Copyright and Digital Teaching Exceptions in the EU: Legislative Developments and Implementation Models of Art. 5 CDSM Directive.

Article 5 of the 2019 EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM) attempted to modernize the regime of copyright exceptions and limitations related to teaching activities. Its aim is to enhance the flexibility behind permitted uses to the benefit of educational institutions regarding their digital and cross-border teaching. The pressing need for such a legislative reform was confirmed by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which dramatically moved teaching environments to online platforms. This paper dissects Art. 5 CDSM Directive unveiling three layers of analysis. First, the substance, logic, and promises of the new provision are introduced. Second, it identifies diverging national implementation models, developing a comparative study of the Hungarian, German, and Italian experiences. Third, drawing from the comparative study, the paper provides fundamental guidance in understanding whether Art. 5 CDSM Directive can be considered an evolution or, rather, a devolution of the copyright teaching exceptions in Europe. Focusing on the systematic concerns arising from the new provision, its embedded limits, and the strategic uses of the licensing carve-out, we conclude that the EU legislature has only partially achieved the goal of striking a more European, modern, and sustainable balance between copyright protection and the right to education in the digital environment.

A timeline of freedom of movement in the European Economic Area.

The European Economic Area (EEA) provides a common market for goods, labour, services, and capital. Promoting integration between countries through the free movement of labour, or more generally persons, pre-dates the previous forms of the EEA. However, during the Southern and Eastern Expansions of the European Union, there have been transition agreements on persons, designed to restrict immigration. Opening up labour markets to the new member states with signifcantly lower GDP per capita than existing states, has been contentious. This is why the use of transition agreements have permitted periods which existing members can limit immigration. Not all existing member states impose restrictions, and during the Eastern Enlargements, the restrictions were imposed for varying lengths of time by different existing members up to a maximum of seven years. During the transition agreement, the economies of new members and existing members can converge, which is ultimately designed to limit the pull factor of migration. In this note, we provide a concise resource of the timeline of the expansion of full free movement of persons for countries in the EEA and Switzerland.

Incumprimento Protecionista no Mercado Único da União Europeia / Protectionist Non-Compliance in the Single Market of the European Union / Infractions Protectionnistes au sein du Marché Unique de l'Union européenne / Incumplimiento Proteccionista en el Mercado Único de la Unión Europea

RESUMO Embora o mercado único da União Europeia (UE) pressuponha a inexistência de barreiras nas trocas intracomunitárias, estas barreiras persistem configurando infrações à livre circulação de bens entre Estados membros. O argumento central deste artigo é que os governos dos países da UE tendem a aceitar infringir a liberdade de circulação e a manter o status quo protecionista em setores em que os grupos de interesse econômico são mais influentes. Com base na análise estatística de duas bases de dados disponibilizadas pela Comissão Europeia, o artigo evidencia a prevalência destas infrações protecionistas na UE e analisa, em especial, como a proteção nacional é mais frequente em setores com maior capacidade de pressão, nomeadamente no setor agrícola. A experiência europeia revela-se útil para outros projetos de integração na medida em que evidencia a possibilidade de ocorrerem pressões protecionistas de grupos econômicos que resultam em violações persistentes às regras dos acordos, e mostra a necessidade de esforços contínuos por parte das instituições regionais de se oporem a esse incumprimento.

ABSTRACT Although the single market of the European Union (EU) supposes the inexistence of barriers in intracommunity trade, such barriers persist, hindering the free circulation of goods between the member states. The main argument proposed in this article is that governments of EU countries tend to accept infringements on freedom of circulation and to maintain the protectionist status quo in sectors in which groups of economic interest are most influential. Based on a statistical analysis of two databases made available by the European Commission, the article highlights the prevalence of such protectionist infractions in the EU, with a particular analysis made on how national protection is more frequent in sectors with a greater capacity for pressure, namely in the agricultural sector. The European experience is a useful comparison point for other integration projects in so far as it reveals how protectionist pressures from economic groups can lead to persistent violations of the regulations in agreements, demonstrating the need for continuous efforts by regional institutions to oppose such non-compliance.

RÉSUMÉ Bien que le Marché unique de l'Union européenne (UE) présuppose l'inexistence de barrières pour les échanges intracommunautaires, certaines d'entre elles persistent néanmoins, en infraction à la libre circulation des biens entre les États membres. L'argument central de cet article est que les gouvernements des pays de l'Union européenne tendent à accepter ces infractions à la liberté de circulation et à maintenir le statu quo protectionniste dans les secteurs où les groupes d'intérêts économiques sont les plus influents. Sur la base de l'analyse statistique de deux banques de données mises à disposition par la Commission européenne, l'article mettra en évidence la prévalence de ces infractions protectionnistes dans l'Union européenne et analysera en particulier de quelle manière la protection nationale est plus fréquente dans des secteurs disposant d'une plus grande capacité de pression, notamment le secteur agricole. L'expérience européenne s'avère utile pour d'autres projets d'intégration dans la mesure où elle met en évidence la possibilité de la survenance de pressions protectionnistes de la part de certains groupes économiques, qui peuvent parfois mener à des infractions persistantes aux règles des accords. Cela met bien évidemment en évidence la nécessité d'efforts continus de la part des institutions régionales pour s'opposer à ses infractions.

RESUMEN A pesar de que el mercado único de la Unión Europea (UE) presupone la inexistencia de barreras en los intercambios intracomunitarios, estos obstáculos persisten y motivan quebrantamientos de la libre circulación de bienes entre Estados miembros. El argumento central de este artículo es que los gobiernos de los países de la UE tienden a aceptar infringir la libertad de circulación y a mantener el status quo proteccionista en sectores en los que los grupos de interés económico son más influyentes. Apoyándose en el análisis estadístico de dos bases de dados facilitadas por la Comisión Europea, el artículo muestra la prevalencia de estas infracciones proteccionistas en la UE y analiza, en especial, en qué medida la protección nacional es más frecuente en sectores con mayor capacidad de presión, en concreto, en el sector agrícola. La experiencia europea se revela útil para otros proyectos de integración, dado que refleja la posibilidad de que se produzcan presiones proteccionistas de grupos económicos que deriven en violaciones persistentes de las reglas de los acuerdos, y muestra la necesidad de que las instituciones regionales se esfuercen constantemente por oponerse a este incumplimiento.