Cost-effectiveness of implementing performance-based financing for improving maternal and child health in Ethiopia.

INTRODUCTION: Performance Based Financing (PBF) supports realization of universal health coverage by promoting bargaining between purchasers and health service providers through identifying priority services and monitoring indicators. In PBF, purchasers use health statistics and information to make decisions rather than merely reimbursing invoices. In this respect, PBF shares certain elements of strategic health purchasing. PBF implementation began in Ethiopia in 2015 as a pilot at one hospital and eight health centers. Prior to this the system predominantly followed input-based financing where providers were provided with a predetermined budget for inputs for service provision. The purpose of the study is to determine whether the implementation of PBF is cost-effective in improving maternal and child health in Ethiopia compared to the standard care. METHODS: The current study used cost-effectiveness analysis to assess the effects of PBF on maternal and child health. Two districts implementing PBF and two following standard care were selected for the study. Both groups of selected districts share common grounds before initiating PBF in the selected group. The provider perspective costing approach was used in the study. Data at the district level were gathered retrospectively for the period of July 2018 to June 2021. Data from health service statistics were transformed to population level coverages and the Lives Saved Tool method used to compute the number of lives saved. Additionally for purpose of comparison, lives saved were translated into discounted quality-adjusted life years. RESULTS: The number of lives saved under PBF was 261, whereas number of lives saved under standard care was 194. The identified incremental cost per capita due to PBF was $1.8 while total costs of delivering service at PBF district was 8,816,370 USD per million population per year while the standard care costs 9,780,920 USD per million population per year. QALYs obtained under PBF and standard care were 6,118 and 4,526 per million population per year, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: The conclusion made from this analysis is that, implementing PBF is cost-saving in Ethiopia compared to the standard care. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY: Due to lack of district-level survey-based data, such as prevalence and effects on maternal and child health, national-level estimates were used into the LiST tool.There may be some central-level PBF start-up costs that were not captured, which may have spillover effects on the existing health system performance that this study has not considered.There may be health statistics data accuracy differences between the PBF and non-PBF districts. The researchers considered using data from records as reported by both groups of districts.

Physician Group Practices Accrued Large Bonuses Under Medicare's Bundled Payment Model, 2018-20.

The Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced Model (BPCI-A), a voluntary Alternative Payment Model for Medicare, incentivizes hospitals and physician group practices to reduce spending for patient care episodes below preset target prices. The experience of physician groups in BPCI-A is not well understood. We found that physician groups earned $421 million in incentive payments during BPCI-A's first four performance periods (2018-20). Target prices were positively associated with bonuses, with a mean reconciliation payment of $139 per episode in the lowest decile of target prices and $2,775 in the highest decile. In the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, mean bonuses increased from $815 per episode to $2,736 per episode. These findings suggest that further policy changes, such as improving target price accuracy and refining participation rules, will be important as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services continues to expand BPCI-A and develop other bundled payment models.

Impact of government-issued financial incentive to medical facilities on management of secondary dysmenorrhea.

AIM: In April 2020, the Japanese government introduced a Specific Medical Fee for managing secondary dysmenorrhea (SD). This initiative provided financial incentives to medical facilities that provide appropriate management of SD with hormonal therapies. We aimed to assess how this policy affects the management processes and outcomes of patients with SD. METHODS: Using a large Japanese administrative claims database, we identified outpatient visits of patients diagnosed with SD from April 2018 to March 2022. We used an interrupted time-series analysis and defined before April 2020 as the pre-introduction period and after April 2020 as the post-introduction period. Outcomes were the monthly proportions of outpatient visits due to SD and hormonal therapy among women in the database and the proportions of outpatient visits for hormonal therapy and continuous outpatient visits among patients with SD. RESULTS: We identified 815 477 outpatient visits of patients diagnosed with SD during the pre-introduction period and 920 183 outpatient visits during the post-introduction period. There were significant upward slope changes after the introduction of financial incentives in the outpatient visits due to SD (+0.29% yearly; 95% confidence interval, +0.20% to +0.38%) and hormonal therapies (+0.038% yearly; 95% confidence interval, +0.030% to +0.045%) among the women in the database. Similarly, a significant level change was observed after the introduction of continuous outpatient visits among patients with SD (+2.68% monthly; 95% confidence interval, +0.87% to +4.49%). CONCLUSIONS: Government-issued financial incentives were associated with an increase in the number of patients diagnosed with SD, hormonal therapies, and continuous outpatient visits.

Are Quality Scores in the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System Associated With Outcomes After Outpatient Orthopaedic Surgery?

BACKGROUND: The Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) ties reimbursement incentives to clinician performance to improve healthcare quality. It is unclear whether the MIPS quality score can accurately distinguish between high-performing and low-performing clinicians. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: (1) What were the rates of unplanned hospital visits (emergency department visits, observation stays, or unplanned admissions) within 7, 30, and 90 days of outpatient orthopaedic surgery among Medicare beneficiaries? (2) Was there any association of MIPS quality scores with the risk of an unplanned hospital visit (emergency department visits, observation stays, or unplanned admissions)? METHODS: Between January 2018 and December 2019, a total of 605,946 outpatient orthopaedic surgeries were performed in New York State according to the New York Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative System database. Of those, 56,772 patients were identified as Medicare beneficiaries and were therefore potentially eligible. A further 34% (19,037) were excluded because of missing surgeon identifier, age younger than 65 years, residency outside New York State, emergency department visit on the same day as outpatient surgery, observation stay on the same claim as outpatient surgery, and concomitant high-risk or eye procedures, leaving 37,735 patients for analysis. The database does not include a list of all state residents and thus does not allow for censoring of patients who move out of state. We chose this dataset because it includes nearly all hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers in a large geographic area (New York State) and hence is not limited by sampling bias. We included 37,735 outpatient orthopaedic surgical encounters among Medicare beneficiaries in New York State from 2018 to 2019. For the 37,735 outpatient orthopaedic surgical procedures included in our study, the mean ± standard deviation age of patients was 73 ± 7 years, 84% (31,550) were White, and 59% (22,071) were women. Our key independent variable was the MIPS quality score percentile (0 to 19th, 20th to 39th, 40th to 59th, or 60th to 100th) for orthopaedic surgeons. Clinicians in the MIPS program may receive a bonus or penalty based on the overall MIPS score, which ranges from 0 to 100 and is a weighted score based on four subscores: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and cost. The MIPS quality score, which attempts to reward clinicians providing superior quality of care, accounted for 50% and 45% of the overall MIPS score in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Our main outcome measures were 7-day, 30-day, and 90-day unplanned hospital visits after outpatient orthopaedic surgery. To determine the association between MIPS quality scores and unplanned hospital visits, we estimated multivariable hierarchical logistic regression models controlling for MIPS quality scores; patient-level (age, race and ethnicity, gender, and comorbidities), facility-level (such as bed size and teaching status), surgery and surgeon-level (such as surgical procedure and surgeon volume) covariates; and facility-level random effects. We then used these models to estimate the adjusted rates of unplanned hospital visits across MIPS quality score percentiles after adjusting for covariates in the multivariable models. RESULTS: In total, 2% (606 of 37,735), 2% (783 of 37,735), and 3% (1013 of 37,735) of encounters had an unplanned hospital visit within 7, 30, or 90 days of outpatient orthopaedic surgery, respectively. Most hospital visits within 7 days (95% [576 of 606]), 30 days (94% [733 of 783]), or 90 days (91% [924 of 1013]) were because of emergency department visits. We found very small differences in unplanned hospital visits by MIPS quality scores, with the 20th to 39th percentile of MIPS quality scores having 0.71% points (95% CI -1.19% to -0.22%; p = 0.004), 0.68% points (95% CI -1.26% to -0.11%; p = 0.02), and 0.75% points (95% CI -1.42% to -0.08%; p = 0.03) lower than the 0 to 19th percentile at 7, 30, and 90 days, respectively. There was no difference in adjusted rates of unplanned hospital visits between patients undergoing surgery with a surgeon in the 0 to 19th, 40th to 59th, or 60th to 100th percentiles at 7, 30, or 90 days. CONCLUSION: We found that the rates of unplanned hospital visits after outpatient orthopaedic surgery among Medicare beneficiaries were low and primarily driven by emergency department visits. We additionally found only a small association between MIPS quality scores for individual physicians and the risk of an unplanned hospital visit after outpatient orthopaedic surgery. These findings suggest that policies aimed at reducing postoperative emergency department visits may be the best target to reduce overall postoperative unplanned hospital visits and that the MIPS program should be eliminated or modified to more strongly link reimbursement to risk-adjusted patient outcomes, thereby better aligning incentives among patients, surgeons, and the Centers for Medicare ad Medicaid Services. Future work could seek to evaluate the association between MIPS scores and other surgical outcomes and evaluate whether annual changes in MIPS score weighting are independently associated with clinician performance in the MIPS and regarding clinical outcomes. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III, therapeutic study.

Social Risk and Dialysis Facility Performance in the First Year of the ESRD Treatment Choices Model.

Importance: The End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices (ETC) model randomly selected 30% of US dialysis facilities to receive financial incentives based on their use of home dialysis, kidney transplant waitlisting, or transplant receipt. Facilities that disproportionately serve populations with high social risk have a lower use of home dialysis and kidney transplant raising concerns that these sites may fare poorly in the payment model. Objective: To examine first-year ETC model performance scores and financial penalties across dialysis facilities, stratified by their incident patients' social risk. Design, Setting, and Participants: A cross-sectional study of 2191 US dialysis facilities that participated in the ETC model from January 1 through December 31, 2021. Exposure: Composition of incident patient population, characterized by the proportion of patients who were non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, living in a highly disadvantaged neighborhood, uninsured, or covered by Medicaid at dialysis initiation. A facility-level composite social risk score assessed whether each facility was in the highest quintile of having 0, 1, or at least 2 of these characteristics. Main Outcomes and Measures: Use of home dialysis, waitlisting, or transplant; model performance score; and financial penalization. Results: Using data from 125 984 incident patients (median age, 65 years [IQR, 54-74]; 41.8% female; 28.6% Black; 11.7% Hispanic), 1071 dialysis facilities (48.9%) had no social risk features, and 491 (22.4%) had 2 or more. In the first year of the ETC model, compared with those with no social risk features, dialysis facilities with 2 or more had lower mean performance scores (3.4 vs 3.6, P = .002) and lower use of home dialysis (14.1% vs 16.0%, P < .001). These facilities had higher receipt of financial penalties (18.5% vs 11.5%, P < .001), more frequently had the highest payment cut of 5% (2.4% vs 0.7%; P = .003), and were less likely to achieve the highest bonus of 4% (0% vs 2.7%; P < .001). Compared with all other facilities, those in the highest quintile of treating uninsured patients or those covered by Medicaid experienced more financial penalties (17.4% vs 12.9%, P = .01) as did those in the highest quintile in the proportion of patients who were Black (18.5% vs 12.6%, P = .001). Conclusions: In the first year of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' ETC model, dialysis facilities serving higher proportions of patients with social risk features had lower performance scores and experienced markedly higher receipt of financial penalties.

Association Between Individual Primary Care Physician Merit-based Incentive Payment System Score and Measures of Process and Patient Outcomes.

Importance: The Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) influences reimbursement for hundreds of thousands of US physicians, but little is known about whether program performance accurately captures the quality of care they provide. Objective: To examine whether primary care physicians' MIPS scores are associated with performance on process and outcome measures. Design, Setting, and Participants: Cross-sectional study of 80 246 US primary care physicians participating in the MIPS program in 2019. Exposures: MIPS score. Main Outcomes and Measures: The association between physician MIPS scores and performance on 5 unadjusted process measures, 6 adjusted outcome measures, and a composite outcome measure. Results: The study population included 3.4 million patients attributed to 80 246 primary care physicians, including 4773 physicians with low MIPS scores (≤30), 6151 physicians with medium MIPS scores (>30-75), and 69 322 physicians with high MIPS scores (>75). Compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly worse mean performance on 3 of 5 process measures: diabetic eye examinations (56.1% vs 63.2%; difference, -7.1 percentage points [95% CI, -8.0 to -6.2]; P < .001), diabetic HbA1c screening (84.6% vs 89.4%; difference, -4.8 percentage points [95% CI, -5.4 to -4.2]; P < .001), and mammography screening (58.2% vs 70.4%; difference, -12.2 percentage points [95% CI, -13.1 to -11.4]; P < .001) but significantly better mean performance on rates of influenza vaccination (78.0% vs 76.8%; difference, 1.2 percentage points [95% CI, 0.0 to 2.5]; P = .045] and tobacco screening (95.0% vs 94.1%; difference, 0.9 percentage points [95% CI, 0.3 to 1.5]; P = .001). MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with risk-adjusted patient outcomes: compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly better mean performance on 1 outcome (307.6 vs 316.4 emergency department visits per 1000 patients; difference, -8.9 [95% CI, -13.7 to -4.1]; P < .001), worse performance on 1 outcome (255.4 vs 225.2 all-cause hospitalizations per 1000 patients; difference, 30.2 [95% CI, 24.8 to 35.7]; P < .001), and did not have significantly different performance on 4 ambulatory care-sensitive admission outcomes. Nineteen percent of physicians with low MIPS scores had composite outcomes performance in the top quintile, while 21% of physicians with high MIPS scores had outcomes in the bottom quintile. Physicians with low MIPS scores but superior outcomes cared for more medically complex and socially vulnerable patients, compared with physicians with low MIPS scores and poor outcomes. Conclusions and Relevance: Among US primary care physicians in 2019, MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with performance on process and outcome measures. These findings suggest that the MIPS program may be ineffective at measuring and incentivizing quality improvement among US physicians.

AMCP Pay-for-Performance Principles: Performance-Based Reimbursement and Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) Fees.

DISCLOSURE: At the direction of its Board of Directors, the AMCP Public Policy and Professional Practice committees developed these principles for pay-for-performance to promote the use of these arrangements that lead to improved patient outcomes. This document was first released on the AMCP website on December 14, 2021.

How Did Orthopaedic Surgeons Perform in the 2018 Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System?

BACKGROUND: The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS? METHODS: Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100. RESULTS: Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score. CONCLUSION: Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III, therapeutic study.

Development of a Knee Arthroplasty Episode-Based Cost Measure for Evaluating Cost in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System.

BACKGROUND: Under the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) evaluate clinicians who manage Medicare patients on the basis of cost and quality outcomes. CMS contractor Acumen, LLC, convened an expert panel to develop a knee arthroplasty episode-based cost measure (EBCM) for use in the MIPS. METHODS: A Clinical Subcommittee of 28 clinician experts affiliated with 27 specialty societies provided guidance in developing the knee arthroplasty EBCM. The Clinical Subcommittee specified all aspects of the EBCM including triggering of the episode, services within the episode, risk adjustment, subgrouping, and exclusions. Services were counted only if the Clinical Subcommittee deemed them under the influence of the clinician assigned to the EBCM (selective service assignment; SSA). We assessed the reliability of the EBCM and compared it with an alternative population-based cost measure constructed without SSA. RESULTS: We identified 249,301 knee arthroplasty episodes from June 1, 2016, to May 31, 2017, with 10,681 clinicians having at least 10 attributed episodes. The mean episode cost was $19,321 with a standard deviation of $1,816. SSA increased the reliability score from 0.71 to 0.81 relative to an alternative measure that counted all patient costs. SSA also led to reclassification of 41.8% of clinicians into different quintiles of performance. CONCLUSIONS: We found that the use of SSA in the creation of the EBCM substantially reduces random noise (i.e., unrelated medical procedures or costs) and offers a tool for assessing clinicians' costs of management that is focused on care directly related to knee arthroplasty.

Alternative Payment Models and Associations With Stroke Outcomes, Spending, and Service Utilization: A Systematic Review.

Stroke contributes an estimated $28 billion to US health care costs annually, and alternative payment models aim to improve outcomes and lower spending over fee-for-service by aligning economic incentives with high value care. This systematic review evaluates historical and current evidence regarding the impacts of alternative payment models on stroke outcomes, spending, and utilization. Included studies evaluated alternative payment models in 4 categories: pay-for-performance (n=3), prospective payments (n=14), shared savings (n=5), and capitated payments (n=14). Pay-for-performance models were not consistently associated with improvements in clinical quality indicators of stroke prevention. Studies of prospective payments suggested that poststroke spending was shifted between care settings without consistent reductions in total spending. Shared savings programs, such as US Medicare accountable care organizations and bundled payments, were generally associated with null or decreased spending and service utilization and with no differences in clinical outcomes following stroke hospitalizations. Capitated payment models were associated with inconsistent effects on poststroke spending and utilization and some worsened clinical outcomes. Shared savings models that incentivize coordination of care across care settings show potential for lowering spending with no evidence for worsened clinical outcomes; however, few studies evaluated clinical or patient-reported outcomes, and the evidence, largely US-based, may not generalize to other settings.

Financial strategies targeting healthcare providers to promote the prudent use of antibiotics: a systematic review of the evidence.

Improving prudent use of antibiotics is one way to limit the spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). The objective of this systematic review was to assess the effects of financial strategies targeting healthcare providers on the prudent use of antibiotics. A systematic review of the literature was conducted searching PubMed, Embase and Cochrane databases, and the grey literature. Search terms related to antibacterial agents, drug resistance, financial strategies, and healthcare providers and/or prescribers. Twenty-two articles were included in the review, reporting on capitation and salary reimbursement, cost containment interventions, pay-for-performance initiatives, penalties, and a one-off bonus payment. There was substantial variation in the reported outcomes describing prescribing behaviours, including proportion of patients prescribed antibiotics, antibiotic prescriptions per patient, and number of cases treated with recommended antibiotic therapy. All financial strategies were associated with improvements in the appropriate prescription of antibiotics in the short-term, although the magnitude of observed effects varied across financial strategies. Financial penalties were associated with the greatest decreases in inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions, followed by capitation models and pay-for-performance schemes that paid bonuses upon achievement of performance targets. However, the risk of bias across studies must be noted. Findings point to the viability of financial strategies to promote the prudent use of antibiotics. Measuring the downstream impact of prescriber behaviour changes is key to estimating the true value of such interventions to tackle AMR. Research efforts should continue to build the evidence on causal mechanisms driving provider prescribing patterns for antibiotics and the long-term impact on antibiotic prescriptions.

Evaluation of Clinical and Economic Outcomes Following Implementation of a Medicare Pay-for-Performance Program for Surgical Procedures.

Importance: Surgical complications increase hospital costs by approximately $20 000 per admission and extend hospital stays by 9.7 days. Improving surgical care quality and reducing costs is needed for patients undergoing surgery, health care professionals, hospitals, and payers. Objective: To evaluate the association of the Hospital-Acquired Conditions Present on Admission (HAC-POA) program, a mandated national pay-for-performance program by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, with surgical care quality and costs. Design, Setting, and Participants: A cross-sectional study of Medicare inpatient surgical care stays from October 2004 through September 2017 in the US was conducted. The National Inpatient Sample and a propensity score-weighted difference-in-differences analysis of hospital stays with associated primary surgical procedures was used to compare changes in outcomes for the intervention and control procedures before and after HAC-POA program implementation. The sample consisted of 1 317 262 inpatient surgical episodes representing 1 198 665 stays for targeted procedures and 118 597 stays for nontargeted procedures. Analyses were performed between November 1, 2020, and May 7, 2021. Exposures: Implementation of the HAC-POA program for the intervention procedures included in this study (fiscal year 2009). Main Outcomes and Measures: Incidence of surgical site infections and deep vein thrombosis, length of stay, in-hospital mortality, and hospital costs. Analyses were adjusted for patient and hospital characteristics and indicators for procedure type, hospital, and year. Results: In our propensity score-weighted sample, the intervention procedures group comprised 1 047 351 (88.5%) individuals who were White and 742 734 (60.6%) women; mean (SD) age was 75 (6.9) years. The control procedures group included 94 715 (88.0%) individuals who were White, and 65 436 (60.6%) women; mean (SD) age was 75 (7.1) years. After HAC-POA implementation, the incidence of surgical site infections in targeted procedures decreased by 0.3 percentage points (95% CI, -0.5 to -0.1 percentage points; P = .02) compared with nontargeted procedures. The program was associated with a reduction in length of stay by 0.5 days (95% CI, -0.6 to -0.4 days; P < .001) and hospital costs by 8.1% (95% CI, -10.2% to -6.1%; P < .001). No significant changes in deep vein thrombosis incidence and mortality were noted. Conclusions and Relevance: The findings of this study suggest that the HAC-POA program is associated with small decreases in surgical site infection and length of stay and moderate decreases in hospital costs for patients enrolled in Medicare. Policy makers may consider these findings when evaluating the continuation and expansion of this program for other surgical procedures, and payers may want to consider adopting a similar policy.

Current Interventional Radiology-Related Benchmarked Clinical Quality Measures Are Less Likely to be "Capped" Than Diagnostic Radiology Clinical Quality Measures.

In the merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS), quality measures are considered topped out if national median performance rates are ≥95%. Quality measures worth 10 points can be capped at 7 points if topped out for ≥2 years. This report compares the availability of diagnostic radiology (DR)-related and interventional radiology (IR)-related measures worth 10 points. A total of 196 MIPS clinical quality measures were reviewed on the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services MIPS website. There are significantly more IR-related measures worth 10 points than DR measures (2/9 DR measures vs 9/12 IR measures; P = .03), demonstrating that clinical IR services can help mixed IR/DR groups maximize their Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services payment adjustment.

Current and Future Status of Merit-Based Incentive Payment Systems.

The Quality Payment Program was established by the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) legislation in response to repeated efforts to create a permanent so-called doc fix in response to the failures of the sustainable growth formula. This article examines the history leading up to MACRA, the current pathways associated with the Quality Payment Program, and future expectation both from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, stakeholders, and patients.

Understanding value and patient complexity among common inpatient vascular surgery procedures.

OBJECTIVE: Vascular surgery patients are highly complex, second only to patients undergoing cardiac procedures. However, unlike cardiac surgery, work relative value units (wRVU) for vascular surgery were undervalued based on an overall patient complexity score. This study assesses the correlation of patient complexity with wRVUs for the most commonly performed inpatient vascular surgery procedures. METHODS: The 2014 to 2017 National Surgical Quality Improvement Program Participant Use Data Files were queried for inpatient cases performed by vascular surgeons. A previously developed patient complexity score using perioperative domains was calculated based on patient age, American Society of Anesthesiologists class of ≥4, major comorbidities, emergent status, concurrent procedures, additional procedures, hospital length of stay, nonhome discharge, and 30-day major complications, readmissions, and mortality. Procedures were assigned points based on their relative rank and then an overall score was created by summing the total points. An observed to expected ratio (O/E) was calculated using open ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm repair (rOAAA) as the referent and then applied to an adjusted median wRVU per operative minute. RESULTS: Among 164,370 cases, patient complexity was greatest for rOAAA (complexity score = 128) and the least for carotid endarterectomy (CEA) (complexity score = 29). Patients undergoing rOAAA repair had the greatest proportion of American Society of Anesthesiologists class of ≥IV (84.8%; 95% confidence interval [CI], 82.6%-86.8%), highest mortality (35.5%; 95% CI, 32.8%-38.3%), and major complication rate (87.1%; 95% CI, 85.1%-89.0%). Patients undergoing CEA had the lowest mortality (0.7%; 95% CI, 0.7%-0.8%), major complication rate (8.2%; 95% 95% CI, 8.0%-8.5%), and shortest length of stay (2.7 days; 95% CI, 2.7-2.7). The median wRVU ranged from 10.0 to 42.1 and only weakly correlated with overall complexity (Spearman's ρ = 0.11; P < .01). The median wRVU per operative minute was greatest for thoracic endovascular aortic repair (0.25) and lowest for both axillary-femoral artery bypass (0.12) and open femoral endarterectomy, thromboembolectomy, or reconstruction (0.12). After adjusting for patient complexity, CEA (O/E = 3.8) and transcarotid artery revascularization (O/E = 2.8) had greater than expected O/E. In contrast, lower extremity bypass (O/E = 0.77), lower extremity embolectomy (O/E = 0.79), and open abdominal aortic repair (O/E = 0.80) had a lower than expected O/E. CONCLUSIONS: Patient complexity varies substantially across vascular procedures and is not captured effectively by wRVUs. Increased operative time for open procedures is not adequately accounted for by wRVUs, which may unfairly penalize surgeons who perform complex open operations.