Developing Integrated Clinical Pathways for the Management of Clinically Severe Adult Obesity: a Critique of NHS England Policy.

PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW: Pathways for obesity prevention and treatment are well documented, yet the prevalence of obesity is rising, and access to treatment (including bariatric surgery) is limited. This review seeks to assess the current integrated clinical pathway for obesity management in England and determine the major challenges. RECENT FINDINGS: Evidence for tier 2 (community-based lifestyle intervention) and tier 3 (specialist weight management services) is limited, and how it facilitates care and improve outcomes in tier 4 remains uncertain. Treatment access, rigidity in pathways, uncertain treatment outcomes and weight stigma seems to be major barriers to improved care. More emphasis must be placed on access to effective treatments, treatment flexibility, addressing stigma and ensuring treatment efficacy including long-term health outcomes. Prevention and treatment should both receive significant focus though should be considered to be largely separate pathways. A simplified system for weight management is needed to allow flexibility and the delivery of personalized care including post-bariatric surgery care for those who need it.

An economy of scales: A selective review of obesity's economic causes, consequences, and solutions.

This paper reviews the economic research on obesity, covering topics such as the measurement of, and trends in, obesity, the economic causes of obesity (e.g. the monetary price and time cost of food, food assistance programs, income, education, macroeconomic conditions, and peer effects), and the economic consequences of obesity (e.g. lower wages, a lower probability of employment, and higher medical care costs). It also examines the extent to which obesity imposes negative externalities, and economic interventions that could potentially internalize such externalities, such as food taxes, subsidies for school-based physical activity programs, and financial rewards for weight loss. It discusses other economic rationales for government intervention with respect to obesity, such as imperfect information, time inconsistent preferences, and irrational behavior. It concludes by proposing a research agenda for the field. Overall, the evidence suggests that there is no single dominant economic cause of obesity; a wide variety of factors may contribute a modest amount to the risk. There is consistent evidence regarding the economic consequences of obesity, which are lower wages and higher medical care costs that impose negative externalities through health insurance. Studies of economic approaches to preventing obesity, such as menu labeling, taxes on energy-dense foods, and financial rewards for weight loss find only modest effects on weight and thus a range of policies may be necessary to have a substantial effect on the prevalence of obesity.

The Affordable Care Act permits greater financial rewards for weight loss: a good idea in principle, but many practical concerns remain.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) increased the maximum rewards that group health insurance plans (including employers who self-insure) may offer in their wellness programs, with the goal of incentivizing healthy behaviors such as weight loss among the obese and smoking cessation. In this essay, I describe the history and intention of such programs, and make the following three points: (1) In principle, incentivizing healthy behavior can reduce external costs and help people with time-inconsistent preferences stick to their resolutions; (2) there are problems with the design of this portion of the ACA that will limit its effectiveness in achieving these goals; and (3) financial rewards for healthy behaviors have a mixed record to date, and thus many practical design features need to be resolved to improve the effectiveness of such programs.

Incentives for wellness: tackling issues of effectiveness, biology, scope, and cost shifting.

Morgan Downey raises several interesting issues in his essay. We agree on several points, for example, that current regulations are "really quite porous," with the result that enrollees will be able to get the rewards even if they do not alter their health behaviors. There are also several areas of disagreement that merit further discussion, and I focus on those in this essay. To provide context, my position is that financial incentives for healthy behavior can improve social welfare by internalizing the external costs of risky behaviors and help people with time-inconsistent preferences to adhere to a healthier lifestyle. To achieve the goal of increasing social welfare, the penalties for risky health behaviors should be set equal to the external costs. The design of the rewards (in terms of their frequency, salience, and the amount of loss aversion they invoke) may be critical in determining their effectiveness.

What counts as a health service? Weight loss companies through the looking glass of New Zealand's Code of Patients' Rights.

In New Zealand, the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumer's Rights is a key innovative piece of legislation for the protection of health and disability service users. It provides rights to consumers and imposes duties on the providers of such services, complemented by a cost-free statutory complaints process for the resolution of breakdowns in the relationship between the two. The Code has a potentially liberal application and is theoretically capable of applying to all manner of services through the generalised definitions of the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 (NZ). As the facilitator of the Code, the Health and Disability Commissioner has a correspondingly wide discretion in determining whether to further investigate complaints of Code breaches. This article considers the extent to which the Code's apparent breadth of application could incorporate commercial weight loss companies as providers and the likelihood of the Commissioner using the discretion to investigate complaints against such companies.