Semantic versus perceptual priming: dissecting their impact on intuitive judgments of semantic coherence.

This research explores the mechanisms underlying the intuitive processing of semantic coherence, focusing on the effects of semantic and perceptual priming on semantic coherence detection. Two studies examined how these priming types influence individuals' abilities to discern semantic incoherence. In Study 1, we used solutions to semantically coherent triads as primes, finding that such priming significantly improves participants' accuracy and confidence in identifying incoherent elements within word tetrads. These results corroborate the hypothesis that intuitive judgments in linguistic tasks are closely tied to the processing fluency elicited by semantic connections. In Study 2, we show that perceptual priming does not significantly enhance accuracy, albeit it does increase the confidence with which individuals make their judgments. Distinct effects of semantic and perceptual priming on intuitive judgments highlight the complex interplay between processing fluency and affect in shaping intuitive judgments of semantic coherence. We discuss the nuanced roles of semantic and perceptual factors in influencing the accuracy and confidence of intuitive decisions.

Moral trade-offs reveal foundational representations that predict unique variance in political attitudes.

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explains variation in moral judgements on the basis of multiple innate, intuitive foundations and has been subject to criticism over recent years. Prior research has tended to rely on explicit self-report in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). In contrast, we seek to capture intuitive choices between foundations in a novel task - the Moral Foundations Conflict Task (MFCT). Across four studies, responses on this task reflect foundations measured by the MFQ (study 1), are not altered under cognitive load or reduced cognitive control (studies 2a and 2b); and explain unique variance in political orientation and related constructs (study 3). Furthermore, using responses and response times generated on the MFCT, we present a computationally explicit model of foundation-related intuitive judgements and show that these patterns are consistent with the theoretical claims of MFT. These findings show that the MFCT outperforms the MFQ and can contribute to the understanding of moral value conflicts, furthering debate on the nature of moral values.

EEG-based driving intuition and collision anticipation using joint temporal-frequency multi-layer dynamic brain network.

Intuition plays a crucial role in human driving decision-making, and this rapid and unconscious cognitive process is essential for improving traffic safety. We used the first proposed multi-layer network analysis method, "Joint Temporal-Frequency Multi-layer Dynamic Brain Network" (JTF-MDBN), to study the EEG data from the initial and advanced phases of driving intuition training in the theta, alpha, and beta bands. Additionally, we conducted a comparative study between these two phases using multi-layer metrics as well as local and global metrics of single layers. The results show that brain region activity is more stable in the advanced phase of intuition training compared to the initial phase. Particularly in the alart state task, the JTF-MDBN demonstrated stronger connection strength. Multi-layer network analysis indicates that modularity is significantly higher for the non-alert state task than the alert state task in the alpha and beta bands. In the W4 time window (1 second before a collision), we identified significant features that can differentiate situations where a car collision is imminent from those where no collision occurs. Single-layer network analysis also revealed statistical differences in node strength and local efficiency for some EEG channels in the alpha and beta bands during the W4 and W5 time windows. Using these biomarkers to predict vehicle collision risk, the classification accuracy of a linear kernel SVM reached up to 87.5%, demonstrating the feasibility of predicting driving collisions through brain network biomarkers. These findings are important for the study of human intuition and the development of brain-computer interface-based intelligent driving hazard perception assistance systems.

Modalization and Transcendence of Health in the Coming Decade: Emphasizing the Human Cognitive System in the Stories of Prophets in the Holy Quran.

In this study, the progression and importance of health knowledge is explored, projecting its future path. We do this by comparing the stages of evolution of the human cognitive system from birth to old age (inner intellect) with the stages of intellectual modalization in divine messengers (external intellect), as depicted in the stories of the prophets in the Holy Quran. This comparison aims to articulate the course of evolution, which includes sensory perception, apprehension, imaginalization, intellection, and intuition. Future medicine will consider the influence of spiritual factors (soul) in the form of human cognition and intention, as well as material effects (genes and biology). The seven medical domains of the future will encompass the field of 'sprito-epigenetico psycho-neuro-endocrino-immuno-pharmacology'. This perspective emphasizes the need for a transcendent outlook in health and medicine. This study employed a library research method, including studies in medical journals from the last forty years.

Time pressure increases children's aversion to advantageous inequity.

The relative contribution of intuitive and reflective cognitive systems in cooperative decision making is a topic of hot debate. Research with adults suggests that intuition often favors cooperation, but these effects are contextually sensitive. Emerging evidence has shown that in many contexts children show a tendency toward intuitive cooperation, but research investigating these processes in children is sparse and has produced mixed findings. In the current study we investigated the influence of intuitive and reflective decision processes on children's fairness behavior by manipulating decision time. We tested (N = 158) pairs of children between 4 and 10 years of age from a rural community in Canada. Children's decisions to accept or reject allocations of candies were either made under time pressure or after a 10-s delay. We assessed the impact of decision time on children's aversion to inequitable distributions of resources by comparing their responses to equal allocations with either disadvantageous allocations or advantageous allocations. We found that children showed a greater age-related increase in advantageous inequity aversion when decisions were made under time pressure compared to when they were made after a delay. In contrast, we did not observe a significant impact of decision time on the development of disadvantageous inequity aversion. These findings suggest that intuitive decision processes may contribute to the development of fairness concerns in middle childhood.

Fast & slow decisions under risk: Intuition rather than deliberation drives advantageous choices.

Would you take a gamble with a 10% chance to gain $100 and a 90% chance to lose $10? Even though this gamble has a positive expected value, most people would avoid taking it given the high chance of losing money. Popular "fast-and-slow" dual process theories of risky decision making assume that to take expected value into account and avoid a loss aversion bias, people need to deliberate. In this paper we directly test whether reasoners can also consider expected value benefit intuitively, in the absence of deliberation. To do so, we presented participants with bets and lotteries in which they could choose between a risky expected-value-based choice and a safe loss averse option. We used a two-response paradigm where participants made two choices in every trial: an initial intuitive choice under time-pressure and cognitive load and a final choice without constraints where they could freely deliberate. Results showed that in most trials participants were loss averse, both in the intuitive and deliberate stages. However, when people opted for the expected-value-based choice after deliberating, they had predominantly already arrived at this choice intuitively. Additionally, loss averse participants often showed an intuitive sensitivity to expected value (as reflected in decreased confidence). Overall, these results suggest that deliberation is not the primary route for expected-value-based responding in risky decision making. Risky decisions may be better conceptualized as an interplay between different types of "fast" intuitions rather than between two different types of "fast" and "slow" thinking per se.

Do we have (in)compatibilist intuitions? Surveying experimental research.

This article critically examines the experimental philosophy of free will, particularly the interplay between ordinary individuals' compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions. It explores key insights from research studies that propose "natural compatibilism" and "natural incompatibilism". These studies reveal a complex landscape of folk intuitions, where participants appear to exhibit both types of intuitions. Here, we examine error theories, which purport to explain the coexistence of apparently contradictory intuitions: the Affective Performance Error hypothesis, the "Free Will No Matter What" hypothesis, the Bypassing hypothesis, and the Intrusion hypothesis, and the article explores the cognitive errors that could shape individuals' inconsistent perceptions of free will. We then explore three possibilities regarding folk intuitions: most individuals may hold either compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions, both simultaneously, or neither. Our aim is to deepen the understanding of the complex dynamics of intuitions about free will, and we close with suggestions for future studies in experimental philosophy.

A stochastic world model on gravity for stability inference.

The fact that objects without proper support will fall to the ground is not only a natural phenomenon, but also common sense in mind. Previous studies suggest that humans may infer objects' stability through a world model that performs mental simulations with a priori knowledge of gravity acting upon the objects. Here we measured participants' sensitivity to gravity to investigate how the world model works. We found that the world model on gravity was not a faithful replica of the physical laws, but instead encoded gravity's vertical direction as a Gaussian distribution. The world model with this stochastic feature fit nicely with participants' subjective sense of objects' stability and explained the illusion that taller objects are perceived as more likely to fall. Furthermore, a computational model with reinforcement learning revealed that the stochastic characteristic likely originated from experience-dependent comparisons between predictions formed by internal simulations and the realities observed in the external world, which illustrated the ecological advantage of stochastic representation in balancing accuracy and speed for efficient stability inference. The stochastic world model on gravity provides an example of how a priori knowledge of the physical world is implemented in mind that helps humans operate flexibly in open-ended environments.

Social intuition: behavioral and neurobiological considerations.

Social intuition is instrumental in bringing about successful human interactions, yet its behavioral and neural underpinnings are still poorly understood. We focus in this article on the automatic, involuntary, nature of social intuition, rather than on higher-level cognitive and explicit Theory-of-Mind processes (which contribute to rendering social intuition meaningful in real-life situations). We argue that social-affective implicit learning plays a crucial role in establishing automatic social intuition. These implicit learning processes involve associations between the perception of other's bodily articulations, concurrent events, and the consequences or outcomes in terms of subsequent actions, affective valences and visceral states. The traditional non-social implicit learning paradigms do not allow one to draw conclusions about the role of implicit learning processes in social intuition, as they lack these vital characteristics typically associated with human actions. We introduce a new implicit learning paradigm, which aims to fill these gaps. It targets agile, rapid, social-affective learning processes, involving cue contingencies with a relatively simple structure, unlike the very complex structures that underpin the traditional tasks. The paradigm features matching social and non-social versions, allowing direct comparison. Preliminary data suggest equal performance of TD (typically-developed) and ASC (autism spectrum conditions) groups on the non-social version, but impaired implicit learning in ASC on the social version. We hypothesize that this reflects an anomalous use of implicitly learned affective information in ASC when judging other people. We further argue that the mirror neuron mechanism (MNM), which is part of the Action Observation Network, forms an integral part of the neural substrate for social intuition. In particular as there are indications that the MNM supports action anticipation, and that implicitly learned information can trigger MNM activation, which both seem vital to a social intuition ability. The insights that can be derived from comparing the performances of TD and ASC individuals on (non)social implicit learning tasks, and the implications for the role of MNM activation, are discussed.

Descartes on certainty in deduction.

This article examines how deduction preserves certainty and how much certainty it can preserve according to Descartes's Rules for the Direction of the Mind. I argue that the certainty of a deduction is a matter of four conditions for Descartes. First, certainty depends on whether the conjunction of simple propositions is composed with necessity or contingency. Second, a deduction approaches the certainty of an intuition depending on how many "acts of conceiving" it requires and-third-the complexity or difficulty of the acts of thinking, which is determined by the content of the thoughts and on external factors. Fourth, certainty depends on the intellectual aptitude of the person using the deduction. A deduction lacks certainty when it relies on memory such that it is not apprehended with immediacy. However, the mental capacity and speed of a mind can be increased by training the special mental faculties of perspicacity and discernment. Increasing one's intellectual aptitude allows for more steps of a deduction to be inferred in fewer acts of conceiving, thereby helping preserve the certainty of a deduction.

Worry as Important "Feelers" in Clinical Anesthesia Practice: A Mixed-Methods Study.

PURPOSE: Worry is an intuitive sense that goes beyond logical reasoning and is valuable in situations where patients' conditions are rapidly changing or when objective data may not fully capture the complexity of a patient's situation. Nurse anesthetists' subjective reasons for worry are quite vague as they are valued inconsistently and not accurately expressed. This study aimed to identify factors playing a role in the emergence of worry during anesthesia practice to clarify its concept. DESIGN: Mixed-methods design consisting of quantitative online surveys followed by qualitative focus group interviews including Dutch nurse anesthetists. METHODS: Both quantitative and qualitative thematic analyses were performed, followed by data and methodological triangulation to enhance the validity and credibility of findings and mitigate the presence of bias. FINDINGS: Surveys (N = 102) were analyzed, and 14 nurse anesthetists participated in the focus group interviews. A total of 89% of the survey respondents reported that at least once have had the feeling of worry, of which 92% use worry during clinical anesthesia practice. Worry was mentioned to be a vital element during anesthesia practice that makes it possible to take precautionary actions to change the anesthetic care plan in a changing situation or patient deterioration. CONCLUSIONS: While a clear definition of worry could not be given, it is a valuable element of anesthesia practice as it serves as a catalyst for critical thinking, problem-solving, clinical reasoning, and decision-making. Use of the feeling of worry alongside technological systems to make an informed decision is crucial. Technology has significantly improved the ability of health care providers to detect and respond to patient deterioration promptly, but it is crucial for nurse anesthetists to use their feeling of worry or intuition alongside technological systems and evidence-based practice to ensure quick assessments or judgments based on experience, knowledge, and observations in clinical practice.

More than meets the gut: a prototype analysis of the lay conceptions of intuition and analysis.

Using a prototype approach, we assessed people's lay conceptions of intuition and analysis. Open-ended descriptions of intuition and analysis were generated by participants (Study 1) and resulting exemplars were sorted into features subsequently rated in centrality by independent participants (Study 2). Feature centrality was validated by showing that participants were quicker and more accurate in classifying central (as compared to peripheral) features (Study 3). Centrality ratings suggested a single-factor structure describing analysis but revealed that participants held lay conceptions of intuition as involving two different types of processes: (1) as an automatic, affective, and non-logical processing, and (2) as a holistic processing that can assist in problem-solving. Additional analyses showed that the centrality ratings of intuition's facets were predicted by participants' self-reported intuitive style, suggesting intuition is differently perceived by intuitive and non-intuitive people. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of intuition and analysis.

Adieu Bias: Debiasing Intuitions Among French Speakers.

Recent debiasing studies have shown that a short, plain-English explanation of the correct solution strategy can improve reasoning performance. However, these studies have predominantly focused on English-speaking populations, who were tested with problem contents designed for an English-speaking test environment. Here we explore whether the key findings of previous debiasing studies can be extended to native French speakers living in continental Europe (France). We ran a training session with a battery of three reasoning tasks (i.e., base-rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and bat-and-ball) on 147 native French speakers. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants first gave an initial intuitive response, under time pressure and cognitive load, and then gave a final response after deliberation. Results showed a clear training effect, as early as the initial (intuitive) stage. Immediately after training, most participants solved the problems correctly, without the need for a deliberation process. The findings confirm that the intuitive debiasing training effect extends to native French speakers.

Does the Cognitive Reflection Test Work with Chinese College Students? Evidence from a Time-Limited Study.

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is an experiment task commonly used in Western countries to test intuitive and analytical thinking styles. However, the validity of this task for Chinese participants has not been explored. Therefore, this study recruited Chinese college students to finish CRT tasks with various experimental designs. To gauge the accuracy of the CRT tasks, 438 Chinese college students first completed online questionnaires. Participants were then invited to participate in an offline laboratory with the same experimental settings. Finally, time pressure was used to strictly control intuition and analytical thinking to explore the performance of Chinese college students on CRT tasks. The results show that of the three experiments, Chinese college students had the highest accuracy in the offline test, and the CRT's intuitive conflict problem still applies to Chinese students under the time-limited condition. This study demonstrates the validity of the CRT in China and proves that time pressure is an effective method for identifying individuals with strong logic ability.

The Evolution of the Optimization of Cognitive and Social Functions in the Cerebellum and Thereby the Rise of Homo sapiens Through Cumulative Culture.

The evolution of the prominent role of the cerebellum in the development of composite tools, and cumulative culture, leading to the rise of Homo sapiens is examined. Following Stout and Hecht's (2017) detailed description of stone-tool making, eight key repetitive involvements of the cerebellum are highlighted. These key cerebellar learning involvements include the following: (1) optimization of cognitive-social control, (2) prediction (3) focus of attention, (4) automaticity of smoothness, appropriateness, and speed of movement and cognition, (5) refined movement and social cognition, (6) learns models of extended practice, (7) learns models of Theory of Mind (ToM) of teachers, (8) is predominant in acquisition of novel behavior and cognition that accrues from the blending of cerebellar models sent to conscious working memory in the cerebral cortex. Within this context, the evolution of generalization and blending of cerebellar internal models toward optimization of social-cognitive learning is described. It is concluded that (1) repetition of movement and social cognition involving the optimization of internal models in the cerebellum during stone-tool making was the key selection factor toward social-cognitive and technological advancement, (2) observational learning during stone-tool making was the basis for both technological and social-cognitive evolution and, through an optimizing positive feedback loop between the cerebellum and cerebral cortex, the development of cumulative culture occurred, and (3) the generalization and blending of cerebellar internal models related to the unconscious forward control of the optimization of imagined future states in working memory was the most important brain adaptation leading to intertwined advances in stone-tool technology, cognitive-social processes behind cumulative culture (including the emergence of language and art) and, thereby, with the rise of Homo sapiens.

The police hunch: the Bayesian brain, active inference, and the free energy principle in action.

In the realm of law enforcement, the "police hunch" has long been a mysterious but crucial aspect of decision-making. Drawing on the developing framework of Active Inference from cognitive science, this theoretical article examines the genesis, mechanics, and implications of the police hunch. It argues that hunches - often vital in high-stakes situations - should not be described as mere intuitions, but as intricate products of our mind's generative models. These models, shaped by observations of the social world and assimilated and enacted through active inference, seek to reduce surprise and make hunches an indispensable tool for officers, in exactly the same way that hypotheses are indispensable for scientists. However, the predictive validity of hunches is influenced by a range of factors, including experience and bias, thus warranting critical examination of their reliability. This article not only explores the formation of police hunches but also provides practical insights for officers and researchers on how to harness the power of active inference to fully understand policing decisions and subsequently explore new avenues for future research.

Intuition and we-ness in Bion and post-Bionian field theory.

"Intuition" is probably the most frequently used term in all Bion's writings. However, in order to understand its role in his thought it is essential to give it the clearest possible definition. The thesis of this article is that by intuition Bion means a "specific" psychoanalytic concept. It is thus possible to extract intuition from the vague and mystifying reading of it by some authors, whic runs the risk of falling into an empty "intuitionism". For Bion, intuition is a psychoanalytic function of the analyst, the principal factors of which are the various expressions of dream-thought and insight. Furthermore, within the frame of the post-Bionian theory of the analytic field, the author suggests adding to these factors the use of the "we" vertex (or we-ness), i.e. to regard virtually every fact of analysis as co-created. The aim is to make the very concept of "field" more accessible. Compared with the metaphor of the analytic field, the concept of we-ness has both greater clinical versatility and greater pregnancy on the metapsychological plane. Indeed, it more directly reflects a radically social conception of human subjectivity: what is known in contemporary speculative thought - in J-L. Nancy, for example - as the "ontology of we".

At-one-ment and twoness are not opposites.

This paper explores how at-one-ment and twoness interact in the clinical setting. Namely, how the unconscious mode of knowing the other intuitively from the inside, by becoming at-one with them, interacts with the conscious-rational mode of knowing about the other from the outside; how experiencing the other's experience as one's own, rather than like one's own, informs (and is informed by) the common clinical stance of twoness, in which analyst and patient meet as separate persons. Through clinical illustrations, I argue that these are complementary (rather than contradictory) modes of knowing, communicating and being and that, paradoxically, twoness is essential for the emergence of at-one-ment, even though the latter is inadvertent.

How Intuitive Is the Administration of Pediatric Emergency Medication Devices for Parents? Objective Observation and Subjective Self-Assessment.

BACKGROUND: to assess the intuitiveness of parents' administration of pediatric emergency devices (inhalation, rectal, buccal, nasal, and auto-injector). METHODS: We invited parents without prior experience to administer the five devices to dummy dolls. We observed whether the parents chose the correct administration route and subsequently performed the correct administration procedures without clinically relevant errors. We interviewed parents for their self-assessment of their own administration performance and willingness to administer devices in actual emergencies. RESULTS: The correct administration route was best for the inhalation device (81/84, 96% of parents) and worst for the intranasal device (25/126, 20%). The correct administration procedures were best for the buccal device (63/98, 64%) and worst for the auto-injector device (0/93, 0%). Their own administration performance was rated to be best by parents for the inhalation device (59/84, 70%) and worst for the auto-injector device (17/93, 18%). The self-assessment of the correct administration overestimated the correct administration procedures for all the devices except the buccal one. Most parents were willing to administer the inhalation device in an emergency (67/94, 79%), while the fewest were willing to administration procedures the auto-injector device (28/93, 30%). CONCLUSIONS: Intuitiveness concerning the correct administration route and the subsequent correct administration procedures have to be improved for all the devices examined. The parents mostly overestimated their performance. Willingness to use a device in an actual emergency depended on the device.