Schedule for Rating Disabilities: Skin. Final rule.

On August 12, 2016, VA published in the Federal Register the proposed rule for Schedule for Rating Disabilities: Skin. VA received multiple responses during the 60-day comment period. This final rule implements the Secretary's proposed rule with limited revisions.

Medicare and Medicaid Programs; CY 2018 Home Health Prospective Payment System Rate Update and CY 2019 Case-Mix Adjustment Methodology Refinements; Home Health Value-Based Purchasing Model; and Home Health Quality Reporting Requirements. Final rule.

This final rule updates the home health prospective payment system (HH PPS) payment rates, including the national, standardized 60-day episode payment rates, the national per-visit rates, and the non-routine medical supply (NRS) conversion factor, effective for home health episodes of care ending on or after January 1, 2018. This rule also: Updates the HH PPS case-mix weights using the most current, complete data available at the time of rulemaking; implements the third year of a 3-year phase-in of a reduction to the national, standardized 60-day episode payment to account for estimated case-mix growth unrelated to increases in patient acuity (that is, nominal case-mix growth) between calendar year (CY) 2012 and CY 2014; and discusses our efforts to monitor the potential impacts of the rebasing adjustments that were implemented in CY 2014 through CY 2017. In addition, this rule finalizes changes to the Home Health Value-Based Purchasing (HHVBP) Model and to the Home Health Quality Reporting Program (HH QRP). We are not finalizing the implementation of the Home Health Groupings Model (HHGM) in this final rule.

Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance Improved Financial Outcomes For Individual Market Insurers With The Highest Claims.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) reformed the individual health insurance market. Because insurers can no longer vary their offers of coverage based on applicants' health status, the ACA established a risk adjustment program to equalize health-related cost differences across plans. The ACA also established a temporary reinsurance program to subsidize high-cost claims. To assess the impact of these programs, we compared revenues to claims costs for insurers in the individual market during the first two years of ACA implementation (2014 and 2015), before and after the inclusion of risk adjustment and reinsurance payments. Before these payments were included, for the 30 percent of insurers with the highest claims costs, claims (not including administrative expenses) exceeded premium revenues by $90-$397 per enrollee per month. The effect was reversed after these payments were included, with revenues exceeding claims costs by $0-$49 per month. The risk adjustment and reinsurance programs were relatively well targeted in the first two years. While there is ongoing discussion regarding the future of the ACA, our findings can shed light on how risk-sharing programs can address risk selection among insurers-a pervasive issue in all health insurance markets.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2017. Final rule.

This final rule sets forth payment parameters and provisions related to the risk adjustment, reinsurance, and risk corridors programs; cost-sharing parameters and cost-sharing reductions; and user fees for Federally-facilitated Exchanges. It also provides additional amendments regarding the annual open enrollment period for the individual market for the 2017 and 2018 benefit years; essential health benefits; cost sharing; qualified health plans; Exchange consumer assistance programs; network adequacy; patient safety; the Small Business Health Options Program; stand-alone dental plans; third-party payments to qualified health plans; the definitions of large employer and small employer; fair health insurance premiums; student health insurance coverage; the rate review program; the medical loss ratio program; eligibility and enrollment; exemptions and appeals; and other related topics.

Basic Health Program; Federal Funding Methodology for Program Years 2017 and 2018. Final methodology.

This document provides the methodology and data sources necessary to determine Federal payment amounts made in program years 2017 and 2018 to states that elect to establish a Basic Health Program under the Affordable Care Act to offer health benefits coverage to low-income individuals otherwise eligible to purchase coverage through Affordable Insurance Exchanges (hereinafter referred to as the Exchanges).

Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services. Final rule with comment period.

This final rule with comment period provides for a transparent data-driven process for states to document whether Medicaid payments are sufficient to enlist providers to assure beneficiary access to covered care and services consistent with section 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act (the Act) and to address issues raised by that process. The final rule with comment period also recognizes electronic publication as an optional means of providing public notice of proposed changes in rates or ratesetting methodologies that the state intends to include in a Medicaid state plan amendment (SPA). We are providing an opportunity for comment on whether future adjustments would be warranted to the provisions setting forth requirements for ongoing state reviews of beneficiary access.

The Association of State Rate Review Authority with Health Insurance Premiums.

Key findings. (1) Adjusted premiums in the individual market in states with prior approval authority combined with loss ratio requirements were lower in 2010-2013 than premiums in states with no rate review authority or file-and-use regulations only. (2) Adjusted premiums declined modestly in prior approval states while premiums increased in states with no rate review authority or with file-and-use regulations only. (3) The findings suggest that states with prior approval authority and loss ratio requirements constrained increases in health insurance premiums.

Medicare Program; Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities (SNFs) for FY 2016, SNF Value-Based Purchasing Program, SNF Quality Reporting Program, and Staffing Data Collection. Final Rule.

This final rule updates the payment rates used under the prospective payment system (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) for fiscal year (FY) 2016. In addition, it specifies a SNF all-cause all-condition hospital readmission measure, as well as adopts that measure for a new SNF Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program, and includes a discussion of SNF VBP Program policies we are considering for future rulemaking to promote higher quality and more efficient health care for Medicare beneficiaries. Additionally, this final rule will implement a new quality reporting program for SNFs as specified in the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 (IMPACT Act). It also amends the requirements that a long-term care (LTC) facility must meet to qualify to participate as a skilled nursing facility (SNF) in the Medicare program, or a nursing facility (NF) in the Medicaid program, by establishing requirements that implement the provision in the Affordable Care Act regarding the submission of staffing information based on payroll data.

States with stronger health insurance rate review authority experienced lower premiums in the individual market in 2010-13.

States have varying degrees of review authority over health insurance carriers' rates, including prior approval authority over proposed rates and requirements for loss ratios, the proportion of premium revenues spent on medical claims. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires carriers in certain categories of health insurance to provide public justification for rate increases of 10 percent or more. We collected data on how states changed their rate review authority and requirements during 2010-13, the years immediately after enactment of the ACA, and we combined these data with carrier filings. We found that adjusted premiums in the individual market in states that had prior-approval authority combined with loss ratio requirements were lower in 2010-13 ($3,489) than premiums in states with no rate review authority or that had only file-and-use regulations, which gave the states no authority to block rate increases ($3,617). Adjusted premiums declined modestly in prior-approval states with loss ratio requirements, from $3,526 in 2010 to $3,452 in 2013, while premiums increased from $3,422 to $3,683 in states with no rate review authority or file-and-use regulations only. Our findings suggest that states with prior approval authority and loss ratio requirements constrained health insurance premium increases.

Medicare Program; Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility Prospective Payment System for Federal Fiscal Year 2016. Final rule.

This final rule updates the prospective payment rates for inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs) for federal fiscal year (FY) 2016 as required by the statute. As required by section 1886(j)(5) of the Act, this rule includes the classification and weighting factors for the IRF PPS's case-mix groups and a description of the methodologies and data used in computing the prospective payment rates for FY 2016. This final rule also finalizes policy changes, including the adoption of an IRF-specific market basket that reflects the cost structures of only IRF providers, a 1-year phase-in of the revised wage index changes, a 3-year phase-out of the rural adjustment for certain IRFs, and revisions and updates to the quality reporting program (QRP).

Medicare Program; FY 2016 Hospice Wage Index and Payment Rate Update and Hospice Quality Reporting Requirements. Final rule.

This final rule will update the hospice payment rates and the wage index for fiscal year (FY) 2016 (October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2016), including implementing the last year of the phase-out of the wage index budget neutrality adjustment factor (BNAF). Effective on January 1, 2016, this rule also finalizes our proposals to differentiate payments for routine home care (RHC) based on the beneficiary's length of stay and implement a service intensity add-on (SIA) payment for services provided in the last 7 days of a beneficiary's life, if certain criteria are met. In addition, this rule will implement changes to the aggregate cap calculation mandated by the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 (IMPACT Act), align the cap accounting year for both the inpatient cap and the hospice aggregate cap with the federal fiscal year starting in FY 2017, make changes to the hospice quality reporting program, clarify a requirement for diagnosis reporting on the hospice claim, and discuss recent hospice payment reform research and analyses.

What's behind health insurance rate increases? an examination of what insurers reported to the federal government in 2013-2014.

The Affordable Care Act requires health insurers to justify rate increases that are 10 percent or more for nongrandfathered plans in the individual and small-group markets. Analyzing these filings for renewals taking effect from mid-2013 through mid-2014, this brief finds that the average rate increase submitted for review was 13 percent. Insurers attributed the great bulk of these larger rate increases to routine factors such as trends in medical costs. Most insurers did not attribute any portion of these medical cost trends to factors related to the Affordable Care Act. The ACA-related factors mentioned most often were nonmedical: the new federal taxes on insurers, and the fee for the transitional reinsurance program. On average, insurers that quantified any ACA impact attributed about a third of their larger rate increases to these new ACA assessments.

Kamakahi vs ASRM and the future of compensation for human eggs.

A recent lawsuit that alleges that the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) engages in price-fixing by capping the amount of compensation paid for human oocytes has several critical ethical and policy implications that have received relatively little attention. ASRM has argued that ceilings on donor compensation prevent enticement, exploitation, and oocyte commodification. Critics counter that low donor compensation decreases supply, because fewer women are then interested in donating, which then increases prices for the service that physicians, not donors, accrue, and that ethical goals can be better achieved through enhanced informed consent, hiring egg donor advocates, and better counseling and screening. Yet, if compensation caps are removed, questions emerge concerning what the oocyte market would then look like. Informed consent is an imperfect process. Beyond the legal and economic questions of whether ASRM violates the Sherman Anti-trust Act also lie crucial questions of whether human eggs should be viewed as other products. We argue that human eggs differ from other factory-produced goods and should command moral respect. Although eggs (or embryos) are not equivalent to human beings, they deserve special consideration, because of their potential for human life, and thus have a different moral status. ASRM's current guidelines appear to address, even if imperfectly, ethical challenges that are related to egg procurement for infertility treatment. Given public concerns about oocyte commodification and ASRM's wariness of government regulations, existing guidelines may represent a compromise by aiding patients who seek eggs, while simultaneously trying to avoid undue influence, exploitation, and eugenics. Although the ultimate outcome of this lawsuit remains unclear, policy makers, providers, lawyers, judges, and others should attend seriously to these issues. Alternatives to current ASRM guidelines may be possible (eg, raising the current caps to, say, $12,000 or $15,000, potentially increasing donation, while still avoiding certain ethical difficulties) and warrant close consideration. These complex conflicting ethical issues deserve more attention than they have received because they affect key aspects of clinical practice and the lives of countless patients.