Aeroportos: entenda a fase emergencial do Plano SP

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Lineamientos para el abordaje de casos positivos para SARS-COV-2 de viajeros que ingresan al país por el aeropuerto internacional "La Aurora" (AILA) / Guidelines for addressing positive cases for SARS-COV-2 of travelers entering the country through the international airport "La Aurora" (AILA)

En los antecedentes se presentan estadísticas del COVID-19 a la fecha en la que se elaboró el documento (enero 2021) y aborda las tres mutaciones del virus conocidas hasta la fecha del documento. Así mismo, menciona el tema de las mutaciones y las tres variantes conocidas hasta ese momento: Reino Unido e Irlanda del Norte, República de Sudáfrica y Brasil, siendo la de mayor transmisibilidad, según el documento, la del Reino Unido En relación a ello y enfocado en el tema principal, menciona que: "La enfermedad por el coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) se ha propagado a través de varias fronteras, lo que ha dado lugar a la demanda de medidas de detección y gestión de los casos sospechosos en los puntos de entrada, en particular los puertos, aeropuertos y pasos fronterizos" Por lo que los objetivos del documento son: "1. Generar información genética mediante la vigilancia genómica de casos confirmados de COVID-19 en el Aeropuerto Internacional "La Aurora". 2. Determinar las variantes genéticas del SARS-CoV-2 de casos confirmados para COVID-19 de pasajeros que ingresan al país. 3. Detectar oportunamente las variantes genómicas del SARS-CoV-2 de interés nacional e internacional." En el anexo 1 incluye: Escenarios para la realización de prueba diagnóstica de COVID-19 y referencia para secuenciación y en el 2: Solicitud de Análisis, Secuenciación SARS-CoV-2

COVID-19​ live Q&A about travels with Dr Carmen Dolea &Dr Negret Emiroglu. Ask WHO​ of 7 August 2020

#AskWHO​ series: This was the live discussion 7 August 2020 about the COVID-19 pandemic and international travels, with Dr Carmen Dolea, Head of the International Health Regulation Secretariat (IHR), and Dr Negret Emiroglu, Director of WHO's Country Readiness Strengthening Department. Questions from the audience were taken.

Travel restrictions and SARS-CoV-2 transmission: an effective distance approach to estimate impact.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the effect of airline travel restrictions on the risk of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) importation. METHODS: We extracted passenger volume data for the entire global airline network, as well as the dates of the implementation of travel restrictions and the observation of the first case of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in each country or territory, from publicly available sources. We calculated effective distance between every airport and the city of Wuhan, China. We modelled the risk of SARS-CoV-2 importation by estimating survival probability, expressing median time of importation as a function of effective distance. We calculated the relative change in importation risk under three different hypothetical scenarios that all resulted in different passenger volumes. FINDINGS: We identified 28 countries with imported cases of COVID-19 as at 26 February 2020. The arrival time of the virus at these countries ranged from 39 to 80 days since identification of the first case in Wuhan. Our analysis of relative change in risk indicated that strategies of reducing global passenger volume and imposing travel restrictions at a further 10 hub airports would be equally effective in reducing the risk of importation of SARS-CoV-2; however, this reduction is very limited with a close-to-zero median relative change in risk. CONCLUSION: The hypothetical variations in observed travel restrictions were not sufficient to prevent the global spread of SARS-CoV-2; further research should also consider travel by land and sea. Our study highlights the importance of strengthening local capacities for disease monitoring and control.

Development of a competency profile for professionals involved in infectious disease preparedness and response in the air transport public health sector.

BACKGROUND: Recent infectious disease outbreaks highlight the importance of competent professionals with expertise on public health preparedness and response at airports. The availability of a competency profile for this workforce supports efficient education and training. Although competency profiles for infectious disease control professionals are available, none addresses the complex airport environment. Therefore, the main aim of this study is to develop a competency profile for professionals involved in infectious disease preparedness and response at airports in order to stimulate and direct further education and training. METHODS: We developed the competency profile through the following steps: 1) extraction of competencies from relevant literature, 2) assessment of the profile in a national RAND modified Delphi study with an interdisciplinary expert group (n = 9) and 3) assessment of the profile in an international RAND modified Delphi study with an airport infectious disease management panel of ten European countries (n = 10). RESULTS: We systematically studied two competency profiles on infectious disease control and three air transport guidelines on event management, and extracted 61 relevant competencies for airports. The two RAND modified Delphi procedures further refined the profile, mainly by specifying a competency's target group, the organizational level it should be present on, and the exact actions that should be mastered. The final profile, consisting of 59 competencies, covers the whole process from infectious disease preparedness, through the response phase and the recovery at airports. CONCLUSION: We designed a profile to support training and exercising the multidisciplinary group of professionals in infectious disease management in the airport setting, and which is ready for use in practice. The many adaptations and adjustments that were needed to develop this profile out of existing profiles and air transport guidelines suggest that other setting-specific profiles in infectious disease control are desirable.

E-cigarettes in airports and on flights: Europe and the US. / Cigarrillos electrónicos en aeropuertos y en vuelos: Europa y EEUU.

BACKGROUND: While progress has been made to create smoke-free airports, sales of e-cigarettes at airports and airplanes and the presence of advertisements might detract from these smoke-free policies. The objective of this study is to describe the presence of policies, advertising, sales and use of e-cigarettes in airports and on flights in Europe and the US. METHODS: A cross-sectional study was conducted between March-May, 2014. The study included 21 large and mid-sized airports of Europe and the US as well as 19 flights. A standardised protocol was used to observe points of sales and advertisements and to collect information on the implementation of policies on e-cigarette use. In addition, a series of questions were developed to obtain policy details from airport personnel and flight attendants. RESULTS: Retail outlets selling e-cigarettes in airports were present in approximately 20% and 40% of the observed pre and post-security areas, respectively. In post-security, 27.8% of the airport staff reported that the use of e-cigarettes indoors was not allowed, 22.2% reported that they did not know, 27.8% reported that it was only allowed in the smoking room, and 22.2% reported that it was allowed anywhere. Smoking ban announcements were made on all flights. However, only 15.8% of the flights made a specific announcement regarding the ban of using e-cigarettes. Conclusions. In light of our results, it seems necessary to reinforce in-flight e-cigarette smoking ban announcements and to instruct airport employees about the existence of e-cigarette smoking policies. Furthermore, airports themselves should also be encouraged to adopt smoke-free policies.

Antecedentes. Pese a los avances en las políticas libres de humo en los aeropuertos, las ventas de cigarrillos electrónicos en aeropuertos y aviones y la presencia de publicidad pueden suponer un paso atrás en la implementación de dichas políticas. El objetivo de este estudio es describir la presencia de políticas, publicidad, ventas y el uso de cigarrillos electrónicos en aeropuertos y en vuelos de Europa y los EE.UU.Métodos. Estudio transversal realizado entre marzo y mayo del año 2014. El estudio incluyó 21 aeropuertos grandes y medianos de Europa y los EE.UU., así como 19 vuelos. Se utilizó un protocolo estandarizado para observar puntos de venta y publicidad y se recogió información sobre la implementación de políticas sobre el uso de cigarrillos electrónicos. Además, obtuvo información más detallada del personal del aeropuerto y de los asistentes de vuelo sobre las políticas de uso de cigarrillo electrónicos.Resultados. Los puntos de venta de cigarrillos electrónicos en los aeropuertos estaban presentes en aproximadamente el 20% y el 40% de las áreas observadas antes y después del control de seguridad, respectivamente. Después del control, el 27,8% del personal del aeropuerto declaró que no estaba permitido el uso los cigarrillos electrónicos en el interior, el 22,2% declaró que no sabía si se podían usar, el 27,8% declaró que sólo estaba permitido en el área de fumadores y el 22,2% declaró que se podía fumar en cualquier parte. Todos los vuelos anunciaron la prohibición de fumar. Sin embargo, sólo el 15,8% de los vuelos específicamente anunció la prohibición de usar cigarrillos electrónicos.Conclusiones. Nuestros resultados muestran que sería necesario reforzar los avisos de prohibición del uso de cigarrillos electrónicos durante los vuelos y de instruir a los empleados del aeropuerto sobre la existencia de políticas sobre el uso de cigarrillos electrónicos. Además, también se debería promover políticas libres de humo sin excepciones en todos los aeropuertos.

Cigarrillos electrónicos en aeropuertos y en vuelos: Europa y EEUU / E-cigarettes in airports and on flights: Europe and the US

Antecedentes. Pese a los avances en las políticas libres de humo en los aeropuertos, las ventas de cigarrillos electrónicos en aeropuertos y aviones y la presencia de publicidad pueden suponer un paso atrás en la implementación de dichas políticas. El objetivo de este estudio es describir la presencia de políticas, publicidad, ventas y el uso de cigarrillos electrónicos en aeropuertos y en vuelos de Europa y los EE.UU. Métodos. Estudio transversal realizado entre marzo y mayo del año 2014. El estudio incluyó 21 aeropuertos grandes y medianos de Europa y los EE.UU., así como 19 vuelos. Se utilizó un protocolo estandarizado para observar puntos de venta y publicidad y se recogió información sobre la implementación de políticas sobre el uso de cigarrillos electrónicos. Además, obtuvo información más detallada del personal del aeropuerto y de los asistentes de vuelo sobre las políticas de uso de cigarrillo electrónicos. Resultados. Los puntos de venta de cigarrillos electrónicos en los aeropuertos estaban presentes en aproximadamente el 20% y el 40% de las áreas observadas antes y después del control de seguridad, respectivamente. Después del control, el 27,8% del personal del aeropuerto declaró que no estaba permitido el uso los cigarrillos electrónicos en el interior, el 22,2% declaró que no sabía si se podían usar, el 27,8% declaró que sólo estaba permitido en el área de fumadores y el 22,2% declaró que se podía fumar en cualquier parte. Todos los vuelos anunciaron la prohibición de fumar. Sin embargo, sólo el 15,8% de los vuelos específicamente anunció la prohibición de usar cigarrillos electrónicos. Conclusiones. Nuestros resultados muestran que sería necesario reforzar los avisos de prohibición del uso de cigarrillos electrónicos durante los vuelos y de instruir a los empleados del aeropuerto sobre la existencia de políticas sobre el uso de cigarrillos electrónicos. Además, también se debería promover políticas libres de humo sin excepciones en todos los aeropuertos

Background. While progress has been made to create smoke-free airports, sales of e-cigarettes at airports and airplanes and the presence of advertisements might detract from these smoke-free policies. The objective of this study is to describe the presence of policies, advertising, sales and use of e-cigarettes in airports and on flights in Europe and the US. Methods. A cross-sectional study was conducted between March-May, 2014. The study included 21 large and mid-sized airports of Europe and the US as well as 19 flights. A standardised protocol was used to observe points of sales and advertisements and to collect information on the implementation of policies on e-cigarette use. In addition, a series of questions were developed to obtain policy details from airport personnel and flight attendants. Results. Retail outlets selling e-cigarettes in airports were present in approximately 20% and 40% of the observed pre and post-security areas, respectively. In post-security, 27.8% of the airport staff reported that the use of e-cigarettes indoors was not allowed, 22.2% reported that they did not know, 27.8% reported that it was only allowed in the smoking room, and 22.2% reported that it was allowed anywhere. Smoking ban announcements were made on all flights. However, only 15.8% of the flights made a specific announcement regarding the ban of using e-cigarettes. Conclusions. In light of our results, it seems necessary to reinforce in-flight e-cigarette smoking ban announcements and to instruct airport employees about the existence of e-cigarette smoking policies. Furthermore, airports themselves should also be encouraged to adopt smoke-free policies

Deposition of respiratory virus pathogens on frequently touched surfaces at airports.

BACKGROUND: International and national travelling has made the rapid spread of infectious diseases possible. Little information is available on the role of major traffic hubs, such as airports, in the transmission of respiratory infections, including seasonal influenza and a pandemic threat. We investigated the presence of respiratory viruses in the passenger environment of a major airport in order to identify risk points and guide measures to minimize transmission. METHODS: Surface and air samples were collected weekly at three different time points during the peak period of seasonal influenza in 2015-16 in Finland. Swabs from surface samples, and air samples were tested by real-time PCR for influenza A and B viruses, respiratory syncytial virus, adenovirus, rhinovirus and coronaviruses (229E, HKU1, NL63 and OC43). RESULTS: Nucleic acid of at least one respiratory virus was detected in 9 out of 90 (10%) surface samples, including: a plastic toy dog in the children's playground (2/3 swabs, 67%); hand-carried luggage trays at the security check area (4/8, 50%); the buttons of the payment terminal at the pharmacy (1/2, 50%); the handrails of stairs (1/7, 14%); and the passenger side desk and divider glass at a passport control point (1/3, 33%). Among the 10 respiratory virus findings at various sites, the viruses identified were: rhinovirus (4/10, 40%, from surfaces); coronavirus (3/10, 30%, from surfaces); adenovirus (2/10, 20%, 1 air sample, 1 surface sample); influenza A (1/10, 10%, surface sample). CONCLUSIONS: Detection of pathogen viral nucleic acids indicates respiratory viral surface contamination at multiple sites associated with high touch rates, and suggests a potential risk in the identified airport sites. Of the surfaces tested, plastic security screening trays appeared to pose the highest potential risk, and handling these is almost inevitable for all embarking passengers.

A bi-objective integer programming model for partly-restricted flight departure scheduling.

The normal studies on air traffic departure scheduling problem (DSP) mainly deal with an independent airport in which the departure traffic is not affected by surrounded airports, which, however, is not a consistent case. In reality, there still exist cases where several commercial airports are closely located and one of them possesses a higher priority. During the peak hours, the departure activities of the lower-priority airports are usually required to give way to those of higher-priority airport. These giving-way requirements can inflict a set of changes on the modeling of departure scheduling problem with respect to the lower-priority airports. To the best of our knowledge, studies on DSP under this condition are scarce. Accordingly, this paper develops a bi-objective integer programming model to address the flight departure scheduling of the partly-restricted (e.g., lower-priority) one among several adjacent airports. An adapted tabu search algorithm is designed to solve the current problem. It is demonstrated from the case study of Tianjin Binhai International Airport in China that the proposed method can obviously improve the operation efficiency, while still realizing superior equity and regularity among restricted flows.

Tobacco Smoke Exposure in Indoor and Outdoor Locations in Airports Across Europe and the United States: A Cross-Sectional Study.

OBJECTIVE: Conduct a systematic evaluation of indoor and outdoor areas of selected airports, assess compliance and identify areas of improvement with smoke-free policies in airports. METHODS: Cross-sectional observational study conducted at 21 airports in Europe (11) and the United States (10). Using a standardized protocol, we assessed compliance (smoking, cigarette butts, smoke smell), and the physical environment (signage, ashtrays, designated smoking rooms [DSRs], tobacco sales). RESULTS: Cigarette butts (45% vs. 0%), smoke smell (67% vs. 0%), ashtrays (18% vs. 10%), and DSRs (63% vs. 30%) were observed more commonly indoors in Europe than in the United States. Poor compliance indoors was related to the presence of DSRs (OR 4.8, 95% CI 0.69, 33.8) and to cigarettes sales in pre-security areas (OR 6.0, 95% CI 0.57, 64.7), although not significantly different. Smoking was common in outdoor areas of airports in Europe and the United States (mean (SD) number of smokers 27.7 (23.6) and 6.3 (7.7), respectively, p value < .001). Around half (55%) of airports in Europe and all airports in the United States had some/partial outdoor smoking restrictions. CONCLUSIONS: Exposure to secondhand smoke (SHS) remains a public health problem in major airports across Europe and in some airports in the United States, specifically related to the presence of DSRs and SHS exposure in outdoor areas. Airports must remove DSRs. Research is needed in low- and middle-income countries and on the effectiveness of outdoor smoking-restricted areas around entryways. Eliminating smoking at airports will protect millions of people from SHS exposure and promote social norms that discourage smoking. IMPLICATIONS: Airports are known to allow exceptions to smoke-free policy by providing DSRs. We found that smoking still occurs in indoor areas in airports, particularly in the context of DSRs. Smoking, moreover, is widespread in outdoor areas and compliance with smoking restrictions is limited. Advancing smoke-free policy requires improvements to the physical environment of airports, including removal of DSRs and implementation of stricter outdoor smoking restrictions.

Measuring the potential of individual airports for pandemic spread over the world airline network.

BACKGROUND: Massive growth in human mobility has dramatically increased the risk and rate of pandemic spread. Macro-level descriptors of the topology of the World Airline Network (WAN) explains middle and late stage dynamics of pandemic spread mediated by this network, but necessarily regard early stage variation as stochastic. We propose that much of this early stage variation can be explained by appropriately characterizing the local network topology surrounding an outbreak's debut location. METHODS: Based on a model of the WAN derived from public data, we measure for each airport the expected force of infection (AEF) which a pandemic originating at that airport would generate, assuming an epidemic process which transmits from airport to airport via scheduled commercial flights. We observe, for a subset of world airports, the minimum transmission rate at which a disease becomes pandemically competent at each airport. We also observe, for a larger subset, the time until a pandemically competent outbreak achieves pandemic status given its debut location. Observations are generated using a highly sophisticated metapopulation reaction-diffusion simulator under a disease model known to well replicate the 2009 influenza pandemic. The robustness of the AEF measure to model misspecification is examined by degrading the underlying model WAN. RESULTS: AEF powerfully explains pandemic risk, showing correlation of 0.90 to the transmission level needed to give a disease pandemic competence, and correlation of 0.85 to the delay until an outbreak becomes a pandemic. The AEF is robust to model misspecification. For 97 % of airports, removing 15 % of airports from the model changes their AEF metric by less than 1 %. CONCLUSIONS: Appropriately summarizing the size, shape, and diversity of an airport's local neighborhood in the WAN accurately explains much of the macro-level stochasticity in pandemic outcomes.

[The possibility of provision of hygienically safe residing for the population in residential construction located closely to air transport enterprises].

Operation of the modern heavy aircraft on the surrounding vast territory is associated with the appearance of high levels of sound pressure generated by the powerful engines, especially during takeoff and landing operations. Currently, the elimination or significant reduction of noise pollution on the environment technically does not yet have a radical solution and the possible reduction of the impact ofnoise pollution on the residents ofnearby settlements is achievedfor residents of building by the optimal location of the runway, changing in conditions for the takeoff and landing of aircrafts, the ordering of the regimen of the airport, the introduction of the package sufficiently effective anti-noise diverse - engineering, planning activities, in some cases, the creation ofprotective noise shield on the border of the residential area and the construction ofprotective awnings over the children's and sports fields with fencing shields converted in the direction of the runway. An example of a positive decision, taking into account the complexity and variety of aspects of the problem, it is possible to consider the development of the project plan of the new microdistrict «Eletsky¼ in the Soviet district of the city of Lipetsk, falling under the impact of aircraft noise of plying aircrafts of the military airfield.

Humans Are Still the Critical Factor in Aviation Security.

INTRODUCTION: In Germany, the German Federal Police assess the performance of aviation security screeners on a regular basis. These so-called "reality tests" are unannounced examinations which aim to investigate whether airport screeners can detect forbidden items in hand luggage or attached to the body. Recent alarming results of such inspections showed clearly that the overall detection rate is in need of improvement. To achieve this, it is important to identify specific factors that influence general screening performance. This especially includes basic cognitive functions like visual screening, alertness, and divided attention, which have come more and more into focus in current fundamental research projects. This brief commentary points out critical factors, contributes background conditions in aviation security screening, and shows possible approaches for enhancement and optimization. Finally, the human aspect is discussed as not only being the weakest factor in security screening, but also one of major importance.

Modelling runway incursion severity.

Analysis of the causes underlying runway incursions is fundamental for the development of effective mitigation measures. However, there are significant weaknesses in the current methods to model these factors. This paper proposes a structured framework for modelling causal factors and their relationship to severity, which includes a description of the airport surface system architecture, establishment of terminological definitions, the determination and collection of appropriate data, the analysis of occurrences for severity and causes, and the execution of a statistical analysis framework. It is implemented in the context of U.S. airports, enabling the identification of a number of priority interventions, including the need for better investigation and causal factor capture, recommendations for airfield design, operating scenarios and technologies, and better training for human operators in the system. The framework is recommended for the analysis of runway incursions to support safety improvements and the methodology is transferable to other areas of aviation safety risk analysis.

Challenges to the implementation of International Health Regulations (2005) on preventing infectious diseases: experience from Julius Nyerere International Airport, Tanzania.

BACKGROUND: The International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) is a legal instrument binding all World Health Organization (WHO) member States. It aims to prevent and control public health emergencies of international concern. Country points of entry (POEs) have been identified as potential areas for effective interventions to prevent the transmission of infectious diseases across borders. The agreement postulates that member states will strengthen core capacities detailed in the IHR (2005), including those specified for the POE. This study intended to assess the challenges faced in implementing the IHR (2005) requirements at Julius Nyerere International Airport (JNIA), Dar es Salaam. DESIGN: A cross-sectional, descriptive study, employing qualitative methods, was conducted at the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW), WHO, and JNIA. In-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and documentary reviews were used to obtain relevant information. Respondents were purposively enrolled into the study. Thematic analysis was used to generate study findings. RESULTS: Several challenges that hamper implementation of the IHR (2005) were identified: (1) none of the 42 Tanzanian POEs have been specifically designated to implement IHR (2005). (2) Implementation of the IHR (2005) at the POE was complicated as it falls under various uncoordinated government departments. Although there were clear communication channels at JNIA that enhanced reliable risk communication, the airport lacked isolated rooms specific for emergence preparedness and response to public health events. CONCLUSIONS: JNIA is yet to develop adequate core capacities required for implementation of the IHR (2005). There is a need for policy managers to designate JNIA to implement IHR (2005) and ensure that public health policies, legislations, guidelines, and practice at POE are harmonized to improve international travel and trade. Policy makers and implementers should also ensure that implementation of the IHR (2005) follow the policy implementation framework, particularly the contextual interaction theory which calls for the availability of adequate resources (inputs) and well-organized process for the successful implementation of the policy.

Administrando yodo radioactivo. Piensa en las alarmas de seguridad de los aeropuertos / Giving radioiodine? Think about airport security alarms

La sensibilidad aumentada de los detectores en los aeropuertos, el aumento del número de pruebas isotópicas y la globalización de la sociedad han dado lugar a varias falsos positivos en las alarmas de radioactivos de los aeropuertos y lugares públicos. Este trabajo presenta dos nuevos casos de pacientes que alertaron las alarmas de seguridad en el aeropuerto después de haber recibido 740MBq de 131I en bocio no-tóxico. Los intentos de comparar la literatura son sorprendentemente limitados en relación a este problema. Un hombre de 57 años desencadenó una alarma en tres aeropuertos diferentes durante los días 17, 28 y 31 después de haber recibido exposición a yodo radioactivo. Curiosamente, mientras tanto, en los días 18 y 22, no se detectó la radiación en el aeropuerto, donde fue detenido dos veces más adelante como fuente de radiación. El segundo caso presenta una mujer de 45 años que activó los detectores de la alama de seguridad cuando cruzó una frontera en un viaje en autobús después de haber recibido yodo radioactivo(AU)

An increased sensitivity of airport detectors, a growing number of isotopic tests, and globalization of the society have raised a number of false positive radioactive alarms at airports and public places. This paper presents two new cases of patients who triggered airport security alarms after receiving 740MBq of 131I for non-toxic goitre and attempts to compare surprisingly limited literature concerning this problem. A 57-year-old man triggered a security alarm at three different airports on the 17th, 28th, and 31st day after radioiodine exposure. Interestingly enough, in the meantime, on the 18th and 22nd day, no radiation was detected in him at the airport where he was twice detained as a source of radiation later on. The second case presents a 45-year-old woman who activated security alarm detectors while crossing a border on her coach trip 28 days after radioiodine administration(AU)