Income change and sympathy for right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands: The role of gender and income inequality within households.

The global rise of right-wing populist [RWP] parties presents a major political concern. RWP parties' voters tend to be citizens who have either experienced or fear economic deprivation. Income change constitutes a viable measure of this deprivation. However, previous contributions examining effects of income change on support for RWP parties have yielded diverging conclusions. This paper challenges previous findings by incorporating considerations of gender and within-household inequality. We hypothesise a negative relationship between, on the one hand, personal and household income change and, on the other hand, sympathy towards RWP parties. Furthermore, we expect to find a stronger association between personal income change and RWP sympathy among men. Moreover, we expect the relationship between household income change and RWP sympathy to differ between genders. Finally, we hypothesise that this gender disparity can be interpreted by considering who contributes most to the household income. All these hypotheses are grounded in gender socialisation and economic dominance theories. Analysing Dutch LISS longitudinal data spanning from 2007 to 2021 (N = 7,801, n = 43,954) through fixed-effects multilevel linear regression models enables us to address various competing explanations. It appears that only for men, personal income change is negatively linked with sympathies towards RWP parties. However, considering who is the highest earner within households reveals that women are also affected by their personal income change if they earn the highest income. For both men and women, household income change is negatively linked with sympathies towards RWP parties. These results lend partial support to both the socialisation and economic dominance theories. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Furthering racial liberalism in UK higher education: The populist construction of the 'free speech crisis'.

In this article we analyse the constructed 'free speech crisis' associated with higher education (HE) in the United Kingdom (UK). We examine the media discourses from 2012 to 2022 which led to the establishment of a sense of crisis around speech in universities and, ultimately, to the Freedom of Speech Act in May 2023. We undertake a critical discourse analysis focused on the constructions of universities and university students in two major right-wing broadsheet newspapers, The Times and The Telegraph, and in the right-wing magazine The Spectator. We conceptualise the 'free speech crisis' as a discursive formation which is part of broader political efforts of conservative elites to maintain hegemony in Britain. Drawing on populism theory and race critical analyses, we argue that the 'free speech crisis' is an expression of racial liberalism and a placeholder for a deeper white anxiety over the social reproduction of elites in university spaces, and thus over (cultural) hegemony in the public sphere. We understand the desire to regulate 'free' speech in HE as an effort to prevent the emergence of an elite and (counter)hegemony different to the status quo. We make contributions to two emergent and interrelating bodies of literature: firstly, the study of populism in (post)Brexit Britain, and secondly, the study of culture wars, including iterations of the 'free speech crisis' and 'the war on woke'.

Falling behind whom? Economic geographies of right-wing populism in Europe.

Existing studies suggest that right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) appeal to people in communities that have fallen behind in material terms. However, it remains open which benchmark communities apply as they become politically discontented. We argue that the structure of territorial inequalities influences the benchmarks used by people in regions falling behind. Panel data regressions using subnational election results in EU states from 1990 to 2018 reveal a sharp contrast between the economic geographies of right-wing populism in core and peripheral EU member states. We find a strong association between falling behind the richest region of the country and RWPP support within core EU countries, while in peripheral EU states falling behind the EU core is associated with regional support for RWPPs. This suggests that RWPP voters in peripheral countries cue on how they are faring relative to the EU core, while RWPP supporters in core countries cue on how they are faring relative to dynamic regions of their own country. Our analysis also shows that increased manufacturing employment reinforces the effect of falling behind the richest region in core EU member states, while we find no strong evidence that regional economic stagnation is important to the electoral performance of RWPPs.

Pharmaceutical messianism and the politics of COVID-19 in the United States.

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, public officials in the United States - from the President to governors, mayors, lawmakers, and even school district commissioners - touted unproven treatments for COVID-19 alongside, and sometimes as opposed to, mask and vaccine mandates. Utilising the framework of 'pharmaceutical messianism', our article focuses on three such cures - hydroxychloroquine, ivermectin, and monoclonal antibodies - to explore how pharmaceuticals were mobilised within politicised pandemic discourses. Using the states of Utah, Texas, and Florida as illustrative examples, we make the case for paying attention to pharmaceutical messianism at the subnational and local levels, which can very well determine pandemic responses and outcomes in contexts such as the US where subnational governments have wide autonomy. Moreover, we argue that aside from the affordability of the treatments being studied and the heterodox knowledge claiming their efficacy, the widespread uptake of these cures was also informed by popular medical (including immunological) knowledge, pre-existing attitudes toward 'orthodox' measures like vaccines and masks, and mistrust toward authorities and institutions identified with the 'medical establishment'. Taken together, our case studies affirm the recurrent nature of pharmaceutical messianism in times of health crises - while also refining the concept and exposing its limitations.

Walking the Talk: How to Identify Anti-Pluralist Parties.

The recent increase of democratic declines around the world - "the third wave of autocratization" - has sparked a new generation of studies on the topic. Scholars tend to agree that the main threat to contemporary democracy arises from democratically elected rulers who gradually erode democratic norms. Is it possible to identify future autocratizers before they win power in elections? Linz (1978) and Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) suggest that a lacking commitment to democratic norms reveals would-be autocratizers before they reach office. This article argues that the concept of anti-pluralism rather than populism or extreme ideology captures this. We use a new expert-coded data set on virtually all relevant political parties worldwide from 1970 to 2019 (V-Party) to create a new Anti-Pluralism Index (API) to provide the first systematic empirical test of this argument. We find substantial evidence validating that the API and Linz's litmus-test indicators signal leaders and parties that will derail democracy if and when they come into power.

Rally 'round the flag effects are not for all: Trajectories of institutional trust among populist and non-populist voters.

Using the Consequences of COVID-19 (COCO) dataset (quota sample of the adult Italian population, surveyed seven times by email), we analysed the trend of trust in political (political parties, parliament and local administrations), super partes (president of the Republic, judiciary and police) and international (the European Union and the United Nations) institutions from June 2019 to October 2022. Three latent growth curve models showed that trust in political institutions increased between June 2019 and April 2020 and subsequently decreased below the pre-pandemic level. Trust in super partes institutions decreased slightly between June 2019 and April 2020, decreased from April 2020 to April 2022 and increased in the subsequent months. Trust in international institutions declined between June 2019 and April 2020 and then returned to pre-pandemic levels. Three piecewise decompositions showed different trends in trust for non-populist voters, populist voters and non-voters. Strengths, weaknesses and possible developments of the study are discussed.

When liars are considered honest.

This article introduces a theoretical model of truth and honesty from a psychological perspective. We examine its application in political discourse and discuss empirical findings distinguishing between conceptions of honesty and their influence on public perception, misinformation dissemination, and the integrity of democracy.

Fear, misinformation, and pharmaceutical messianism in the promotion of compounded bioidentical hormone therapy.

Compounded bioidentical hormone therapy (cBHT) for menopausal symptoms maintains popularity in western countries despite the availability of hormone products in different formulations and dosages produced by pharmaceutical companies with federal oversight. Akin to many populist therapeutic trends in the history of medicine, cBHT advocates tend to capitalize on consumer fears about existing FDA-approved hormone treatments. Unsubstantiated, exaggerated, or outright false claims are commonplace in promoting cBHT. Given these elements, the basic elements of pharmaceutical messianism continue to drive the cBHT movement.

Populism, Economic Distress, Cultural Backlash, and Identity Threat: Integrating Patterns and Testing Cross-National Validity.

Populism is on the rise across liberal democracies. The sociopsychological underpinnings of this increasing endorsement of populist ideology should be uncovered. In an online cross-sectional survey study among adult samples from five countries (Chile, France, Italy, Romania, and the United Kingdom; N = 9,105), we aimed to replicate an economic distress pattern in which relative deprivation and identity threat are associated with populism. We further tested a cultural backlash pattern-including perceived anomie, collective narcissism, and identity threat as predictors of populism. Multigroup structural equation models supported both economic distress and cultural backlash paths as predictors of populist thin ideology endorsement. In both paths, identity threat to belonging played a significant role as partial mediator. Furthermore, an integrative model showed that the two patterns were not mutually exclusive. These findings emphasize the implication of identity threat to belonging as an explanatory mediator and demonstrate the cross-national generalizability of these patterns.

How Populism Affects Bioethics.

This article aims at raising awareness about the intersection of populism and bioethics. It argues that illiberal forms of populism may have negative consequences on the evolution of bioethics as a discipline and on its practical objectives. It identifies at least seven potential negative effects: (1) The rise of populist leaders fosters "epistemological populism," devaluing the expert and scientific perspectives on which bioethics is usually based, potentially steering policies away from evidence-based foundations. (2) The impact of "moral populism" is evident in legislative prioritization of the "morality of common people," often solicited through popular consultations on issues like abortion, drug legalization, or LGBT issues. (3) Populist distrust in autonomous governmental agencies and advisory bodies, including national bioethics commissions, can compromise expert advice, challenging both their authority and decisions. (4) Populists may erode transparency by undermining institutions responsible for it, hindering access to vital information for bioethical research. (5) "Medical populism" creates adversarial dynamics, prompting politicians to make simplistic healthcare policy decisions based on political rather than informed criteria, adversely affecting vulnerable populations. (6) Radical-right populist parties' "welfare chauvinism" may shape healthcare policies, impacting service access and resource allocation, disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups such as migrants, but indirectly affecting the rest of the population. (7) Nationalist sentiments associated with populism may obstruct international collaborations, posing challenges for global bioethics that seeks to address ethical concerns beyond national borders. In summary, these dynamics raise significant bioethical concerns encompassing evidence-based decision-making, transparency, healthcare equity, and global collaboration. How bioethicists may respond to these challenges is discussed.

The Politics of Covid-19 Vaccination Hesitancy in Southeastern Europe.

The execution of Covid-19 vaccination drives in former Yugoslavia's successor states has been disappointing. The rapidly evolving literature on the Covid-19 pandemic suggests the levels of support for vaccination are correlated with education, trust in public-health institutions, and exposure to the negative economic and health effects of the pandemic. The explanations of the political foundations of vaccination hesitancy, however, need better empirical grounding. We shed light on this subject by analyzing the results of a survey conducted on more than six thousand respondents from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, as well as a combination of public-health, economic, and sociodemographic data across more than five hundred municipalities in Croatia. Most notably, we find the political sources of vaccination hesitancy to be strongly related to people's support for the ideas of political parties committed to nationalist populism.

Health emergencies, science contrarianism and populism: A scoping review.

Populism has emerged as a central explanation employed by both media outlets and scholars for the mishandling of the COVID-19 crisis. Nonetheless, the relationship between public health and populism extends before and beyond the pandemic. This paper offers a comprehensive overview of existing evidence and theoretical conceptualisations on the intersection of populism, health emergencies, and contrarian scientific positions, drawing from a diverse range of disciplines. I conducted a scoping review of 283 original studies, analysing their analytical framework, geographic focuses, and methodological approaches. Employing quantitative text analysis, I summarised the research field into 18 common topics, organised into five coherent categories: citizen's perspective, political elites, political communication, pandemic consequences, and non-COVID-related issues. While the scholarly interest in this area has surged since the onset of the pandemic, it has predominantly concentrated on specific cases, such as Brazil and the US, often conflating different policy types. The evidence summary elucidates that populism assumes varying roles within distinct contexts, and there is no linear relationship between political populism and specific approaches to health crises and science. I further compare definitions of populism within the context of health and scientific positions. I propose that future research should employ a policy typology for health emergency responses, assessing political positions based on policy arenas. This paper contributes to the understanding of the complex interplay between political populism, contrarian scientific perspectives, and public health.

Religion and nationalism revisited: Insights from southeastern and central eastern Europe.

This paper explores the dynamics behind the rise of religious nationalism in Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe with distinct populist, nativist, and authoritarian overtones. The paper explores the relationship between nationalism and religion today and the broader transformation challenges both within the region and more globally that can shape this relationship. It then looks closer into the historical experiences in the region with regard to the relationship between state and church as well as nationalism and religion, critically analysing how these relations have evolved during nation-state formation in the 19th and early 20th century, under Communism, and in the last three decades. Analysing critically the relevant literature, the paper discusses the entanglements between state and religious institutions as well as between national identity and faith, and how these are mobilised today. The paper argues for the need to consider both internal and external factors in the evolution of the relationship between nationalism and religion in Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe and more broadly.

Conspiracy Mentality: How it Relates to Populism, Relative Deprivation, Mistrust of Expertise and Voting Behaviour.

Background and research aims. Considering the high prevalence of conspiracy theories and misinformation, there is an urgent need to explain the tendency to adopt a conspiracy mentality and identify behavioural (including voting) outcomes of a high conspiracy mentality. The aims of the present paper are 1) the examination of populist attitudes dimensions, relative deprivation and mistrust of expertise as predictors of conspiracy mentality and 2) proposal of comprehensive models, that combine predictors of conspiracy mentality and its voting consequences. METHODOLOGY: Studies utilised OSL regression and structural equation modelling. RESULTS: The overall regression was statistically significant. It was found that dimensions of populist attitudes (anti-elitism, sovereignty), relative deprivation and mistrust of expertise were significant predictors of conspiracy mentality. In line with the second research aim, the fitness of models was confirmed and results suggest mistrust of expertise is also a significant predictor of far-right voting. DISCUSSION: The contribution of the paper lies in connecting conspiracy mentality with not only attitudes but also with important behaviour outcome - voting behaviour. We propose future research should experimentally examine whether the reduction of some of the identified predictors could possibly lower levels of conspiracy mentality and whether this reduction translates into voting behaviour.

'Like we definitely have to go greener, but ': Analysing affective-discursive practices in populist environmental discourse.

Previous studies on environmental issues in right-wing populism have mostly focused on political actors and their argumentation. In contrast, this study examines environmental populist discourse from the perspective of laypeople in Finland. We used interviews (n = 25) to analyse affective-discursive practices in environmental talk, identifying four partly interrelated practices: belittling the 'annoying liberals', constructing the ordinary rural people as victims, externalizing blame to the 'real' polluters, and glorifying Finnish nature. These practices shed light on subject positions, affect, and functions in environmental discourse. Our contributions to the field of social psychology are threefold. First, we apply an affective-discursive approach in a novel context, deepening our understanding of affect in environmental populism. Second, we explore the nuanced features of populist reasoning and argumentation, shedding light on the functions and social implications of populist environmental discourse. Third, our analysis of identities and the discourse of laypeople provides insights into the dynamics that contribute to the polarization around environmental issues in society. We argue that the sceptical environmental discourse associated with right-wing populism may persist precisely due to the affective and polarized nature of environmental issues.

Red-pilled mama bears and enlightened power goddesses: Discursive constructions of feminine identities in a conspiracy theory space.

Previous research into the gendered social identity work involved in conspiracy theories (CTs) has largely focused on expressions of masculinity. The present study investigates the employment and mobilization of feminine identities in online Covid-19 conspiracy theory seminars through a critical discursive psychological perspective. The analysis finds three interpretative repertoires for representing the pandemic: the totalitarianism repertoire, the corrupt medical profession repertoire and the awakening repertoire. The most prominent feminine subject position constructed in relation to these repertoires is a maternal identity that functions as a category entitlement: mothers are represented as having a unique viewpoint on the purported pandemic conspiracy by virtue of their supposed inherent morality and concern for the welfare of children. Mothers are depicted as the cultural reproducers of the group, tasked with keeping the(ir) children safe from the influence of the conspiracy. Moreover, women are persuaded to take part in anti-conspiracy action by drawing on notions of empowerment, self-actualization, and sisterhood. These findings suggest that feminine identities, and maternal identities in particular, play a key role in the mobilizing power of CTs.

Understanding Populism.

The diversity of features attributed to populism - and, as a result, the variety of critiques leveled at it - are remarkable. It sometimes seems as though people are using the same terms to address very different phenomena. Is there any distinctive meaning to populism? Is populism inherently anti-democratic or, on the contrary, is it the epitome of democratic practice? What should an engagement with populist movements mean for the theory and practice of democracy? This paper seeks to map the discursive ecosystem that populism determines. It canvasses the phenomena often associated with populism, proposes an interrelated set of concerns that is distinctive to populism, suggests how populism intersects with propensities and affinities with which it is often associated, emphasises the role of growing economic inequality, and suggests responses to populist movements that are grounded in a truly democratic constitutionalism.

The 'Will of the People': The Populist Challenge to Democracy in the Name of Popular Sovereignty.

This article analyses how right-wing populist actors claim to represent the "voice of the people" and express "popular sovereignty" as a mode of challenging the traditional constitutional foundation of liberal democracy. This hypothesis is illustrated by an investigation into the political discourse of the Alternative for Germany considering how this populist actor has developed a political strategy claiming to speak for the "people" in an authentic and immediate fashion. The analysis of this actor's political mobilization shows how the championed direct democratic representation is couched in a sovereigntist discourse that relies on divisive identity markers rather than genuine democratic participation. Drawing on Carl Schmitt's concept of the political, the article interprets right-wing populism as invoking a permanent "state of exception" that employs an emotionally charged friend-enemy distinction whose logic of representing the people has the potential of triggering radical political change as well as undermining the integrity of rule-based democracy.

How orientations to expertise condition the acceptance of (mis)information.

This review explores psychological barriers to the acceptance of expert guidance. Specifically, the constructs of epistemic overconfidence, institutional distrust, anti-expert sentiments, anti-establishment orientations, science populism, and conspiracist worldviews are jointly considered as orientations to expertise. I review the state of the literature on their origins, prevalence, and effects on misinformation endorsement and acceptance of corrections. Addressing these psychological barriers requires building trust in institutions, backed by transparent communication and the involvement of community-based, non-expert messengers. As the review synthesizes disparate research strands, it underscores the need for future studies to compare, validate, and consolidate different orientations to expertise, understand causal relationships, and explore generalizability to diverse contexts.

Staging enmity: reading populist productions of shame with Jelinek's On the Royal Road.

Background: Populism is often perceived as a shamelessly loud segment of political discourse. However, Jelinek's play On the Royal Road, written on the occasion of Trump's 2016 election as US president, suggests that populism leads to societal silencing. Jelinek's text expounds that when a society's public sphere is marked by ubiquitous enmity against an imagined "we", grounded in antagonism, then the possibility of speaking to one another disappears, because speaking to one another is based on the willingness to give one's counterpart space and listen to them. In a public discourse that stages enmity, the counterpart vanishes. Therefore, populism, loud as it is, leads to the silencing of whole communities insofar as they are left with nothing in common but enmity. Method: Critical discourse analysis is used to contextualise close readings of select passages of Jelinek's play with recent social sciences and humanities research on global populisms to highlight what literary language and the dramatic form can contribute to understanding populism. Results: The silencing populisms entail is fed, in large part, by a dynamics linking the interpersonal emotion of shame to its discursive exploitation in shamelessness and shaming: populist voices transgress rules of democratic debate in the public sphere to elicit outrage by mainstream politics, media, and civil society, which often retort populist shamelessness by shaming populist actors. The audience excitement populist leaders and supporters generate is an important factor in normalizing the emotional, moralizing populist polarization of "us" versus "them" that undermines differentiated discussion and a dispute of arguments. Conclusion: While media and research commonly suggest that with the populist reduction of politics to a spectacle, citizens become a passive audience, the article expounds that audiences play a key role in the production of populist enmity. This insight offers an alley to counteract populism.