Epistemic language in news headlines shapes readers' perceptions of objectivity.

How we reason about objectivity-whether an assertion has a ground truth-has implications for belief formation on wide-ranging topics. For example, if someone perceives climate change to be a matter of subjective opinion similar to the best movie genre, they may consider empirical claims about climate change as mere opinion and irrelevant to their beliefs. Here, we investigate whether the language employed by journalists might influence the perceived objectivity of news claims. Specifically, we ask whether factive verb framing (e.g., "Scientists know climate change is happening") increases perceived objectivity compared to nonfactive framing (e.g., "Scientists believe [...]"). Across eight studies (N = 2,785), participants read news headlines about unique, noncontroversial topics (studies 1a-b, 2a-b) or a familiar, controversial topic (climate change; studies 3a-b, 4a-b) and rated the truth and objectivity of the headlines' claims. Across all eight studies, when claims were presented as beliefs (e.g., "Tortoise breeders believe tortoises are becoming more popular pets"), people consistently judged those claims as more subjective than claims presented as knowledge (e.g., "Tortoise breeders know…"), as well as claims presented as unattributed generics (e.g., "Tortoises are becoming more popular pets"). Surprisingly, verb framing had relatively little, inconsistent influence over participants' judgments of the truth of claims. These results demonstrate how, apart from shaping whether we believe a claim is true or false, epistemic language in media can influence whether we believe a claim has an objective answer at all.

Modeling and leveraging intuitive theories to improve vaccine attitudes.

Much of the richness of human thought is supported by people's intuitive theories-mental frameworks capturing the perceived structure of the world. But intuitive theories can also contain and reinforce dangerous misconceptions. In this paper, we take up the case of misconceptions about vaccine safety that discourages vaccination. These misconceptions constitute a major public health risk that predates the coronavirus pandemic but that has become all the more dire in recent years. We argue that addressing such misconceptions requires awareness of the broader conceptual contexts in which they are embedded. To build this understanding, we examined the structure and revision of people's intuitive theories of vaccination in five large survey studies (total N = 3,196). Based on these data, we present a cognitive model of the intuitive theory surrounding people's decisions about whether to vaccinate young children against diseases like measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR). Using this model, we were able to make accurate predictions about how people's beliefs would be revised in light of educational interventions, design an effective new intervention encouraging vaccination, and understand how these beliefs were affected by real-world events (the measles outbreaks of 2019). In addition to presenting a promising way forward for promoting the MMR vaccine, this approach has clear implications for encouraging the uptake of COVID-19 vaccines, especially among parents of young children. At the same time, this work provides the foundation for richer understandings of intuitive theories and belief revision more broadly. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Gender Categories as Dual-Character Concepts?

Seminal work by Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) distinguished a set of concepts, which they named "dual-character concepts." Unlike traditional concepts, they require two distinct criteria for determining category membership. For example, the prototypical dual-character concept "artist" has both a concrete dimension of artistic skills, and an abstract dimension of aesthetic sensibility and values. Therefore, someone can be a good artist on the concrete dimension but not truly an artist on the abstract dimension. Does this analysis capture people's understanding of cornerstone social categories, such as gender, around which society and everyday life have traditionally been organized? Gender, too, may be conceived as having not only a concrete dimension but also a distinct dimension of abstract norms and values. As with dual-character concepts, violations of abstract norms and values may result in someone being judged as not truly a man/woman. Here, we provide the first empirical assessment of applying the dual-character framework to people's conception of gender. We found that, on some measures that primarily relied on metalinguistic cues, gender concepts did indeed resemble dual-character concepts. However, on other measures that depicted transgressions of traditional gender norms, neither "man" nor "woman" appeared dual-character-like, in that participants did not disqualify people from being truly a man or truly a woman. In a series of follow-up studies, we examined whether moral norms have come to replace gender role norms for the abstract dimension. Implications for the evolution of concepts and categories are explored.

"Just as good": Learning gender stereotypes from attempts to counteract them.

How do children learn gender stereotypes? Although people commonly use statements like "Girls are as good as boys at math" to express gender equality, such subject-complement statements subtly perpetuate the stereotype that boys are naturally more skilled. The syntax of such statements frames the item in the complement position (here, boys) as the standard for comparison or reference point. Thus, when the statement concerns ability, listeners infer that this item is naturally more skilled than the item in the subject position (here, girls). In 2 experiments, we ask whether subject-complement statements could not only reinforce preexisting gender stereotypes, but also teach them. The participants were 288 adults (51% women, 49% men) and 337 children ages 7 to 11 (50% girls, 50% boys; of the 62% who reported race, 44% self-declared as White; from primarily middle-class to upper middle-class families). Participants were provided with subject-complement statements about either novel abilities (e.g., "Girls are as good as boys at trewting") or nonstereotyped activities (e.g., "Boys are as good as girls at snapping"). Both adults and children inferred that the gender in the complement position was naturally more skilled than the gender in the subject position. Using subject-complement statements to express gender equality (e.g., "Girls are as good as boys at math") could thus backfire and teach children that boys have more natural ability. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

When intents to educate can misinform: Inadvertent paltering through violations of communicative norms.

Paltering is a form of deception whereby true statements are used to mislead and is widely employed in negotiations, marketing, espionage, and ordinary communications where speakers hold ulterior motives. We argue that paltering is accomplished through strategic violations of communicative norms such as the Gricean cooperative principles of relevance, quantity, quality and manner. We further argue that, just as genuine paltering deceives by deliberately violating communicative norms, inadvertent violations of these norms may be just as misleading. In this work, we demonstrated that educational information presented prominently on the American Diabetes Association website violated the Gricean communicative principles and disrupted readers' performance on a test of diabetes knowledge. To establish the effects of these communicative violations, we revised the ADA's information to preserve the original content while better adhering to pragmatic principles. When these ADA explanations were judiciously revised to minimize pragmatic violations, they were transformed from misleading to educational.

Why do we eat cereal but not lamb chops at breakfast? Investigating Americans' beliefs about breakfast foods.

Healthy breakfast consumption has a multitude of positive benefits. However, typical American breakfasts are notoriously unhealthy. We hypothesize that the resistance to include nutritious foods at breakfast is due in part to misconceptions about what "breakfast" should be. Consistent with this proposal, results from three studies (N = 1097) suggest that American adults perceive typical breakfast foods as particularly well suited for breakfast and believe that more nutritious alternatives consumed at lunch or dinner are less appropriate for breakfast. As a result, people are unwilling to add more nutritious alternatives to their breakfast repertoire. To counter this rigidity, we devised an intervention passage emphasizing that (1) many foods became breakfast staples because of intensive marketing campaigns, and that (2) people in other cultures readily include lunch or dinner foods on their breakfast plate. This approach effectively revised people's beliefs about breakfast foods, and improved their motivation to adopt a healthier breakfast diet. Our findings demonstrate the power of a conceptually rich framework in undermining mistaken beliefs and boosting healthy eating behaviors.

"Girls Are as Good as Boys at Math" Implies That Boys Are Probably Better: A Study of Expressions of Gender Equality.

Although "Girls are as good as boys at math" explicitly expresses equality, we predict it could nevertheless suggest that boys have more raw talent. In statements with this subject-complement structure, the item in the complement position serves as the reference point and is thus considered more typical and prominent. This explains why "Tents are like houses," for instance, sounds better than "Houses are like tents"-people generally think of houses as more typical. For domains about ability, the reference point should be the item that is typically more skilled. We further propose that the reference point should be naturally more skilled. In two experiments, we presented adults with summaries of actual scientific evidence for gender equality in math (Experiment 1) or verbal ability (Experiment 2), but we manipulated whether the reference point in the statements of equality in the summaries (e.g., "Boys' verbal ability is as good as girls'") was girls or boys. As predicted, adults attributed more natural ability to each gender when it was in the complement rather than subject position. Yet, in Experiment 3, we found that when explicitly asked, participants judged that such sentences were not biased in favor of either gender, indicating that subject-complement statements must be transmitting this bias in a subtle way. Thus, statements such as "Girls are as good as boys at math" can actually backfire and perpetuate gender stereotypes about natural ability.

Misleading Health Consumers Through Violations of Communicative Norms: A Case Study of Online Diabetes Education.

Communication is a cooperative endeavor that goes well beyond decoding sentences' literal meaning. Listeners actively construe the meaning of utterances from both their literal meanings and the pragmatic principles that govern communication. When communicators make pragmatically infelicitous statements, the effects can be similar to paltering-misleading speech that evokes false inferences from true statements. The American Diabetes Association's (ADA's) "Diabetes Myths" website provides a real-world case study in such misleading communications. Calling something a myth implies that it is clearly false. Instead, the ADA's "myths" are false only because of some technicality or uncharitable reading. We compared participants' baseline knowledge of diabetes with that of participants who read either the ADA's myths or the myths rewritten as questions that do not presuppose the statement is false. As predicted, exposure to the ADA's "myths," but not to the rephrased questions, reduced basic knowledge of diabetes. Our findings underscore the need to consider psycholinguistic principles in mass communications.

Rethinking people's conceptions of mental life.

How do people make sense of the emotions, sensations, and cognitive abilities that make up mental life? Pioneering work on the dimensions of mind perception has been interpreted as evidence that people consider mental life to have two core components-experience (e.g., hunger, joy) and agency (e.g., planning, self-control) [Gray HM, et al. (2007) Science 315:619]. We argue that this conclusion is premature: The experience-agency framework may capture people's understanding of the differences among different beings (e.g., dogs, humans, robots, God) but not how people parse mental life itself. Inspired by Gray et al.'s bottom-up approach, we conducted four large-scale studies designed to assess people's conceptions of mental life more directly. This led to the discovery of an organization that differs strikingly from the experience-agency framework: Instead of a broad distinction between experience and agency, our studies consistently revealed three fundamental components of mental life-suites of capacities related to the body, the heart, and the mind-with each component encompassing related aspects of both experience and agency. This body-heart-mind framework distinguishes itself from Gray et al.'s experience-agency framework by its clear and importantly different implications for dehumanization, moral reasoning, and other important social phenomena.

Theory-based explanation as intervention.

Cogent explanations are an indispensable means of providing new information and an essential component of effective education. Beyond this, we argue that there is tremendous untapped potential in using explanations to motivate behavior change. In this article we focus on health interventions. We review four case studies that used carefully tailored explanations to address gaps and misconceptions in people's intuitive theories, providing participants with a conceptual framework for understanding how and why some recommended behavior is an effective way of achieving a health goal. These case studies targeted a variety of health-promoting behaviors: (1) children washing their hands to prevent viral epidemics; (2) parents vaccinating their children to stem the resurgence of infectious diseases; (3) adults completing the full course of an antibiotic prescription to reduce antibiotic resistance; and (4) children eating a variety of healthy foods to improve unhealthy diets. Simply telling people to engage in these behaviors has been largely ineffective-if anything, concern about these issues is mounting. But in each case, teaching participants coherent explanatory frameworks for understanding health recommendations has shown great promise, with such theory-based explanations outperforming state-of-the-art interventions from national health authorities. We contrast theory-based explanations both with simply listing facts, information, and advice and with providing a full-blown educational curriculum, and argue for providing the minimum amount of information required to understand the causal link between a target behavior and a health outcome. We argue that such theory-based explanations lend people the motivation and confidence to act on their new understanding.

Children Increase Their Sensitivity to a Speaker's Nonlinguistic Cues Following a Communicative Breakdown.

Bilingual children regularly face communicative challenges when speakers switch languages. To cope with such challenges, children may attempt to discern a speaker's communicative intent, thereby heightening their sensitivity to nonverbal communicative cues. Two studies examined whether such communication breakdowns increase sensitivity to nonverbal cues. English-speaking monolingual (n = 64) and bilingual (n = 54) 3- to 4-year-olds heard instructions in either English only or English mixed with a foreign language. Later, children played a hiding game that relied on nonverbal cues. Hearing a foreign language switch improved both monolingual and bilingual children's use of these cues. Moreover, bilinguals with more prior code-switching exposure outperformed those with less prior code-switching exposure. Children's short-term strategies to repair communication breakdowns may evolve into a more generalizable set of skills.

Are Horses Like Zebras, or Vice Versa? Children's Sensitivity to the Asymmetries of Directional Comparisons.

Adults exhibit strong preferences when framing symmetrical relations. Adults prefer, for example, "A zebra is like a horse" to "A horse is like a zebra," and "The bicycle is near the building" to "The building is near the bicycle." This is because directional syntax requires more typical or prominent items (i.e., reference points) to be placed in the complement position. Three experiments with children ages 4-8 (N = 181) explored whether children share this sensitivity to directional syntax. Children of this age showed an incipient preference for framing reference points as complements. Stating, "Girls do math as well as boys," which frames boys as the reference point for girls, may therefore actually teach children that boys set the standard.

Preschoolers use pedagogical cues to guide radical reorganization of category knowledge.

In constructing a conceptual understanding of the world, children must actively evaluate what information is idiosyncratic or superficial, and what represents essential, defining information about kinds and categories. Preschoolers observed identical evidence about a novel object's function (magnetism) produced in subtly different manners: accidentally, intentionally, or demonstrated communicatively and pedagogically. Only when evidence was explicitly demonstrated for their benefit did children reliably go beyond salient perceptual features (color or shape), to infer function to be a defining property on which to base judgments about category membership. Children did not show this pattern when reasoning about a novel perceptual property, suggesting that a pedagogical communicative context may be especially important for children's learning about artifact functions. Observing functional evidence in a pedagogical context helps children construct fundamentally different conceptions of novel categories as defined not by superficial appearances but by deeper, functional properties.

Teaching young children a theory of nutrition: conceptual change and the potential for increased vegetable consumption.

In two experiments, we used a novel approach to educating young children about nutrition. Instead of teaching simple facts, we provided a rich conceptual framework that helped children understand the need to eat a variety of healthy foods. Using the insight that children's knowledge can be organized into coherent belief systems, or intuitive theories, we (a) analyzed the incipient knowledge that guides young children's reasoning about the food-body relationship, (b) identified the prerequisites that children need to conceptualize food as a source of nutrition, and (c) devised a strategy for teaching young children a coherent theory of food as a source of diverse nutrients. In these two experiments, we showed that children can learn and generalize this conceptual framework. Moreover, this learning led children to eat more vegetables at snack time. Our findings demonstrate that young children can benefit from an intervention that capitalizes on their developing intuitive theories about nutrition.

Thinking in categories or along a continuum: consequences for children's social judgments.

Can young children, forming expectations about the social world, capture differences among people without falling into the pitfalls of categorization? Categorization often leads to exaggerating differences between groups and minimizing differences within groups, resulting in stereotyping. Six studies with 4-year-old children (N = 214) characterized schematic faces or photographs as falling along a continuum (really mean to really nice) or divided into categories (mean vs. nice). Using materials that children naturally group into categories (Study 3), the continuum framing prevented the signature pattern of categorization for similarity judgments (Study 1), inferences about behavior and deservingness (Studies 2 and 5), personal liking and play preferences (Study 4), and stable and internal attributions for behavior (Study 6). When children recognize people as members of continua, they may avoid stereotypes.

Preschoolers use intentional and pedagogical cues to guide inductive inferences and exploration.

Children are judicious social learners. They may be particularly sensitive to communicative actions done pedagogically for their benefit, as such actions may mark important, generalizable information. Three experiments (N = 224) found striking differences in preschoolers' inductive generalization and exploration of a novel functional property, depending on whether identical evidence for the property was produced accidentally, intentionally, or pedagogically and communicatively. Results also revealed that although 4-year-olds reserved strong generalizations for a property that is pedagogically demonstrated, 3-year-olds made such inferences when it was produced either intentionally or pedagogically. These findings suggest that by age 4 children assess whether evidence is produced for their benefit in gauging generalizability, giving them a powerful tool for acquiring important kind-relevant, generic knowledge.

Preschoolers' use of morphosyntactic cues to identify generic sentences: indefinite singular noun phrases, tense, and aspect.

Generic sentences (e.g., "Birds lay eggs") convey generalizations about entire categories and may thus be an important source of knowledge for children. However, these sentences cannot be identified by a simple rule, requiring instead the integration of multiple cues. The present studies focused on 3- to 5-year-olds' (N = 91) use of morphosyntactic cues--in particular, on whether children can (a) interpret indefinite singular noun phrases (e.g., "a strawberry") as generic and (b) use a verb's tense and aspect (e.g., "A bat sleeps/slept/is sleeping upside down") to determine whether its subject noun phrase is generic. Children demonstrated sensitivity to both cues. Thus, solving the in-principle problem of identifying generics may not be beyond the reach of young children's comprehension skills.

The generic/nongeneric distinction influences how children interpret new information about social others.

These studies investigate how the distinction between generic sentences (e.g., "Boys are good at math") and nongeneric sentences (e.g., "Johnny is good at math") shapes children's social cognition. These sentence types are hypothesized to have different implications about the source and nature of the properties conveyed. Specifically, generics may be more likely to imply that the referred-to properties emerge naturally from an internal source, which may cause these properties to become essentialized. Four experiments (N = 269 four-year-olds and undergraduates) confirmed this hypothesis but also suggested that participants only essentialize the information provided in generic form when this construal is consistent with their prior theoretical knowledge. These studies further current understanding of language as a means of learning about others.

Information learned from generic language becomes central to children's biological concepts: evidence from their open-ended explanations.

Generic sentences (e.g., "Snakes have holes in their teeth") convey that a property (e.g., having holes in one's teeth) is true of a category (e.g., snakes). We test the hypothesis that, in addition to this basic aspect of their meaning, generic sentences also imply that the information they express is more conceptually central than the information conveyed in similar non-generic sentences (e.g., "This snake has holes in his teeth"). To test this hypothesis, we elicited 4- and 5-year-old children's open-ended explanations for generic and non-generic versions of the same novel properties. Based on arguments in the categorization literature, we assumed that, relative to more peripheral properties, properties that are understood as conceptually central would be explained more often as causes and less often as effects of other features, behaviors, or processes. Two experiments confirmed the prediction that preschool-age children construe novel information learned from generics as more conceptually central than the same information learned from non-generics. Additionally, Experiment 2 suggested that the conceptual status of novel properties learned from generic sentences becomes similar to that of familiar properties that are already at the category core. These findings illustrate the power of generic language to shape children's concepts.

Children's use of mutual exclusivity to learn labels for parts of objects.

When teaching children part terms, adults frequently outline the relevant part rather than simply point. This pragmatic information very likely helps children interpret the label correctly. But the importance of gestures may not negate the need for default lexical biases such as the whole object assumption and mutual exclusivity. On this view, children initially assume that a novel label refers to a whole object. If the label for the object is familiar, mutual exclusivity blocks this assumption and frees children to look for a part referent. In this study, the authors taught children part terms by outlining a novel part of a real object. We made mutual exclusivity available by showing children familiar whole objects with novel parts and unavailable by showing unfamiliar whole objects with novel parts. During test, the object was oriented with the part facing away from the child to distinguish pointing to the object from pointing to the part. Both 2-year-olds and 3-year-olds learned more part labels when mutual exclusivity was available. Thus, mutual exclusivity is indispensable even when part labeling is accompanied by naturalistic communicative gestures.