatry, such as the nature of mental states and cognitive processes, or the relationships between mental states and the world. Anticipating the accumulation of experimental data from neuroscience, it provides a framework for the generation of theories in cognitive science. Philosophy of mind has thus laid the foundations of the conceptual space within which cognitive sciences have spread: a large part of contemporary theories in cognitive science result from a hybridization of conceptions forged by philosophers of mind and data produced by neuroscientists. Yet contemporary psychiatry is still reluctant to feed on the philosophy of mind, other than through the fragments that emerge from neuroscience. In this paper, we describe the evolution of contemporary philosophy of mind, and we detail its contributions around three central themes for psychiatry: naturalization of mind, mental causality, and subjectivity of mental states. We show how philosophy of mind provide the conceptual framework to link different levels of explanation in psychiatry: from biological to functional, from neurophysiology to cognition, from matter to mind.

A Neuroscience Levels of Explanation Approach to the Mind and the Brain.

The relation between mental states and brain states is important in computational neuroscience, and in psychiatry in which interventions with medication are made on brain states to alter mental states. The relation between the brain and the mind has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Here a neuroscience approach is proposed in which events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a mental state, with content about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality can best be described in brains as operating within but not between levels. This allows the supervenient (e.g., mental) properties to be emergent, though once understood at the mechanistic levels they may seem less emergent, and expected. This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are different levels of explanation of the operation of the computational system. This approach may provide a way of thinking about brains and minds that is different from dualism and from reductive physicalism, and which is rooted in the computational processes that are fundamental to understanding brain and mental events, and that mean that the mental and mechanistic levels are linked by the computational process being performed. Explanations at the different levels of operation may be useful in different ways. For example, if we wish to understand how arithmetic is performed in the brain, description at the mental level of the algorithm being computed will be useful. But if the brain operates to result in mental disorders, then understanding the mechanism at the neural processing level may be more useful, in for example, the treatment of psychiatric disorders.

Mind and soul? Two notions in the light of contemporary philosophy.

From the perspective of the Aristotelian notion of 'Form', the author explores the history of the concepts of mind and soul focusing on their ontologized version, as entertained by conventional science. He concludes that current neuroscience lacks the conceptual wherewithal required to deal with the meaning of mind and soul and with agential consequences such as free will and moral decision making. [GEB].

Cerebros, mentes y robots: una aproximación a través del cine del siglo XXI / Brains, minds and robots: An approach through 21st century cinema

La neuroética aplicada y fundamental y el transhumanismo neurotecnológico son disciplinas académicas relativamente nuevas, a medio camino entre las humanidades y las neurociencias. En el presente estudio se ha realizado un análisis descriptivo sobre el interés del certamen de los premios Óscar por obras que han tratado estas temáticas a lo largo del siglo XXI. Los resultados obtenidos indican que el 16,8 % de las 107 películas estudiadas muestran personajes u ofrecen temáticas relacionadas con la neurociencia, la neurología, las ciencias cognitivas y de la computación, todas ellas áreas científicas de vanguardia que tendrán un importante impacto biomédico y social en los próximos años. (AU)

Neuroethics and neurotechnological transhumanism are relatively new academic disciplines. Both are midway between the humanities and the neurosciences. In this study, a descriptive analysis has been made of the interest of the Oscar awards for works that have dealt with these subjects throughout the 21st century. The results obtained indicate that 16.8% of the 107 films studied show characters or offer themes related to neuroscience, neurology, cognitive and computer sciences, all of which are cutting-edge scientific areas that will have a significant biomedical and social impact in the coming years. (AU)

The Self-Simulation Hypothesis Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.

We modify the simulation hypothesis to a self-simulation hypothesis, where the physical universe, as a strange loop, is a mental self-simulation that might exist as one of a broad class of possible code theoretic quantum gravity models of reality obeying the principle of efficient language axiom. This leads to ontological interpretations about quantum mechanics. We also discuss some implications of the self-simulation hypothesis such as an informational arrow of time.

Developmental origins of cognitive offloading.

Many animals manipulate their environments in ways that appear to augment cognitive processing. Adult humans show remarkable flexibility in this domain, typically relying on internal cognitive processing when adequate but turning to external support in situations of high internal demand. We use calendars, calculators, navigational aids and other external means to compensate for our natural cognitive shortcomings and achieve otherwise unattainable feats of intelligence. As yet, however, the developmental origins of this fundamental capacity for cognitive offloading remain largely unknown. In two studies, children aged 4-11 years (n = 258) were given an opportunity to manually rotate a turntable to eliminate the internal demands of mental rotation--to solve the problem in the world rather than in their heads. In study 1, even the youngest children showed a linear relationship between mental rotation demand and likelihood of using the external strategy, paralleling the classic relationship between angle of mental rotation and reaction time. In study 2, children were introduced to a version of the task where manually rotating inverted stimuli was sometimes beneficial to performance and other times redundant. With increasing age, children were significantly more likely to manually rotate the turntable only when it would benefit them. These results show how humans gradually calibrate their cognitive offloading strategies throughout childhood and thereby uncover the developmental origins of this central facet of intelligence.

Evaluation of Risk Behavior in Gambling Addicted and Opioid Addicted Individuals.

Evidence suggests that both opioid addicted and gambling addicted individuals are characterized by higher levels of risky behavior in comparison to healthy people. It has been shown that the administration of substitution drugs can reduce cravings for opioids and the risky decisions made by individuals addicted to opioids. Although it is suggested that the neurobiological foundations of addiction are similar, it is possible that risk behaviors in opioid addicts may differ in detail from those addicted to gambling. The aim of this work was to compare the level of risk behavior in individuals addicted to opioid, with that of individuals addicted to gambling, using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The score and response time during the task were measured. It was also observed, in the basis of the whole IGT test, that individuals addicted to gambling make riskier decisions in comparison to healthy individuals from the control group but less riskier decisions in comparison to individuals addicted to opioids, before administration of methadone and without any statistically significant difference after administration of methadone-as there has been growing evidence that methadone administration is strongly associated with a significant decrease in risky behavior.

Conservation Laws and the Philosophy of Mind: Opening the Black Box, Finding a Mirror.

Since Leibniz's time, Cartesian mental causation has been criticized for violating the conservation of energy and momentum. (Non-epiphenomenalist property dualism is analogous.) Many dualist responses clearly fail. But conservation laws have important neglected features generally undermining the objection. Conservation is local, holding first not for the universe, but for everywhere separately. The energy (or momentum, etc.) in any volume changes only due to what flows through the boundaries (no teleportation). Constant total energy holds if the global summing-up of local conservation laws converges; it probably doesn't in reality. Energy (momentum) conservation holds if there is symmetry, the sameness of the laws over time (space). Thus, if there are time-places where symmetries fail due to nonphysical influence, conservation laws fail there and then, while holding elsewhere, such as refrigerators and stars. Noether's converse first theorem shows that conservation laws imply symmetries. Thus conservation trivially nearly entails the causal closure of the physical. But expecting conservation to hold in the brain (without looking) simply assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism. Hence Leibniz's objection begs the question. Empirical neuroscience is another matter. So is Einstein's General Relativity: far from providing a loophole, General Relativity makes mental causation harder.

Will We Ever Have Conscious Machines?

The question of whether artificial beings or machines could become self-aware or conscious has been a philosophical question for centuries. The main problem is that self-awareness cannot be observed from an outside perspective and the distinction of being really self-aware or merely a clever imitation cannot be answered without access to knowledge about the mechanism's inner workings. We investigate common machine learning approaches with respect to their potential ability to become self-aware. We realize that many important algorithmic steps toward machines with a core consciousness have already been taken.

On the origin of mental representations.

The symbol grounding problem raises its head in the fields of the philosophy of AI, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of cognitive sciences. The solution to the symbol grounding problem must account for the genesis of mental representations in the world. It has to offer a strategy for grounding mental representations in the objective domain. Orthodox representationalist theories do not provide a satisfactory reply to the symbol grounding problem. On the other hand, there are embodied-enactivist approaches that dissolve the problem but only at the cost of representations and internal phenomenal states. The code model of biosemiotics provides a biologically viable (i.e., mechanistic) venue for developing a new solution to the problem. For the same reason, it could reconcile representationalism to the embodied approach.