The Development of Surveillance Systems.

Surveillance systems in public health practice have increased in number and sophistication with advances in data collection, analysis, and communication. When the Communicable Disease Center (now the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) was founded some 70 years ago, surveillance referred to the close observation of individuals with suspected smallpox, plague, or cholera. Alexander Langmuir, head of the Epidemiology Branch, redefined surveillance as the epidemiology-based critical factor in infectious disease control. I joined Langmuir as assistant chief in 1955 and was appointed chief of the Surveillance Section in 1961. In this paper, I describe Langmuir's redefinition of surveillance. Langmuir asserted that its proper use in public health meant the systematic reporting of infectious diseases, the analysis and epidemiologic interpretation of data, and both prompt and widespread dissemination of results. I outline the Communicable Disease Center's first surveillance systems for malaria, poliomyelitis, and influenza. I also discuss the role of surveillance in the global smallpox eradication program, emphasizing that the establishment of systematic reporting systems and prompt action based on results were critical factors of the program.

Results from the first 12 months of the national surveillance of healthcare associated outbreaks in Germany, 2011/2012.

BACKGROUND: In August 2011, the German Protection against Infection Act was amended, mandating the reporting of healthcare associated infection (HAI) outbreak notifications by all healthcare workers in Germany via local public health authorities and federal states to the Robert Koch Institute (RKI). OBJECTIVE: To describe the reported HAI-outbreaks and the surveillance system's structure and capabilities. METHODS: Information on each outbreak was collected using standard paper forms and notified to RKI. Notifications were screened daily and regularly analysed. RESULTS: Between November 2011 and November 2012, 1,326 paper forms notified 578 HAI-outbreaks, between 7 and 116 outbreaks per month. The main causative agent was norovirus (n = 414/578; 72%). Among the 108 outbreaks caused by bacteria, the most frequent pathogens were Clostridium difficile (25%) Klebsiella spp. (19%) and Staphylococcus spp. (19%). Multidrug-resistant bacteria were responsible for 54/108 (50%) bacterial outbreaks. Hospitals were affected most frequently (485/578; 84%). Hospital outbreaks due to bacteria were mostly reported from intensive care units (ICUs) (45%), followed by internal medicine wards (16%). CONCLUSION: The mandatory HAI-outbreak surveillance system describes common outbreaks. Pathogens with a particular high potential to cause large or severe outbreaks may be identified, enabling us to further focus research and preventive measures. Increasing the sensitivity and reliability of the data collection further will facilitate identification of outbreaks able to increase in size and severity, and guide specific control measures to interrupt their propagation.

Implementing basic infection control practices in disaster situations.

Infections, troublesome in even optimal health care environments, can be a source of serious and persistent concern for local populations and health care workers during a disaster, and in austere environments such as those found in Iraq and Afghanistan. For these scenarios, it is vital to have standard infection control practices in place and to have them used consistently. Only then will healthcare workers be able to contain the potential spread of disease and improve conditions for those affected.

The 1918 influenza epidemic in New York City: a review of the public health response.

New York City approached the 1918 influenza epidemic by making use of its existing robust public health infrastructure. Health officials worked to prevent the spread of contagion by distancing healthy New Yorkers from those infected, increasing disease surveillance capacities, and mounting a large-scale health education campaign while regulating public spaces such as schools and theaters. Control measures, such as those used for spitting, were implemented through a spectrum of mandatory and voluntary measures. Most of New York City's public health responses to influenza were adapted from its previous campaigns against tuberculosis, suggesting that a city's existing public health infrastructure plays an important role in shaping its practices and policies during an epidemic.

Revisando a descoberta do sinal de Romaña / Reviewing the discovery of signal Romaña

Revisões históricas aos avanços científicos para o controle da doença, o Simpósio Internacional Comemorativo do Centenário da Descoberta da Doença de Chagas (1909-2009).

[Historical development of health reporting on the community level--an academic void]. / Die historische Entwicklung der kommunalen Gesundheitsberichterstattung--eine Forschungslücke.

In the literature health reporting is often placed within the context of new public health. By doing so, health reporting is viewed as a historically new development distinct from the "old" medical statistics. This point of view, however, only holds true with a view to the medical statistics of the German postwar period in the 20th century. There is also a forgotten health reporting enrooted in the so-called "medical topographies" with a history reaching back more than 200 years. Part of this latter tradition are the Bavarian medical district reports ("Physikatsberichte") from the 19th century. These reports depicted the way of life and state of health of a population in combination with a social medical analysis with a strong action orientation. The demise of these forms of health reports began with the advent of bacteriology.

Transmission dynamics of the great influenza pandemic of 1918 in Geneva, Switzerland: Assessing the effects of hypothetical interventions.

Recurrent outbreaks of the avian H5N1 influenza virus in Asia represent a constant global pandemic threat. We characterize and evaluate hypothetical public health measures during the 1918 influenza pandemic in the Canton of Geneva, Switzerland. The transmission rate, the recovery rate, the diagnostic rate, the relative infectiousness of asymptomatic cases, and the proportion of clinical cases are estimated through least-squares fitting of the model to epidemic curve data of the cumulative number of hospital notifications. The latent period and the case fatality proportion are taken from published literature. We determine the variance and identifiability of model parameters via a simulation study. Our epidemic model agrees well with the observed epidemic data. We estimate the basic reproductive number for the spring wave R1;=1.49 (95% CI: 1.45-1.53) and the reproductive number for the fall wave R2;=3.75 (95% CI: 3.57-3.93). In addition, we estimate the clinical reporting for these two waves to be 59.7% (95% CI: 55.7-63.7) and 83% (95% CI: 79-87). We surmise that the lower reporting in the first wave can be explained by a lack of initial awareness of the epidemic and the relative higher severity of the symptoms experienced during the fall wave. We found that effective isolation measures in hospital clinics at best would only ensure control with probability 0.87 while reducing the transmission rate by >76.5% guarantees stopping an epidemic.

[Mandatory disclosure and infectious disease. From "pestilential" disease to "emerging" diseases]. / Déclaration obligatoire des maladies infectieuses. Des maladies "pestilentielles" aux maladies "émergentes".

Due to the recent overhaul of the procedure on mandatory disclosure of infectious diseases (law relating to the reinforcement of sanitation quality control established in July 1998, and the May 1999 and May 2001 decrees on the application of this law), wishing to take advantage of this opportunity, the authors propose a chronological review retracing the history of these legal declarations. For over a century, they have represented the main instrument used for intervention and surveillance allowing for the fight against infectious diseases. The health options kept have varied over the years, as well as the precautions taken to respect secrecy (nominative or anonymous disclosure, modalities of transmission...). Procedures adopted to reconcile the principle of confidentiality along with the necessity to protect public health in the case where it would require an immediate and urgent intervention are examined throughout the chronology (determining the source of contamination, prevention of contagion).

[The history of poliomyelitis in Norway--disease, society and patients]. / Poliomyelittens historie i Norge--sykdommen, samfunnet og pasienten.

The first epidemic of poliomyelitis in Norway was reported in 1868. Over the course of the 20th century, a total of 23,000 cases of acute poliomyelitis were registered, and the disease caused much suffering and fear before vaccination was introduced in 1956. After 1960, treatment and rehabilitation facilities for polio patients were gradually converted to other uses. Today there are 5,000-10,000 persons with sequelae poliomyelitis in Norway, many of them suffering from late effects of poliomyelitis, so-called postpolio syndrome. Thus there is still a need for multidisciplinary services for these patients, even though the poliovirus could be eradicated in a few years' time.

[Professional cooperation and overview of the health status. Two important initiatives from Christian August Egeberg in 1838 and 1855]. / Faglig samarbeid og oversikt over helsetilstanden. To viktige initiativer fra Christian August Egeberg i 1838 og 1855.

Christian August Egeberg (1809-74) was a Norwegian military surgeon who practised surgery and family medicine in the capital city of Christiania and in neighbouring rural Baerum. He saw the medical profession's need for establishing a scientific community, for information-seeking and knowledge updates. He was among the founders of the Norwegian Medical Society in 1833 and in 1838 initiated a series of Scandinavian scientific conferences which lasted until 1929. In 1855 he established a notification system for contagious diseases with reports submitted every month from practising physician. The system was intended to provide a basis for surveillance of the so-called epidemic constitution, so that appropriate measures might be taken against prevailing diseases.

Public health. Surveillance and privacy.

Surveillance is the radar of public health. It has provided the foundation for public health planning, intervention, and prevention. Important ethical issues regarding privacy--the extent to which name-based reporting violates the trust and assumptions made about how personal medical information will be treated--are raised by public health surveillance. This policy forum looks at the contexts of differing responses from the public health communities and general public to surveillance efforts.