Increasing Access to Buprenorphine for Opioid Use Disorder in Primary Care: an Assessment of Provider Incentives.

BACKGROUND: Primary care providers (PCPs) are essential to increasing access to office-based buprenorphine medication treatment for opioid use disorder (B-MOUD). Barriers to B-MOUD prescribing are well-documented, but there is little information regarding incentives to overcome these barriers. OBJECTIVE: To identify optimal incentives for PCPs to promote B-MOUD prescribing and compare incentive preferences across provider and practice characteristics. DESIGN: We surveyed PCPs using best-worst scaling (BWS) to prioritize seven potential incentives for B-MOUD prescribing (monetary compensation, paid vacation, protected time, professional development, reduced workload, service recognition, clinical resources). We then used a direct elicitation approach to determine preferred incentive levels (e.g., monetary thresholds) and types (e.g., specific clinical resources). PARTICIPANTS: Primary care physicians and advanced practice providers (APPs) at a large Department of Veterans Affairs healthcare system. MAIN MEASURES: B-MOUD prescribing incentive preferences and relative preference levels using descriptive statistics and conditional logistic regression with relative importance scale transformation (coefficients sum to 100, higher coefficient=greater importance). KEY RESULTS: Fifty-three PCPs responded (73% response), including 47% APPs and 36% from community-based clinics. Reduced workload (relative importance score=26.8), protected time (18.7), and clinical resources (16.8) were significantly more preferred (Ps < 0.001) than professional development (10.5), paid vacation (10.3), or service recognition (1.5). Relative importance of monetary compensation varied between physicians (12.6) and APPs (17.5) and between PCPs located at a medical center (11.4) versus community clinic (22.3). APPs were more responsive than physicians to compensation increases of $5000 and $12,000 but less responsive to $25,000; trends were similar for medical center versus community clinic PCPs. The most frequently requested clinical resource was on-demand consult access to an addiction specialist. CONCLUSIONS: Interventions promoting workload reductions, protected time, and clinical resources could increase access to B-MOUD in primary care. Monetary incentives may be additionally needed to improve B-MOUD prescribing among APPs and within community clinics.

A demand-smoothing incentive for cesarean deliveries.

We study the demand-smoothing incentives for private hospitals to perform c-sections. First, we show that a policy change in Chile that increased delivery at private hospitals by reducing the out-of-pocket cost for women with public insurance increased the probability of a c-section by 8.6 percentage points despite private hospitals receiving the same price for a vaginal or cesarean delivery. Second, to understand hospitals' incentives to perform c-sections, we present a model of hospital decisions about the mode of delivery without price incentives. The model predicts that, because c-sections can be scheduled, a higher c-section rate increases total deliveries, compensating the forgone higher margin of vaginal deliveries. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with the demand-smoothing mechanism: hospitals with higher c-section rates are more likely to reschedule deliveries when they expect a high-demand week.

Examining the Effectiveness of Provider Incentives to Increase CRC Screening Uptake in Neighborhood Healthcare: A California Federally Qualified Health Center.

As an awardee of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Colorectal Cancer Control Program, the California Department of Public Health partnered with Neighborhood Healthcare to implement evidence-based interventions and provider incentives (incentives offered to support staff, e.g., medical assistants, phlebotomists, front office staff, lab technicians) to improve colorectal cancer screening uptake. The objective of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness and cost of the provider incentive intervention implemented by Neighborhood Healthcare to increase colorectal cancer screening uptake. We collected and analyzed process and cost data to assess fecal immunochemical test (FIT) kit return rates to the health centers and the number of completed FIT kits. We estimated the costs of the preexisting interventions and the new interventions. Analyses were conducted for two time periods: preimplementation and implementation. Most Neighborhood Healthcare health centers experienced an increase in the percentage of FIT kit returns (average of 3.6 percentage points) and individuals screened (an average increase of 111 FIT kits per month) from the baseline period through the implementation period. The cost of the incentive intervention for each additional screen was $66.79. In conclusion, the results indicate that incentive programs can have an overall positive impact on both the percentage of FIT kits returned and the number of individuals screened.

Provider responses to a global budgeting system: The case of drug expenditures in Taiwan hospitals.

In July 2002, a global budgeting system was imposed on hospitals in Taiwan. This system set a fixed budget for all hospitals within a region but included special provisions that sheltered reimbursements for drug expenditures. We study the size and nature of changes in hospital physicians' use of drugs for outpatient care following this budgetary change and find that drug expenditures for outpatient care increased by 11.7%. Our results suggest that physicians began prescribing more expensive drugs, more drugs, and drugs for longer periods but that these different responses did not all occur at the same time. The overall response was strongest in for-profit hospitals, but drug-related decisions changed in all hospital types.

Payment Reform and Health Disparities: Changes in Dialysis Modality under the New Medicare Dialysis Payment System.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the effect of the Medicare dialysis payment reform on potential disparities in the selection of peritoneal dialysis (PD) for the treatment of end-stage renal disease (ESRD). DATA SOURCES: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) ESRD Medical Evidence Form, Medicare claims, and other CMS data for 2008-2013. STUDY DESIGN: We examined the association of patient age, race/ethnicity, urban/rural location, pre-ESRD care, comorbidities, insurance, and other factors with the selection of PD as initial dialysis modality across prereform (2008-2009), interim (2010), and postreform (2011-2013) time periods. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Selection of PD increased among diverse patient subgroups following the payment reform. However, the lower PD selection observed with older age, black race, Hispanic ethnicity, less pre-ESRD care, and Medicaid insurance before the reform largely remained in the initial postreform years. CONCLUSIONS: Despite recent growth in PD, there may be ongoing disparities in access to PD that have largely not been mitigated by the payment reform. There is potential for modifying provider financial incentives to achieve policy goals related to cost and quality of care. However, even with a substantial shift in financial incentives, separate initiatives to reduce existing disparities in care may be needed.

Performance-based financing to increase utilization of maternal health services: Evidence from Burkina Faso.

Performance-based financing (PBF) programs are increasingly implemented in low and middle-income countries to improve health service quality and utilization. In April 2011, a PBF pilot program was launched in Boulsa, Leo and Titao districts in Burkina Faso with the objective of increasing the provision and quality of maternal health services. We evaluate the impact of this program using facility-level administrative data from the national health management information system (HMIS). Primary outcomes were the number of antenatal care visits, the proportion of antenatal care visits that occurred during the first trimester of pregnancy, the number of institutional deliveries and the number of postnatal care visits. To assess program impact we use a difference-in-differences approach, comparing changes in health service provision post-introduction with changes in matched comparison areas. All models were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with standard errors clustered at the facility level. On average, PBF facilities had 2.3 more antenatal care visits (95% CI [0.446-4.225]), 2.1 more deliveries (95% CI [0.034-4.069]) and 9.5 more postnatal care visits (95% CI [6.099, 12.903]) each month after the introduction of PBF. Compared to the service provision levels prior to the interventions, this implies a relative increase of 27.7 percent for ANC, of 9.2 percent for deliveries, and of 118.7 percent for postnatal care. Given the positive results observed during the pre-pilot period and the limited resources available in the health sector, the PBF program in Burkina Faso may be a low-cost, high impact intervention to improve maternal and child health.

Does health insurance improve health?: Evidence from a randomized community-based insurance rollout in rural Burkina Faso.

From 2004 to 2006, a community-based health insurance (CBI) scheme was rolled out in Nouna District, Burkina Faso, with the objective of improving access to health services and population health. We explore the random timing of the insurance rollout generated by the stepped wedge cluster-randomized design to evaluate the welfare and health impact of the insurance program. Our results suggest that the insurance had limited effects on average out-of-pocket expenditures in the target areas, but substantially reduced the likelihood of catastrophic health expenditure. The introduction of the insurance scheme did not have any effect on health outcomes for children and young adults, but appears to have increased mortality among individuals aged 65 and older. The negative health effects of the program appear to be primarily driven by the adverse provider incentives generated by the scheme and the resulting decline in the quality of care received by patients.