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1.
Arch. Clin. Psychiatry (Impr.) ; Arch. Clin. Psychiatry (Impr.);42(3): 74-75, May-Jun/2015. tab
Artigo em Inglês, Português | LILACS | ID: lil-797118

RESUMO

Psychiatrists’ views on the mind-brain relationship (MBR) have marked clinical and research implications, but there is a lack of studies on this topic. Objectives: To evaluate psychiatrists’ opinions on the MBR, and whether they are amenable to change or not. Methods: We conducted a survey of psychiatrists’ views on the MBR just before and after a debate on the MBR at the Brazilian Congress of Psychiatry in 2014. Results: Initially, from more than 600 participants, 53% endorsed the view that “the mind (your “I”) is a product of brain activity”, while 47% disagreed. Moreover, 72% contested the view that “the universe is composed only of matter”. After the debate, 30% changed from a materialist to a non-materialist view of mind, while 17% changed in the opposite way. Discussion: Psychiatrists are interested in debates on the MBR, do not hold a monolithic view on the subject and their positions are open to reflection and change, suggesting the need for more in-depth studies and rigorous but open-minded debates on the subject...


Psychiatrists’ views on the mind-brain relationship (MBR) have marked clinical and research implications, but there is a lack of studies on this topic. Objectives: To evaluate psychiatrists’ opinions on the MBR, and whether they are amenable to change or not. Methods: We conducted a survey of psychiatrists’ views on the MBR just before and after a debate on the MBR at the Brazilian Congress of Psychiatry in 2014. Results: Initially, from more than 600 participants, 53% endorsed the view that “the mind (your “I”) is a product of brain activity”, while 47% disagreed. Moreover, 72% contested the view that “the universe is composed only of matter”. After the debate, 30% changed from a materialist to a non-materialist view of mind, while 17% changed in the opposite way. Discussion: Psychiatrists are interested in debates on the MBR, do not hold a monolithic view on the subject and their positions are open to reflection and change, suggesting the need for more in-depth studies and rigorous but open-minded debates on the subject...


Assuntos
Humanos , Brasil , Conhecimento , Psiquiatria , Inquéritos e Questionários
2.
Explore (NY) ; 10(5): 300-8, 2014.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-25103071

RESUMO

CONTEXT: The study of mediumship is important because if mediumistic abilities were real, they would provide empirical support for non-reductionist theories of the mind, thus having major implications to our understanding of the mind-brain relationship. This study investigated the alleged mediumship of Chico Xavier, a very prolific and influential "medium" in Brazil. OBJECTIVE: To investigate the accuracy of the information conveyed in Xavier's "psychographed" letters (i.e., letters allegedly authored by a deceased personality) and to explore the possible explanations for it. METHOD: After a systematic search for Xavier's psychographed letters, we selected one set of 13 letters allegedly written by a same spiritual author (J.P.). The letters were initially screened for the identification of items of information that were objectively verifiable. The accuracy of the information conveyed by these items and the estimated likelihood of the Xavier's access to the information via ordinary means were rated using Fit and Leak scales based on documents and interviews carried out with the sister and friends of J.P. RESULTS: We identified 99 items of verifiable information conveyed in these 13 letters; 98% of these items were rated as "Clear and Precise Fit" and no item was rated as "no Fit." We concluded that ordinary explanations for accuracy of the information (i.e., fraud, chance, information leakage, and cold reading) were only remotely plausible. These results seem to provide empirical support for non-reductionist theories of consciousness.


Assuntos
Luto , Estado de Consciência , Correspondência como Assunto , Relações Metafísicas Mente-Corpo , Redação , Brasil , Comunicação , Humanos
3.
Dement. neuropsychol ; 5(4): 242-250, dez. 2011.
Artigo em Inglês | LILACS | ID: lil-612054

RESUMO

Modern science has undermined belief in countless imaginary causalities. What is the nature of the relation between mind and brain? Philosophers have debated the issue for millennia, but it is only in the last twenty years that empirical evidence has begun to uncover some of the secrets of this ancient riddle. This lecture explores the possiblity that advances in neuroscience will undermine and subvert our intuitive, mentalist understanding of the mind-body relationship. Recent findings in neuroscience seem to support the notions that (i) mental events are a subclass of neurophysiological events, and (ii) they are devoid of causal efficacy upon the workings of the brain. If physicalism is true then the belief in the causal potency of conscious thoughts and free will are bound to join company with countless other imaginary causalities exploded by the progress of science.


A ciência moderna tem minado a crença em inúmeras causalidades imaginárias. Qual é a natureza da relação entre mente e cérebro? Filósofos têm debatido a questão por milênios, mas apenas nos últimos 20 anos a evidência empírica começou a descobrir alguns dos segredos deste antigo enigma. Esta palestra explora a possibilidade de que os avanços na neurociência vão corroer e subverter a nossa compreensão intuitiva e mentalista da relação mente-corpo. Descobertas recentes da neurociência parecem apoiar as noções de que (i) os eventos mentais são uma subclasse de eventos neurofisiológicos, e (ii) que são desprovidos de eficácia causal sobre o funcionamento do cérebro. Se o fisicalismo é verdade, então as crenças na potência causal de pensamentos conscientes e no livre arbítrio estão destinadas a fazer companhia a inúmeras outras causalidades imaginárias que foram destruídas pelo progresso da ciência.


Assuntos
Humanos , Psicofisiologia , Cérebro , Teoria da Mente
4.
Dement Neuropsychol ; 5(4): 242-250, 2011.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-29213751

RESUMO

Modern science has undermined belief in countless imaginary causalities. What is the nature of the relation between mind and brain? Philosophers have debated the issue for millennia, but it is only in the last twenty years that empirical evidence has begun to uncover some of the secrets of this ancient riddle. This lecture explores the possiblity that advances in neuroscience will undermine and subvert our intuitive, mentalist understanding of the mind-body relationship. Recent findings in neuroscience seem to support the notions that (i) mental events are a subclass of neurophysiological events, and (ii) they are devoid of causal efficacy upon the workings of the brain. If physicalism is true then the belief in the causal potency of conscious thoughts and free will are bound to join company with countless other imaginary causalities exploded by the progress of science.


A ciência moderna tem minado a crença em inúmeras causalidades imaginárias. Qual é a natureza da relação entre mente e cérebro? Filósofos têm debatido a questão por milênios, mas apenas nos últimos 20 anos a evidência empírica começou a descobrir alguns dos segredos deste antigo enigma. Esta palestra explora a possibilidade de que os avanços na neurociência vão corroer e subverter a nossa compreensão intuitiva e mentalista da relação mente-corpo. Descobertas recentes da neurociência parecem apoiar as noções de que (i) os eventos mentais são uma subclasse de eventos neurofisiológicos, e (ii) que são desprovidos de eficácia causal sobre o funcionamento do cérebro. Se o fisicalismo é verdade, então as crenças na potência causal de pensamentos conscientes e no livre arbítrio estão destinadas a fazer companhia a inúmeras outras causalidades imaginárias que foram destruídas pelo progresso da ciência.

5.
Psicol. reflex. crit ; 24(4): 798-809, 2011. ilus, tab
Artigo em Português | LILACS | ID: lil-611126

RESUMO

Muitos dos conceitos existentes na neurociência moderna possuem suas origens nas especulações elaboradas pelos antigos filósofos e médicos gregos. Questões centrais sobre a fonte dos pensamentos humanos, o mecanismo da atividade cognitiva, e a natureza das emoções, percepção e movimento voluntário, por exemplo, foram levantadas pelos pensadores gregos. É a partir desta civilização que surgem as observações mais sistemáticas sobre a estrutura e o funcionamento do corpo, da mente e a relação entre estas duas entidades. Assim, o presente trabalho pretende observar as principais tentativas iniciais gregas em vincular estruturas do corpo (tais como o cérebro ou o coração) e atividades mentais, ao longo das diversas especulações gregas sobre a natureza, a filosofia, a psicologia e a medicina.


Many of the existing concepts in modern neuroscience have their origins in the speculations made by ancient Greek philosophers and physicians. Core questions about the source of human thought, the mechanism of cognitive activity as well as the nature of emotions, perceptions and voluntary movements, for example, were raised by Greek thinkers. It is from this civilization that arise more systematic observations on the structure and functioning of body, mind and relationship between these two entities. The present paper intends to adhere to the first Greek attempts to link structures of the body (such as the brain or the heart) and mental activities regarding various Greek speculations about the nature, philosophy, psychology and medicine.


Assuntos
Mundo Grego/história , Neurociências/história , Psicofisiologia/história
6.
Psicol. reflex. crit ; 24(4): 798-809, 2011. ilus, tab
Artigo em Português | Index Psicologia - Periódicos | ID: psi-52076

RESUMO

Muitos dos conceitos existentes na neurociência moderna possuem suas origens nas especulações elaboradas pelos antigos filósofos e médicos gregos. Questões centrais sobre a fonte dos pensamentos humanos, o mecanismo da atividade cognitiva, e a natureza das emoções, percepção e movimento voluntário, por exemplo, foram levantadas pelos pensadores gregos. É a partir desta civilização que surgem as observações mais sistemáticas sobre a estrutura e o funcionamento do corpo, da mente e a relação entre estas duas entidades. Assim, o presente trabalho pretende observar as principais tentativas iniciais gregas em vincular estruturas do corpo (tais como o cérebro ou o coração) e atividades mentais, ao longo das diversas especulações gregas sobre a natureza, a filosofia, a psicologia e a medicina.(AU)


Many of the existing concepts in modern neuroscience have their origins in the speculations made by ancient Greek philosophers and physicians. Core questions about the source of human thought, the mechanism of cognitive activity as well as the nature of emotions, perceptions and voluntary movements, for example, were raised by Greek thinkers. It is from this civilization that arise more systematic observations on the structure and functioning of body, mind and relationship between these two entities. The present paper intends to adhere to the first Greek attempts to link structures of the body (such as the brain or the heart) and mental activities regarding various Greek speculations about the nature, philosophy, psychology and medicine.(AU)


Assuntos
Psicofisiologia/história , Neurociências/história , Mundo Grego/história
7.
Vertex rev. argent. psiquiatr ; Vertex Rev. Argent. Psiquiatr. (En línea);19(78): 57-64, mar.-abr. 2008. ilus
Artigo em Espanhol | LILACS | ID: lil-539672

RESUMO

El presente trabajo explora, a partir de las ideas de Daniel Dennett y Douglas Hofstadter, qué es el Yo, qué es la conciencia y qué vínculo mantienen ambos con el cerebro. El punto central es cuáles son las ilusiones del Yo y de la conciencia, cómo llegan a producirse y cuáles son los ejes para comprender nuestra habitual resistencia a desarmarlas. El Yo es considerado un mito poderoso aunque, a la vez, desde una perspectiva funcionalista, una herramienta indispensable en nuestra vida cotidiana y en nuestras explicaciones acerca de nosotros mismos y los otros.


Departing from Daniel Dennett's and Douglas Hofstadter's ideas, the present paper explores what the self and consciousness are and puts forward a possible explanation of their relationship with the brain. The paper deconstructs the illusions of my self and those of my consciousness, how they are produced and which the key elements to understand our reluctance to see ourselves as brains are. The self is considered a powerful myth but, at the same time, from a functionalist perspective, also an indispensable device in our daily life and in our explanations about others and about ourselves.


Assuntos
Humanos , Cérebro , Ego , Estado de Consciência , Filosofia , Ilusões
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