Out-of-Pocket Spending for Influenza Hospitalizations in Medicare Advantage.

INTRODUCTION: Although many Medicare Advantage plans have waived cost sharing for COVID-19 hospitalizations, these waivers are voluntary and may be temporary. To estimate the magnitude of potential patient cost sharing if waivers are not implemented or are allowed to expire, this study assesses the level and predictors of out-of-pocket spending for influenza hospitalizations in 2018 among elderly Medicare Advantage patients. METHODS: Using the Optum De-Identified Clinformatics DataMart, investigators identified Medicare Advantage patients aged ≥65 years hospitalized for influenza in 2018. For each hospitalization, out-of-pocket spending was calculated by summing deductibles, coinsurance, and copays. The mean out-of-pocket spending and the proportion of hospitalizations with out-of-pocket spending exceeding $2,500 were calculated. A 1-part generalized linear model with a log link and Poisson variance function was fitted to model out-of-pocket spending as a function of patient demographic characteristics, plan type, and hospitalization characteristics. Coefficients were converted to absolute changes in out-of-pocket spending by calculating average marginal effects. RESULTS: Among 14,278 influenza hospitalizations, the mean out-of-pocket spending was $987 (SD=$799). Out-of-pocket spending exceeded $2,500 for 3.0% of hospitalizations. The factors associated with higher out-of-pocket spending included intensive care use, greater length of stay, and enrollment in a preferred provider organization plan (average marginal effect=$634, 95% CI=$631, $636) compared with enrollment in an HMO plan. CONCLUSIONS: In this analysis of elderly Medicare Advantage patients, the mean out-of-pocket spending for influenza hospitalizations was almost $1,000. Federal policymakers should consider passing legislation mandating insurers to eliminate cost sharing for COVID-19 hospitalizations. Insurers with existing cost-sharing waivers should consider extending them indefinitely, and those without such waivers should consider implementing them immediately.

Medicare Advantage for Most.

Policy Points Fixing the ACA requires real cost containment in addition to better subsidies. Private Medicare (Medicare Advantage) plans are uniquely empowered to control costs and deliver good care. Medicare Advantage plans should serve as the public option on the ACA Marketplace. Medicare Advantage plans can also be deployed to voluntarily raise minimum employer-sponsored benefits and contain their costs.

Perspectives on Opportunities and Challenges for Medicare Advantage Plans to Address Social Determinants of Health via the CHRONIC Care Act.

There is increasing recognition of the role of social determinants of health (SDOH) in the ability of Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollees to obtain needed care. The 2018 CHRONIC Care Act established Special Supplemental Benefits for the Chronically Ill (SSBCI), which for the first time gives MA plans the flexibility to provide supplemental benefits to enrollees to address SDOH. Given the role of SDOH in chronic disease, this represents an opportunity for MA plans to address underlying issues not strictly health care related with which MA enrollees struggle and that affect their overall health. MA plans have experimented with different approaches to address SDOH but have been limited by the lack of ability to offer services as part of covered benefits and reliance on partnerships, grants, and other funding sources to support the provision of these services. The effect of this policy and how it may evolve before implementation begins in 2020 remains uncertain as we wait to see how MA plans will interpret eligibility criteria and services offered without any additional allotted funding.

Medicare Program; Contract Year 2019 Policy and Technical Changes to the Medicare Advantage, Medicare Cost Plan, Medicare Fee-for-Service, the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs, and the PACE Program. Final rule.

This final rule will revise the Medicare Advantage (MA) program (Part C) regulations and Prescription Drug Benefit program (Part D) regulations to implement certain provisions of the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA) to further reduce the number of beneficiaries who may potentially misuse or overdose on opioids while still having access to important treatment options; implement certain provisions of the 21st Century Cures Act; support innovative approaches to improve program quality, accessibility, and affordability; offer beneficiaries more choices and better care; improve the CMS customer experience and maintain high beneficiary satisfaction; address program integrity policies related to payments based on prescriber, provider and supplier status in MA, Medicare cost plan, Medicare Part D and the PACE programs; provide an update to the official Medicare Part D electronic prescribing standards; and clarify program requirements and certain technical changes regarding treatment of Medicare Part A and Part B appeal rights related to premiums adjustments.

Effects of Caps on Cost Sharing for Skilled Nursing Facility Services in Medicare Advantage Plans.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate a federal regulation effective in 2011 that limited how much that Medicare Advantage (MA) plans could charge for the first 20 days of care in a skilled nursing facility (SNF). DESIGN: Difference-in-differences retrospective analysis comparing SNF utilization trends from 2008-2012. SETTING: Select MA plans. PARTICIPANTS: Members of 27 plans with mandatory cost sharing reductions (n=132,000) and members of 21 plans without such reductions (n=138,846). MEASUREMENTS: Mean monthly number of SNF admissions and days per 1,000 members; annual proportion of MA enrollees exiting the plan. RESULTS: In plans with mandated cost sharing reductions, cost sharing for the first 20 days of SNF care decreased from an average of $2,039 in 2010 to $992 in 2011. In adjusted analyses, plans with mandated cost-sharing reductions averaged 158.1 SNF days (95% confidence interval (CI)=153.2-163.1 days) per 1,000 members per month before the cost sharing cap. This measure increased by 14.3 days (95% CI=3.8-24.8 days, p=0.009) in the 2 years after cap implementation. However, increases in SNF utilization did not significantly differ between plans with and without mandated cost-sharing reductions (adjusted between-group difference: 7.1 days per 1,000 members, 95% CI=-6.5-20.8, p=.30). Disenrollment patterns did not change after the cap took effect. CONCLUSIONS: When a federal regulation designed to protect MA members from high out-of-pocket costs for postacute care took effect, the use of SNF services did not change.

Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims and Entitlement, Medicare Advantage Organization Determination, and Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage Determination Appeals Procedures. Final rule.

This final rule revises the procedures that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) follows at the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) level for appeals of payment and coverage determinations for items and services furnished to Medicare beneficiaries, enrollees in Medicare Advantage (MA) and other Medicare competitive health plans, and enrollees in Medicare prescription drug plans, as well as appeals of Medicare beneficiary enrollment and entitlement determinations, and certain Medicare premium appeals. In addition, this final rule revises procedures that the Department of Health and Human Services follows at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Medicare Appeals Council (Council) levels of appeal for certain matters affecting the ALJ level.

Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2017; Medicare Advantage Bid Pricing Data Release; Medicare Advantage and Part D Medical Loss Ratio Data Release; Medicare Advantage Provider Network Requirements; Expansion of Medicare Diabetes Prevention Program Model; Medicare Shared Savings Program Requirements. Final rule.

This major final rule addresses changes to the physician fee schedule and other Medicare Part B payment policies, such as changes to the Value Modifier, to ensure that our payment systems are updated to reflect changes in medical practice and the relative value of services, as well as changes in the statute. This final rule also includes changes related to the Medicare Shared Savings Program, requirements for Medicare Advantage Provider Networks, and provides for the release of certain pricing data from Medicare Advantage bids and of data from medical loss ratio reports submitted by Medicare health and drug plans. In addition, this final rule expands the Medicare Diabetes Prevention Program model.

Plans on a roll. Will they continue to rock?

Well, they've defied expectations so far. It was expected that MA enrollment would decline from 10.9 million enrollees (or 24% of all Medicare enrollment) to 8.2 million (15% of Medicare's total enrollment). Instead, enrollment has continued to climb. In 2016, 17.6 million Medicare beneficiaries-or 31% of all beneficiaries-were in MA plans.

Medicare Advantage: what explains its robust health?

The Medicare Advantage (MA) program continues to grow and thrive, despite plan payment cuts imposed through the Affordable Care Act. What explains this surprising outcome (one that is strikingly different than the experience of MA plans in the late 1990s, when payment cuts led to dramatic shrinkage in enrollment and curtailment of plans)? This analysis argues that a combination of factors, including the way payment cuts were imposed, the plan offerings, the characteristics of beneficiaries, and the way they make choices together explain the program's current health. Understanding these factors is important for MA, Medicare, and, more generally, for participants in new payment models.

Governing Health Care through Free Choice: Neoliberal Reforms in Denmark and the United States.

We compare free choice reforms in Denmark and the United States to understand what ideas and political forces could generate such similar policy reforms in radically different political contexts. We analyze the two cases using our own interpretation of neoliberalism as having "two faces." The first face seeks to expand private markets and shrink the public sector; the second face seeks to strengthen the public sector's capacity to govern through incentives and competition. First, we show why these two most-different cases offer a useful comparison to understand similar policy tools. Second, we develop our theoretical framework of the two faces of neoliberalism. Third, we examine Denmark's introduction of a free choice of hospitals in 2002, a policy that for the first time allowed some patients to receive care either in a public hospital outside their local area or in a private hospital. Fourth, we examine the introduction of free choice among private managed care plans into the US Medicare program in 1997. We show how policy makers in both countries used neoliberal reform as a mechanism to make their public health care sectors governable. Fifth, on the basis of our analysis, we draw five lessons about neoliberal policy reforms.