How to influence fertility: the experience so far.

PIP: Even though fertility in the US is 2, the population grows each year by 2.5 million people due to natural increase and immigration. The US has never had a formal population policy to influence its birth rate. Yet the US government advises other nations, especially developing nations, how they should go about reducing their fertility. Instead the US can learn from population policies of direct disincentives, such as no income tax allowance for 3 children. In Indonesia, the president and Islamic religious leaders strongly support family planning. In Mexico, both the public and private sectors provide family planning services. The US does not have experience in influencing fertility declines, since fertility declined due to economic development over a period of time. Some scholars claim that there are 3 preconditions for a sustained decline in fertility, all of which have significance for setting population policies. The 1st is called rational choice in which conditions are such in a society that women can make their own decision. For example, the existence of legislation that guarantees women the right to act in their own interest, including the right to make their own reproductive decisions. The 2nd involves policies or conditions that motivate individuals and/or couples to limit family size. Incentives and disincentives can provide the needed motivation. For example, the government pays a woman for not having a child for a specific interval. The last precondition includes the necessity of having means available to limit family size. These means include knowledge of contraceptive methods and accessibility to them.^ieng

[The one-child policy in China]. / La politica de un solo hijo en China.

PIP: Although the government of the People's Republic of China manifested sporadic concern about the nation's rapid population growth beginning at the time of the 1953 national census, it was not until the 1970s that a small family with a maximum of 2 children began to be promoted through a national campaign of education and persuasion. With the subsequent advent of the 1-child policy in 1979, the family planning campaign became a campaign for population planning in which the government no longer limited itself to contraceptive education and distribution, but began to intervene in human reproduction to accomodate it to material production. China's population policy, despite setbacks and delays, has had notable results. No other predominantly peasant society has achieved such a significant fertility decline in such a short time, but the price has been high. The problems have included confrontation with ancient cultural traditions, interference of the government in the most intimate aspects of family life, the sacrifice of a natural desire for children, evasion of marriage and birth registration, and even female infanticide. The incentives and sanctions for the 1-child policy have been primarily economic in nature, but widespread coercion and abuse have been reported. Although China's fertility has declined steadily since 1971, the fall was considerably greater in the cities, where the expense of children and critical housing shortages have effectively discouraged childbearing. In the countryside the dismantling of the communes and substitution of a system of family responsibility for agricultural production have had a strong pronatalist effect, reinforcing the desire for children as a means of old age security. The costs of children in rural areas are insignificant compared to the cities, housing is less crowded, and fertility sanctions are harder to enforce. Rural discontent and resistence to government family planning policy nevertheless became so acute that it was probably a factor in the 1984 relaxation of the 1-child policy in certain rural areas. Despite considerable success, the Chinese government has not met its family planning goals. 32.3 million couples, or 18% of fertile-aged couples, have expressed willingness to have only 1 child. The 32.3 million include 36% of urban and 11% of rural couples. According to a July 1988 fertility survey, the crude birth rate dropped to 8.84/1000, but the rates of early marriage and adolescent pregnancy were increasing. A major problem in the next 5 years will be the arrival at marriageable age of the large cohorts born around the time of the Cultural Revolution.^ieng

The people yet to come; avoiding the demographic trap.

PIP: The demographic trap is defined as the condition where a nation has passed through the process of lowering death rates, but has not been able to lower birth rates before ecological carrying capacity is exceeded. A minimal estimate predicts that by the year 2000, 63 countries, or 1.1 billion people, will be trapped by starvation, dependence on imported food, and resulting economic and political instability. Such a country that failed to complete the demographic transition will fall back to the original stage, of high death as well as birth rates. Most nations in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa are at risk, notably Mexico, India, Nigeria, Ethiopia, because they already have falling living standards coupled with rapid growth rates. Most governments are unaware of the subtle signs that carrying capacity has been exceeded. Even those that are able to understand such events, often practice ineffective policies. For example, the U.S. has dropped U.N.F.P.A. support ostensibly because one nation, China, allowed forced abortions. On the other hand, some third world countries have initiated novel campaigns to reduce births, for example popular media campaigns in Mexico, free dissemination of birth control pills to all women in Brazil, and a separate family planning ministry in Zimbabwe.^ieng

[The cases of China and Brazil]. / Os casos de China e Brasil.

PIP: Demographic developments and family planning in China and Brazil are described and compared. Postrevolutionary China was characterized by initial rapid economic expansion, followed later by recurrent agricultural crises. Abortion and sterilization were strictly forbidden. The mid-twenties was legal minimum age for marrying, thus increasing the work force. In the early 1960s, population control measures were introduced, legalizing sterilization and abortion, a trend reversed, in 1966, by the cultural revolution, which resulted in a baby boom and an enormous proportion of young women, today, in their reproductive ages. Various stages of increased government involvement finally resulted in a 1 family, 1 child policy adopted in 1978, coercing families and individuals to sign a certificate, severely limiting earning potentials and privileges, if having more than 1 child. By the year 2050, if current policies are being enforced, the population is projected to be 917 million. Brazil traditionally has had an intellectual pro-natality movement, due to its vast internal space, low population density and high economic productive capacity. By 1970, however, the economic miracle had passed. Child mortality and health problems became rampant. Democratizing access to contraceptive means and services, and the economic for migration to large empty spaces of the country were emphasized. The state assumed responsibility for providing contraceptive means instead of leaving it in the hands of private agencies. Brazil refuses to recognize simplistic rhetoric blaming population increases for all ills in the developing countries and espouses the position that planning for children, the more positive term for family planning, is a fundamental right of all human beings and should stem from free and informed choice by couples and individuals.^ieng

Speech at the UN International Conference on Population, Mexico City, August, 1984.

PIP: In seeking a solution to its population problem, China, as a developing socialist country, has been making unremitting efforts to develop economy while controlling the rapid growth. The objective is to control rapid population growth so that population growth may be in keeping with socioeconomic development and commensurate with utilization of natural resources and environmental protection. In the past decade, and particularly since 1979, China has made much progress in developing economy and gained remarkable successes in controlling population growth. The natural population growth rate dropped to 1.15% in 1983, from 2.089% in 1973. Living standards have improved with a gradual annual increase of per capita income. All this proves that the policy of promoting family planning to control population growth along with planned economic development is correct. In China family planning is a basic state policy. The government has advocated the practice of "1 couple, 1 child" since 1979. This does not mean that 1 couple could have 1 child only in every case. The government provides guidance for the implementation of family planning programs in the light of specific conditions such as economic developments, cultural background, population structure, and the wishes of the people in different localities. The requirements are more flexible in rural than in urban areas and more so among the people of national minorities than among the people of the Han Nationality. In rural areas, couples who have actual difficulties and want to have 2 children may have a 2nd birth with planned spacing. In carrying out its family planning program, China has consistently adhered to the principle of integrating state guidance with the masses' voluntariness. The government has always emphasized the importance of encouraging the people's own initiatives, through publicity and education, which is the key link in implementing the family planning program.^ieng