Informed Consent in Implantable BCI Research: Identifying Risks and Exploring Meaning.

Implantable brain-computer interface (BCI) technology is an expanding area of engineering research now moving into clinical application. Ensuring meaningful informed consent in implantable BCI research is an ethical imperative. The emerging and rapidly evolving nature of implantable BCI research makes identification of risks, a critical component of informed consent, a challenge. In this paper, 6 core risk domains relevant to implantable BCI research are identified-short and long term safety, cognitive and communicative impairment, inappropriate expectations, involuntariness, affective impairment, and privacy and security. Work in deep brain stimulation provides a useful starting point for understanding this core set of risks in implantable BCI. Three further risk domains-risks pertaining to identity, agency, and stigma-are identified. These risks are not typically part of formalized consent processes. It is important as informed consent practices are further developed for implantable BCI research that attention be paid not just to disclosing core research risks but exploring the meaning of BCI research with potential participants.

[Manipulation of mental competence: an ethical problem in case of electrical stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus for severe Parkinson's disease]. / Manipuleerbare wilsbekwaamheid: een ethisch probleem bij elektrostimulatie van de nucleus subthalamicus voor ernstige ziekte van Parkinson.

Three years after the implantation of electrodes in the subthalamic nucleus (STN) and the start of deep brain stimulation (DBS) for advanced Parkinson's disease, a 62-year-old man was admitted because of a stimulation-related manic state that did not respond to treatment with a mood stabiliser and that led to chaotic behaviour, megalomania, serious financial debts and mental incompetence. Although adjustment of the stimulation parameters resulted in a normophoric state with a return of insight and capacity to judge, this was only at the cost of a serious exacerbation of his motor symptoms that left the patient bedridden. There was no therapeutic margin between the two states. Ultimately, there seemed to be only two alternatives: to admit the patient to a nursing home because of serious invalidity, but mentally in good condition, or to admit the patient to a chronic psychiatric ward because of a manic state, but with acceptable motor capacity and ADL functions. Thorough ethical evaluation followed. When not being stimulated, the patient was considered competent to decide about his own treatment; in this condition the patient chose for the second option. In accordance with his own wishes he was therefore legally committed to a chronic ward in the regional psychiatric hospital. The current ethical views on mental competence do not consider the potential influence of modern methods of treatment such as STN-DBS on this capacity.