Otto Neurath's Scientific Utopianism Revisited-A Refined Model for Utopias in Thought Experiments.

Otto Neurath's empiricist methodology of economics and his contributions to political economy have gained increasing attention in recent years. We connect this research with contemporary debates regarding the epistemological status of thought experiments by reconstructing Neurath's utopias as linchpins of thought experiments. In our three reconstructed examples of different uses of utopias/dystopias in thought experiments we employ a reformulation of Häggqvist's model for thought experiments and we argue that: (1) Our reformulation of Häggqvist's model more adequately complies with many uses of thought experiments, especially with the open-ended discussions of utopias and dystopias in thought experiments. (2) As a strict logical empiricist, Neurath is committed to a strictly empiricist account of thought experiments. John Norton's empiricist argument view can indeed account for the justifications of empirical beliefs and genuine discoveries targeted by scientific utopianism in three distinct (yet connected) ways, all of which Neurath already contemplated: (2.I) Dealing with utopias and thought experiments on a regular basis increases creativity and inventiveness. (2.II) Particular ways of presenting knowledge facilitate scientific discovery and social progress. (2.III) The use of utopias in thought experiments can prompt conceptual change and allow access to new phenomena. We conclude by highlighting that, even though thought experiments support a positive attitude for exploring new social possibilities, Neurath points out that active decisions are unavoidable. The exploration of alternatives and the awareness of a need for decisions in policy discussion avert a technocratic outlook in social science.

A coisa em psicanálise e o objeto no lísis de Platão / The thing in psychoanalysis and object in Plato's lysis / La cosa en psicoanálisis y el objeto en lisis de Platón

Este artigo propõe o estudo sobre o conceito de outro como semelhante e como objeto. Partindo de textos que interpelam a alteridade na psicanálise e remetendo aos temas do complexo semelhante, da satisfação, da perda, do luto, da negativa, da repetição; avalia o conceito de outro articulando textos de diversos autores. A partir da psicanálise freudiana, estuda o das Ding e a negação, discriminando com estes termos um objeto estruturante na origem do psiquismo. Aborda textos técnicos da psicanálise para delimitar o tema da repetição. Também a recordação e a repetição são vinculadas ao objeto e estudadas na perspectiva da filosofia moderna. São retomados temas do diálogo platônicos para definir o lugar do erótico e da amizade. No fim do presente artigo, propomos o termo clássico grego Oikos com valor equivalente ao da Coisa freudiana e como esta aparece em escritos psicanalíticos.(AU)

This article studies the concept of other as similar and object. It is based on texts that question the alterity in psychoanalysis and refers to the themes of otherness complex, loss, grief, negative, repetition, and evaluates the concept of other, using articles of diverse authors. Based on Freudian psychoanalysis, it studies the Thing and the denial and discriminates a structuring object in the origin of psychism. It approaches technical texts of psychoanalysis to delimitate the theme of repetition. The recordation and repetition are also linked to the object and studied from the perspective of modern philosophy. Themes of the platonic dialogues are resumed to define the place of the erotic and the friendship. In the end of the article, we propose the greek classic term Oikos, with equal value to the Freudian Thing, as this one appears in psychoanalytic writings.(AU)

Este artículo estudia el concepto Otro como semejante y como objeto. A partir de textos que interpelan la alteridad en psicoanálisis y que se refieren a temas del complejo semejante, de la satisfacción, de la pérdida, del duelo, de la negación, de la repetición, se evalúa el concepto de Otro articulando textos de diferentes autores. Basado en el psicoanálisis freudiano, se aborda Ding y la negación, discriminando con estos términos un objeto estructurante en el origen de lo psíquico. Se abordan textos técnicos del psicoanálisis para delimitar el tema de la repetición; el recuerdo y la repetición son vinculadas al objeto y estudiadas desde la perspectiva de la filosofía moderna; y se retoman temas de los diálogos platónicos para definir el lugar de lo erótico y la amistad. Al culminar este artículo se propone leer el término griego clásico Oikos con un valor equivalente al de la Cosa freudiana como aparece en los escritos psicoanalíticos.(AU)

Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf-Field challenge.

A Benacerraf-Field challenge is an argument intended to show that common realist theories of a given domain are untenable: such theories make it impossible to explain how we've arrived at the truth in that domain, and insofar as a theory makes our reliability in a domain inexplicable, we must either reject that theory or give up the relevant beliefs. But there's no consensus about what would count here as a satisfactory explanation of our reliability. It's sometimes suggested that giving such an explanation would involve showing that our beliefs meet some modal condition, but realists have claimed that this sort of modal interpretation of the challenge deprives it of any force: since the facts in question are metaphysically necessary and so obtain in all possible worlds, it's trivially easy, even given realism, to show that our beliefs have the relevant modal features. Here I show that this claim is mistaken-what motivates a modal interpretation of the challenge in the first place also motivates an understanding of the relevant features in terms of epistemic possibilities rather than metaphysical possibilities, and there are indeed epistemically possible worlds where the facts in question don't obtain.

Circularity, indispensability, and mathematical explanation in science.

In this paper I consider the objection that the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) is circular and hence fails to support mathematical platonism. The objection is that the explanandum in any mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon is itself identified using mathematical concepts. Hence the explanandum is only genuine if the truth of some mathematical theory is already presupposed. I argue that this objection deserves to be taken seriously, that it does sometimes undermine support for EIA, but that there is no reason to think that circularity is an unavoidable feature of mathematical explanation in science.

Reprint of "Mathematics as verbal behavior".

"Behavior which is effective only through the mediation of other persons has so many distinguishing dynamic and topographical properties that a special treatment is justified and indeed demanded" (Skinner, 1957, p. 2). Skinner's demand for a special treatment of verbal behavior can be extended within that field to domains such as music, poetry, drama, and the topic of this paper: mathematics. For centuries, mathematics has been of special concern to philosophers who have continually argued to the present day about what some deem its "special nature." Two interrelated principal questions have been: (1) Are the subjects of mathematical interest pre-existing in some transcendental realm and thus are "discovered" as one might discover a new planet; and (2) Why is mathematics so effective in the practices of science and engineering even though originally such mathematics was "pure" with applications neither contemplated or even desired? I argue that considering the actual practice of mathematics in its history and in the context of acquired verbal behavior one can address at least some of its apparent mysteries. To this end, I discuss some of the structural and functional features of mathematics including verbal operants, rule-and contingency-modulated behavior, relational frames, the shaping of abstraction, and the development of intuition. How is it possible to understand Nature by properly talking about it? Essentially, it is because nature taught us how to talk.

Mathematics as verbal behavior.

"Behavior which is effective only through the mediation of other persons has so many distinguishing dynamic and topographical properties that a special treatment is justified and indeed demanded" (Skinner, 1957, p. 2). Skinner's demand for a special treatment of verbal behavior can be extended within that field to domains such as music, poetry, drama, and the topic of this paper: mathematics. For centuries, mathematics has been of special concern to philosophers who have continually argued to the present day about what some deem its "special nature." Two interrelated principal questions have been: (1) Are the subjects of mathematical interest pre-existing in some transcendental realm and thus are "discovered" as one might discover a new planet; and (2) Why is mathematics so effective in the practices of science and engineering even though originally such mathematics was "pure" with applications neither contemplated or even desired? I argue that considering the actual practice of mathematics in its history and in the context of acquired verbal behavior one can address at least some of its apparent mysteries. To this end, I discuss some of the structural and functional features of mathematics including verbal operants, rule-and contingency-modulated behavior, relational frames, the shaping of abstraction, and the development of intuition. How is it possible to understand Nature by properly talking about it? Essentially, it is because nature taught us how to talk.