Effectiveness of Point of Entry Health Screening Measures among Travelers in the Detection and Containment of the International Spread of COVID-19: A Review of the Evidence.

COVID-19 remains a communicable disease with the capacity to cause substantial damage to health and health systems. Enhanced health screening at points of entry (POEs) is a public health measure implemented to support early detection, prevention and response to communicable diseases, such as COVID-19. The purpose of this study was to review the available evidence on the effectiveness of POE health screening in the detection and containment of the COVID-19 pandemic. This study was registered under PROSPERO and followed PRISMA guidelines in which the literature between 2019 and 2022 was retrieved from Scopus, PubMed, Web of Science, Global Health, CINAHL, Embase, Google Scholar and international organizations. A total of 33,744 articles were screened for eligibility, from which 43 met the inclusion criteria. The modeling studies predicted POE screening able to detect COVID-19 in a range of 8.8% to 99.6%, while observational studies indicated a detection rate of 2% to 77.9%, including variants of concern depending on the screening method employed. The literature also indicated these measures can delay onset of the epidemic by 7 to 32 days. Based on our review findings, if POE screening measures are implemented in combination with other public health interventions such as rapid tests, they may help detect and reduce the spread of COVID-19.

Assessing One Health capacities for transboundary zoonotic diseases at the Libya-Tunisia border.

BACKGROUND: The dynamic nature of zoonotic emergence, spillover and spread necessitates multisectoral coordination beyond national borders to encompass cross-boundary and regional cooperation. Designated points of entry (POEs), specifically ground crossings, serve as critical locales for establishing and maintaining robust prevention, detection, notification, coordination, and response mechanisms to transboundary emerging and re-emerging disease threats. In order to better assess One Health capacities for transboundary zoonotic diseases (TZD) prevention, detection and response we adapted an existing tool, One Health Systems Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHSAPZ), for a cross-border, POE setting in North Africa. METHODS: The One Health Transboundary Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHTAPZ) tool was used to support prioritization of transboundary zoonoses and analyze operational capacities between national and subnational-level human and animal health stakeholders from Libya and Tunisia. Country partners jointly identified and prioritized five TZDs of concern. Case study scenarios for each priority pathogen were used to elicit current disease operations, as well as multisectoral and bilateral engagement networks. Finally, a gap analysis was performed to determine bilateral strengths and weaknesses to TZDs. RESULTS: The five priority TZDs jointly confirmed to undergo One Health assessment were avian influenza (low and high pathogenic strains); brucellosis; Rift Valley fever; Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever; and rabies. Using the qualitative information collected, a transboundary systems map schematic was developed outlining the movement of human patients, animals, diagnostic samples, and routes of communication and coordination both within and between countries for zoonotic diseases. CONCLUSIONS: Analysis of current operations (prevention, detection, surveillance, laboratory capacity, quarantine/isolation, and response) and the resulting transboundary systems map schematic helped identify existing capacity strengths for certain priority pathogens, as well as challenges to timely information-sharing and coordination. We developed targeted recommendations to address these limitations for joint action planning between Libya and Tunisia.

Points of entry dynamics: understanding the cross-border threats for Ebola virus disease and COVID-19 in Ghana using a logic model approach.

Background: The influx of people across the national borders of Ghana has been of interest and concern in the public health and national security community in recent times due to the low capacity for the prevention and management of epidemics and other public health risks. Although the international health regulations (IHR) stipulate core public health capacities for designated border facilities such as international airports, seaports, and ground crossings, contextual factors that influence the attainment of effective public health measures and response capabilities remain understudied. Objective: This study aims to assess the relationship between contextual factors and COVID-19 procurement to help strengthen infrastructure resources for points of entry (PoE) public health surveillance functions, thereby eliminating gaps in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of pandemic-related interventions in Ghana. Methods: This study employed a mixed-methods design, where quantitative variables were examined for relationships and effect size interactions using multiple linear regression techniques and the wild bootstrap technique. Country-level data was sourced from multiple publicly available sources using the social-ecological framework, logic model, and IHR capacity monitoring framework. The qualitative portion included triangulation with an expert panel to determine areas of convergence and divergence. Results: The most general findings were that laboratory capacity and Kotoka International Airport testing center positively predicted COVID-19 procurement, and public health response and airline boarding rule negatively predicted COVID-19 procurement. Conclusion: Contextual understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic and Ebola epidemic is vital for strengthening PoE mitigation measures and preventing disease importation.

Points of entry dynamics: understanding the cross-border threats for Ebola virus disease and COVID-19 in Ghana using a logic model approach

Background. The influx of people across the national borders of Ghana has been of interest and concern in the public health and national security community in recent times due to the low capacity for the prevention and management of epidemics and other public health risks. Although the International Health Regulations (IHR) stipulate core public health capacities for designated border facilities such as international airports, seaports, and ground crossings, contextual factors that influence the attainment of effective public health measures and response capabilities remain understudied. Objective. To assess the relationship between contextual factors and COVID-19 procurement to help strengthen infrastructure resources for points of entry (PoE) public health surveillance functions, thereby eliminating gaps in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of pandemicrelated interventions in Ghana. Materials and Methods. This study employed a mixed-methods design, where quantitative variables were examined for relationships and effect size interactions using multiple linear regression techniques and the wild bootstrap technique. Country-level data was sourced from multiple publicly available sources using the social-ecological framework, logic model, and IHR capacity monitoring framework. The qualitative portion included triangulation with an expert panel to determine areas of convergence and divergence. Results. The most general findings were that laboratory capacity and KIA testing center positively predicted COVID-19 procurement, and public health response and airline boarding rule negatively predicted COVID-19 procurement. Conclusion. Contextual understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic and Ebola epidemic is vital for strengthening PoE mitigation measures and preventing disease importation.

Assessing core capacities for addressing public health emergencies of international concern at designated points of entry in cameroon during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

BACKGROUND: Points of Entry (POEs) are at the frontline for prevention, detection and response to international spread of diseases. The objective of this assessment was to ascertain the current level of existing International Health Regulations (IHR) core capacities of designated airports, ports and ground crossings in Cameroon and identify critical gaps for capacity building for prevention, early warning and response to public health threats including COVID-19. METHODS: Data were collected from April to May 2020 in 5 designated POEs: Yaounde Nsimalen International Airport (YIA), Douala international Airport (DIA), Douala Autonomous Port (DAP), Garoua-Boulai ground crossing, Kye-Ossi ground crossing which were all selected for their high volume of passenger and goods traffic. The World Health Organization (WHO) assessment tool for core capacity requirements at designated airports, ports and ground crossings was used to collect data on three technical capacities: (i) communication and coordination, (ii) Capacities at all times and (iii) capacities to respond to Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC). RESULTS: All the investigated POEs scored below 50% of capacities in place. YIA recorded the highest percentage for all groups of capacities, coordination and communication and for core capacity at all times with a percentage of 42%, 58% and 32% respectively. For core capacity to respond to PHEIC, all the POEs recorded below 50%. The DAP and all ground crossings lacked trained personnel for inspection of conveyances. Only DIA had a public health emergency plan. There is no isolation/quarantine and transport capacity at the POEs. CONCLUSION: All POEs assessed did not meet IHR standards and need significant improvement to fulfill the IHR requirements. Unstructured communication channels between stakeholders make the implementation of IHR challenging. A coordination mechanism, with clear functions and structure, is necessary for well-coordinated response efforts to health emergencies at POEs. This assessment will serve as a baseline to inform planning and IHR implementation at designated POEs in Cameroon.

COVID-19 Amongst Travelers at Points of Entry in Nepal: Screening, Testing, Diagnosis and Isolation Practices.

WHO recommends surveillance for COVID-19 among travelers at Points of Entry (POE) to countries. At 13 selected POE at the Nepal-India border, between March 2021 and July 2021, we describe the screening, testing, diagnosis and isolation practices of COVID-19 amongst travelers. Those who stayed in India or elsewhere for > one day and those who did not have a negative RT-PCR result within the last 72 h of travel were tested for COVID-19 with rapid antigen diagnostic tests. Daily surveillance reports maintained at POE were used for analysis. Of 337,338 travelers screened, 69,886 (21%) were tested and 3907 (6%) were diagnosed with COVID-19. The proportions tested averaged 15% during April-May when screened numbers were high and increased to 35% in July when screened numbers had decreased. The proportions diagnosed positive peaked at 10% in April-May, but decreased to below 1% in June and July. Testing coverage varied from 0−99% in the different POE. Most COVID-19 cases were Nepalese, male, <60 years of age, migrant workers and presented with fever. Of COVID-19 cases, 32% had home-based isolation, 64% underwent community-based isolation and the remainder either went to hospital or returned to India. In conclusion, about one fifth of travelers overall were tested, with coverage varying considerably over time and among different POE. Strengthening surveillance processes at POE is needed.

Assessment of Infection Prevention and Control Measures at Points of Entry in Sierra Leone in 2021: A Cross-Sectional Study.

Implementing and monitoring infection prevention and control (IPC) measures at immigration points of entry (PoEs) is key to preventing infections, reducing excessive use of antimicrobials, and tackling antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Sierra Leone has been implementing IPC measures at four PoEs (Queen Elizabeth II Quay port, Lungi International Airport, and the Jendema and Gbalamuya ground crossings) since the last Ebola outbreak in 2014-2015. We adapted the World Health Organization IPC Assessment Framework tool to assess these measures and identify any gaps in their components at each PoE through a cross-sectional study in May 2021. IPC measures were Inadequate (0-25%) at Queen Elizabeth II Quay port (21%; 11/53) and Jendema (25%; 13/53) and Basic (26-50%) at Lungi International Airport (40%; 21/53) and Gbalamuya (49%; 26/53). IPC components with the highest scores were: having a referral system (85%; 17/20), cleaning and sanitation (63%; 15/24), and having a screening station (59%; 19/32). The lowest scores (0% each) were reported for the availability of IPC guidelines and monitoring of IPC practices. This was the first study in Sierra Leone highlighting significant gaps in the implementation of IPC measures at PoEs. We call on the AMR multisectoral coordinating committee to enhance IPC measures at all PoEs.

Barriers and facilitators to COVID-19 screening at Jaipur International Airport, India.

Background: Airports pose a possible threat in facilitating global disease transmission within the community which may be prevented by rigorous systematic entry-exit screening. This study captures the perception of stakeholders on barriers and facilitators of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) screening. Further, key outcomes viz. total passengers screened, suspected cases, and confirmed cases were assessed. Methods: An inductive-deductive mix-method thematic analysis was conducted to capture qualitative data of key stakeholders on COVID-19 disease screening at Jaipur International Airport. Additionally, secondary data retrieved from Rajasthan Medical & Health Department team deployed for COVID-19 airport screening were analyzed. Results: Jaipur International Airport screened 4565 passengers (Males = 4073 and Females = 492) with 23 suspected cases during an outlined period of declaration of Pandemic to Lockdown in India (11 to 24 March 2020). Total 65 passengers had travel history from China (3 from Wuhan). The mean average age of passengers was 40.95 ± 7.8 years. The average screening time per passenger was 2-3 min with a load of 25-90 passengers per team per flight. Fishbone analysis of screening challenges revealed poor cooperation of passengers, masking symptoms, apprehension, and stigma related to quarantine. Moreover, inadequate human resources and changing guidelines overburdened healthcare providers. But, perception of risk, and social responsibility of travelers together with supportive organization behavior act as facilitators. Overall, groundwork on airport screening was insightful to propose key action areas for screening. Conclusions: Globally, COVID-19 has an impact on health infrastructure and international travel. International coordination with streamlined screening will go an extended way in virus containment.

Pakistan's COVID-19 Outbreak Preparedness and Response: A Situational Analysis.

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to devastate countries around the world. Pakistan has had a largely successful control strategy with fewer hospitalizations and mortality than its neighboring countries of China, Iran, and India. The aim of our study was to assess Pakistan's state of preparedness for and response to the COVID-19 outbreak, including its multifaceted approach in surveillance, response, and diagnostic services. The study was a situational analysis based on the 2020 World Health Organization COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan. The authors collected national data from January to August 2020 from the government of Pakistan's COVID-19 website and Pakistan's Directorate of Central Health Establishments. We also conducted an extensive review of recently published articles on COVID-19, literature, news alerts, and publicly available data on COVID-19 in Pakistan. To address the COVID-19 pandemic, the country drafted a national action plan, developed mobile applications and the national 1166 helpline, conducted thermal screening and active case finding at all points of entry, and established and strengthened a surveillance system for contact tracing and case-based surveillance, with coordination at the federal and provincial levels. Additionally, a total of 134 laboratories have been designated in major cities for testing of COVID-19; 735 hospitals have been designated for the management of cases in isolation wards at federal, provincial, and regional levels; and dedicated quarantine places have been ensured. Despite being a resource-constrained country, the government of Pakistan has mounted a coordinated national effort using the best available resources. The government is rightly focusing on 4 major areas-surveillance, management, response, and coordination-in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic in Pakistan.

Assessing training needs in infectious disease management at major ports, airports and ground-crossings in Europe.

BACKGROUND: The implementation of core capacities as stated in the International Health Regulations (IHR) is far from complete, and, as the COVID-19 pandemic shows, the spreading of infectious diseases through points of entry (POEs) is a serious problem. To guide training and exercises, we performed a training needs assessment on infectious disease management among professionals at European POE. METHODS: We disseminated a digital questionnaire to representatives of designated airports, ports, and ground-crossings in Europe. Topics were derived from the IHR core capacities for POEs. Based on the importance (4-point Likert scale) and training needs (4-point Likert scale), we identified the topics with the highest priority for training. These results were put in further perspective using prior experience (training < 3 year, exercise < 5 years, events < 5 years). Also, preferences for training methodologies were assessed. RESULTS: Fifty questionnaires were included in the analyses, representing 50 POEs from 19 European countries. Importance is high for 26/30 topics, although scores widely vary among respondents. Topics with a high training need (16/30) are amongst others the handling of ill travelers; using and composing the public health emergency contingency plan, and public health measures. Respondents from ports and airports attribute equal importance to most topics, but respondents from ports showed higher training needs on 75% of the topics. POEs are unevenly and generally little experienced. The most preferred training methods were presentations. Simulation is the preferred methodology for training the handling of ill or exposed travelers. CONCLUSIONS: The European workforce at designated ports, airports and ground-crossings has a different level of experience and perceives varying importance of the topics assessed in our study. We identified the topics on which training is required. We call for European collaboration between POEs to agree upon the importance of infectious disease management, and to jointly build a trained and prepared workforce that is ready to face the next crisis.

[Air and maritime transport during the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany: challenges for the public health service]. / Flug- und Schiffsverkehr während der COVID-19-Pandemie in Deutschland: Herausforderungen für den Öffentlichen Gesundheitsdienst.

COVID-19 has been challenging our society since January 2020. Due to global travel, the new coronavirus has rapidly spread worldwide. This article aims to provide an overview of the challenges in implementing measures in the air and maritime transport sector from the perspective of the German Public Health Service (Öffentlicher Gesundheitsdienst, ÖGD). Significant events and measures for air and maritime transport between January and August 2020 were selected. Lessons learned are discussed.During the COVID-19 pandemic, the ÖGD has been operating in a field of tension between the dynamics of scientific knowledge, political decision-making, social acceptance and consent.There are specific challenges at points of entry such as airports and seaports. These include staff shortages and the need to implement measures with a high organisational effort at very short notice such as health authority passenger checks carried out on aircraft, the establishment of test centres at points of entry and control of compliance with quarantine measures. Aggravating the situation, passenger lists, which are necessary for effective contact tracing, are often not available or incomplete. There is also a lack of digital tools for contact tracing but also, for example, the exchange of personal data within the ÖGD. Further difficulties in outbreak management arise from the cramped conditions on board ships and from the potential psychological stress on crew members and passengers, which have not yet been sufficiently considered.In view of all these challenges, it is paramount to strengthen the German Public Health Service in general and at points of entry and to intensify the exchange between the national, federal state and local levels.

Ebola virus disease surveillance in the absence of a confirmed case; the case of the Rwenzori region of Uganda.

INTRODUCTION: the August 2018 ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo turns out to be second largest outbreak of ebola in public health history. The response to the outbreak which would have halted wider spread to neighboring countries failed. Hence, high risk districts in Uganda initiated preparedness activities in the wake of a possible inflow of cases. This study was therefore designed to identify, describe and assess surveillance activities and preparedness in the Kasese, Ntoroko and Bundibugyo districts of Uganda. METHODS: the study employed the mixed method approach. The qualitative arm involved the use of participant observation to describe surveillance activities that were carried out as part of the ebola preparedness surveillance in the high-risk districts. The quantitative arm included assessment of 102 health facilities on ebola virus disease preparedness with a WHO standard checklist hosted on the Open Data Kit software. Descriptive statistics were performed using STATA (version 14). RESULTS: the study showed that high risk districts employed numerous interlocking public health emergency activities which included readiness assessment, risk mapping and temperature-based screening for ebola at points of entry. Most health workers (91.18%) could correctly state the case definition of ebola although only 56.86% of them were trained on ebola surveillance. CONCLUSION: health worker knowledge on ebola virus disease case definition was high but training and logistics were inadequate. Continuous efforts are required to sustain health workers knowledge on ebola surveillance through trainings and supportive supervision whiles addressing gaps in the operation of ebola screening posts.

Exit and Entry Screening Practices for Infectious Diseases among Travelers at Points of Entry: Looking for Evidence on Public Health Impact.

A scoping search and a systematic literature review were conducted to give an insight on entry and exit screening referring to travelers at points of entry, by analyzing published evidence on practices, guidelines, and experiences in the past 15 years worldwide. Grey literature, PubMed. and Scopus were searched using specific terms. Most of the available data identified through the systematic literature review concerned entry screening measures at airports. Little evidence is available about entry and exit screening measure implementation and effectiveness at ports and ground crossings. Exit screening was part of the World Health Organisation's (WHO) temporary recommendations for implementation in certain points of entry, for specific time periods. Exit screening measures for Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in the three most affected West African countries did not identify any cases and showed zero sensitivity and very low specificity. The percentages of confirmed cases identified out of the total numbers of travelers that passed through entry screening measures in various countries worldwide for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) and EVD in West Africa were zero or extremely low. Entry screening measures for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) did not detect any confirmed SARS cases in Australia, Canada, and Singapore. Despite the ineffectiveness of entry and exit screening measures, authors reported several important concomitant positive effects that their impact is difficult to assess, including discouraging travel of ill persons, raising awareness, and educating the traveling public and maintaining operation of flights from/to the affected areas. Exit screening measures in affected areas are important and should be applied jointly with other measures including information strategies, epidemiological investigation, contact tracing, vaccination, and quarantine to achieve a comprehensive outbreak management response. Based on review results, an algorithm about decision-making for entry/exit screening was developed.

Building core capacities at the designated points of entry according to the International Health Regulations 2005: a review of the progress and prospects in Taiwan.

BACKGROUND: As designated points of entry (PoEs) play a critical role in preventing the transmission of international public health risks, huge efforts have been invested in Taiwan to improve the core capacities specified in the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005). This article reviews how Taiwan strengthened the core capacities at the Taoyuan International Airport (TIA) and the Port of Kaohsiung (PoK) by applying a new, practicable model. DESIGN: An IHR PoE program was initiated for implementing the IHR core capacities at designated PoEs. The main methods of this program were 1) identifying the designated PoEs according to the pre-determined criteria, 2) identifying the competent authority for each health measure, 3) building a close collaborative relationship between stakeholders from the central and PoE level, 4) designing three stages of systematic assessment using the assessment tool published by the World Health Organization (WHO), and 5) undertaking action plans targeting the gaps identified by the assessments. RESULTS: Results of the self-assessment, preliminary external assessment, and follow-up external assessment revealed a continuous progressive trend at the TIA (86, 91, and 100%, respectively), and at the PoK (77, 97, and 99.9%, respectively). The results of the follow-up external assessment indicated that both these designated PoEs already conformed to the IHR requirements. These achievements were highly associated with strong collaboration, continuous empowerment, efficient resource integration, and sustained commitments. CONCLUSIONS: Considering that many countries had requested for an extension on the deadline to fulfill the IHR 2005 core capacity requirements, Taiwan's experiences can be a source of learning for countries striving to fully implement these requirements. Further, in order to broaden the scope of public health protection into promoting global security, Taiwan will keep its commitments on multisectoral cooperation, human resource capacity building, and maintaining routine and emergency capacities.

A decade of gains in public health emergency preparedness and response at points of entry

The role of air travel in rapid translocation of infectious disease is indisputable.1 The global health community has long been concerned about the movement across borders of vaccine-preventable diseases, tuberculosis and other diseases of public health concern. These concerns escalated following the September 2001 terrorist attack and the anthrax bioterrorism incident in the United States of America; the worldwide spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003; and the reemergence of H5N1 avian influenza soon thereafter, which stoked fears about the possibility of a severe influenza pandemic. To better prepare and coordinate countries to respond to all-hazards health emergencies at their borders, in the past 10 years the global public health community has formed numerous domestic and international alliances.