Private care and public waiting.

Waiting time for public hospital care is a regular matter for political debate One political response has been to suggest that expanding private sector activity will reduce public waiting times. This paper tests the hypothesis that increased private activity in the health system is associated with reduced waiting times using secondary analysis of hospital activity data for 2001-02. Median waiting time is shown to be inversely related to the proportion of public patients. Policymakers should therefore be cautious about assuming that additional support for the private sector will take pressure off the public sector and reduce waiting times for public patients.

Structural problems in the German hospital system.

The German health care system has been based on the Hospital Financing Act, which the German government introduced in 1972. According to that, the federal states plan hospitals and make investments. The health insurance funds finance the operating costs. But now the Hospital Financing Act is obsolete, because both the health insurance funds and the federal states are in financial trouble and try to avoid the costs, which are nevertheless rising. In order to freeze costs, the legislators have introduced a new remuneration system, called DRGs (Diagnosis Related Groups), which will be mandatory from 2007 onwards. In this system, the treatment provided will be coded and remunerated on the basis of the primary diagnosis. Periods of hospitalisation and different remuneration systems will no longer be relevant. Transparency and quality will thus be promoted, and the upshot will be more competition among the hospitals. Hospitals that cannot meet quality standards will lose patients and will ultimately have to close. Other participants in the health care system, such as, for example, nursing staff, physicians, pharmacies, rehabilitaion centres and patients, will also be concerned in many ways. The consequences of the DRGs for the health care system, its future development and possible alternatives are discussed in this article.

Impact of private health insurance incentives on obstetric outcomes in NSW hospitals.

The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of changes in Australian private health insurance coverage as seen in NSW public and private hospital birth profies, and identify trends in obstetric outcomes from 1997-2001. NSW Midwives Data Collection unit record data is analysed for women who gave birth to a live singleton baby of term gestation (> or = 37 weeks) and cephalic presentation in NSW hospitals during 1997- 2001. Use of private hospitals for childbirth has increased in conjunction with increases in private health insurance coverage. Although some obstetric interventions have increased for both public and private hospitals over time, clinical factors do not explain the large differences in birth interventions and outcomes between NSW public and private hospitals. Incentives to increase private health insurance coverage appear to be having a negative impact on childbirth, in terms of higher birth intervention and operative birth rates in NSW private hospitals.

Critical issues in hospital antitrust law.

Antitrust litigation involving hospitals is common. This paper describes recent developments and underlying issues in antitrust law with respect to hospital-hospital relations, hospital-physician relations, and hospital-payer relations. A key unanswered question in each of these areas is how government regulation and public purchasing affect competitive markets for hospital services.

Hospital inpatient prospective payment system: incorporating new technology.

New technologies in the impatient prospective payment system are discussed. On December 21, 2000, Congress passed Public Law 106-554 that includes a requirement to establish a mechanism to more expeditiously incorporate the costs and establish qualifying criteria for payment of new services and technologies into the hospital inpatient prospective payment system. The final ruling of this law states that a new service or technology must demonstrate substantial improvement, be inadequately paid under the DRG system, and be "new." The intent of these criteria is to identify new technologies that offer substantial improvement over existing technologies and to provide supplemental payment that encourages physicians and hospitals to utilize the new technology. In November 2001, drotrecogin alfa (activated) received fast-track FDA approval because of the robust findings from the PROWESS trial. Drotrecogin alfa (activated) is the first agent proven to reduce mortality in patients suffering from severe sepsis associated with acute organ dysfunction who are at a high risk of death (i.e., APACHE II score > 24). In August 2002, drotrecogin alfa (activated) was one of four such new technologies and the first agent approved for new technology payment under the prospective payment system (PPS). This decision offers confidence that the PPS is effectively striving to incorporate new medical services and technologies at a pace similar to that of innovation. Providers may receive up to $3400 in additional reimbursement when drotrecogin alfa (activated) is administered in the Medicare population. Pharmacy and patient accounting personnel should develop a collaborative process to identify, document, and capture this new source of payment.

The reform of hospital financing in Germany: an international solution?

From 2003, each inpatient's stay at a German hospital will be reimbursed according to diagnosis related groups. The former German hospital financing system, which consisted partly of per diem rates and partly of per-case rates, was abolished in an attempt to increase efficiency in hospitals. This can be seen as the government's attempt to act on the principles of evidence-based policy. Since there is no strict global budget for inpatient treatment, it is not certain that those diagnosis related groups will actually decrease overall expenditures on hospitals. Also, it is argued that the introduction of diagnosis related groups in Germany may not be the last step in rebuilding the German health care system. The manner, scope and timing of this reform suggests that it will not succeed. Reforms lead to yet more reforms.