Certificate of need laws: a systematic review and cost-effectiveness analysis.

BACKGROUND: Certificate of Need (CON) laws, currently in place in 35 US states, require certain health care providers to obtain a certification of their economic necessity from a state board before opening or undertaking a major expansion. We conduct the first systematic review and cost-effectiveness analysis of these laws. METHODS: We review 90 articles to summarize the evidence on how certificate of need laws affect regulatory costs, health expenditures, health outcomes, and access to care. We use the findings from the systematic review to conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of CON. RESULTS: The literature provides mixed results, on average finding that CON increases health expenditures and overall elderly mortality while reducing heart surgery mortality. Our cost-effectiveness analysis estimates that the costs of CON laws somewhat exceed their benefits, although our estimates are quite uncertain. CONCLUSIONS: The literature has not yet reached a definitive conclusion on how CON laws affect health expenditures, outcomes, or access to care. While more and higher quality research is needed to reach confident conclusions, our cost-effectiveness analysis based on the existing literature shows that the expected costs of CON exceed its benefits.

Certificate of need and the cost of competition in home healthcare markets.

We used 2010-16 Medicare Cost Reports for 10,737 freestanding home health agencies (HHAs) to examine the impact of home health (HH) and nursing home (NH) certificate-of-need (CON) laws on HHA caseload, total and per-patient variable costs. After adjusting for other HHA characteristics, total costs were higher in states with only HH CON laws ($2,975,698), only NH CON laws ($1,768,097), and both types of laws ($3,511,277), compared with no CON laws ($1,538,536). Higher costs were driven by caseloads, as CON reduced per-patient costs. Additional research is needed to distinguish whether this is due to skimping on quality vs. economies of scale.

The Impact of Certificate-of-Need Laws on Nursing Home and Home Health Care Expenditures.

Over the past two decades, nursing homes and home health care agencies have been influenced by several Medicare and Medicaid policy changes including the adoption of prospective payment for Medicare-paid postacute care and Medicaid-paid long-term home and community-based care reforms. This article examines how spending growth in these sectors was affected by state certificate-of-need (CON) laws, which were designed to limit the growth of providers and have remained unchanged for several decades. Compared with states without CON laws, Medicare and Medicaid spending in states with CON laws grew faster for nursing home care and more slowly for home health care. In particular, we observed the slowest growth in community-based care in states with CON for both the nursing home and home health industries. Thus, controlling for other factors, public postacute and long-term care expenditures in CON states have become dominated by nursing homes.

The association of hospital cost-inefficiency with certificate-of-need regulation.

Certificate-of-need (CON) regulations can promote hospital efficiency by reducing duplication of services; however, there are practical and theoretical reasons why they might be ineffective, and the empirical evidence generated has been mixed. This study compares the cost-inefficiency of urban, acute care hospitals in states with CON regulations against those in states without CON requirements. Stochastic frontier analysis was performed on pooled time-series, cross-sectional data from 1,552 hospitals in 37 states for the period 2005 to 2009 with controls for variations in hospital product mix, quality, and patient burden of illness. Average estimated cost-inefficiency was less in CON states (8.10%) than in non-CON states (12.46%). Results suggest that CON regulation may be an effective policy instrument in an era of a new medical arms race. However, broader analysis of the effects of CON regulation on efficiency, quality, access, prices, and innovation is needed before a policy recommendation can be made.

State deregulation and Medicare costs for acute cardiac care.

Past literature suggests that Certificate of Need (CON) regulations for cardiac care were ineffective in improving quality, but less is known about the effect of CON on patient costs. We analyzed Medicare data for 1991-2002 to test whether states that dropped CON experienced changes in costs or reimbursements for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery or percutaneous coronary interventions. We found that states that dropped CON experienced lower costs per patient for CABG but not for percutaneous coronary intervention. Average Medicare reimbursement was lower for both procedures in states that dropped CON. The cost savings from removing CON regulations slightly exceed the total fixed costs of new CABG facilities that entered after deregulation. Assuming continued cost savings past 2002, the savings from deregulating CABG surgery outweigh the fixed costs of new entry. Thus, CON regulations for CABG may not be justified in terms of either improving quality or controlling cost growth.

Do hospital chief executive officers extract rents from Certificate of Need laws?

Prior research suggests that Certificate of Need (CON) laws reduce competition in the hospital services industry. As a result, this study empirically investigates if not-for-profit hospital chief executive officers (CEOs) are able to extract rents from CON laws in the form of higher compensation. A sample of 256 not-for-profit hospital CEOs in states with and without CON laws and data for 2007 are used in the empirical analysis. The study considers the endogenous nature of a CON law and allows such a law to indirectly affect CEO compensation through its impact on the number of hospitals and beds. The multiple regression results indicate that special and public interests both motivate the decision of a state to maintain a CON law. CON laws are shown to reduce the number of beds at the typical hospital by 12 percent, on average, and the number of hospitals per 100,000 persons by 48 percent. These reductions ultimately lead urban hospital CEOs in states with CON laws to extract economic rents of $91,000 annually.

Uncompensated care and quality assurance among rural hospitals.

Health care disparities in rural areas remain significant in the U.S. health care industry. Uncompensated care makes health care disparities in rural areas worse, and rural hospitals are unfavorably positioned to compete with urban hospitals in the economic-downturn marketplace. How uncompensated care affects quality care among rural hospitals has been lightly investigated. Given that many rural residents experience difficulty accessing high quality care and given the importance of establishing quality care practice standards in a rural setting, we conducted a systematic literature review to identify some quality-care barriers and opportunities and suggested strategies to strengthen the position of rural hospitals in response to uncompensated care.

The impact of CON regulation on hospital efficiency.

In this paper we propose an empirically implementable measure of aggregate-level efficiency along the lines of Debreu's (1951) coefficient of resource utilization but restricted to the production side. The efficiency measure is based on directional distance functions, which allows the overall measure of efficiency to be decomposed into measures of technical and "structural" efficiency. The latter measure, which captures inefficiencies associated with the organization of production within an industry, is further decomposed into measures of scale and mix efficiency. The measures developed in the paper are illustrated using U.S. hospital data. The illustration sheds light on the efficacy of certificate of need (CON) regulations.

The development of certificate of need legislation.

This article examines the development of Certificate of Need (CON) legislation in the United States. Over time, CON legislation developed into efforts to contain rising health care costs, while maintaining quality of care. In recent years, numerous states have begun to reevaluate the current impact of CON regulations, and ask whether the programs should be discontinued. State regulators as well as academic researchers must address the costs vs. benefits of such legislation. Specific measures within such regulations must be addressed in order for health policy makers, administrators, and researchers to help meet the escalating demand for health services.

Cooperative ventures in a competitive environment: the influence of regulation on management decisions.

Two generalized game theory models are developed to explain observed management decisions between two large hospitals in Shelby County Tennessee within the regulatory context of competition for an advanced radiological technology pursued through the certificate-of-need process. The first model rationalizes each hospital's decision to submit competing certificate-of-need applications. The second model rationalizes the eventual joint venture agreement between the two hospitals and offers an explanation as to why the technology has yet to be acquired. The models are tested through interviews with the hospital administrators responsible for negotiating the joint venture agreement. The interviews confirm a preemptive motive behind each hospital's decision to compete and that the certificate-of-need requirement contributed to the eventual joint venture agreement.

Does removing certificate-of-need regulations lead to a surge in health care spending?

This study assesses the impact of certificate-of-need (CON) regulation for hospitals on various measures of health spending per capita, hospital supply, diffusion of technology, and hospital industry organization. Using a time series cross-sectional methodology, we estimate the net impact of CON policies on costs, supply, technology diffusion, and industry organization, controlling for area characteristics, the presence of other forms of regulation, such as hospital rate-setting, and competition. Mature CON programs are associated with a modest (5 percent) long-term reduction in acute care spending per capita, but not with a significant reduction in total per capita spending. There is no evidence of a surge in acquisition of facilities or in costs following removal of CON regulations. Mature CON programs also result in a slight (2 percent) reduction in bed supply but higher costs per day and per admission, along with higher hospital profits. CON regulations generally have no detectable effect on diffusion of various hospital-based technologies. It is doubtful that CON regulations have had much effect on quality of care, positive or negative. Such regulations may have improved access, but there is little empirical evidence to document this.

The Columbia/HCA hospital sales: an opportunity to re-focus on community benefits.

Columbia/HCA, currently the target of federal fraud investigations that have led to indictments of four top executives, announced plans in late 1997 to sell 115 hospital facilities. In a period of frenetic mergers, this sale will most affect communities in which Columbia has put multiple facilities on the auction block, yet this round of restructuring also foreshadows an increasingly consolidated--and profit-driven--industry. States of Health explores how community intervention in these sales may offer a chance to see that health needs are not further sacrificed to industry profits.