Making space for the new state capitalism, part II: Relationality, spatiotemporality and uneven development.

The theme issue 'Making Space for the New State Capitalism' brings together insights from critical economic geography and heterodox political economy through a series of papers published in three installments, each accompanied by an introductory essay written by the guest editors. In this, the second of these introductory commentaries, we explore the consequences of embracing relationality, spatiotemporality and uneven development, together with the second group of papers. Introducing a final group of papers, the third installment will address the challenges and opportunities of thinking conjuncturally.

State capitalism as Lazarus meets Loch Ness: Insights from the Asiatic mode of production.

This paper comments on the unexamined bifurcation of new state capitalism studies into two camps: changes in liberal capitalism and analyses of illiberal state forms. I characterize these aspects as Lazarus meets Loch Ness: Lazarus-like when focused on the ever-reborn market interventions of the liberal capitalist state, and Loch Ness-like in its rediscovery of the resurfaced 'other.'

A very British state capitalism: Variegation, political connections and bailouts during the COVID-19 crisis.

The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in governments playing increasingly prominent roles as active economic agents. However, state capitalism does not necessarily serve broad developmental purposes, and rather can be directed to supporting sectional and private interests. As the literature on variegated capitalism alerts us, governments and other actors regularly devise fixes in response to a systemic crisis, but the focus, scale, and scope of the interventions vary considerably, according to the constellation of interests. Rapid progress with vaccines notwithstanding, the UK government's response to COVID-19 has been associated with much controversy, not only because of an extraordinarily high death rate, but also because of allegations of cronyism around the granting of government contracts and bailouts. We focus on the latter, investigating more closely who got bailed out. We find that badly affected sectors (e.g. hospitality, transportation) and larger employers were more likely to get bailouts. However, the latter also favored the politically influential and those who had run up debt profligately. Although, as with state capitalism, crony capitalism is most often associated with emerging markets, we conclude that the two have coalesced into a peculiarly British variety, but one that has some common features with other major liberal markets. This might suggest that the eco-systemic dominance of the latter is coming to an end, or, at the least, that this model is drifting towards one that assumes many of the features commonly associated with developing nations.

A review of the internationalization of state-owned firms and sovereign wealth funds: Governments' nonbusiness objectives and discreet power.

We review and bridge the literature on the internationalization of state-owned firms and sovereign wealth funds to provide a novel understanding of how government ownership affects foreign investments in three ways. First, we explain how state-owned firms and funds behave differently from private ones because they need to balance governments' nonbusiness objectives and firms' business goals. This results in competing predictions on whether government ownership helps or hinders internationalization due to particular nonbusiness objectives. Second, building on the review, we provide suggestions on how to extend research topics and theories of the firm by incorporating these nonbusiness objectives in the internationalization decisions in four areas: home government's endowments, characteristics, and attitudes; host-country expansion's support, influence, and impact; home- and host-country relationship conflicts, mediation, and disguising; and management's orientation, opacity, and arbitrage. Third, we capture how governments may use state-owned multinationals and sovereign wealth funds to nudge host-country governments by introducing the concept of discreet power and the use of four strategies (recognition, values, development, and supremacy) to achieve it. This helps to outline the beginning of a unified approach to how governments use their foreign investments to achieve nonbusiness goals. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41267-022-00522-w.

Nous passons en revue et rapprochons la littérature de l'internationalisation des entreprises publiques et celle des fonds souverains afin d'apporter une nouvelle compréhension de la façon dont la propriété gouvernementale influence les investissements étrangers. Cette contribution se concrétise de trois manières. Premièrement, nous expliquons comment les entreprises et les fonds publics se comportent différemment des entreprises privées, parce qu'ils doivent trouver un équilibre entre les objectifs non commerciaux des gouvernements et les objectifs commerciaux des entreprises. Ce qui génère les prédictions opposées sur le rôle que joue la propriété gouvernementale: est-ce qu'elle aide ou entrave l'internationalisation en raison d'objectifs non commerciaux particuliers? Deuxièmement, nous appuyant sur la revue des littératures, nous élaborons les suggestions sur la manière d'étendre, via l'incorporation des objectifs non commerciaux aux décisions d'internationalisation, les thèmes de recherche et les théories de l'entreprise dans quatre domaines: les dotations, les caractéristiques et les attitudes du gouvernement du pays d'origine; le soutien, l'influence et l'impact de l'expansion du pays d'accueil; les conflits, la médiation et le déguisement dans les relations entre pays d'origine et pays d'accueil; et l'orientation, l'opacité et l'arbitrage de la direction. Troisièmement, nous essayons de saisir la manière dont les gouvernements peuvent utiliser les multinationales publiques et les fonds souverains pour influencer les gouvernements des pays d'accueil, et ce en introduisant le concept de pouvoir discret et l'utilisation de quatre stratégies (reconnaissance, valeurs, développement et suprématie) pour y parvenir. Cela permet d'esquisser le début d'une approche unifiée de la manière dont les gouvernements utilisent leurs investissements étrangers pour atteindre des objectifs non commerciaux.

Revisamos y unimos la literatura sobre la internacionalización de las empresas de propiedad estatal y los fondos soberanos para proporcionar una comprensión novedosa de cómo la propiedad gubernamental afecta las inversiones extranjeras de tres maneras. Primero, explicamos cómo las empresas y los fondos estatales se comportan de manera diferente a los privados porque necesitan equilibrar los objetivos no comerciales de los gobiernos y los objetivos comerciales de las empresas. Esto da lugar a predicciones contradictorias sobre si la propiedad gubernamental ayuda o dificulta la internacionalización debido a objetivos particulares no comerciales. En segundo lugar, sobre la base de la revisión, proporcionamos sugerencias sobre cómo ampliar los temas de investigación y las teorías de la empresa mediante la incorporación de estos objetivos no comerciales en las decisiones de internacionalización en cuatro áreas: recursos, características y actitudes del gobierno local; el apoyo, la influencia y el impacto de la expansión del país anfitrión; conflictos, mediación y encubrimiento de las relaciones entre el país de origen y el país anfitrión; y la orientación, opacidad y arbitraje de la gestión. En tercer lugar, capturamos cómo los gobiernos pueden usar multinacionales estatales y fondos soberanos para empujar a los gobiernos de los países anfitriones mediante la introducción del concepto de poder discreto y el uso de cuatro estrategias (reconocimiento, valores, desarrollo y supremacía) para lograrlo. Esto ayuda a delinear el comienzo de un enfoque unificado sobre cómo los gobiernos utilizan sus inversiones extranjeras para lograr objetivos no comerciales.

Revisamos e ligamos a literatura sobre a internacionalização de empresas estatais e fundos soberanos para fornecer uma nova compreensão de como a propriedade do governo afeta investimentos estrangeiros de três formas. Em primeiro lugar, explicamos como empresas e fundos estatais se comportam de maneira diferente de entidades privadas porque precisam equilibrar objetivos não comerciais de governos e metas de negócios das empresas. Isso resulta em previsões antagônicas sobre se a propriedade do governo ajuda ou atrapalha a internacionalização devido a certos objetivos não comerciais. Em segundo lugar, com base na revisão, fornecemos sugestões sobre como estender tópicos de pesquisa e teorias da firma incorporando esses objetivos não comerciais nas decisões de internacionalização em quatro áreas: dotações, características e atitudes do governo local; apoio, influência e impacto da expansão do país anfitrião; conflitos, mediação e disfarce nas relações entre país de origem e anfitrião; e orientação, opacidade e arbitragem da administração. Em terceiro lugar, capturamos como governos podem usar multinacionais e fundos soberanos estatais para estimular governos de países anfitriões, introduzindo o conceito de poder discreto e o uso de quatro estratégias (reconhecimento, valores, desenvolvimento e supremacia) para alcançá-lo. Isso ajuda a delinear o início de uma abordagem unificada de como governos usam seus investimentos estrangeiros para atingir objetivos não comerciais.

A by-product of big government: the attenuating role of public procurement for the effectiveness of grants-based entrepreneurship policy.

We study the contextual role of public procurement for the effectiveness of grants-based entrepreneurship policy. Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm, we argue that partaking in procurement can erode grant effectiveness by relaxing a firm's preexisting financial constraints and diverting managerial attention away from market-centered resource configurations. To test our hypothesis, we use detailed firm-level data from Slovenia and combine matching with difference-in-differences. When firms are not involved in procurement, all investigated types of grants meet the intended policy goals, apart from productivity growth. In contrast, when firms participate in procurement, small-business grants exhibit generally weaker effects, R&D grants fail to have any impact, and employment grants lastingly reduce firm productivity. Given that public procurement occupies a large footprint in many economies, our analysis highlights an unintended adverse by-product of big government and underscores the limits of state capitalism. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11187-023-00788-w.

Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11187-023-00788-w.

This study explores how public procurement shapes the effectiveness of grants-based entrepreneurship policy. If procurement loosens firm's preexisting financial constraints or induces businesses to prioritize contracting with the government over other market opportunities, then public procurement could reduce the effectiveness of government grants. Empirical evidence from Slovenia supports this perspective. When firms do not partake in procurement, all examined types of grants achieve their intended policy goals, except for productivity growth. However, when firms are involved in public procurement, the effectiveness of the grants diminishes dramatically: small-business grants have weaker effects in general, R&D grants do not exert any impact, and employment grants decrease firm productivity. Thus, the principal implication of this study is that public procurement can hamper the effectiveness of grants-based entrepreneurship policy. The research also contributes to the understanding of the unintended consequences of big government and the limitations of state capitalism.

State Capitalism and the New Global D/development Regime.

Official discourses of Development are being redefined. If the key geopolitical contexts shaping the post-war Development project were decolonisation and the Cold War, the defining world-historical transformations shaping the emerging vision of Development are the expansion of state capitalism and the rise of China. The IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, the G20, other multilaterals, and bilateral partners are increasingly taking stock of the rise of state capitalism, and acting as ideational vectors of this emerging regime. However, this new "state capitalist normal" is also portrayed as carrying risks. There is anxiety regarding the direction the political form of global capital accumulation is heading: with the unchecked proliferation of state capitalism possibly blunting competition, politicising economic relations, and intensifying geoeconomic tensions. This anxiety underwrites the current re-articulation of Development, one which embraces the state as promoter, supervisor, and owner of capital; even as it critiques China's use of similar instruments.

Leviathan as a partial cure? Opportunities and pitfalls of using the state-owned apparatus to respond to the COVID-19 crisis / ¿Leviatán como una cura parcial? Oportunidades y dificultades al usar el aparato estatal para responder a la crisis de COVID-19 / O Leviatã como uma cura parcial? Oportunidades e armadilhas no uso do aparato estatal para responder à crise da COVID-19

Abstract While some argue that market forces are imperative to stimulate the increased supply of critical products and services to address the COVID-19 crisis, others contend that dealing with the pandemic requires coordination and rapid adjustments in supply that may be constrained by a host of factors. Although discussions have centered on policies to promote financial liquidity, we examine whether the state apparatus-not only state-owned enterprises but also development agencies and investment funds-can innovate and adjust production processes to improve infrastructure and capabilities to prevent and treat the disease. Potential actions include public-private effort addressing both discovery and coordination problems-such as a collaborative effort to develop prevention and treatment technologies, as well as state capital to stimulate retooling and expansion of strategic infrastructure. The state apparatus can also help access remote and critical areas with relatively lower private returns. In contrast, support to industries must be implemented with caution, especially for sectors whose demand may suffer permanently due to lifestyle changes. Exit strategies must be carefully crafted to avoid the risk of perpetuating unjustified and ineffective state support, establishing milestones and termination clauses based on clear performance indicators. We argue that, although using the state apparatus as a countermeasure entails a set of risks, not using it may increase the risk of extending the crisis and end with an overloaded state sector (e.g., due to massive bailouts), challenging the implementation of subsequent adjustments.

Resumen Mientras que algunos sostienen que las fuerzas del mercado son imperativas para estimular el suministro de productos y servicios críticos para enfrentar la crisis de COVID-19, otros recomiendan coordinación y ajustes rápidos en el suministro que pueden estar limitados por varios factores. Si bien las discusiones habituales se centran en políticas para promover la liquidez financiera, examinamos si el aparato estatal ‒no solo las empresas estatales, sino también las agencias de desarrollo y los fondos públicos‒ puede promover la experimentación y el ajuste en los procesos de producción. Las acciones potenciales incluyen esfuerzos público-privados que buscan el descubrimiento y la coordinación, como los esfuerzos de colaboración para desarrollar tecnologías de prevención y tratamiento, así como inyecciones de capital para estimular la expansión de la infraestructura estratégica. El aparato estatal también puede ayudar a acceder a áreas remotas y críticas, con rendimientos privados más bajos. Por otro lado, el apoyo selectivo a las industrias debe implementarse con precaución, especialmente en sectores cuya demanda puede sufrir cambios permanentes debido a un nuevo estilo de vida. Para evitar el riesgo de perpetuar el apoyo estatal injustificado, las estrategias de salida deben diseñarse cuidadosamente, con hitos y cláusulas de terminación basadas en indicadores de desempeño. Aunque usar el aparato estatal como contramedida conlleve su propio conjunto de riesgos, quizás paradójicamente no usarlo también aumente el riesgo de extender la crisis y de dar como resultado un sector estatal hinchado (por ejemplo, debido a rescates masivos), lo que dificulta la implementación de ajustes posteriores.

Resumo Enquanto alguns argumentam que as forças de mercado são imperativas para estimular a oferta de produtos e serviços críticos para lidar com a crise da COVID-19, outros recomendam coordenação e ajustes rápidos na oferta que podem ser limitados por uma série de fatores. Embora as discussões usuais coloquem foco em políticas para promover liquidez financeira, examinamos se o aparato estatal - não apenas empresas estatais, mas também agências de desenvolvimento e fundos públicos - pode promover experimentação e ajuste nos processos de produção para aumentar a infraestrutura e capacidade de prevenção e tratamento. Ações potenciais incluem esforços público-privados buscando descoberta e coordenação - como esforços colaborativos para desenvolver tecnologias de prevenção e tratamento, além de injeções de capital para estimular o reequipamento e a expansão da infraestrutura estratégica. O aparato estatal também pode ajudar a acessar áreas remotas e críticas, com retornos privados relativamente mais baixos. Por outro lado, apoio seletivo às indústrias deve ser implementado com cautela, especialmente em setores cuja demanda pode sofrer alterações permanentes devido a mudanças no estilo de vida. Para evitar o risco de perpetuar apoio estatal injustificado e ineficaz, estratégias de saída devem ser elaboradas com cuidado, com marcos e cláusulas de término com base em indicadores de desempenho. Embora o uso do aparato estatal como contramedida acarrete seu próprio conjunto de riscos, talvez paradoxalmente não utilizá-lo também aumente o risco de estender a crise e acabar com um setor estadual inchado (por exemplo, devido a resgates maciços), tornando mais difícil a implementação de ajustes subsequentes.