Applying process dissociation to self-sacrificial moral dilemmas: Extending the dual-process model.

There is considerable evidence linking cognitive reflection with utilitarian judgments in dilemmas that involve sacrificing someone else for the greater good. However, the evidence is mixed on the question of whether cognitive reflection is associated with utilitarian judgments in self-sacrificial dilemmas. We employed process dissociation to extract a self-sacrificial utilitarian (SU) parameter, an altruism (A) parameter, an other-sacrificial (OU) utilitarian parameter, and a deontology (D) parameter. In Study 1, the cognitive reflection test (CRT) positively correlated with both SU and OU (replicated in Studies 2 and 4, pre-registered). In Study 2, we found that instructing participants to rely on reason increased SU and OU (replicated in Study 4, pre-registered). In Study 3, we found that SU and OU positively correlated with giving in the single-game version of the public goods game (replicated in Study 4, pre-registered), which provides behavioral validation that they are genuine moral tendencies. Together, these studies constitute strong cumulative evidence that SU and OU are both valid measures that are associated with reliance on cognitive reflection.

Caring for people with disability and human growth: evolutionary perspectives and contribution to psychological wellbeing.

From an evolutionary point of view, organisms with mutations resulting in maladaptation are an unavoidable result of genetic variability, and they do not usually survive natural selection. Thus, they do not produce benefits for the species. I contend that this is different in humans at two levels. First, the existence of people with disability has been essential for human growth as a species. Human ancestors' evolving cognitive and social abilities were boosted by caring for vulnerable members of the species, including premature offspring and people with disability. Therefore, caregiving was an essential trait of the evolution of humans, intertwined with the development of bipedalism, the hand, face, vocal apparatus, and brain. Second, caring for disability is also a source of growth at a personal level. Even though most scientific literature focuses on the stress and burden caused by caring for people with disability, there is solid evidence to accept caregiving as a source of happiness and flourishing for human beings. Hence, disability still has an essential role in improving human life nowadays. Contrary to this evidence, influential utilitarian bioethicists promote the elimination of disability from modern societies. Following the arguments presented here, this will lead to the withering of society. In conclusion, disability should be acknowledged as an essential source of growth for the human species.

Effects of Sadness and Fear on Moral Judgments in Public Emergency Events.

With the rapid development of society and the deteriorating natural environment, there has been an increase in public emergencies. This study aimed to explore how sadness and fear in the context of public emergencies influence moral judgments. This research first induced feelings of sadness and fear by using videos about public emergencies and music, and then used moral scenarios from the CNI model (C parameter: sensitivity to consequences; N parameter: sensitivity to norms; I parameter: general preference for inaction) to assess participants' moral thinking. In Study 1, participants were divided into a sadness group and a neutral group, while in Study 2, participants were divided into a fear group and a neutral group. During the experiment, participants were exposed to different videos related to public emergencies to induce the corresponding emotions, and emotional music was continuously played throughout the entire experiment. Participants were then asked to answer questions requiring moral judgments. The results showed that based on the CNI model, sadness induced in the context of public emergencies significantly increased the C parameter, without affecting the N or I parameters. Fear increased the I parameter, without affecting the C or I parameters. That is, sadness and fear induced in the context of a public emergency can influence moral judgments. Specifically, sadness increases individuals' sensitivity to consequences and fear increases the general preference for inaction in moral judgments.

When You Think of and Identify Yourself as a Nurse, You Will Become More Deontological and Less Utilitarian.

This study aims to examine how the activation of the role of nursee and professional identification as a nurse can influence moral judgments in terms of deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In Study 1, a priming technique was used to assess the impact of activating the nursing concept on moral reasoning. Participants were randomly assigned to either a nursing prime or neutral prime condition. By using a scrambled-sentence task, participants were prompted to think about nursing-related or neutral thoughts. Following the priming task, participants were asked to respond to 20 moral dilemmas. The process dissociation approach was employed to measure the degree of deontological and utilitarian tendencies in their moral reasoning. In Study 2, participants completed the nursing profession identification scale and the moral orientation scale before engaging in moral judgments similar to those in Study 1. The findings revealed that priming the concept of being a nursee resulted in an increase in deontological clinical inclinations while having no significant effect on utilitarian inclinations. Additionally, a positive correlation was observed between identification with the nursing profession and deontological clinical inclinations, whereas a negative correlation was found with utilitarian inclinations. Deliberation orientation acted as a complete mediator in the relationship between nursing professional identification and deontological tendencies and as a partial mediator for utilitarian tendencies.

Neural Reward Representations Enable Utilitarian Welfare Maximization.

From deciding which meal to prepare for our guests to trading off the proenvironmental effects of climate protection measures against their economic costs, we often must consider the consequences of our actions for the well-being of others (welfare). Vexingly, the tastes and views of others can vary widely. To maximize welfare according to the utilitarian philosophical tradition, decision-makers facing conflicting preferences of others should choose the option that maximizes the sum of the subjective value (utility) of the entire group. This notion requires comparing the intensities of preferences across individuals. However, it remains unclear whether such comparisons are possible at all and (if they are possible) how they might be implemented in the brain. Here, we show that female and male participants can both learn the preferences of others by observing their choices and represent these preferences on a common scale to make utilitarian welfare decisions. On the neural level, multivariate support vector regressions revealed that a distributed activity pattern in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a brain region previously associated with reward processing, represented the preference strength of others. Strikingly, also the utilitarian welfare of others was represented in the VMPFC and relied on the same neural code as the estimated preferences of others. Together, our findings reveal that humans can behave as if they maximized utilitarian welfare using a specific utility representation and that the brain enables such choices by repurposing neural machinery processing the reward others receive.

The optimal design of assisted reproductive technologies policies.

This paper studies the optimal fiscal treatment of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in an economy where individuals differ in their reproductive capacity (or fecundity) and in their wage. We find that the optimal ART tax policy varies with the postulated social welfare criterion. Utilitarianism redistributes only between individuals with unequal fecundity and wages but not between parents and childless individuals. To the opposite, ex post egalitarianism (which gives absolute priority to the worst-off in realized terms) redistributes from individuals with children toward those without children, and from individuals with high fecundity toward those with low fecundity, so as to compensate for both the monetary cost of ART and the disutility from involuntary childlessness resulting from unsuccessful ART investments. Under asymmetric information and in order to solve for the incentive problem, utilitarianism recommends to either tax or subsidize ART investments of low-fecundity-low-productivity individuals at the margin, depending on the degree of complementarity between fecundity and ART in the fertility technology. On the opposite, ex post egalitarianism always recommends marginal taxation of ART.

Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT: How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

The "Bystander at the Switch" Revisited? Ethical Implications of the Government Strategies Against COVID-19.

Suppose COVID-19 is the runaway tram in the famous moral thought experiment, known as the "Bystander at the Switch." Consider the two differentiated responses of governments around the world to this new threat, namely the option of quarantine/lockdown and herd immunity. Can we contrast the hypothetical with the real scenario? What do the institutional decisions and strategies for dealing with the virus, in the beginning of 2020, signify in a normative moral framework? This paper investigates these possibilities in order to highlight the similarities and, more importantly, the differences that exist between utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Analysis shows that the hypothetical scenario can never be fully compared to the complex multifactorial nature of the real world. But if a comparison is attempted, the most obvious difference between the two governmental strategies is the concept of duty within the Kantian perspective. Ultimately, it is a matter of comparing freedom and life. Attributing a moral "priority ticket" to one or the other can be analysed through interpersonal aggregation.

Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status.

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.

Ethics in placebo-controlled, acute treatment trials in schizophrenia: Two rival ethical frameworks.

Placebo-controlled, acute treatment trials in schizophrenia enroll acutely symptomatic persons, randomize them to receive placebo or antipsychotic medication for several weeks, and evaluate whether symptoms improve. These trials can have scientific benefits, especially when they test drugs with novel mechanisms of action. However, the use of placebo is ethically problematic inasmuch as standard treatment is withheld and participants are subjected to prolonged psychotic symptoms and associated risks. We propose that both deontological (duty-based) and utilitarian analyses are relevant, that it may be impossible to satisfy the ideals of both frameworks, and that researchers who conduct these trials will unavoidably encounter ethical tension and criticism even when they give careful attention to ethical aspects of study design.

Confessions of an Antinatalist Philosopher.

Antinatalism assigns reproduction a negative value. There should be fewer or no births. Those who say that there should be fewer births have been called conditional antinatalists. A better name for their view would be selective pronatalism. Those who say that there should be no births face two challenges. They must define the scope of their no-birth policy. Does it apply only to human or sentient beings or can it also be extended to all organic life, perhaps even to machine consciousness? And whatever the scope, they have to justify the eventual extinction of humankind or other life forms, an inevitable consequence of unconditional antinatalism. Different axiologies and moral theories produce different responses to these challenges. It is argued that a two-value conflict-sensitive negative utilitarianism would produce a kind and reasonable justification for ending at least human and factory-animal reproduction. The conclusion is purely moral and supports only voluntary extinction for humankind.

Exit Duty Generator.

This article presents a revised version of negative utilitarianism. Previous versions have relied on a hedonistic theory of value and stated that suffering should be minimized. The traditional rebuttal is that the doctrine in this form morally requires us to end all sentient life. To avoid this, a need-based theory of value is introduced. The frustration of the needs not to suffer and not to have one's autonomy dwarfed should, prima facie, be decreased. When decreasing the need frustration of some would increase the need frustration of others, the case is deferred and a fuller ethical analysis is conducted. The author's perceptions on murder, extinction, the right to die, antinatalism, veganism, and abortion are used to reach a reflective equilibrium. The new theory is then applied to consumerism, material growth, and power relations. The main finding is that the burden of proof should be on those who promote the status quo.

You're heartless, I'm less: self-image and social norms in moral judgment.

Are moral judgments to sacrificial dilemmas shaped by a latent social norm? The present research addresses this issue. We report a set of six studies (plus a supplementary one) which question the existence of a social norm in the longstanding deontism/utilitarian debate by relying on two original tools, namely substitution technique and self-presentation paradigm. Study 1 showed that American participants asked to answer like most Americans would do gave more utilitarian responses than control participants who answered in their own name (Study 1). Study 2 showed that participants instructed to answer in a disapproval fashion were more utilitarian than both participants instructed to answer in an approval fashion and control participants. Importantly, no difference was observed between the approval and control conditions, suggesting that participants naturally align their moral judgments with a latent norm they think is the most socially desirable. Studies 3-5 explored in addition the effect of the activation of a deontism-skewed norm using the substitution instruction on subsequent impression formation. For the latter task, participants were instructed to evaluate a random participant selected from a previous study who gave utilitarian-like responses (Studies 3a-3b), or to evaluate a fictitious politician who endorsed either a deontic or utilitarian orientation (Studies 4-5). Although we consistently replicated the effect of substitution instruction, we failed to show that attempts to activate a norm in a given individual shaped their evaluation of other people who do not align with this norm. Finally, we report a mini meta-analysis targeting the pooled effect and homogeneity among our studies.

Efficiency or equality? The utilitarianism-egalitarianism trade-off determines carbon allocation preference.

International carbon allocation confronts the conflict between efficiency and equality. Previous research based on the intergroup bias perspective has attributed carbon allocation preference to the defence of ingroup interests (i.e., national interests) while overlooking the critical role of trade-offs between competing moral values. Integrating the contingency theory of justice and moral philosophical theories of utilitarianism and egalitarianism, we proposed that the moral-values trade-off between utilitarianism and egalitarianism determines carbon allocation preference through justice reasoning. Analysis of large-scale survey datasets (Study 1) revealed that aggregated national endorsement of utilitarianism over egalitarianism predicted greater efficiency preference in total and per capita carbon emission levels. Study 2 demonstrated that experimentally manipulating endorsement of utilitarianism versus egalitarianism boosted efficiency (vs. equality) preference in carbon allocation, and justice reasoning characterized by enhanced efficiency-focused justice and diminished equality-focused justice accounted for these effects. Using a 'manipulation-of-mediator' design, Study 3 further confirmed the causal link in the mediation model. By highlighting the significance of moral trade-offs in shaping carbon allocation preference, this research not only provides a novel moral perspective in understanding debates on international carbon allocation but also has important implications for fostering international carbon abatement cooperation.

Ethical Reflection on the Distribution of Medical Resources in Public Health Emergency / 中国医学伦理学

How medical resources can be fairly distributed in a public health emergency such as COVID-19. There have been mature or comparatively mature studies on this issue in both traditional ethics and contemporary ethics: the traditional ethics has the "maximum happiness principle" represented by utilitarianism, while the contemporary ethics has the new principle doctrine and the medical justice theory, which respectively put forward the methods suitable for the distribution of emergency medical resources, and defended their respective theories from different perspectives. However, when COVID-19 broke out, the actual medical resource distribution methods were still the traditional medical resource distribution methods, but did not use the contemporary mainstream ethical medical distribution approach, which was due to the limitations of the emerging medical ethics distribution theory. Therefore, in order to better provide ethical services to the medical and health field, the contemporary emerging theory of distribution of health care needs to introduce global bioethics, with its tolerance and respect, give full play to its advantages, and improve its shortcomings, so as to solve the problem of medical resources distribution.

Exploring moral algorithm preferences in autonomous vehicle dilemmas: an empirical study.

Introduction: This study delves into the ethical dimensions surrounding autonomous vehicles (AVs), with a specific focus on decision-making algorithms. Termed the "Trolley problem," an ethical quandary arises, necessitating the formulation of moral algorithms grounded in ethical principles. To address this issue, an online survey was conducted with 460 participants in China, comprising 237 females and 223 males, spanning ages 18 to 70. Methods: Adapted from Joshua Greene's trolley dilemma survey, our study employed Yes/No options to probe participants' choices and Likert scales to gauge moral acceptance. The primary objective was to assess participants' inclinations toward four distinct algorithmic strategies-Utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, Egoism, and a Hybrid approach-in scenarios involving AVs. Results: Our findings revealed a significant disparity between participants' preferences in scenarios related to AV design and those focused on purchase decisions. Notably, over half of the respondents expressed reluctance to purchase AVs equipped with an "egoism" algorithm, which prioritizes the car owner's safety. Intriguingly, the rejection rate for "egoism" was similar to that of "utilitarianism," which may necessitate self-sacrifice. Discussion: The hybrid approach, integrating "Utilitarianism" and "Egoism," garnered the highest endorsement. This highlights the importance of balancing self-sacrifice and harm minimization in AV moral algorithms. The study's insights are crucial for ethically and practically advancing AV technology in the continually evolving realm of autonomous vehicles.

Foundations of utilitarianism under risk and variable population.

Utilitarianism is the most prominent social welfare function in economics. We present three new axiomatic characterizations of utilitarian (that is, additively-separable) social welfare functions in a setting where there is risk over both population size and individuals' welfares. We first show that, given uncontroversial basic axioms, Blackorby et al.'s (1998) Expected Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarianism is equivalent to a new axiom holding that it is better to allocate higher utility-conditional-on-existence to possible people who have a higher probability of existence. The other two characterizations extend and clarify classic axiomatizations of utilitarianism from settings with either social risk or variable-population, considered alone.

Vaccine Nationalism Counterintuitively Erodes Public Trust in Leaders.

Global access to resources like vaccines is key for containing the spread of infectious diseases. However, wealthy countries often pursue nationalistic policies, stockpiling doses rather than redistributing them globally. One possible motivation behind vaccine nationalism is a belief among policymakers that citizens will mistrust leaders who prioritize global needs over domestic protection. In seven experiments (total N = 4,215 adults), we demonstrate that such concerns are misplaced: Nationally representative samples across multiple countries with large vaccine surpluses (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and United States) trusted redistributive leaders more than nationalistic leaders-even the more nationalistic participants. This preference generalized across different diseases and manifested in both self-reported and behavioral measures of trust. Professional civil servants, however, had the opposite intuition and predicted higher trust in nationalistic leaders, and a nonexpert sample also failed to predict higher trust in redistributive leaders. We discuss how policymakers' inaccurate intuitions might originate from overestimating others' self-interest.

Moral characteristics predicting COVID-19 vaccination.

OBJECTIVE: The current study aims to assess, for the first time, whether vaccination is predicted by different behavioral and cognitive aspects of moral decision-making. BACKGROUND: Studies linking moral factors to vaccination have largely examined whether vaccination decisions can be explained by individual differences in the endorsement of various principles and norms central to deontology-based arguments in vaccination ethics. However, these studies have overlooked whether individuals prioritize norms over other considerations when making decisions, such as maximizing consequences (utilitarianism). METHOD: In a sample of 1492 participants, the current study assessed whether vaccination is explained by individual differences in three aspects of moral decision-making (consequence sensitivity, norm sensitivity, and action tendency), while also considering ethics position (idealism, relativism) and moral identity. RESULTS: Supportive vaccination (vaccine uptake accompanied by a positive attitude toward vaccines) was associated with utilitarianism (increased consequence sensitivity) and increased tolerance to risks and harm toward others. Meanwhile, although those in the non-vaccinated group was associated with higher harm sensitivities, they neither supported nor received the COVID vaccines (when vaccines prevent harm from infection). CONCLUSION: Pro-vaccination messages may be made more effective by addressing perceptions of harms associated with vaccines and infections, respectively.

The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale: Psychometric properties of a French adaptation (OUS-Fr).

It is well established that one's sense of morality may be readily influenced by one's culture, education, and life situation. Very few psychometric tools are currently available to measure facets of human morality in different cultures. Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to develop a French adaptation of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS-Fr) and formally evaluate its validity. The OUS-Fr was developed through a process of back-translation and administered to a sample of 552 participants. Results from exploratory factor analyses revealed a bidimensional structure with satisfactory loadings that was then also supported in the confirmatory factor analysis check. The OUS-Fr scale demonstrated good psychometric properties, with acceptable internal consistency and coherent results in the convergent validity analyses. These findings contribute to morality measurement literature by providing evidence for the reliability and validity of the French adaptation of the OUS. The OUS-Fr can be viewed as a valuable tool for researchers and practitioners for assessing utilitarian tendencies within the French-speaking population, which could pave the way for cross-cultural understandings that are important for fully understanding the intricacies of human morality.