Physician Group Practices Accrued Large Bonuses Under Medicare's Bundled Payment Model, 2018-20.

The Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced Model (BPCI-A), a voluntary Alternative Payment Model for Medicare, incentivizes hospitals and physician group practices to reduce spending for patient care episodes below preset target prices. The experience of physician groups in BPCI-A is not well understood. We found that physician groups earned $421 million in incentive payments during BPCI-A's first four performance periods (2018-20). Target prices were positively associated with bonuses, with a mean reconciliation payment of $139 per episode in the lowest decile of target prices and $2,775 in the highest decile. In the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, mean bonuses increased from $815 per episode to $2,736 per episode. These findings suggest that further policy changes, such as improving target price accuracy and refining participation rules, will be important as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services continues to expand BPCI-A and develop other bundled payment models.

Social Risk and Dialysis Facility Performance in the First Year of the ESRD Treatment Choices Model.

Importance: The End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices (ETC) model randomly selected 30% of US dialysis facilities to receive financial incentives based on their use of home dialysis, kidney transplant waitlisting, or transplant receipt. Facilities that disproportionately serve populations with high social risk have a lower use of home dialysis and kidney transplant raising concerns that these sites may fare poorly in the payment model. Objective: To examine first-year ETC model performance scores and financial penalties across dialysis facilities, stratified by their incident patients' social risk. Design, Setting, and Participants: A cross-sectional study of 2191 US dialysis facilities that participated in the ETC model from January 1 through December 31, 2021. Exposure: Composition of incident patient population, characterized by the proportion of patients who were non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, living in a highly disadvantaged neighborhood, uninsured, or covered by Medicaid at dialysis initiation. A facility-level composite social risk score assessed whether each facility was in the highest quintile of having 0, 1, or at least 2 of these characteristics. Main Outcomes and Measures: Use of home dialysis, waitlisting, or transplant; model performance score; and financial penalization. Results: Using data from 125 984 incident patients (median age, 65 years [IQR, 54-74]; 41.8% female; 28.6% Black; 11.7% Hispanic), 1071 dialysis facilities (48.9%) had no social risk features, and 491 (22.4%) had 2 or more. In the first year of the ETC model, compared with those with no social risk features, dialysis facilities with 2 or more had lower mean performance scores (3.4 vs 3.6, P = .002) and lower use of home dialysis (14.1% vs 16.0%, P < .001). These facilities had higher receipt of financial penalties (18.5% vs 11.5%, P < .001), more frequently had the highest payment cut of 5% (2.4% vs 0.7%; P = .003), and were less likely to achieve the highest bonus of 4% (0% vs 2.7%; P < .001). Compared with all other facilities, those in the highest quintile of treating uninsured patients or those covered by Medicaid experienced more financial penalties (17.4% vs 12.9%, P = .01) as did those in the highest quintile in the proportion of patients who were Black (18.5% vs 12.6%, P = .001). Conclusions: In the first year of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' ETC model, dialysis facilities serving higher proportions of patients with social risk features had lower performance scores and experienced markedly higher receipt of financial penalties.

Association Between Individual Primary Care Physician Merit-based Incentive Payment System Score and Measures of Process and Patient Outcomes.

Importance: The Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) influences reimbursement for hundreds of thousands of US physicians, but little is known about whether program performance accurately captures the quality of care they provide. Objective: To examine whether primary care physicians' MIPS scores are associated with performance on process and outcome measures. Design, Setting, and Participants: Cross-sectional study of 80 246 US primary care physicians participating in the MIPS program in 2019. Exposures: MIPS score. Main Outcomes and Measures: The association between physician MIPS scores and performance on 5 unadjusted process measures, 6 adjusted outcome measures, and a composite outcome measure. Results: The study population included 3.4 million patients attributed to 80 246 primary care physicians, including 4773 physicians with low MIPS scores (≤30), 6151 physicians with medium MIPS scores (>30-75), and 69 322 physicians with high MIPS scores (>75). Compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly worse mean performance on 3 of 5 process measures: diabetic eye examinations (56.1% vs 63.2%; difference, -7.1 percentage points [95% CI, -8.0 to -6.2]; P < .001), diabetic HbA1c screening (84.6% vs 89.4%; difference, -4.8 percentage points [95% CI, -5.4 to -4.2]; P < .001), and mammography screening (58.2% vs 70.4%; difference, -12.2 percentage points [95% CI, -13.1 to -11.4]; P < .001) but significantly better mean performance on rates of influenza vaccination (78.0% vs 76.8%; difference, 1.2 percentage points [95% CI, 0.0 to 2.5]; P = .045] and tobacco screening (95.0% vs 94.1%; difference, 0.9 percentage points [95% CI, 0.3 to 1.5]; P = .001). MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with risk-adjusted patient outcomes: compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly better mean performance on 1 outcome (307.6 vs 316.4 emergency department visits per 1000 patients; difference, -8.9 [95% CI, -13.7 to -4.1]; P < .001), worse performance on 1 outcome (255.4 vs 225.2 all-cause hospitalizations per 1000 patients; difference, 30.2 [95% CI, 24.8 to 35.7]; P < .001), and did not have significantly different performance on 4 ambulatory care-sensitive admission outcomes. Nineteen percent of physicians with low MIPS scores had composite outcomes performance in the top quintile, while 21% of physicians with high MIPS scores had outcomes in the bottom quintile. Physicians with low MIPS scores but superior outcomes cared for more medically complex and socially vulnerable patients, compared with physicians with low MIPS scores and poor outcomes. Conclusions and Relevance: Among US primary care physicians in 2019, MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with performance on process and outcome measures. These findings suggest that the MIPS program may be ineffective at measuring and incentivizing quality improvement among US physicians.

AMCP Pay-for-Performance Principles: Performance-Based Reimbursement and Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) Fees.

DISCLOSURE: At the direction of its Board of Directors, the AMCP Public Policy and Professional Practice committees developed these principles for pay-for-performance to promote the use of these arrangements that lead to improved patient outcomes. This document was first released on the AMCP website on December 14, 2021.

How Did Orthopaedic Surgeons Perform in the 2018 Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System?

BACKGROUND: The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS? METHODS: Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100. RESULTS: Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score. CONCLUSION: Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III, therapeutic study.

Development of a Knee Arthroplasty Episode-Based Cost Measure for Evaluating Cost in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System.

BACKGROUND: Under the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) evaluate clinicians who manage Medicare patients on the basis of cost and quality outcomes. CMS contractor Acumen, LLC, convened an expert panel to develop a knee arthroplasty episode-based cost measure (EBCM) for use in the MIPS. METHODS: A Clinical Subcommittee of 28 clinician experts affiliated with 27 specialty societies provided guidance in developing the knee arthroplasty EBCM. The Clinical Subcommittee specified all aspects of the EBCM including triggering of the episode, services within the episode, risk adjustment, subgrouping, and exclusions. Services were counted only if the Clinical Subcommittee deemed them under the influence of the clinician assigned to the EBCM (selective service assignment; SSA). We assessed the reliability of the EBCM and compared it with an alternative population-based cost measure constructed without SSA. RESULTS: We identified 249,301 knee arthroplasty episodes from June 1, 2016, to May 31, 2017, with 10,681 clinicians having at least 10 attributed episodes. The mean episode cost was $19,321 with a standard deviation of $1,816. SSA increased the reliability score from 0.71 to 0.81 relative to an alternative measure that counted all patient costs. SSA also led to reclassification of 41.8% of clinicians into different quintiles of performance. CONCLUSIONS: We found that the use of SSA in the creation of the EBCM substantially reduces random noise (i.e., unrelated medical procedures or costs) and offers a tool for assessing clinicians' costs of management that is focused on care directly related to knee arthroplasty.

Alternative Payment Models and Associations With Stroke Outcomes, Spending, and Service Utilization: A Systematic Review.

Stroke contributes an estimated $28 billion to US health care costs annually, and alternative payment models aim to improve outcomes and lower spending over fee-for-service by aligning economic incentives with high value care. This systematic review evaluates historical and current evidence regarding the impacts of alternative payment models on stroke outcomes, spending, and utilization. Included studies evaluated alternative payment models in 4 categories: pay-for-performance (n=3), prospective payments (n=14), shared savings (n=5), and capitated payments (n=14). Pay-for-performance models were not consistently associated with improvements in clinical quality indicators of stroke prevention. Studies of prospective payments suggested that poststroke spending was shifted between care settings without consistent reductions in total spending. Shared savings programs, such as US Medicare accountable care organizations and bundled payments, were generally associated with null or decreased spending and service utilization and with no differences in clinical outcomes following stroke hospitalizations. Capitated payment models were associated with inconsistent effects on poststroke spending and utilization and some worsened clinical outcomes. Shared savings models that incentivize coordination of care across care settings show potential for lowering spending with no evidence for worsened clinical outcomes; however, few studies evaluated clinical or patient-reported outcomes, and the evidence, largely US-based, may not generalize to other settings.

Financial strategies targeting healthcare providers to promote the prudent use of antibiotics: a systematic review of the evidence.

Improving prudent use of antibiotics is one way to limit the spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). The objective of this systematic review was to assess the effects of financial strategies targeting healthcare providers on the prudent use of antibiotics. A systematic review of the literature was conducted searching PubMed, Embase and Cochrane databases, and the grey literature. Search terms related to antibacterial agents, drug resistance, financial strategies, and healthcare providers and/or prescribers. Twenty-two articles were included in the review, reporting on capitation and salary reimbursement, cost containment interventions, pay-for-performance initiatives, penalties, and a one-off bonus payment. There was substantial variation in the reported outcomes describing prescribing behaviours, including proportion of patients prescribed antibiotics, antibiotic prescriptions per patient, and number of cases treated with recommended antibiotic therapy. All financial strategies were associated with improvements in the appropriate prescription of antibiotics in the short-term, although the magnitude of observed effects varied across financial strategies. Financial penalties were associated with the greatest decreases in inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions, followed by capitation models and pay-for-performance schemes that paid bonuses upon achievement of performance targets. However, the risk of bias across studies must be noted. Findings point to the viability of financial strategies to promote the prudent use of antibiotics. Measuring the downstream impact of prescriber behaviour changes is key to estimating the true value of such interventions to tackle AMR. Research efforts should continue to build the evidence on causal mechanisms driving provider prescribing patterns for antibiotics and the long-term impact on antibiotic prescriptions.

Evaluation of Clinical and Economic Outcomes Following Implementation of a Medicare Pay-for-Performance Program for Surgical Procedures.

Importance: Surgical complications increase hospital costs by approximately $20 000 per admission and extend hospital stays by 9.7 days. Improving surgical care quality and reducing costs is needed for patients undergoing surgery, health care professionals, hospitals, and payers. Objective: To evaluate the association of the Hospital-Acquired Conditions Present on Admission (HAC-POA) program, a mandated national pay-for-performance program by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, with surgical care quality and costs. Design, Setting, and Participants: A cross-sectional study of Medicare inpatient surgical care stays from October 2004 through September 2017 in the US was conducted. The National Inpatient Sample and a propensity score-weighted difference-in-differences analysis of hospital stays with associated primary surgical procedures was used to compare changes in outcomes for the intervention and control procedures before and after HAC-POA program implementation. The sample consisted of 1 317 262 inpatient surgical episodes representing 1 198 665 stays for targeted procedures and 118 597 stays for nontargeted procedures. Analyses were performed between November 1, 2020, and May 7, 2021. Exposures: Implementation of the HAC-POA program for the intervention procedures included in this study (fiscal year 2009). Main Outcomes and Measures: Incidence of surgical site infections and deep vein thrombosis, length of stay, in-hospital mortality, and hospital costs. Analyses were adjusted for patient and hospital characteristics and indicators for procedure type, hospital, and year. Results: In our propensity score-weighted sample, the intervention procedures group comprised 1 047 351 (88.5%) individuals who were White and 742 734 (60.6%) women; mean (SD) age was 75 (6.9) years. The control procedures group included 94 715 (88.0%) individuals who were White, and 65 436 (60.6%) women; mean (SD) age was 75 (7.1) years. After HAC-POA implementation, the incidence of surgical site infections in targeted procedures decreased by 0.3 percentage points (95% CI, -0.5 to -0.1 percentage points; P = .02) compared with nontargeted procedures. The program was associated with a reduction in length of stay by 0.5 days (95% CI, -0.6 to -0.4 days; P < .001) and hospital costs by 8.1% (95% CI, -10.2% to -6.1%; P < .001). No significant changes in deep vein thrombosis incidence and mortality were noted. Conclusions and Relevance: The findings of this study suggest that the HAC-POA program is associated with small decreases in surgical site infection and length of stay and moderate decreases in hospital costs for patients enrolled in Medicare. Policy makers may consider these findings when evaluating the continuation and expansion of this program for other surgical procedures, and payers may want to consider adopting a similar policy.

Current Interventional Radiology-Related Benchmarked Clinical Quality Measures Are Less Likely to be "Capped" Than Diagnostic Radiology Clinical Quality Measures.

In the merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS), quality measures are considered topped out if national median performance rates are ≥95%. Quality measures worth 10 points can be capped at 7 points if topped out for ≥2 years. This report compares the availability of diagnostic radiology (DR)-related and interventional radiology (IR)-related measures worth 10 points. A total of 196 MIPS clinical quality measures were reviewed on the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services MIPS website. There are significantly more IR-related measures worth 10 points than DR measures (2/9 DR measures vs 9/12 IR measures; P = .03), demonstrating that clinical IR services can help mixed IR/DR groups maximize their Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services payment adjustment.

Current and Future Status of Merit-Based Incentive Payment Systems.

The Quality Payment Program was established by the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) legislation in response to repeated efforts to create a permanent so-called doc fix in response to the failures of the sustainable growth formula. This article examines the history leading up to MACRA, the current pathways associated with the Quality Payment Program, and future expectation both from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, stakeholders, and patients.

Understanding value and patient complexity among common inpatient vascular surgery procedures.

OBJECTIVE: Vascular surgery patients are highly complex, second only to patients undergoing cardiac procedures. However, unlike cardiac surgery, work relative value units (wRVU) for vascular surgery were undervalued based on an overall patient complexity score. This study assesses the correlation of patient complexity with wRVUs for the most commonly performed inpatient vascular surgery procedures. METHODS: The 2014 to 2017 National Surgical Quality Improvement Program Participant Use Data Files were queried for inpatient cases performed by vascular surgeons. A previously developed patient complexity score using perioperative domains was calculated based on patient age, American Society of Anesthesiologists class of ≥4, major comorbidities, emergent status, concurrent procedures, additional procedures, hospital length of stay, nonhome discharge, and 30-day major complications, readmissions, and mortality. Procedures were assigned points based on their relative rank and then an overall score was created by summing the total points. An observed to expected ratio (O/E) was calculated using open ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm repair (rOAAA) as the referent and then applied to an adjusted median wRVU per operative minute. RESULTS: Among 164,370 cases, patient complexity was greatest for rOAAA (complexity score = 128) and the least for carotid endarterectomy (CEA) (complexity score = 29). Patients undergoing rOAAA repair had the greatest proportion of American Society of Anesthesiologists class of ≥IV (84.8%; 95% confidence interval [CI], 82.6%-86.8%), highest mortality (35.5%; 95% CI, 32.8%-38.3%), and major complication rate (87.1%; 95% CI, 85.1%-89.0%). Patients undergoing CEA had the lowest mortality (0.7%; 95% CI, 0.7%-0.8%), major complication rate (8.2%; 95% 95% CI, 8.0%-8.5%), and shortest length of stay (2.7 days; 95% CI, 2.7-2.7). The median wRVU ranged from 10.0 to 42.1 and only weakly correlated with overall complexity (Spearman's ρ = 0.11; P < .01). The median wRVU per operative minute was greatest for thoracic endovascular aortic repair (0.25) and lowest for both axillary-femoral artery bypass (0.12) and open femoral endarterectomy, thromboembolectomy, or reconstruction (0.12). After adjusting for patient complexity, CEA (O/E = 3.8) and transcarotid artery revascularization (O/E = 2.8) had greater than expected O/E. In contrast, lower extremity bypass (O/E = 0.77), lower extremity embolectomy (O/E = 0.79), and open abdominal aortic repair (O/E = 0.80) had a lower than expected O/E. CONCLUSIONS: Patient complexity varies substantially across vascular procedures and is not captured effectively by wRVUs. Increased operative time for open procedures is not adequately accounted for by wRVUs, which may unfairly penalize surgeons who perform complex open operations.

Peer Learning in Radiology: Effect of a Pay-for-Performance Initiative on Clinical Impact and Usage.

OBJECTIVE. The purpose of this article is to assess the effects of a pay-for-performance (PFP) initiative on clinical impact and usage of a radiology peer learning tool. MATERIALS AND METHODS. This retrospective study was performed at a large academic hospital. On May 1, 2017, a peer learning tool was implemented to facilitate radiologist peer feedback including clinical follow-up, positive feedback, and consultation. Subsequently, PFP target numbers for peer learning tool alerts by subspecialty divisions (October 1, 2017) and individual radiologists (October 1, 2018) were set. The primary outcome was report addendum rate (percent of clinical follow-up alerts with addenda), which was a proxy for peer learning tool clinical impact. Secondary outcomes were peer learning tool usage rate (number of peer learning tool alerts per 1000 radiology reports) and proportion of clinical follow-up alerts (percent of clinical follow-ups among all peer learning tool alerts). Outcomes were assessed biweekly using ANOVA and statistical process control analyses. RESULTS. Among 1,265,839 radiology reports from May 1, 2017, to September 29, 2019, a total of 20,902 peer learning tool alerts were generated. The clinical follow-up alert addendum rate was not significantly different between the period before the PFP initiative (9.9%) and the periods including division-wide (8.3%) and individual (7.9%) PFP initiatives (p = .55; ANOVA). Peer learning tool usage increased from 2.2 alerts per 1000 reports before the PFP initiative to 12.6 per 1000 during the division-wide PFP period (5.7-fold increase; 12.6/2.2), to 25.2 in the individual PFP period (11.5-fold increase vs before PFP; twofold increase vs division-wide) (p < .001). The clinical follow-up alert proportion decreased from 37.5% before the PFP initiative, to 34.4% in the division-wide period, to 31.3% in the individual PFP period. CONCLUSION. A PFP initiative improved radiologist engagement in peer learning by marked increase in peer learning tool usage rate without a change in report addendum rate as a proxy for clinical impact.

Troubling Trend: Texas' 2018 QPP Data Contains More Bad Signs.

As the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services continues to churn out glowing data annually on its Quality Payment Program (QPP), a full picture of the program's impact eludes the agency's reporting. According to the Texas Medical Association's analysis of state-level data in the 2018 QPP Experience Report, it's clear that small practices continue to feel most of the program's punitive pressures.

Payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings.

BACKGROUND: Changes to the method of payment for healthcare providers, including pay-for-performance schemes, are increasingly being used by governments, health insurers, and employers to help align financial incentives with health system goals. In this review we focused on changes to the method and level of payment for all types of healthcare providers in outpatient healthcare settings. Outpatient healthcare settings, broadly defined as 'out of hospital' care including primary care, are important for health systems in reducing the use of more expensive hospital services. OBJECTIVES: To assess the impact of different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings on the quantity and quality of health service provision, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, cost of service provision, and adverse effects. SEARCH METHODS: We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase (searched 5 March 2019), and several other databases. In addition, we searched clinical trials platforms, grey literature, screened reference lists of included studies, did a cited reference search for included studies, and contacted study authors to identify additional studies. We screened records from an updated search in August 2020, with any potentially relevant studies categorised as awaiting classification. SELECTION CRITERIA: Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient care settings. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the payment methods comparisons and outcomes, and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different outcome categories. Where feasible, we used meta-analysis to synthesise the effects of payment interventions under the same category. Where it was not possible to perform meta-analysis, we have reported means/medians and full ranges of the available point estimates. We have reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative difference (as per cent change or mean difference (MD)) for continuous outcomes. MAIN RESULTS: We included 27 studies in the review: 12 randomised trials, 13 controlled before-and-after studies, one interrupted time series, and one repeated measure study. Most healthcare providers were primary care physicians. Most of the payment methods were implemented by health insurance schemes in high-income countries, with only one study from a low- or middle-income country. The included studies were categorised into four groups based on comparisons of different payment methods. (1) Pay for performance (P4P) plus existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings P4P incentives probably improve child immunisation status (RR 1.27, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.19 to 1.36; 3760 patients; moderate-certainty evidence) and may slightly increase the number of patients who are asked more detailed questions on their disease by their pharmacist (MD 1.24, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.54; 454 patients; low-certainty evidence). P4P may slightly improve primary care physicians' prescribing of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medicines compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.07, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.12; 362 patients; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effects of extra P4P incentives on mean blood pressure reduction for patients and costs for providing services compared with an existing payment method (very low-certainty evidence). Outcomes related to workload or other health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial found that compared to the control group, the performance of incentivised professionals was not sustained after the P4P intervention had ended. (2) Fee for service (FFS) compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings We are uncertain about the effect of FFS on the quantity of health services delivered (outpatient visits and hospitalisations), patient health outcomes, and total drugs cost compared to an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. The quality of service provision and health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial reported that physicians paid via FFS may see more well patients than salaried physicians (low-certainty evidence), possibly implying that more unnecessary services were delivered through FFS. (3) FFS mixed with existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings FFS mixed payment method may increase the quantity of health services provided compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to 1.76; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effect of FFS mixed payment on quality of services provided, patient health outcomes, and health professional outcomes compared with an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. Cost outcomes and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. (4) Enhanced FFS compared with FFS for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings Enhanced FFS (higher FFS payment) probably increases child immunisation rates (RR 1.25, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.48; moderate-certainty evidence). We are uncertain whether higher FFS payment results in more primary care visits and about the effect of enhanced FFS on the net expenditure per year on covered children with regular FFS (very low-certainty evidence). Quality of service provision, patient outcomes, health professional outcomes, and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: For healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings, P4P or an increase in FFS payment level probably increases the quantity of health service provision (moderate-certainty evidence), and P4P may slightly improve the quality of service provision for targeted conditions (low-certainty evidence). The effects of changes in payment methods on health outcomes is uncertain due to very low-certainty evidence. Information to explore the influence of specific payment method design features, such as the size of incentives and type of performance measures, was insufficient. Furthermore, due to limited and very low-certainty evidence, it is uncertain if changing payment models without including additional funding for professionals would have similar effects. There is a need for further well-conducted research on payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings in low- and middle-income countries; more studies comparing the impacts of different designs of the same payment method; and studies that consider the unintended consequences of payment interventions.